

MY LIFE AND ACTS

IN

HUNGARY

IN THE YEARS 1848 AND 1849.

BY

ARTHUR GÖRGEI.

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CONTENTS OF VOL. II.

CHAPTER I.

	PAGE
Retrospective glance at my helpless situation as commander of the army, after the first news of the declaration of independence. How events assisted me. Situation at that moment, and my proclamation of Komorn	1

CHAPTER II.

The theatre of war after the 26th of April. Instead of the uninterrupted prosecution, as at first intended, of our offensive operations against the hostile main army, the siege of the fortress of Ofen comes into the fore-ground.....	12
--	----

CHAPTER III.

My appointment as war-minister. Damjanics becomes unfit for service. Klapka leaves the main army in order to act as my substitute in the war-ministry. Changes in the army	24
--	----

CHAPTER IV.

Pöltenberg occupies Raab. The main body of the army invests Ofen. The range of the investment. The fortress of Ofen. The disposition of our batteries. The over-hasty attack. Its cessation. My letter to Major-general Hentzi. His answer. A letter from Klapka, in which he dissuades from the operation against Ofen .	27
---	----

VI

CHAPTER V.

	PAGE
The siege of Ofen	38

CHAPTER VI.

Criticism on the siege and defence of Ofen.....	56
---	----

CHAPTER VII.

The events of the war on the upper Waag. Condition of affairs in the district of the operations of the main army at the time of the taking of Ofen. Klapka's plan of defensive operations, and my disposition of the troops, immediately after the taking of Ofen 60

CHAPTER VIII.

A meeting between General Klapka and myself. Its consequences. I refuse the distinctions which the Diet had intended for me, and in consequence of this enter into communication with the parliamentary opponents of the declaration of independence..... 65

CHAPTER IX.

Account of the circumstances which, on the one hand, bound me to the chief command of the army, and on the other hand determined me to undertake personally the management of the ministry of war. Plan for the offensive against the Austrians. Origin of the central office of operations..... 74

CHAPTER X.

My meeting with members of the peace-party in Debreczin.....	79
--	----

CHAPTER XI.

Kossuth and the declaration of independence. My relation to Kossuth after the 14th of April 1849	87
--	----

CHAPTER XII.

The seat of the government, notwithstanding my counter-repre-

VII

sentations, transferred from Debreczin to Pesth. Commencement of my activity against the existence of the declaration of independence. Two captured Honvéd officers executed by order of the new commander-in-chief of the Austrian army, Baron Haynau.....91

CHAPTER XIII.

Significance and consequences of the executions mentioned in the preceding chapter. Continuation of my endeavours hostile to the existence of the act of independence. The final aim of these endeavours. The peculiarity of my relation to the peace-party, to Szemere, to Kossuth. Supplementary facts from my duties as war-minister..... 97

CHAPTER XIV.

Events on the theatre of war of the Hungarian main army from the taking of Ofen till the middle of June. Reciprocal position of the Hungarian and Austrian main armies at that time. My suppositions about the enemy's plan of operations. Uncertainty as to the strength and the serious commencement of the Russian intervention. The influence of this uncertainty on my resolves as commander-in-chief of the army. The causes of the delay of our offensive. Dispositions for the retreat and other preparations in the event of a serious commencement of the Russian intervention 107

CHAPTER XV.

The opening of our offensive against the Austrians (on the 16th of June) miscarries. I fix the 20th of June for a second more energetic attempt at the offensive. General Klapka dissuades from it, and proposes again instead his plan of defensive operations, but in vain.....119

CHAPTER XVI.

The events of the war on the 20th, 21st, and 22d of June126

VIII

CHAPTER XVII.

	PAGE
The first news of the serious commencement of the Russian intervention. Their confirmation, and influence on my resolutions. The ministerial council of the 26th of June. Loss of Raab (28th June). Retreat into the fortified camp at Komorn.....	156

CHAPTER XVIII.

Differences between the government and myself.....	172
--	-----

CHAPTER XIX.

The 2d of July	180
----------------------	-----

CHAPTER XX.

The last days at Komorn.....	202
------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XXI.

A part of the main army leaves Komorn. Retreat as far as Waizen. First encounter with outposts of the Russian main army. Battle at Waizen (15th of July). Not able to improve the advantages gained by it, and informed that the Russian main army was immediately opposite us, I determine on turning the latter by Miskolcz. Reasons for this choice. Necessity of gaining on the new line of retreat a considerable advance on the Russian main army. The only means of attaining it, the nightly retreat from the position before Waizen, is ordered for the night between the 16th and 17th of July. Unexpected interruption. The hostile surprise very early in the morning of the 17th of July. General Leiningen nevertheless enables the army to depart. Rear-guard combat on the Waizen mountain, before Rétság and at this place. Continuation of the retreat on the 17th of July as far as Vadkert. Commencement of the further retreat on the 18th towards Balassa-Gyarmat.....

	238
--	-----

CHAPTER XXII.

	PAGE
Events of the war from the 18th to the 20th of July. Our conjectures at that time about the plan of the enemy's operations. Their influence on the employment of the divers army corps. Dispositions for the march on the 21st of July	263

CHAPTER XXIII.

The first Russian trumpets in the camp of the army under my command. Immediate consequences of this event.....	270
--	-----

CHAPTER XXIV.

Continuation of the operation of breaking through towards Mis-kolcz. Drawing up of the army on the left bank of the Sajó. Situation of the army at that time. Encounter of outposts at Harsány on the 23d of July. Dispositions for the 24 th	282
--	-----

CHAPTER XXV.

A letter of the Russian General Count Rüdiger. My answer. What occurred to it. Exchange of arms between Lieut.-General Sass and myself	291
--	-----

CHAPTER XXVI.

Combat at Gö'römböly on the 24th of July. Battle on the Sajó on the 25th. Retreat from the Sajó to the left bank of the Hernád. My determination to remain on the Hernád. Motives for it	295
--	-----

CHAPTER XXVII.

Kossuth censures my answer to the Russian commander-in-chief. Particular motives which determine me to receive this censure in silence. The real object of a letter to General Klapka. Conditions for a favourable turn of affairs in the south of Hungary. I advise Kossuth to remove Dembinski from the chief command. Kossuth assents, and intends himself to take the chief command. A projected rendezvous with Kossuth does not take place.....	305
---	-----

CHAPTER XXVIII.

PAGE

The Russians cross the Theiss at Tiszafüred. Our strategic situation on the Hernád. A new Russian corps enters on the scene of war. Combat at Gesztely on the 28th of July. Commencement of the retreat from the Hernád in the night between the 28th and 29th. News about the movement of the Russians from Tiszafüred. Division of the army into two columns (at Nyíregyháza). Dispositions of the march for the combined retreat. Explanations of them; and instructions for the leader of the secondary column. Conflict between the latter and the Russians at Debreczin on the 2d of August. The situation of the principal column (the main body of the army) during this conflict and immediately after it. Retreat as far as Gross-Wardein. General Nagy-Sándor's culpability, and my seeming indulgence towards him. The consequences of the 2d of August at Debreczin, and their influence on the further dispositions. Uninterrupted continuation of the retreat from Gross-Wardein to Arad.....310

CHAPTER XXIX.

Supplementary account of divers circumstances, rumours, and events, from the time of the retreat from the Hernád to Arad.....331

CHAPTER XXX.

The next war-operations, and Lieut.-General Dembinski's retreat from Szöreg to Temesvár. General Nagy-Sándor on his march from Arad to Temesvár attacked and forced back to Arad. The last ministerial council of the 10th of August 1849.....351

CHAPTER XXXI.

The provisional government and the negotiations with Russia. Tendency of my taking part in the latter.....371

CHAPTER XXXII.

My last meeting with Kossuth. Count Guyon reports that Dembinski's army has been scattered at Temesvár. I call upon Kossuth

to resign. He nominates me commander-in-chief. Csányi induces the governor to resign. Kossuth's last proclamation to the nation. Answer of the Russians to our invitation to negotiate. I propose an unconditional surrender before the Russians. The military council accepts my proposal375

CHAPTER XXXIII.

March from Arad to Világos. Events there.....411

CHAPTER XXXIV.

The surrender of arms 426

CHAPTER XXXV.

After the surrender of arms 430

MY LIEE AND ACTS.

CHAPTER I.

WHEN, on the 17th of April 1849, the news of the resolution adopted three days before by the Diet reached my head-quarters at Lévecz, and all the officers of my suite who happened to be present immediately expressed the most undisguised indignation at this resolution; when, on the following day, the officers of the seventh army corps called upon me for the fulfilment of the second point especially in the concluding declaration of my proclamation from Waizen, and moreover informed me beforehand, that the whole seventh army corps intended to do the same officially on the first opportunity; while at the same time a disposition nothing less than unfavourable to the new law seemed to prevail among the army corps under Damjanics and Klapka; —I had seriously to apprehend that the army was near its dissolution. The peculiar conjunctures of the moment* obliged me to resolve, in the last extremity — that is, if the seventh army corps should insist on my acting in a determined manner, in accordance, with my proclamation of Waizen, against the decision of the 14th of April — to summon the staff-officers of the army, and likewise

* See Chapter xlv. of Vol. I.

deputies from the corps of subaltern officers belonging to all bodies of troops, to assemble for consultation, and set down the declaration of the majority of the assembly as a compromise between the parties of different opinions existing in the army.

The danger of such a step, in the face of the conflicts with the enemy to be expected; the excitement of the passions during the discussion; the depressingly vivid exhibition — unavoidable on the occasion — of the pernicious consequences to Hungary of the 14th of April; the participation in our further contests of probably scarcely half of those who, through the admitted difference of opinion for and against the law of the 14th of April — whatever the decision of the majority — would otherwise be forced to fight against their conviction; — all these undeniable consequences of this desperate resolve proved to me clearly enough that, as I could nevertheless discover no better means, my sagacity was here nonplused.

In the conclusion of the chapter in which the 14th of April was mentioned here for the first time, I was obliged, anticipating the chronological order of these records, already to acknowledge, that while in this perplexed condition, *events came to my assistance*: and such was really the case.

The seventh army corps — accidentally not united — *before* the battle of Nagy-Sarló could come to no decision upon the intended demonstration against the law of the 14th of April. *After* this battle, the operations on our part, which had been interrupted for several days by the tardy construction of the bridge across the river Gran, had again reached that point of offensive development, when they completely absorbed at the same time

both the physical and mental activity of the soldier; and while the known success of these operations — the defeat of the enemy at Nagy-Sarló on the 19th, his retreat from the battle-field at Kernend over the Danube on the 20th, the partial deliverance of Komorn on the 21st, its complete relief on the 26th of April, and finally the general retreat of the Austrian army towards the frontiers of the country — satisfied *alike* the *adversaries* and the *non-adversaries* of the 14th of April; the *former* by this very success were strengthened in their *idea*, *first of all to expel completely out of the country the EXTERNAL enemies to the Hungarian constitution of 1848*, in order afterwards to get rid more easily of its INTERNAL foes, and thus *to restore that constitution*, the overthrow of which was the point where the political extremes of the Hungary of that day met.

Confidence in the possibility of realising this idea, however, in spite of the late victories, by which it had been raised, dissolved into pure enthusiasm before a single *calm* glance of the soldier at the recent past, the present, and the near future.

The Hungarian arms in the space of four weeks had, it is true, performed such unwonted exploits, as to have prophesied would have been to succeed in rivalling Kossuth's most high-flown proclamations. With our armed forces, however, small in proportion to those of the enemy, I could by no means conceal from myself, that these exploits were the extreme which Hungary had to expect from her army with its then degree of military training.

We were unfortunately obliged to admit, according to my own experience in the field, that it was not, perhaps, a high degree of valour pervading the "young

army," which had nailed victory to our colours. Nay, we were forced to acknowledge — however powerfully self-love strove against it — that a considerable part of the thanks of the nation for the speedy and happy termination of the just-described April campaign, was due at bottom to Field-marshal Prince Windisch-Grätz and the Ban Baron Jellachich.

We had gained bloody victories. This, indeed, no bulletins could nullify, even with the best intentions on the part of the enemy; but the palm of most of these victories was constantly due only to a small part of our army, almost always to one and the same part. In *it* the young original Honvéd soldiers were indeed strongly represented, but still disproportionately less so than the old soldiers, the regular ones, as they were called — the former constituent parts of the very army opposed to us. This portion of our force — as no reliance whatever could be placed on the remainder, the greater part by far — could never at any time be spared; it bore the brunt in every engagement; the majority of the losses by which we had to purchase every advantage on the field of battle had constantly fallen upon the ranks of our best troops — those who could not be replaced.

And the rest were very far from having gained, during the course of the campaign, so much in discipline and valour as to make up in a moral point of view for our losses. The strict military discipline, which, assisted by the older officers, I had been endeavouring to introduce, and not altogether without success, into the corps d'armée of the upper Danube — now the seventh army corps — met with little sympathy from the commanders of the other corps, Aulich excepted. As the temporary substitute of the commander-in-chief,

Field-marshal Lieut. Vetter, however, I had not in fact sufficient power to keep my comrades energetically to equal efforts.

The greater part of the hopeful young army could not always as yet be supplied with provisions for more than one day in advance; consequently the uninterrupted resolute pursuit of the beaten enemy was never possible; but without such a pursuit there can be no complete defeat, and without it no favourable termination to a war, which, like that between Hungary and Austria, especially after the 14th of April 1849, could end only with the complete defeat of the one or the other armed force.

Moreover, the camp of the most of the army corps literally swarmed with the vehicles of officers, non-commissioned officers, and sutlers, without reckoning the wagons necessary for the transport of the daily supplies. This barricade of wagons, inseparable from the army, and extremely obstructive to its swift, continuous advance, already rendered an accidentally called-for flank-movement a problem difficult of solution, and any thought on the part of the general of the possible necessity for a retreat was enough to make one's hair stand on end.

In order accordingly to nail victory lastingly to the Hungarian tricolor banner in this state of discipline of the majority of our troops, *either* the army must be augmented to such an extent, that numerically superior forces, under the command of skilful leaders, could be opposed to the enemy on all points on which the country was menaced by him; *or* the leaders of the Hungarian army, in general inferior to the enemy in number, discipline, and valour, must remain superior to the hostile

generals, taking one with another, in the amount of the fortune-of-war or of talent to such a degree as had hitherto been the case.

To satisfy the first demand of this alternative was simply impossible; for, however willingly the country might have furnished the number of recruits necessary for the formation of new battalions, the means of equipping them, according to the exigencies of the modern system of warfare, were wanting. And the idea of raising the army to the desired strength with *scythe-hearers*, or perhaps even with *Amazons*, may perhaps do well enough as clap-trap in high-sounding debates about the invincibility of this or that nation; but the lips of an experienced soldier, to whom the esteem of his companions in arms is still of some importance, cannot speak of it without irony!

The second demand of the preceding alternative could only be addressed to that firm in which "pious wishes" are realised.

It is true the history of war names gifted generals who knew how to secure victory in spite of the inferior number of their troops; but no where do we find definite measures and formulas given, by the use of which it would be possible to discover beforehand — to pass over the fortune-of-war in silence — first, the strategic genius of an individual, then the *maximum* of the relative *minus* in the number of troops which would be compensated for by a certain quantity of genius in the general. Nay, even assuming that such measures and formulas were indicated by the art of war, and that we had the ability to make the best possible use of them, we might, it is true, have been spared many a sad mistake in the choice of our own commanders of troops;

but to preserve unchanged the favourable proportion in which the leaders of our armies have hitherto appeared to be superior to the hostile generals in fortune-of-war or talent would nevertheless have *no longer* been in our power, *after* the chief command of the hostile army had been transferred from Field-marshal Prince Windisch-Grätz to the Master of the Ordnance Baron Weiden. For although the latter's renown, in the light in which it had then penetrated to our ranks, appertained rather to the author than to the general, the woful change in the condition of the Austrian army from December 1848 to April 1849 had fully convinced us, that an appointment to the hostile chief command more favourable to us than that of Field-marshal Prince Windisch-Grätz was almost impossible — an equally favourable one in the highest degree improbable.

Our situation, after this change in the hostile chief command, in spite of our late victories, threatened consequently to become at all events more critical than it had previously been, altogether independently of the fateful consequences of the 14th of April to us.

If, moreover, I took these also fully into consideration, I could not fail to perceive that — with the probability of seeing the hostile forces opposed to us soon augmented to an overwhelming superiority — it was indeed quite indifferent whether Field-marshal Prince Windisch-Grätz or any other stood at the head of the hostile army. The change in the Austrian chief command, by the side of the inauspicious declarations of the Austrian soldiers who had been made prisoners on the 26th of April, sank to a subordinate circumstance, insignificant as regarded the question of the existence of Hungary.

For these prisoners of war related, that their officers had consoled them for the repeated retreats with the assurance that a Russian army was already about marching against us, and that the Austrian forces were retreating only in order to await the entrance of the former into Hungary.

These declarations were indeed derided by our optimists, as flying rumours. Nay, even to myself they came unexpectedly; for I had supposed that the Austrian Government, as it seemed now to be necessary to make an unusual sacrifice for the salvation of the monarchy, would, for reasons which it is superfluous to enumerate, decide rather on the evacuation of Italy than on the acceptance of foreign aid. The *unlooked-for nature* of these declarations, however, could scarcely weaken their credibility in the eyes of those who were unprejudiced enough to consider, that the hostile officers, even from jealousy of the victorious reputation of their own army, would have hesitated to console their bewildered inferiors with the prospect of the assistance of a foreign army, if the same consolation had not been given to them by their generals, and to these by the ministers in Vienna.

I no longer doubted for a moment that the Emperor of Russia would interfere with Hungary.

Hereupon our optimists again thought, that in such a case England, France, Sardinia, North America, all Germany, Turkey, &c. would immediately declare war against the Emperor of Russia. But however plausible this view had been *before* the 14th of April, *after* that day its surprisingly quick propagation seemed to me to be only a lamentable proof how largely a certain epidemic of political eccentricity prevailed in my country.

Moreover, it must be quite indifferent to the defender of any cause which falls in consequence of the hostile intervention of a third party, whether the *right* of this third one to interfere is or is not afterwards, disputed by a fourth or fifth.

The Debreczin lawgivers of the 14th of April had with the Russian intervention immediately raised the ghost of the last hours of the country; but were not in possession of the right magic formula to lay it again. They could not compensate for this by all their optimist oracular apothegms; could not charm away the gaping wounds, of which I mentally saw that my fatherland was bleeding to death; could not deceive the calm glance, before which, as has been said, confidence in the possible realisation of the idea of again restoring the constitution of the country, in defiance of its external as well as internal enemies — namely, those Debreczin lawgivers — melted away as mere enthusiasm.

The facts, the consideration of which led to this sorrowful result, lay open to the glance of every soldier in our main army — they were generally known. From them any one might deduce the same inference, before which my belief in the possibility of saving Hungary from the "*blessings of the octroyed constitution*" had already melted into thin air. For this no peculiar sagacity was necessary. A mind uninfatuated and a vision unobstructed were quite sufficient.

And the blind belief — which could not withstand that inference; which alone kept the army still together; in which alone the old constitutional soldiers, in spite of their hostile feeling against the lawgivers of the 14th of April, were united with the friends of the latter in the struggle against the army of the octroyed

constitution — was consequently a very uncertain means of unison for the parts of the Hungarian army opposed to each other in their political opinions. The same troops which the contest against Austria united to-day might to-morrow employ their arms against each other. The most dangerous enemy of the Hungarian army did *not stand in front of it*, he lurked — thanks to the 14th of April, which had aroused him — in their own ranks; it was *the spirit of discord*, silenced for the present, but by no means banished for ever, by a not less dangerous enemy, *the spirit of arrogance*.

To cajole the former — for I distrusted my power of successfully combating it openly — to destroy the latter, on the contrary, at one stroke, I saw was my next task, if I had still the energetic prosecution of the war against Austria seriously at heart, which, notwithstanding the 14th of April, was really the case.

I attempted to accomplish this by a proclamation, the original sketch of which, in Hungarian, I happen still to possess. I here give it in the German translation.

" *Komorn, 29th April, 1849.*

" COMPANIONS IN ARMS!

" A month has scarcely elapsed since we stood on the other side of the Theiss, casting a doubtful glance into our doubtful future.

" Who would then have believed that a month later we should have already crossed the Danube, and have delivered the greater part of our fair country from the yoke of a perfidious dynasty?

" The boldest among us had not dared confidently to expect so much.

" But the noble feeling of patriotism had inspired

you; and in your courage the enemy beheld — numberless legions.

" You have been victorious — victorious seven times in uninterrupted succession — and you must continue to conquer.

" Think of this when you again encounter the enemy.

" Every battle we fought was decisive; more decisive still will be every one we have yet to fight.

" On you has devolved the happiness, by the sacrifice of your lives, of securing to Hungary her ancient independence, her nationality, her freedom, and her permanent existence. Such your most glorious, holiest mission.

" Think of this when you again encounter the enemy.

" Many of us imagine the wished-for future to be already won. Do not deceive yourselves! This combat — not Hungary alone against Austria — Europe will fight, for the natural, most sacred rights of peoples against usurping tyranny.

" And the peoples will conquer every where!

" But you can hardly live to witness the victory, if you dedicate yourselves to the combat with unflinching fidelity; for this you can do only with the firm resolve to fall a sacrifice in this most glorious, noblest victory.

" Think of this when you again encounter the enemy.

And being animated by the lively belief that none of you would prefer a degraded existence to a glorious death; that you all feel with me that it is impossible to enslave a nation, whose sons resemble the heroes of Szolnok, Hatvan, Tápió-Bicske, Isaszeg, Waizen, Nagy-Sarló, and Komorn, — I have for you in future, even amid the fiercest thunder of the battle, but one cry:

"Forward, comrades! forward!"

" Think of this when you again encounter the enemy."

The attack against the dynasty, which I designedly associated with my review of the rapid, fortunate course of the recent campaign, was intended to shake the fundamental aversion of the old constitutional soldiers to the law of the 14th of April, and thus in some measure to become myself the mediator between them and the part of the army well disposed to the law.

This in itself hazardous attempt — thanks to the popularity which I enjoyed among the old soldiers of the main army especially — had nevertheless the favourable result, that those of the officers belonging to this category who could by no means feel that their further participation in the war was compatible even with the mere silent acknowledgment of this law, quitted the ranks of the active army, at least with every possible avoidance of any exciting *éclat*; while the rest — reckoning the silent acknowledgment as none at all — soothed themselves with the circumstance that no official homage whatever had been offered in the name of the army to the law of the 14th of April.

CHAPTER II.

THE state of affairs in the sphere of operations of the Hungarian main army, immediately after the 26th of April (the day of the complete, relief of Komorn), was as follows:

On the left bank of the Danube — out of the island of Schutt — the Austrian forces were retreating to the

right bank of the Waag, in part forced back, in part merely followed, in the valley of Túrócz, by Armin Görgei's expeditionary detachment; along the road from Lévençz to Neutra by the expeditionary column, which had been sent from the seventh army corps to Verebély before the relief of Komorn; in the island of Schutt itself the western besieging corps falling back towards Presburg, abandoned that part of the island which is situated next to the fortress, to the extent of one or two days' march, to a column detached from the garrison of Komorn.

On the right bank of the Danube, the Austrian main army, after the evacuation of the city of Pesth, which took place on the 23d or 24th of April — leaving as a garrison in the fortress of Ofen (Budavár) some battalions under the command of Major-general Hentzi — had divided itself into two unequal parts, and begun its retreat out of the interior of the country towards its frontier, on two diverging lines. The smaller part, the corps d'armée of Ban Baron Jellachich, marched along the Danube down to the Drau; while the larger part (comprising that portion of the army which had been defeated by Colonel Pöltenberg on the 20th of April at Kernend on the river Gran, and obliged to retreat to the right bank of the Danube over the pontoon at Gran) retreating on the Fleischhauer road, the shortest line towards Vienna, having been accidentally stopped by the battle on the 26th of April in its retrograde movement, continued it again on the following day in company with the besieging corps of Komorn.

On our side, General Aulich, as soon as Pesth was occupied, had undertaken the formation of a bridge across the Danube below the capitals, in order to reach

without delay the lines of junction between the garrison of Ofen and the Jellachich corps; Colonel Kmety, on his part, had the pontoon over the Danube between Gran and Párkány restored, and removed his army division to the right bank of the river near Gran; while the other two-thirds of the seventh army corps, under Pöltenberg, with the Damjanics and Klapka army corps, after the battle of the 26th of April, remained together in the fortified camp at Komorn, where we confined ourselves, on the 27th, after the retreat of the enemy towards Raab, to occupying with strong detachments the places lying nearest to us on the main road to Raab and the Fleischhauer road, and having the enemy's retreat observed by means of patrols.

When we perceived from the reports that arrived, that the enemy, not intending any offensive repelling operation, really hastened to confirm the declaration of our prisoners, that the Austrian army would remain on the defensive till the irruption of the Russian army; it would perhaps have been best for us, strategically considered, without taking any serious notice of the hostile garrison of Ofen and the Jellachich corps, which was withdrawing towards the south, speedily to have reunited the main army, and opened immediately the new campaign by an offensive on the enemy's principal line of retreat by Raab towards Vienna.

But it so happened that the batteries of the Damjanics and Klapka corps in the last encounter (on the 26th of April) had fired almost their last cartridge, and the supplies of ammunition, which were to come from beyond the Theiss, had suddenly inexplicably failed. The batteries of the two divisions of the seventh army corps, under Pöltenberg, in the fortified camp at Ko-

morn — of the third division of the same corps under Kmety, near the Gran — and, if I mistake not, likewise those of the second corps (Aulich) near the capitals — were still, it is true, able to take the field, but only for one, or at most two serious days' fighting.

The execution of the present idea of an uninterrupted prosecution of our offensive operations against the hostile main army was consequently delayed by the necessity of previously awaiting the arrival of the next transport of ammunition, which, according to the official information received by the commander of the artillery of the army, ought to have taken place long ago, — a necessity rendered imperative, considering the certainty of finding the enemy's resistance as well as the amount of danger increased with every step in advance. The reflections, moreover — as may be conceived, of an unusually vivid cast, and chiefly of a political nature — to which the Debreczin impromptu of the 14th of April gave rise, soon led to the complete abandonment of that idea; and this the more certainly, as my two strategic counsellors (General Klapka and the chief of the general staff) did not agree in their views as to what object of operations it would be most judicious for us next to choose.

The chief of the general staff persisted in his original proposal to continue the offensive against the main body of the hostile army, which was retreating on the road to Raab, with the simultaneous advance of a part of the garrison of Komorn in the island of Schutt towards Presburg; dwelling at the same time on the great probability of being able within a few days to restore regularity in the accidentally interrupted arrival of supplies of ammunition.

General Klapka, on the contrary, pleaded for the urgent necessity of taking Ofen, pointing out that this fortress, so long as it was occupied by the enemy, blocked up the chain-bridge, the most important communication for us across the Danube during the just-proposed offensive. This communication, he added, was the most important, because situated on the shortest line between the active army on the right bank of the Danube and the war-stores behind the Theiss, and as a permanent solid connexion between both banks of the Danube the least exposed to disturbing influences.

General Klapka mentioned further, that the hostile garrison of Ofen rendered insecure the principal communication with the roads leading from central Hungary, and stopped completely the traffic on the Danube between the north and south of the country. It was true that another communication, out of the immediate reach of the fortress, might be substituted in the mean time, and could be perfectly secured by closely investing the fortress with a force sufficient to frustrate all sallies of the hostile troops of occupation; but as the deduction of such considerable forces as seemed necessary for closely investing it could by no means be borne, considering the proposed offensive against Raab, only a one-sided palliative would be gained by the investment, for the traffic on the Danube would remain interrupted, as before, in its most susceptible point. It could be re-established only by a resolute enterprise against Ofen calculated for the reduction of the fortress. Such an undertaking seemed moreover to be enjoined by the prospect of coming into possession (most important to Hungary) of the armament of the fortified place and of the enormous quantities of war-supplies of all

kinds which were stored there; but most urgently was it called for by the consideration of the inspiring impulse to the most strenuous prosecution of the war, which would be imparted to the nation by the reconquest of Ofen, its historical palladium.

General Klapka asserted finally, that the march against Ofen had the sympathies of the army in its favour; and if moreover, he concluded, there be taken into consideration, on the one hand, the certainty of becoming master of the fortress on the first assault with an imposing force, if not without drawing a sword, — a certainty which, according to all the information hitherto received respecting the moral state of the garrison, was scarcely to be doubled on the other hand, the probability that the news of the unexpectedly sudden fall of Ofen would only increase the present consternation in the hole camp, and thus the more favour our offensive to due commenced immediately afterwards with undivided strength; — then the reconquest of Ofen must be acknowledged to be at present the nearest operation of the war for the Hungarian main army.

Klapka's proposal was on accordance with Kossuth's last intimations to no, as they likewise urged above all things the reconquest of Ofen.

Klapka agreed with Kossuth also in believing the rumours about the dejection of the garrison of Ofen. This he did, nevertheless, not to such an extent as Kossuth, according to whom the mere crossing of some Aulich battalions from the Pesth bank of the Danube to that at Ofen, would be immediately followed by the fall of the fortress. His confidence in the truth of these rumours, however, was still strong enough to lead him to suppose that the garrison of the fortress,

in the face of an imposing force, would not let it come to a regular siege.

Still I most decidedly distrusted these rumours, breathing contempt of the adversary. They savoured of the very same national arrogance, which had found its ultimate expression in the law of the 14th of April, and — to my surprise — a thousandfold echo even in the ranks of the "young army." And if I nevertheless did not deny the probability of becoming master of Ofen without a regular siege, the reason of this was solely that I doubted the possibility of rendering the place tenable by means of some temporary fortifications, it having been acknowledged to be untenable scarcely four months before,, and abandoned by us without drawing a blade to the victorious - army of Field-marshal Windisch-Gräts.

However, neither the erroneously supposed facility of taking Ofen, in which Klapka;and myself agreed, although on: different grounds, nor the other reasons by which he supported his proposal, nor Kossuth's urging the same objectras Klapka .recommended to be next aimed at, nor filially- thç ixâfeuTAstance that I estimated far higher than the chief of the general staff the uncertainty of speedily re-establishing again an uninterrupted supply of ammunition, — none of these sufficed to make Klapka's plan of operations appear to me preferable to that of the chief of the general staff.

The motives which chiefly decided me to abandon the idea of an uninterrupted prosecution of our offensive operations against the hostile main army were, as I have already indicated, mainly of a political nature.

My personal conviction of the impossibility of inducing *those parts of the main army which were opposed*

to the law of the 14th of April, even assuming the most favourable course of the proposed operations on the line to Raab, to prosecute them beyond the frontier of the country, led me — considering the insignificant military importance of the western frontiers of Hungary situated next to the right bank of the Danube — to perceive that the final strategic aim, which ought to have formed the basis of those operations, was wanting.

Through this conviction I was further led to the idea of giving to those operations — should the fortune of war repeatedly smile upon us during them — at least a *political* conclusion, by inviting, immediately after reaching the Lajtha, in the name of the victorious Hungarian army, the Austrian Government as well as the Hungarian Diet to prefer the way of a peaceable agreement, based on the Hungarian constitution of 1848, to the exasperated continuance of an unhappy civil war.

The probability of the success of this step I deduced from the following considerations:

The octroyed constitution of Olmütz, which denied to the kingdom of Hungary its further existence, and the resolution of the Diet at Debreczin that of the empire of Austria, both stood on one and the same level of "*impracticability* WITHOUT FOREIGN AID."

In Olmütz as well as in Debreczin a great word had been spoken, without its having been previously maturely considered, whether their own disposable forces were sufficient to justify the word by the deed, though only in the sense of the right of might.

" Those at Olmütz, who had therein set those at Debreczin a good example, maintained also their precedence — so it happened accidentally — in the course that undeceived both in a humiliating manner.

The result of the April campaign — according to the known declarations of the captured Austrian soldiers about the impending Russian intervention in Hungary — seemed to have forced upon the Austrian ministers, with the perception of the greatness of the danger into which they had brought Austria by their acts, simultaneously the extreme means for saving it — the aid of Russia.

The question now was, whether the Austrian Government would be *more* injured by desisting from the realisation of the octroyed constitution, or by the lie which it was about to give to its own power by having recourse to Russian aid.

According to my simple notions of state-policy, if it seemed impossible for the Austrian Government without foreign aid to carry out the experiment of forming, although only provisionally, a *homogeneous* state from the *heterogeneous* constituent parts of the Austrian monarchy, under a simultaneous guarantee of the equality of rights of the nationalities calculated rather to separate than to unite them, — it had been better altogether to abandon this hopeless experiment, and return to Austria's relation to Hungary, which, based on national rights, had been regulated by our constitution modified in the year 1848.

The Austrian Government — after the Hungarian Diet should have abandoned in like manner the carrying out of its experiment, still more hopeless without foreign aid, of creating an *independent Hungary* — could undertake this, without compromising its authority *in the interior* of the country more than it had already done by the ineffectual proclamation of the octroyed constitution, as shewn by the result of the April cam-

paign, or than it now seemed to be taking the best way of compromising it *abroad* likewise, by receiving Russian aid.

The Austrian Government could perfectly well disengage itself from the octroyed constitution without shaking the reverence for the dynasty, any more than it had already done by overthrowing the constitution of Hungary sanctioned in 1848.

It could finally put its hand to an agreement with the Hungarian Diet based on the Hungarian constitution of 1848 — introduced, as I said, by the peaceable initiative of the Hungarian army, assumed to have victoriously advanced as far as the Lajtha — with the assured prospect, that the agreement would take place with some modifications of the Hungarian constitution in favour of the central power of Austria; for in case Such an agreement should have been wrecked by the opposition of the Debreczin Diet, I was firmly resolved to dare the extreme against it.

I think it unnecessary to point out, how far from ine is the thought of pleading here for the practicability of my just-developed idea of reconciliation (at that time), in the face of the *fact* that the Austrian Government still — two full years since the last active opposition of Hungary to the realisation of the octroyed constitution has been subdued by Russian aid — thinks it cannot do without the proviso, equally convenient as unconstitutional, as well as a state of siege, even in *those* extra-Hungarian parts of free, united, constitutional Austria, in which a similar opposition has never been Observable.

I confine myself simply to communicating the reflections on the opportunity of carrying out the idea of

reconciliation, which were stirred up in me during the events I am describing, by the endeavour to gain a clear way for the salvation of the fatherland between the Olmütz octroyed constitution and the Debreczin 14th of April — at that time the Scylla and Charybdis of the constitutional kingdom of Hungary.

A knowledge of that *leading idea* is indispensably necessary to the formation of a right judgment on my conduct during those days.

The difficulties connected with the realisation of this idea of reconciliation, the precariousness, nay daring of the steps necessary to it, I nevertheless did not conceal from myself even at that time.

But what serious attempt to save Hungary from that fatal dilemma would have been connected with fewer difficulties, would have been less daring, less precarious?

And I was urged to dare some serious attempt *in the direction indicated*, by the clear inward conviction that such an attempt was not only better fitted to promote the welfare of the nation, but was also far more conformable to its historical character, than the humiliating acknowledgment of the Olmütz octroyed constitution on the one hand, or the arrogance of the Debreczin 14th of April on the other.

Consequently, when I acceded to Klapka's proposal to let the reconquest of Ofen precede the vigorous prosecution of our offensive operations against the hostile principal army, I did so with the conviction that the attempt to facilitate an agreement between the Austrian Government and the Hungarian Diet, based on the constitution of the year 1848, must have far more chance of success if the fortress of Ofen was previously ours, than if it continued in the possession of the enemy

in spite of our supposed victorious offensive operations, apparently menacing Vienna itself.

But the more ardently I now wished, on the one hand, for the *speedy* fall of Ofen, and the greater, on the other hand, my distrust of the innumerable rumours about the depressed moral state of the garrison of the fortress, the more resolutely, once determined to act against Ofen, must I accede also to Klapka's proposal, that it should be undertaken with an imposing force. Although prejudiced by the preconceived opinion, that the fortress of Ofen could scarcely be sufficiently tenable to be held long against the attacks of infantry alone, if vigorously supported by a brisk fire of howitzers — the ammunition necessary for which, it so happened, could in this instance be taken from the stores of the fortress of Komorn; — I nevertheless believed in the probability of an energetic resistance on the part of the garrison, but thought to render it of no avail by the massive superiority of our forces on all points of attack.

I consequently appointed, besides the second army corps (Aulich), which moreover was already stationed near the capitals, also the first corps (Klapka) and the third corps (Damjanics), together with the Kmety division of the seventh corps, for the operations against Ofen; while only the remainder of the latter corps, under Poltenberg, was to be directed against Raab; and a part of the garrison of Komorn, on the same height with the former two divisions, to advance on the island of Schutt.

General Klapka declared that he completely agreed in this measure; the chief of the general staff, however, only on condition, that the operations against Ofen, once begun, were not to be given up again, if we should be

suddenly undeceived as to the presupposed facility of taking the fortress, and thereby a vacillation be brought into our operations, which would infallibly be closely followed by the discouragement of our army, and the victory of the enemy.

In this consultation about the next operations of the main army we kept in view the hostile corps of Ban Baron Jellachich, which had been directed from Ofen southwards — trusting to the assurances which Kossuth had given us during his sojourn, at Gödöllő* about the simultaneous movements of General Bem — only in so far as we assumed, that he, who, according to these assurances, was to have crossed the Danube at Baja with a force of 16,000 men in the second half of the month of April, would effect this passage, though too late — as we thought when in Gödöllő — to help us in the relief of Komorn, at all events early enough to thwart Ban Jellachich in his march towards the south.

CHAPTER III.

IN consequence of the resolution of the Diet at Debreczin of the 14th of April, the Committee of Defence was dissolved, and in its stead a provisional governor of the country, with a ministry by his side, took the reins of the government of Hungary.

The governor of the country was Kossuth. He offered me the portfolio of the minister of war. I received his letter containing the offer before the consul-

* See Chapter xiii. of Vol. I.

tation upon our next war-operations, described in the preceding chapter, had taken place.

This offer was very welcome to me, inasmuch as I therein greeted the possibility of at once putting a finishing stroke to the use-and-wont mode in which the war-ministry had been conducted, to the great injury, in many respects, of matters relating to the defence of the country.

But in order to charge myself in person with the portfolio, I should have been obliged to quit the army; and I could by no means entertain a thought of this, so long as I clung to that *leading idea*, to which Klapka's proposal, that the capture of Ofen should be our next undertaking, was indebted for my assent.

Generals Damjanics and Klapka were also of opinion — though for a different reason, since I had not thought the time was come for communicating to them this my leading idea — that I ought to remain with the army. Considering the uncommon popularity which I enjoyed in the main army — said they — my removing from the chief command might affect the troops in a manner prejudicial to the successful progress of our operations.

The necessity for saving the war-ministry without delay from the state into which it had sunk, destitute alike of energy and prudence — the occasion just then seeming to be favourable for doing so — was nevertheless not less evident; and accordingly General Damjanics offered to undertake for the present in *my* room the direction of the business of the war-ministry.

Damjanics was at that time, with Aulich, the Hungarian general of the main army most to be relied upon before the enemy. By his separation from its ranks for a time, it would suffer a sensible though temporary loss.

Consequently it may be conceived that the only reason which induced me to consent to Damjanics departing to Debreczin as my provisional substitute in the war-ministry, was the conviction, on the one hand, that Hungary's war in self-defence must come to a disgraceful end, if the real cancer of the defence of the country — the arbitrary conduct of the separate independent commanders of troops, and the favouritism prevailing" in the nomination of officers and promotions — should continue as heretofore, from weakness or want of discernment, to be encouraged and cherished in the war-ministry itself; on the other hand, that Damjanics was just the man very speedily and radically to extirpate these cancerous diseases.

The loss might therefore truly be said to be irreparable, which not only the army but the cause of Hungary in general sustained, when General Damjanics, on the evening before the day fixed for his departure from Komorn to Debreczin, in consequence of an unfortunate leap from a carriage, shattered his leg, and was thereby rendered for ever unfit for service.

After this lamentable accident, General Klapka declared himself ready to act as my substitute in the war-ministry. But apart from the circumstance, that I should miss *Mm* much with the army — to whose advice I always used to attach great importance — he seemed to me to be of too yielding a nature to be equal to the Herculean task which awaited him at Debreczin.

There was, however, no other choice left me, if I would not run the risk of seeing the ministry of war fall under a perhaps still more doubtful guidance than that of General Mészáros had been.

General Klapka consequently left the army, to be-

take himself to Debreczin. In his stead Colonel Nagy-Sándor undertook the command of the first army corps; that of the third corps (Damjanics) was intrusted to Colonel Knézich.

Both colonels were accordingly advanced to the rank of generals.

CHAPTER IV.

THE sudden retardation of the confidently expected supplies of ammunition, had, on the 26th of April (the day of the complete relief of Komorn), placed us in the strange position of being obliged to terminate a battle, favourable to us as regarded our success on that day, with a *defensive* bearing.

For the same reason also we could not — as has been mentioned — on the following days continue with our whole strength the offensive operations, which had originally been intended only for the relief of Komorn. The speedy pursuit of the enemy by the two Pöltenberg army divisions — that third part of our force united on the evening of the 26th of April in the fortified camp of Komorn, of which the artillery was still fit for action — did not, however, promise any favourable result; because the hostile main army, which had been opposed to us on the 26th of April, had begun its retreat from the field of battle towards Raab in the best order and *voluntarily* ∴ therefore, though retreating, it was by no means in such a condition as that it could not have repulsed, with sensible disadvantage to the pursuer him-

self, a pursuit undertaken on our part with proportionately weak forces.

Meanwhile the inexplicable, sudden retardation of the supplies of ammunition was the very natural cause of our irresolution during several days, in consequence of which it happened that Pöltenberg did not reach Raab with his two army divisions till the 1st of May, after it had been evacuated by the enemy; and the other parts of our main army could not begin the blockade of the fortress of Ofen till late in the forenoon of the 4th of May, in the following manner:

Below Ofen, on the road from Stuhlweissenburg, secured against the fire from the fortress by the Blocksberg, the second corps (Aulich) encamped, and took upon itself the close investment of the fortress, commencing from the Danube as far as up to the Fleischhauer road.

With the investing range of the second corps, that of the first (Nagy-Sándor) — which established itself behind the Spitzbergel, and undertook the investment as far as the little Schwabenberg — was in close junction.

From hence to near the suburb (the Wasserstadt), situated to the north of Ofen on the bank of the Danube, the investing range of the third corps (Knézich) extended, which had advanced on the road from Kovácsy up to the suburb of Christinenstadt.

The prolongation of the blockading line to the Danube again, above the fortress, was assigned to the Kmety division, which encamped on the southern extremity of Alt-Ofen (Ó-Buda), north of the Wasserstadt.

The principal rampart of the fortress crowned the elongated hill, which, rising close to the bank of the

Danube, adjoins the edge of the plateau on which the city proper of Ofen stands. This rampart, taken as a whole, formed in fact only four fronts: two long ones, almost parallel with the course of the Danube, and two others, short as compared with the former two, which joined (in reference to the course of the Danube) the *upper* and *lower* ends of the long fronts, and thereby completely enclosed the inner space of the fortress.

The eastern of the two long fronts faced the Danube, or what is the same, the city of Pesth. It formed in the ground-plan, as respects its principal form, an obtuse re-entering angle, and consisted of a line of defence of remarkable irregularity, which was many times broken through at unequal distances.

In the apex of the re-entering angle of this front, above the prolongation of the chain-bridge, was situated one of the four principal entrances to the fortress, the "Water-gate."

Below this point, immediately on the bank of the stream, was a forcing-pump, which supplied the town and fortress with water from the Danube.

The securing of this forcing-pump, situated beyond the principal rampart at the southern end of the Wasserstadt, consequently quite exposed to any attacks from the north and south along the bank of the stream, had been effected by the Austrians, during their occupation of the capitals, by several intrenchments, formed of palisades and of walls and houses prepared for being defended by infantry, which leant on the one side against the principal rempart, on the other descended into the Danube, and which separated from the outside, together with the forcing-pump, the opening also of the chain-bridge on the right bank of the Danube. The access

from the Pesth bank — the left — over the chain-bridge itself, partly dismantled of its carriage-way, was moreover defended by a blockhouse erected on the prolongation of the bridge in the space enclosed by the intrenchments. The long front in question extended upwards and downwards far beyond the points on which these intrenchments leant.

The part of the Wasserstadt nearest to the forcing-pump lay immediately under the northern half of the Pesth front, repeatedly mentioned; while from the high commanding principal rampart — the southern half of this front — the main approach through the Wasserstadt to the forcing-pump, the principal line of attack of the northern intrenchments which protected it, could be cannonaded in its length, passing over them.

These local dispositions, however, we learned to know and appreciate only during the siege, after having previously many times dearly paid for our experience.

Thus much about the eastern long or Pesth front from recollection; there being no plan of the fortress of Ofen, as it then stood, at my command.

The western long front of the fortress faced the Spitzbergel with its southern half, with its northern end the little Schwabenberg.

Its principal rampart presented the aspect of a straight line of defence, strengthened by projecting rondels only on two points, the northern terminating one, and south of its centre.

The rondel situated, as has been said, south of the centre of the front, namely, the "Weissenburg" rondel, had to play the most important part during the siege.

It divided the most western long front of the fortress into two unequal halves, a southern (the shorter), and a

northern (the longer one). The principal rampart of the southern half appeared, compared with that of the northern, to be somewhat re-entering, and differed moreover from it in that not far from the Weissenburg rondel it changed from a simple enclosing wall into a terraced one; while the northern in its whole length consisted only of a simple uninterrupted straight enclosing wall.

Through the Weissenburg rondel itself another of the four principal entrances to the fortress led, the "Stuhlweissenburg-gate;" it was, however, blocked up.

Of the two short fronts, the southern (an irregular combination, and one very favourable for the defence in consequence of the points of support offered by the locality) with the "Castle-gate" looked towards the Blocksberg, and the northern (a straight line of defence with a flanking fire, like the western long front) with the "Vienna-gate" towards that ridge of heights between which and the Danube the Wasserstadt and Alt Ofen are situated.

The hill on which the fortress stands is, as it were, the last spur of this ridge of heights. Both are perceptibly separated only by a saddle, over which the Vienna suburb extends from the Wasserstadt as far as the northern end of the Christinenstadt.

The inner space of the fortress, corresponding with the two long fronts, was, for its small width, disproportionately long; while the circumstances, that the western long (Weissenburg) front presented an almost straight line of defence, but the Pesth front formed a re-entering angle, necessitated a considerable contraction of the inner space at the apex of this re-entering angle. Just on this contraction lay, in the Pesth front, the open

Water-gate, serving as the principal communication with that part of the declivity and the bank of the stream which was protected against our attacks by the intrenchments; in the Weissenburg front the rondel of that name.

As the last-mentioned long front was divided by the Weissenburg rondel, the inner space of the fortress seemed also to be divided by the foresaid contraction into two unequal halves, a southern shorter, and a northern longer one. In the southern, besides the smaller part of the town, stood likewise the royal castle, together with the park belonging to it, which was surrounded by a high strong wall, exposed on none of its points to the straight effective fire, and formed the extreme line of defence of the south-eastern part of the fortress.

As objects of attack — the castle-park, with the castle-gate, on the west and close to the park, and the nearest parts of the principal rampart, were assigned to the second corps (Aulich); the adjoining southern half of the Weissenburg front and its rondel, to the first corps (Nagy-Sándor); the salient angle on the northern extremity of this long front, together with the adjacent northern short one, the Vienna front with its gate, to the third corps (Knézich); and the forcing-pump on the bank of the Danube, protected by the intrenchments, to the Kmety division.

In the range of the second corps, on the northern edge of the Blocksberg, at the commencement of the investment a twelve-pounder field-battery was planted against the fortress; as well as another battery of the same calibre on the little Schwabenberg, and both the increased seven-pounder howitzer batteries belonging to

the seventh corps, on the ridge opposite the Vienna front. The battery on the little Schwabenberg and the two howitzer batteries were in the range of the third corps.

It was not my intention to attack the place without previously having summoned the garrison to surrender. The over-hasty zeal of the commander of the howitzer batteries, however, caused a cannonade on our part before this summons had been sent.

This attack was of course stopped as speedily as was permitted by the considerable distance, especially of the Blocksberg battery, from the head-quarters at the northern extremity of Christinenstadt; and after this was effected, an Austrian officer, whom we had brought with us a prisoner, was sent into the fortress with a written summons addressed personally to the commander Major-general Hentzi.

As I possess no copy of this letter, of the agreement of which with the original I could be morally convinced, I can indicate here only that part of its contents which has remained vividly in my memory. It contained:

Information that Ofen was invested by us. An opinion, that it would not be possible to maintain the place long against us.

A summons to surrender it, with the promise of honourable treatment as prisoners of war (the officers with their arms, the men without). The assurance of a humane treatment of the prisoners, even in case the garrison intended to resist to the last, provided that the chain-bridge and the city of Pesth, from which the fortress had to expect no attack, were spared: if this

condition were not complied with, however, the pledge of my word of honour, that after the taking of the fortress, the whole garrison should be put to the sword.

An appeal, founded on the rumours that Major-general Hentzi was a native of Hungary, to his patriotic sentiments; and finally, An explanation, that I had chosen for the bearer of this letter an Austrian officer, who was our prisoner, because our trumpets used to be detained in the Austrian camp.

I remember further to have declared in the same letter, that this violation of the personal liberty of a hostile trumpet, as well as the bombardment of Pesth, and the attempt to destroy the chain-bridge, were infamous acts.

My view of the moral character of those actions is still the same: I must now, however, here *retract* the assertion, that it was *usual* with the Austrian army to make our trumpets prisoners. I know of only the one case of this kind, which I have mentioned in the Vllth Chapter of the first volume. Nevertheless my assertion at that time appears to be justified, inasmuch as, rendered cautious by that case, I could never again determine to send a Hungarian officer as trumpet into an Austrian camp; and the cases, where this has been attempted by other leaders of Hungarian troops, and the international usage which guarantees the inviolability of the trumpet in the hostile camp has been *respected* on the part of the Austrians, did not come to my knowledge till *after* the time in which the date of my letter to Major-general Hentzi falls.

The reply of Major-general Hentzi to me contrasted

very strangely with the absurd rumours of an unparalleled depression in the garrison of Ofen, in consequence of which Kossuth could hardly stop till some of Aulich's battalions had crossed the Danube, that the said garrison might not have to wait any longer for the plausible reason they desired for laying down their arms; on which rumours also Klapka had principally based his proposal, first of all to march against Ofen.

In his answer Major-general Hentzi scoffingly repudiated the assumption, that he would evacuate without resistance the place confided to him; declared Ofen to be a *really tenable* place, although our precipitate retreat in the early part of the year 1849 seemed to have proved the contrary; called upon me immediately to put a stop to my firing, if I wished Pesth to be spared; added moreover, that he must *in any case*, and directly, bombard Pesth, *because he was forced by a cannonading which had just now been commenced there** He then

* Major-general Hentzi's assertion, that a cannonading had *taken place from Pesth* against Ofen, was *untrue*.

To justify this assertion, and the bombardment of the city of Pesth, Which had actually been commenced in the afternoon of the 4th of May, on the following day a placard made its appearance, in which Major-general Hentzi described even the effect of one of the balls fired from Pesth:

"The Ofen pier" — so it was said in this placard, as near as I remember — "has been struck and injured by a projectile from a cannon on the lower part of both of its comers, facing the Pesth bank."

This statement was correct, as I convinced myself personally after the fall of the fortress: nevertheless the assumption, that this projectile had come from the *Pesth bank* was just as *incorrect as the whole assertion of β cannonading from Pesth* was *untrue*. Such an attack could not have taken place, because, in order not to expose Pesth to a bombardment, I had given, before the investment of Ofen, an order to General Aulich, not ^{only} to avoid any attack, nay even demonstration against the fortress "Orn the Pesth bank, but not even to allow a gun to be seen on any point

corrected my erroneous supposition that Hungary was his native country; and declared finally, that he would hold out to the last man, as in duty and honour bound.

Meanwhile General Klapka, on his journey from Komorn through Pesth to Debreczin, had stopped some days in Pesth; and during this time, partly from his own reflections, partly from information obtained about the state of the fortress of Ofen and the disposition of the garrison, had become convinced that the taking of Ofen might not be so speedily accomplished, as he had endeavoured to prove to the chief of the general staff and myself, in our consultation at Komorn on our further operations.

This new conviction caused him in writing to dissuade me from storming Ofen. By the date, the letter in which he did so (it was, if I remember right, of the 1st or 2d of May) seemed to have been intended to find me still on the march against Ofen, while the means which Klapka had taken to forward it to me indicated the contrary intention; for I did not receive it till after

of the bank situated within range of the fortress; and because the result of a subsequent investigation proved *that this order had been conscientiously obeyed.*

This damage on the upper pier could consequently only have been caused by a ball from the twelve-pounder battery, which had been planted on the Blocksberg.

I may repeat here, that my intention, not to attack the fortress before having summoned it to surrender, had been frustrated by the precipitancy of the commander of the howitzer batteries; that the twelve-pounder battery on the little Schwabenberg and on the Blocksberg began to fire immediately after the howitzer batteries; and that the latter especially, to which the order to stop firing could not be communicated so quickly as to the others, on account of the considerable distance from my headquarters to the point where it was planted, had already been playing unceasingly when Major-general Hentzi replied to my letter.

Major-general Hentzi had been very categorically summoned to surrender, and had hereupon given just as categorical a refusal.

After that summons, however, and the reply to it, my views of what is called "military honour" no longer permitted me to retire from before Ofen, without having previously exerted myself to the uttermost to take it.

Moreover, regard for the honour of our arms, acting at present as a motive for the siege of Ofen, was supported also by those political reasons which had mainly determined me, in the consultation held at Komorn about the next operations, to give the preference to Klapka's proposal over that of the chief of the general staff (see Chapter II. of this volume).

If I had then supposed that the *speedy* fall of Ofen would present a favourable opportunity for the attempt to invite to a peaceable agreement the Austrian Government as well as the Hungarian Diet, in the name of the Hungarian main army, assumed to have victoriously advanced as far as the Lajtha, — I could not fail to perceive, after Major-general Hentzi's energetic reply to my summons, the absolute necessity there was that Ofen should fall, whether sooner or later, before I could have the most remote idea of daring this attempt with any prospect of success, even if the progress that attended the immediate offensive towards the Lajtha were ever so successful.

CHAPTER V.

MAJOR-GENERAL HENTZI had not said too much, when he asserted, in his reply, that Ofen, since the occupation of the capitals by the Austrians, had been changed into a tenable place. I was soon to have an opportunity of convincing myself of the correctness of this assertion, and of the precipitancy of my contrary opinion.

While our prisoner the Austrian officer was on his way to the fortress with my letter to Hentzi, the Kmety division stood in the Wasserstadt, awaiting the order to storm the intrenchments.

The trumpet returned with Major-general Hentzi's answer; and a few minutes after the orders to attack were on their way to the Kmety division, and the batteries posted on the Blocksberg, the little Schwabenberg, and the ridge opposite the Vienna front.

Kmety attacked courageously, as he always did, and was indirectly supported by the brisk fire of our batteries, which aimed at the general discouragement of the garrison.

Our intention in storming the intrenchments in front of the forcing-pump was that we might destroy the latter.

The fortress of Ofen possessed, as far as I knew, neither cisterns nor wells.

From time immemorial two aqueducts have served to remedy this defect. One of them, which supplied the fortress with good water for drinking, from a spring on the great Schwabenberg, we had already destroyed.

If we should succeed in like manner with the second, the forcing-pump, every supply of water would be completely cut off from the interior of the fortress; and the garrison, in my opinion, could not hold out many days.

The storming of the Kmety division, however, miscarried, and the losses we suffered in it were sufficient to deter us from the repetition of a similar separate undertaking.

The fire of our batteries also had to be moderated even during the course of the first day, and confined to merely answering the different hostile shots, because the enigmatical hindrance, which had put a stop to the regular arrival of supplies of ammunition now for a long time, was still unremoved.

I have a very lively recollection of the fact, that the commander of the artillery of the main army did not succeed till during the further progress of the siege of Ofen in discovering at the same time the cause of the delay that had taken place in sending the ammunition for the field-artillery, as well as the reason of this delay.

Immediately after the evacuation of the city of "Waizen on the part of the enemy (April 10th), the rumour had been spread beyond the Theiss, that the capitals of the country were already in our hands, and that the communication by means of the Pesth and Szolnok railway would consequently be re-opened.

From this rumour, the individual charged with forwarding the ammunition to the main army was induced to direct the *convois* — instead of sending them, as hitherto, by Miskólcz and Ipolyság, or on the Gyön-gyös main road — to Szolnok, supposing that by making use of the railway, they would reach the place of their destination much sooner. But when doing so he omitted

to inform the commander of the artillery of the main army that he had changed the route of the transport; and thus these supplies of ammunition — which the artillery commander, after having vainly expected their arrival for some days in the fortified camp of Komorn, had ordered to be searched for on all imaginable routes, except, of course, on the impracticable railway-line — remained undiscovered for a long time, first in Szolnok, till the re-opening of the railroad communication (in the end of April or beginning of May), and afterwards even in Pesth also.

The inevitable consequence of this state of things, the sudden silence of our batteries — after the brisk fire of artillery by which the storming of the Kmety division against the intrenchments had been seconded — which during more than a week had been only now and then partially broken through, had probably assured the enemy; for all this time he did scarcely any thing from which we could have inferred that any notice was taken of our preparations for a very serious attempt to become masters of the fortress; while we could least of all conceal from his observation those preparations which most clearly betrayed our intention to effect a breach in a part of the fortress wall.

After the unsuccessful attack of the Kmety division on the intrenchments, I agreed with the chief of the general staff to defer the assault, which at first we had intended to undertake without loss of time, until it could either be combined with the simultaneous use of a breach, or we should be convinced that it was impossible for us to effect a breach with the means of siege at our command.

We came to this conclusion from the attention we

paid to the elevation (the Spitzberg) facing the southern half of the Weissenburg front, but especially that short space opposite it which lay south of the Weissenburg rondel, immediately between it and the commencing point of the terraced exterior enclosure; this elevation being rather favourable for the erection of a breach-battery.

For the interior of the fortress at this place, as well as in by far the greater part of its circumference, was separated from the exterior only by a simple wall, which, though strong, was completely exposed to our direct fire.

The unusually great distance of the point fit for the erection of the breach-battery from the wall of the fortress, however, rendered the probability of success the more seriously doubtful, as we could arm the breach-battery at most with only four twenty-four and one eighteen-pounder.* The sensible loss, moreover, with which the attack of the Kmety division on the intrenchments in front of the forcing-pump had been repulsed, had at once created in me so much respect for the strength of the fortress of Ofen, that the successful result of a mere escalade by itself seemed now to be far more improbable.

The formation of the battery on the Spitzbergel was consequently energetically undertaken without further deliberation; and that from the time of beginning it till the first breach-shot *more than a week* elapsed, was owing neither to the enemy, who, as has been said, did

* These were the same five undamaged pieces of the battery which we had taken from the Austrian blockading-corps in the sudden attack on the trench before Komorn (on the 26th of April); the sixth piece — an eighteen-pounder — was already spiked when it fell into our hands.

extremely little to delay its construction, nor to the circumstance that we were obliged to seek for all the materials needed for it, nor to our mistakes during its erection, hut solely and exclusively to the narrow-mindedness of General Count Guyon, the then commander of the fortress of Komorn.

This shewed itself in his refusing at first to deliver up the above-mentioned five battering-guns, and complaining to Kossuth that I intended to exhaust the means for the defence of the fortress intrusted to him.

Fortunately Kossuth's conviction of the necessity for taking Ofen coincided with my own, although — as I thought I afterwards perceived — for quite different reasons; and thus General Guyon had at last to submit to supply our most urgent want of besieging-artillery out of the stores of the fortress of Komorn. He did this, however, tardily enough to delay for several days the armament of the breach-battery, which was at last completed.

Foreseeing this opposition to me on the part of Guyon, I had intentionally at first asked only for the delivery of the said captured guns, because they did not belong to the armament of the fortress of Komorn, and consequently Guyon could by no means find in my demand any valid reason for refusing to comply with it.

I was obliged to observe this precaution, in consequence of being at first uncertain whether Kossuth was disposed for or against the regular *siege* of Ofen. But when I thought I could infer with certainty, from Guy on's compliance, which at last took place, that Kossuth had this time taken a decided part for me, or, more correctly, for the furtherance of my undertaking against Ofen, much time as it would cost, I then immediately raised

my demands on Guyon somewhat higher, and claimed besides the equipment for a breach-battery, the delivery also of four mortars, I believe thirty-pounders. These, however, I did not receive till near the end of the siege.

Besides the breach-battery, adjoining it on the right a dismounting-battery* of from twelve to sixteen gun-stands had been thrown up; for the armament of which, however, only six-pounders could be employed, because we had at our disposal no other twelve-pounder batteries than the two posted on the Blocksberg and the little Schwabenberg.

Opposite these approaches, which were in fact not of very great consequence, the enemy thought he had done enough, when he armed the Weissenburg rondel with cannon, and planted besides four pieces of the largest calibre (if I remember right, they were four-and-twenty-pounders), without any protection, on the rampart between the Weissenburg rondel and the one situated at the northern salient angle, about a hundred paces distant from the former, and disturbed our workmen from time to time by separate shots.

The only effect of these measures upon us, however, was, that we drew back the first corps (Nagy-Sándor), which was encamping westward from the Spitzbergel, just in the line of these shots, to the ground lying on

* This dismounting-battery properly originated, so to say, against our will. It was primarily intended for a breach-battery. But when almost completed, the place on which it had been planted, as well as its whole construction, turned out to be not calculated for a breach-battery. The erection of a new breach-battery was now — after the loss of several days — undertaken, close to the left of the former, which was made use of afterwards as a dismounting-battery, having been extended on the right several gun-stands.

the Fleischhauer road, which was protected against the fire of the fortress by the western continuation of the Blocksberg.

In like manner I had been obliged by the fire from the northern rondel of the Weissenburg front, on the first day of the siege to draw back with my head-quarters from the suburbs of Christinenstadt. I removed them first to the entrance of the Auwinkel,* then to the great Schwabenberg.

During the whole time of constructing our batteries we had confined our fire to indispensable replies to that of the enemy. By this we intended, on the one hand, as much as possible to spare our ammunition, which in the meantime had been a little augmented, and to reserve it for the energetic defence of the breach-battery; on the other hand, to confirm the enemy in the remarkable lukewarmness with which he carried on the defence of the Weissenburg front, which was menaced by us, and was notoriously his weakest side.

On the ninth or tenth day of the siege (I cannot indicate the day with certainty) the breach-battery began to play.

The first breach-shot was at the same time the signal for all the other batteries to open their fire as briskly as possible on the opposite ramparts of the fortress. Especially the howitzer batteries were to play upon the Vienna front; the twelve-pounder batteries upon the four twenty-four-pounders planted without protection on the rampart of the Weissenburg front; and the six-pounders of the dismounting-battery, thrown up to the right of the breach-battery, upon the enemy's guns on the Weissenburg rondel.

* A pleasure-ground. — *Transl.*

The unexpectedly vehement attack of artillery seemed to make a powerful impression on the defender; for with evident haste he drew back the four twenty-four-pounders from the rampart into the interior of the fortress, behind the outermost row of houses, and allowed our breach-battery to play almost entirely undisturbed during the whole day. It is also possible that, on account of its great distance, he believed he had not much to fear for his rampart from it.

Be this as it may, the gaps, any thing but inconsiderable, which our breach-battery had made in the stone-work, in spite of the great distance, by the evening of the first day were sufficient to rouse the defender to increased activity, and on the next morning his four twenty-four-pounders, protected by traverses against the fire of our twelve-pounder battery, stood again on the rampart; at the same time, on several points of the latter, the digging of a ditch (which doubtless was intended to compensate for the want of a sheltered rampart-walk) had been begun, and the earth-works behind the breach, which had likewise been commenced during the night, and vigorously continued during the day, plainly shewed the intention of isolating this breach from the inner space of the fortress by a kind of intrenchment.

On this and the following days the defender no longer looked idly on, as during the course of the preceding day, while our breach-battery continued its effective brisk fire. On the contrary, he attacked it with a treble cross-fire from three points — to the south of the breach, from the Weissenburg rondel, and from the traverses; while from the interior of the fortress he threw bombs against it.

In spite of all this, by the end of the following day (the third of the assault by the battery), if I am not mistaken, the breach appeared to us to be so far advanced, that we believed it already practicable.

Major-general Hentzi had meanwhile been exerting himself to fulfil his threats in a terrific manner. For Pesth, as on the first day of the siege, so also on some of the following ones, was bombarded with increasing vehemence; and my precipitancy in ordering the general storm in the night of the 17th or 18th of May — , without having previously thoroughly convinced myself that the breach was practicable — had its origin in my indignation at these bombardments, which were altogether unjustifiable in whatever light regarded.

The dispositions for this storm indicated as objects of attack — for the second army corps, the park of the castle and the castle-gate with its nearest environs; for * the first corps, the breach; for the third corps, the northern rondel with its vicinity on the salient angle of the Vienna and Weissenburg fronts; and for the Kmety division, the intrenchments before the forcing-pump.

The attack commenced shortly after midnight, was unsuccessful on all points, and was discontinued before daybreak.

The storming-columns of the first corps had encountered an obstacle in the overhanging remains of still undemolished stone-work at the uppermost edge of the breach, insurmountable without ladders. The imperfection of the breach being masked by the apex of the loose heap of *debris*, which gave way under the feet of the assailants, had escaped our previous observation — confined to a mere glance. The attempt at escalade

of the third corps had been rendered impracticable by the insufficient length of their ladders; that of the second corps, in whose objects of attack this circumstance was not prominent, was defeated by the valour of that part of the garrison by which the park of the castle and its vicinity were defended. Finally, the attack of the Kmety division failed through the impossibility of advancing against the intrenchments along their approaches, upon which projectiles of all kinds were showered down from the ramparts of the Pesth front.

The defensive activity of the enemy, suddenly so vividly excited by the effective fire of our breach-battery, shewed itself after this storming in a still higher degree of development than before it. The earth-works on the rampart extending from the Weissenburg to the northern rondel, as well as those behind the breach, were most zealously continued, and, besides, the strengthening of the environs of the castle-gate energetically commenced. For he hastened to demolish some buildings in the vicinity of the castle-gate, which had favoured the escalade attempted by the troops of the second corps, and prepared others for defence.

The more reason had we — opposed to an enemy who appeared resolved to dare the worst, and taught by the bitter consequence of my precipitancy, the failure of our first storming — to do all in our power that our next effort for the final fall of the fortress might not again be unsuccessful.

In the attempt of the third corps to escalade the rampart of the fortress near the salient angle of the Vienna and Weissenburg front, it has been mentioned that the length of the ladders they possessed had proved to be insufficient. That the next escalade of the third

corps might not fail again from this cause, longer ladders were sought for; and instead of the vicinity of the salient angle, where the rampart of the fortress was almost highest, the part of the Vienna front situated nearest to the gate of that name was fixed as the object of attack for the third corps.

At the first storming, the breach was still impracticable. The breach-battery had consequently immediately afterwards to continue its attacks vigorously; and in order to be quite sure of success, it was arranged that the troops of the first army corps, when they next stormed at the breach, should, like those appointed for the escalade exclusively, be provided with ladders.

In the first storming our troops had found the approach to the breach impeded by occasional high and strong fences of all kinds, as walls, iron gratings, planks, and these had first of all to be removed out of their way, at a great cost of time and strength. From the loud noise unavoidable in such operations, the enemy could guess our intention long before the arrival of our storming-column at the foot of the breach. Instead of the defender, the assailant consequently was rather the surprised; for the former began the combat before the latter was in a condition to attack him. The storming had not yet commenced, and already the troops of the first corps were exhausted by their efforts during the advance on the difficult ground, and shaken by the vehement fire of the too-soon alarmed enemy. Before the next escalade all hindrances had therefore to be completely removed from the approach to the breach.

Till now the garrison, especially in the interior of the fortress, had been only occasionally molested by our projectiles; they had enough of the necessary rest to

remain, with a simultaneous abundance of victuals, in perfectly good humour. Undoubtedly it would be of very great advantage to us during the next storm, if they could meanwhile be brought down a little. We thought to attain this object most certainly by bombarding from this time the inner part of the fortress as briskly as the scantiness of our means permitted (we had meanwhile obtained from the fortress of Komorn the above-mentioned four mortars, and had planted them partly on the Blocksberg, partly in the Vienna suburb), and at the same time cannonading it with the twelve-pounder and howitzer batteries, in order to set fire to those buildings especially which were pointed out to us by scouts as magazines and barracks.

By the first storming, it will be seen — if the details just given be duly considered — that the garrison could not by any means be taken by surprise. But the less unexpected an attack, the more doubtful its success, other circumstances being equal. It was consequently of the first importance to insure to the next storming, by some means, the advantage of a surprise.

To this end, immediately on the approach of the first night after the miscarried assault, noisy feigned attacks were made on the whole circuit of the fortress, except on the Pesth front which was inaccessible to us, and continued uninterruptedly till about two in the morning; at this hour, however, the fire of musketry and that from the batteries completely ceased, and recommenced only with bright daylight. The repetition of this manoeuvre during the two or three following nights was intended, on the one hand, to frustrate the nocturnal undertakings of the enemy, directed perhaps to rendering the breach or the approach to it impracticable; on the other hand,

to accustom him to believe that the second hour after midnight was the fixed time, after which till the next night set in, he had no longer to fear any further molestation.

The last repetition of these feigned attacks took place in the night between the 20th and 21st of May.

With the second hour after midnight our brisk nocturnal harassing fire suddenly ceased this time also, and immediately the preparations for the real storm noiselessly began.

Masked by the darkness of the night, the columns approached their objects of attack, awaiting the signal for the onset.

At the stroke of three in the morning all the batteries together sent forth a discharge; then they were silent again. This was the signal for the general storming.

The darkness, which still continued for some time, rendered it impossible at first to observe distinctly what was taking place at the breach, although the situation of the head-quarters was favourable for this purpose. But the flashing of the divers discharges of cannons and muskets from the Weissenburg rondel, the short luminous curves of the hand-grenades thrown from it against the near breach, and the brisk fire of tirailleurs maintained on our part by a dense chain of sharpshooters deployed in the rear of the real storming-columns against the defenders, in order to facilitate the assault — meanwhile gave us reason to believe that our troops were already on the breach.

Soon afterwards, in the twilight, we could perceive that the masses repeatedly stormed up the breach, but were nevertheless as often driven back again by the fierce fire from the Weissenburg rondel. At almost

every new assault, however, some of them gained the rampart. But the next moment these also were no longer any where to be seen; the balls of the defenders might have struck them down.

The longer we observed these unsuccessful efforts, the clearer became the conviction in us, that our tirailleur fire, spite of its briskness, was far from sufficient to disconcert, to the degree required for the success of the storming, the most obstinate defenders of the breach, the forces of the Weissenburg rondel. Here it was necessary to help with artillery. The breach-battery, and the dismounting one to the right of it, received orders to open their fire against the Weissenburg rondel, but in such a manner, that the projectiles might pass over it as close as possible. We promised ourselves from the imposing noise of the solid bullets rushing in quick succession over the heads of the men of the Weissenburg rondel, a far more favourable success for the assailants than from the musketry of our sharp-shooters, murderous though it was.

In consequence of the considerable distance of the breach-battery from the head-quarters, a good while elapsed before this order could be carried into effect; and we could distinctly remark in the meanwhile, that the continued attempts at storming, undertaken time after time with evidently less strength, grew ever more unsuccessful.

But as soon as these batteries began to play, the sinking courage of our troops seemed suddenly to revive. The next assault, essayed with visibly greater energy, brought the larger half of the then storming party on to the rampart. The Weissenburg rondel now lay to the left behind them; they turned to the right, and very

soon disappeared in the still-impenetrable shade of the dark walls of some half-finished houses situated not far from the breach.

Painful uncertainty seized us as to the fate of these brave fellows.

A second attempt to storm, with almost as favourable and enigmatical an issue, and even a third, succeeded the first at short intervals. After the last, however, an inexplicable standstill suddenly took place. The breach was no longer stepped upon, — and nevertheless, as nearly as we could calculate, scarcely more than half a battalion could have reached the rampart. It seemed as if the combat, just at the moment when it began to take a more favourable turn for the assailants, had been basely given up by them. Anxiously we endeavoured to discover, in the proximity of the breach, still but very faintly illumined, some particular cause for this sorrowful change of affairs.

The fire from the Weissenburg rondel — thanks to the activity of our breach and dismounting-batteries — had rather slackened than increased, though it still continued pretty uninterruptedly. But otherwise not one of the garrison was visible on the rampart next the breach; only at some distance south of it, we thought we remarked a hostile troop, which seemed to assemble just then on the rampart, in order to advance directly to the breach and again occupy its apparently abandoned proximity. Yet, though we watched it a long time, we could not perceive that it gained ground towards the breach. At first we took this for a favourable sign, supposing that those of our troops who had previously mounted the breach had not succumbed, and were now preventing this troop from advancing on the

rampart towards the breach. But along the whole extent of the rampart as far as the breach not a single shot had been fired; and judging from the immobility of this troop, attacks with the bayonet were out of the question.

The increasing daylight at last explained all contradictions. That troop on the rampart was assembled round the tricolor banner of a Honvéd battalion! It consisted in part of those brave fellows who had previously mounted the breach, and had there found a tenable spot; in part of those who had preferred to escalate by means of ladders the "terraced enclosure," rather than make further attempts to gain the rampart by the breach. But the escalate — rendered difficult by the fire of the Weissenburg rondel also, though, on account of the greater distance, in a less degree than mounting the breach, and moreover confined at the uppermost wall to a single ladder — furnished only a very feeble afflux of fresh forces for the re-inforcement of that isolated troop on the rampart.

The apprehension of seeing these give way before the desperate attacks of the garrison, if the escalate on the Vienna front and the storm on the intrenchments before the forcing-pump should now be suddenly abandoned, as it was already day, and these undertakings had not yet succeeded — induced me speedily to send two officers from the head-quarters to the third corps and the Kmety division, to convey to them the encouraging news of the success of the first corps, and communicate to them at the same time a strict order for the increasingly energetic continuance of their attacks.

This measure, however, was soon seen to be super-

fluous. The two officers could scarcely have got half way from the head-quarters to the Vienna suburb, when we saw the first escaladers of the third corps on the rampart of the Vienna front, advancing towards the angle formed by it and the Weissenburg front; the Croats, on the contrary, who had defended this point, retreating into the interior of the fortress.

Soon afterwards, the sign of submission — an off-hand white banner — waved from one of those traverses on the Weissenburg rampart, which had been thrown up to protect the four twenty-four pounders planted there against our breach-battery.

But the waving of this banner did not in the least prevent the defenders of the Weissenburg rondel from continuing their fatal fire against the escaladers of the first corps on the terraced enclosure, as briskly as was practicable, considering the activity of our tirailleurs and batteries directed against them; and so long as this lasted, we had of course to take no notice at all of this sign of submission; the less so, as it had accidentally escaped our observation by *whom* the white banner had been set up. The *anonymous* "entreaty for pardon" might have originated only from a peaceful citizen of Ofen, whose house chanced to be situated in one and the same direction with the Weissenburg rondel and our breach-battery, by the bullets from which it was perhaps being roughly handled.

After a while, however, one of the garrison suddenly approached the traverses, seized the banner, and bore it with unsteady steps to the Weissenburg rondel. Arrived there, he planted it on the parapet.

This seemed to some among the defenders of this point a welcome pretext for desisting from further re-

sisfance. The greater part continued to fire. Moreover, a few moments later, an officer appeared on the rondel, approached the parapet, tore down the sign of submission, and threw it on the ground. But scarcely had he retired, when the banner waved anew over the parapet. And now the idea of submission seemed to have the majority of the defenders in its favour; for only some of them still fired occasionally. These also at last laid down their arms. Our batteries and tirailleurs ceased their fire; and while the latter mounted the Weissenburg rondel by means of ladders, the majority of the battalion of the first corps had already forced their way from the point where they had gathered on the rampart, south of the breach, into the interior of the town, and the last desperate combat had now commenced in the streets. This, however, we were prevented from observing by the range of houses along the rampart of the Weissenburg front: we saw only the smoke of the enemy's guns spreading over the roofs.

Almost simultaneously a cloud of powder-smoke of uncommon extent rose on the other side of the fortress. This had been aimed at the chain-bridge! But the irrational intention had been frustrated by the injudicious nature of the mine, which was designed to blow in pieces the gigantic chains of the bridge.

Half an hour afterwards I received General Nagy-Sándor's report, that the fortress together with the garrison — Major-general Hentzi mortally wounded — was completely in our power.

CHAPTER VI.

ABOUT noon of the 4th of May Ofen was invested by us, and not till the morning of the 21st did we gain possession of the place; we had consequently employed almost seventeen entire days in its conquest.

The chief causes of this loss of time, by no means unimportant to us, were, next to the firmness of the hostile garrison, the want of all preparation for the operations of a siege, which had unexpectedly proved necessary; our mistakes during the siege; our deficiency of besieging-artillery; and moreover the unseasonable scruples — to choose the mildest expression — of the commander of the fortress of Komorn, Count Guyon.

It cannot be denied, that the fortress of Ofen, from the method of defence adopted by Major-general Hentzi, must have been in our possession at furthest within eight days, if, instead of the preconceived opinion of being able to conquer it by mere attacks with infantry and howitzers, I had at once brought with me the besieging-park from Komorn, had prepared beforehand the requisites for the construction of batteries, and with more circumspection and equal energy had set about the construction of the batteries themselves. For the method in which Major-general Hentzi conducted the defence seemed to be based on the peculiar illusion, that the longer maintenance of a besieged strong place depended not so much on the energetic impediments thrown in the way of the besiegers' operations, as on the amount of

devastation committed on some point *beyond the offensive range*.

Instead of hindering, at any sacrifice, the construction of our batteries, without the completion of which we should have been confined exclusively to the escalade — certainly very precarious, considering the valour of the garrison — Major-general Hentzi used exclusively for the repeated bombardments of Pesth those colossal means, of the possession of which he had with good reason boasted in his reply to my summons to surrender.

While on our part the intrenchments at the Spitzbergel were carried on uninterruptedly under his very eyes, though with evident helplessness, and one half of the guns employed in those bombardments would have sufficed to frustrate the erection of the breach-battery; Major-general Hentzi was above all solicitous for the demolition of the deserted House of Representatives, and amused himself, by the way, in changing into ruins and ashes some dozens of houses happening to belong to thoroughly excellently-disposed black-and-yellow Pesth citizens; till at last the cannibal personal gratification arising from the further repetition of similar experiments was embittered to him by the thundering *memento mori* of our breach-battery, which had meanwhile been completed.

Not till his foot was already excoriated, did Major-general Hentzi seem to observe where the shoe really pinched him.

From this time, it is true, we see him do every thing in his power subsequently to rase the parapets, the construction of which he had taken *en bagatelle*; subsequently to silence the guns, the planting of which in the batteries he had not even attempted to prevent;

subsequently we see him undertake with surprising energy, and unceasingly continue, the construction of defensive works, which he ought to have begun on the first day of the siege.

But these gigantic efforts had only the usual result of all "*subséquents.*" They came too late. Those days on which they ought to have been made, Major-general Hentzi thought he must devote exclusively to the bombardment of Pesth.

And now that they were past, that is, when our twenty-four-pounders were already in activity, he could no longer prevent us from effecting a breach; nay, even the most desperate resistance of the garrison could not then retard the fall of the fortress, which, considering our want of means and our helplessness during the siege, might still be said to be premature.

The above-described defence of Ofen was enfeebled, in spite of all its valour, by the prevalence of a destructive rage, ascribable only to political fanaticism, but just as foolish as absolutely detestable.

The bombardments of Pesth were, I repeat it, by no means justifiable in any point of view. Not politically; because the Pesth "landlords," as has been said, were neither Kossuthians nor republicans. And just as little strategically; for these bombardments (apart from what has already been said against them) did not even accomplish their object as repressive measures: as such they should have induced us to give up the siege immediately, and march off straightway.

This, however, by no means took place; and with a calm estimate of the then state of the specifically-austrian cause in Hungary, might have been foreseen on the part of the enemy (even if no importance at all was

attached to the categorical tone of my summons to surrender) with just as little difficulty as the dangerous exasperation, which, in consequence of these devastations of the city of Pesth, must seize upon our ranks against their originators.

Considering all this beforehand, I had asked Major-general Hentzi to spare the city of Pesth and the chain-bridge, under the assurance that he had no attack whatever to apprehend from the left bank of the Danube. I had simultaneously guaranteed to him and to his troops, even if they should defend themselves to the last, a humane treatment, provided these objects, which were *innocuous to the garrison*, were spared.

The bombardments of Pesth shewed clearly enough that no regard was paid to humane considerations; and I immediately issued an *express prohibition* to all the divisions of the besieging army against giving quarter to the garrison. But on the capture of its commander I set an especial price: for I intended to make an example of him, as a warning to those who have an itching for *purposelessly* augmenting the horrors of war.

Major-general Hentzi fell mortally wounded into *my* power; with the dying man a HIGHER power was already reckoning.

The garrison was not put to the sword. Let it be thankful to *those* officers who in part have since expired on the scaffold, in part are languishing in the state-prisons of Austria; let it hold the memory of its noble-minded enemies in honour!

CHAPTER VII.

ABOUT the middle of the month of April 1849, as is known from what precedes, while the main body of our principal army was on its march from Waizen towards Lévincz, an expeditionary column, composed of six companies of infantry, one squadron of hussars, and two six-pounders, under the command of the Honvéd Major Armin Görgei, was detached into the district of the mountain-towns to purge them from the Austrian garrisons; and thus protect the rear of the main body of our army during its further advance against Komorn.

On the 18th of April Major Görgei began the fulfilment of his mission by taking Schemnitz by storm. The hostile soldiers, who on this occasion became our prisoners, stated that the strength of the Austrian column, distributed in the district of the mountain-towns, consisted of ten companies of infantry and two pieces of artillery.

The commander of these troops (Major Trenk) stood on that day with a part of them in Neusohl.

At the first news of the expulsion of his troops from Schemnitz, Major Trenk evacuated the district of the mountain-towns without further opposition, and concentrated his forces near Szent-Márton, in the Turócz comitate, which it bounds on the north.

Major Görgei pressed forward on the shortest route (by Kremnitz) towards Szent-Márton. Simultaneous reconnoiterings on the part of the Austrian and Hun-

garian columns led to a conflict at Pribócz in the night between the 22d and the 23d. The Hungarian advanced troops were victorious; and Major Trenk now retreated through the Sztrecsen defile, and across the Waag as far as Varin on the right bank of that river.

At the same time the Slavonian free-corps were roving about in the Liptau comitate. They had been expelled from Eperjes in the second half of the month of March by the expeditionary column which had been detached from the seventh army corps, then acting independently, and sent from Miskolcz against them. This is the expeditionary column which subsequently surprised the Austrian Colonel Almásy in Lossoncz. These free-troops now intended undoubtedly to join the Austrian Major Trenk in Varin, by Alsó-Kubin, Párnicza, and Tcrhova.

But a company of Major Görgei's expeditionary column — which had in the mean time crossed the Waag at Szucsán — overtook and attacked them on the 28th, not far from Alsó-Kubin, made about 160 of them prisoners, and put the remainder to flight towards Tverdossin. The captured free-troopers were disarmed and sent away to their homes.

Major Görgei now hastened against Major Trenk in Varin by the same route as that on which he had perhaps expected to be joined by the Slavonian free-corps. The attack on Varin took place on the 1st of May. Major Trenk was defeated, and on the 2d was pursued, by Budetin, as far as Radolya on the road to Jablunka.

Before it was possible to overtake him, Major Gbrgei received news that Field-marshal Lieut. Vogel, coming from the Zips, with from 6,000 to 7,000 men and eighteen guns, had broken into the Liptau.

In consequence of this information the further pursuit of Major Trenk was abandoned; and by the 4th of May our expeditionary column was already in Szent-Miklós in the Liptau, partly to impede the advance of Field-marshal Lieut. Vogel as much as possible; partly, in the last extremity, to protect the road from Rosenberg to Neusohl.

To retard the westward advance of these hostile forces in the valley of the Waag seemed to be demanded by the natural supposition, that Lieut.-general Dembinski — who, it is known, had been intrusted, soon after his removal from the chief command, with the charge of an army corps, newly formed in Eperjes and Kaschau, and had occupied the Zips before the irruption into it of Field-marshal Lieut. Vogel — was now pursuing the latter. This supposition was, however, any thing but natural in the case of Dembinski. As far as my knowledge of him went, Dembinski, as soon as he scented the enemy *a-head*, had always without exception moved back. So also this time. Instead of pursuing Field-marshal Lieut. Vogel, Dembinski barricaded himself in the Sáros comitate against that of Zips; while Field-marshal Lieut. Vogel left the latter in an opposite direction, probably for the purpose of reaching on the shortest line the left wing of the Austrian main army on the central Waag.

This shortest line led, indeed, through the district of the mountain-towns. Our expeditionary column, which had destroyed the bridges over the Waag between Szent-Miklós and Rosenberg, and occupied the defile at the latter place, was nevertheless sufficient to determine Field-marshal Lieut. Vogel, by turning northwards from Szent-Miklós, to pass the territory between

the rivers Waag and Arva on mountain-ways practicable only with extreme difficulty, and to accomplish his strategic task on the road from Alsó-Kubin by Varin, Silein (Zsolna), and Trencsin; while our expeditionary column, flanking his left, continually protected the district of the mountain-towns.

Meanwhile we perceived the disproportion between the great extent of the district to be protected and the small strength of the expeditionary column; and from the camp of Ofen six companies of infantry, half a squadron of hussars, and two three-pounders, were sent to it as a re-inforcement.

When this re-inforcement reached the expeditionary column, Field-marshal Lieut. Vogel had already effected his junction with the Austrian main army.

To form the extreme left wing of the latter seemed at the same time to have been assigned to the independent brigade of Major-general Barko, which, coming from Silesia, broke into Hungary through the Jablunka defile, and advanced towards Silein on the Waag.

⁴ At the time of the fall of Ofen our now re-inforced expeditionary column was just about assuming the offensive against this hostile brigade; while the other expeditionary column from the seventh army corps, which, as is known, had shortly before the relief of Komorn been detached to Verebély, had advanced from this point as far as Neutra, for the purpose of occupying the hostile forces distributed on the central Waag, and thereby favouring the undertakings of Major Gbrgei against the Barko brigade.

Pbltenberg had stood with his two army divisions of the seventh corps in and before Raab since the beginning of May, but little disturbed by the Austrians; and

a part of the garrison of Komorn at the same height in the great Schutt.

Kossuth's previous assurances (at the beginning of April, in Gödöllő), that Lieutenant-general Bern would cross the Danube at Baja with 16,000 men in the second half of April, had not been confirmed. Even in May Bern was only at Temesvár; and the Ban Baron Jella-chich consequently reached the right bank of the Drau without molestation.

While I purposed resuming the offensive against the Austrian main army immediately after the fall of Ofen, a plan of operations was drawn up by my substitute in the war-ministry, General Klapka, the fundamental idea of which for the war-operations was, that we should observantly await the irruption of a Russian army into Hungary, now thought probable even by the provisional government; and moreover having as its intention to subordinate all the leaders of Hungarian troops in Hungary and Transylvania to the control of the ministry of war. This plan owed it to the latter intention, and not to its idea for the war-operations, that I did not reject it at the outset, but only afterwards practically disavowed its fundamental idea of operations by my disposal of the troops, which was intended to render possible the renewal of the offensive against the Austrian main army before the invasion of the Russians.

Immediately after the fall of Ofen, accordingly, the first, second, and third army corps were directed from the camp at Ofen, by Gran, to the left bank of the Danube, towards the lower Waag; but on the right bank only the Kmety division, by Stuhlweissenburg, towards the territory situated between the Platten and the Neu-siedel lakes.

CHAPTER VIII.

DURING the siege of Ofen, and shortly before the failure of the first general assault — about the middle of the month of May — General Klapka, leaving Debreczin for some days, suddenly arrived at my head-quarters on the great Schwabenberg; partly that he might convince himself personally of the progress of the siege; partly that he might communicate to me the most important points of what he had at present learned, during the short time of his occupation as war-minister, about certain circumstances which had remained unknown to us who were with the army. These were, the relation in which the most important war-supplies and the resources of the country stood to the development of greater forces in the field, generally recognised as indispensable, — that of the war-ministry to Kossuth, — of Kossuth to the Diet.

The resources of the country General Klapka described as insufficient for energetically carrying on the war even for half a year longer. Apart from the financial difficulty, which was moreover no secret to the army, Klapka pointed especially to the circumstance, that the supplies of gunpowder and of saltpetre were not enough for even the complete equipment of the fortresses which were in our power; and that the manufactories of arms furnished but a small part of what the government had publicly announced they were capable of producing.

General Klapka on that occasion declared undis-

guisedly his sorrowful conviction, that the salvation of Hungary was impossible without foreign assistance, and that this would be probable only if we succeeded in resisting the combined attacks of the Austrians and Russians — of the intervention of the latter he doubted just as little as myself — until the end of next autumn; because in consequence of the prevailing peculiarities of this season of the year in by far the greater part of Hungary, a suspension of operations on the part of the hostile armies would be unavoidable, and the continuance of the resistance until the next spring be facilitated to us, and thereby the necessary time be secured to induce foreign countries to take part with Hungary.

The principal condition — Klapka thought further — for a resistance as successful as these conjectures presupposed it to be, was, above all things, union in the conduct of the operations of all parts of the national army, isolated from each other. Recognising this, he had directed his activity hitherto, as my substitute in the war-ministry, especially to the attainment of this indispensable unity.

Unfortunately he had encountered herein almost insuperable difficulties.

These consisted partly in the circumstance that the majority of the independent commanders of troops in their operations had been accustomed to take not the slightest notice of the general purpose, and completely to ignore the decrees of the war-ministry; and partly in Kossuth's habit, without the knowledge of the war-minister, of constantly exercising on the operations of some of the independent leaders a direct influence, almost always as injurious to the progress of our cause in the field as it was partial, whereby these leaders were of

course encouraged in their disobedience to the war-minister.

On this occasion General Klapka spoke very unfavourably of Kossuth generally. With lively indignation he blamed, among other things, especially the intention of Kossuth, and of those who sided with him, to exterminate completely the Serbians (*i. e.* the Schokazen and Raizen) in the Banat and the Bácska, and, without more ado, colonise the districts thus depopulated with Honvéd battalions.

Finally, the new law of the kingdom of the 14th of April, and especially the manner in which it had been originated, Klapka condemned most unsparingly. He described the real creators of this law, in expressions by no means honourable to them, as men who had never made any sacrifice for the good of the country, and who in general had scarcely any thing to lose. While those who were in all respects the most estimable patriots — asseverated Klapka — men who had already really made the most important sacrifices for the salvation of Hungary, and among these a very considerable part of the representatives, were without exception decided adversaries of this law.

Two or three weeks previous to the time at which this conference between General Klapka and myself took place in the camp before Ofen, a private letter from the then government commissary (afterwards minister of communication) Ladislaus Csányi, had reached nae in Komorn (before the complete relief of this fortress), wherein he declared to me, that he could countenance the separation of Hungary from Austria only because Kossuth had assured him by letter that it had My entire approval.

Now as Kossuth, when he wrote in the sense just indicated to the government commissary Ladislaus Csányi, could not possibly have forgotten my decided disapprobation of his intention (communicated to me, as is known, in Gödöllő, after the battle of Isaszeg) to venture on a politically offensive step against Austria, and consequently could not feel himself justified even in *assuming* my sympathy for the decision of the Diet of the 14th of April; — it may be conceived, that by Csányi's letter alone I must have been rendered suspicious of the *purity* of the manner in which the decision of the 14th of April had been obtained.

The above-mentioned communications of Klapka, as to the existence of a numerous weighty party in the Diet, which, though not approving of the law of the 14th of April, had nevertheless voted for it, now confirmed the suspicion which had been awakened in me by Csányi's letter; while, again, the credibility of *these* communications (from my entire confidence in Csányi's strict probity and love of truth, the result of my personal conviction,) found a strong support in *this* letter.

I consequently declared that I perfectly agreed with the proposal, which Klapka made to me in the course of our conference, to open the way to a reciprocal approximation between the adversaries of the new Hungarian law and the army; and learned with thankful acknowledgment, from Klapka's further communications, that during his short stay in Debreczin he had already taken the initiative to such an approximation, and had assured the most eminent persons of the said party (the so-called "peace-party") not only of my personal sympathy, but moreover of that of the whole main army for them (the adversaries of the new law). Nay, I

most urgently exhorted Klapka to continue his activity in this direction immediately after his return to Debreczin; — and this after he had shewn me the contradiction between the aversion of the peace-party to the new law, and their co-operation in the decision of the 14th of April, by revealing to me that the members of the Diet belonging to the peace-party had been shaken in their resolute opposition to the proposed declaration of independence, partly by Kossuth's assertion, that *the army* so eagerly desired the separation of Hungary from Austria, that the proclamation of it, should the Diet delay any longer, was to be apprehended from the army; partly by the intimidating demeanour of the population of Debreczin, fanaticised by Kossuth and his agents for the idea of the total defection from Austria.

I had hitherto considered the new Hungarian law of the 14th of April — in my ignorance of the circumstances under which it saw the light — to have been the result of a resolution of the whole Diet, which, though inconsiderate, or originating in deception, was nevertheless a voluntary one. And because such a resolution could by no means be made to harmonise with those communications which Kossuth (in the beginning of March 1849, in Tiszafüred) had made to me upon the unceasing demand of *the very same* Diet for unconditional submission to the power of Prince Windisch-Grätz, without at the same time assuming the existence of some contrary sudden impulse; I had hitherto supposed that the exasperation, which had seized the collective body of the Hungarian representatives at the Olmütz stroke of policy, had been so extremely intense, as — in conjunction with the national arrogance, which had perhaps been inflamed by the surprisingly

favourable progress of the April campaign — to have sufficed to call into existence the law of the 14th of April.

But with this supposition, I could not deny that the law, in spite of all the irrationality contained in it, had a *nimbus* of the national will; and however injurious in its consequences (more to Hungary than to Austria) this law might appear to me, the secretly hostile position which I took up against it was rendered very painful to me by the idea, that with the Diet, the whole nation, as it were, was opposed to me.

Only in consequence of Klapka's intimation of the manner in which this law originated (the first intimation moreover which I had received of it), I began to feel my hostile position to it becoming by degrees more bearable, in the same measure as my conviction increased that the law of the 14-th of April had not been desired by the nation, but was the handiwork of Kossuth, and forced upon it by him.

The sensible loss of seventeen days before Ofen; the supposition, unfortunately only too well founded, that the Austrians might have meanwhile pretty well recovered from the stunning blows of the April campaign, and that they might moreover have considerably strengthened their main army in Hungary by drafting thither all their forces not required elsewhere; the statements of Klapka as to our insufficiency in the most essential war-supplies; — all this was certainly very unfavourable to the possibility of realising my idea, namely, to urge the provisional governments on this and the other side the Lajtha to a compromise, based on the constitution sanctioned in the year 1848, before the Russian intervention should actually begin.

But nevertheless I was forced to recognise in the serious attempt to carry out this idea — considering my grave doubts of the existence of an energetic European sympathy for Hungary's independence as a state — the only beam which might perhaps be still strong enough to reward the last convulsive clinging to it of the submerging.

And if I had not been deterred from the thought of an armed opposition to the new Hungarian law, at a time when I could not but believe that in such a step I should have the whole nation against me; then, I should suppose, it cannot be necessary to detail the reasons which led me to persist in this thought, after Klapka's accounts had proved beyond doubt the existence of a numerous party in the country of the same political opinions as myself — a party which contained the majority of those who were acknowledged to be the most disinterested patriots.

A few days after the taking of Ofen, a deputation from the Diet appeared in Pesth for the purpose of rewarding me, in the name of the Diet and of the Government, for my services in the army of the fatherland, with the order of the *first* class of military merit, and the rank of Field-marshal Lieutenant.

I felt a repugnance to accept rewards from that party, the political acts of which I could not fail to perceive were injurious to the nation. But in order to mask as much as possible the real significance of my refusal, I began by stating it to the deputation of the Diet, and adduced as motives for my conduct, partly the statutes of the order of military merit, according to which the first class of these distinctions did not at all appertain to me; partly the incompatibility of the dig-

nity of field-marshal lieutenant with the republican programme of government of the ministerial president Bartholomäus von Szemere.

In consequence of this, all official intercourse between me and the deputies ceased. I was, however, honoured by their leaders with a private visit; and on this occasion became unexpectedly acquainted with two decided opponents to the new law.

These had probably perceived, in my refusal to accept the above-mentioned rewards, a confirmation of what had been told them by Klapka during his presence in Debreczin relative to my disapproval of the decree of the Diet of the 14th of April, and had thereby felt themselves encouraged to meet me with confidence.

They quite undisguisedly expressed their joy at the false position in which I had placed the Government by my unexpected refusal of the distinctions intended for me; confirmed and completed Klapka's former evidences of Kossuth's intrigues, by means of which he had brought about the declaration of independence; and finally cautioned me against accepting the portfolio of war-minister, or, more correctly, they earnestly besought me *not to leave the army*.

Only so long as I actually stood at the head of the army — said they — could I reckon on its obedience, on its unreserved confidence, — would my word have weight in the balance of public opinion, — would it maintain its influence even with that large part of the nation which my personal enemies had set *against me*. This was just as little a secret to the leaders of the 14th of April party — the men of the Government — as was the danger by which their policy would be menaced if I took part against them. This was also the reason why the Go-

vernment feared to transfer to me definitively the chief command of the army; why it wished to remove me from the theatre of war; and only that it might appear justified before the army in doing so, had it offered me the minister's portfolio.

I hereupon gave the two leaders of the deputation from the Diet the tranquillising assurance that other additional circumstances obliged me still to retain the chief command.

I did not, however, communicate to them my previous determination to compel the Diet in due time by force of arms to annul the law of the 14th of April, because I had given up all thoughts of the execution of this determination as soon as the discovery of a weighty party in the Diet of the same political opinions as myself, led me to suppose it now possible to strive for the same object — which at first had seemed to me to be attainable only by the bayonet — with the observance at the same time of the constitutional forms, which had obtained in Hungary such general authority.

Moreover, the way in which this was forthwith to be attempted had not been at all discussed during the above-mentioned private visit, which the leaders of the deputation from the Diet paid me. I knew then that I should be at Debreczin in the course of a few days, and preferred to await the opportunity which would probably be offered to me there, of declaring openly before a larger number of members of the peace-party my views in relation to the present situation of Hungary.

CHAPTER IX.

GENERAL AULICH, immediately after the taking of Ofen, in consequence of an obstinate inward complaint, had applied for his dismissal into retirement.

General Damjanics was miserably laid up with his shattered leg.

All the other coryphei of the army, except General Klapka, had been far too little tried as independent leaders to be confidently intrusted with the chief command. General Klapka, however, I could by no means wish at the head of the army, with my intention of resuming most energetically the offensive against the Austrians before the Russians should prevent us from doing so, after he had so decidedly declared himself for observing the defensive, in the general plan of operations projected by him and approved by the council of ministers in Debreczin.

Under these circumstances I was constrained to retain the chief command of the army.

Not mistaking the weighty influence of the war-ministry upon the services and the political disposition of the army, I was, however, already convinced of the necessity of obstructing for ever the way in which Kosuth and those about him had hitherto known how to gain this influence; and unfortunately General Klapka, during the short time he had acted as my substitute in Debreczin, had justified in a very deplorable manner my apprehension that he might scarcely be equal to this task, on account of his being of too yielding a nature.

For I was one day surprised by the appointment of a sister of the Governor of Hungary as foster-mother-in-chief of the sick of the country; and moreover by a war-ministerial decree, signed by Klapka himself, which subordinated the authorities of all hospitals in the country, in all their administrative relations, to the immediate rule of the said foster-mother-in-chief of the sick of the country.

The aptitude of the fair sex for nursing the sick has hitherto, I should think, been denied by nobody; but "to nurse the sick" and "to organise and conduct the nursing of the sick of a whole country, especially of an army during war," are certainly two different things. This could not have been unknown to General Klapka; but his moral strength, as above indicated, might have been insufficient to oppose, with the regard due to the fair sex, yet still with manly firmness, the administrative inclinations of a lady, which even with the best intentions were at any rate inopportune.

In consequence of this the war-ministry under Klapka had lost more of its independence in a few days than under Mészáros in months. It would indeed have been unjustifiable to intrust it any longer to a guidance, the weakness of which completely opened the door to the remarkable passion of Kossuth and those about him of both sexes for dabbling in the most important affairs of war, constantly with as much want of common sense as with excessive vanity. Klapka himself seemed to know this; for shortly after the fall of Ofen he declared that he found he was not at all in his element as war-minister, and wished to return to the active army.

At this moment, however, I knew of no disposable person whatever, to whom I could more satisfactorily

have transferred my duties as war-minister than to General Klapka; and I was thus obliged for the present to take upon myself personally the war-ministry also, at least until I should see the possibility of confiding the principal direction of it to a substitute on whom I could rely.

Accordingly I went to Debreczin in the beginning of June, my personal presence with the army not being indispensable for the next few days in the present condition of affairs on the theatre of war.

The main army had lost in Generals Damjanics and Aulich its two best leaders.

After the taking of Ofen it was literally an orphan. At least I considered it so.

Neither Klapka's talents as a general, though extraordinary, nor my own efforts, appeared to me sufficient to make up for the heavy loss which the army had sustained in those two persons.

But to the new commanders of corps, Generals Nagy-Sándor and Knézich, to Colonel Pöltenberg, as well as to Aulich's successor in the command of the second army corps, Colonel Asbóth, no opportunity had hitherto been afforded for trying their independent action before the enemy — either in critical moments on the field of battle, as in the case of Damjanics at Isaszeg and Nagy-Sárlo; or in accomplishing a strategic task alike perilous and decisively important, as was that of Aulich during the April campaign before Pesth.

And there was no reason to suppose that the offensive campaign against the Austrians, which I seriously intended, in spite of Klapka's plan of defensive operations, would be less fertile in similar critical moments and situations.

I was therefore obliged to decide *either* to open this campaign with the main body of the principal army concentrated under my personal command *on a single* line of operation, and to face at random its later critical phases with commanders of army corps as yet untried; *or* to break up the main body of the army corps, and attempt the opening of the campaign with distinct independent army corps *on several* lines of operation, for the purpose of discovering, at the very commencement of the campaign, those among the new commanders of army corps who might be qualified to compensate for Generals Damjanics and Aulich.

In accordance with the opinion of the chief of the general staff I chose the latter expedient.

According to this, our offensive against the Austrians — as we shall see afterwards — was to begin with a combined attack of the independently-operating first, second, and third army corps on the hostile position at the Waag; and the reunion of these army corps, under my personal command, was not to take place till after the successful crossing of that river.

The seventh army corps, under Pöltenberg and Kmety, had meanwhile to demonstrate on the right bank of the Danube.

My task as commander-in-chief was consequently limited, during the first development of these offensive operations, to merely keeping an eye upon their unity.

I entrusted the fulfilment of this task to the chief of the general staff.

This convenient measure led to the establishment of a mobile central office of operations for all Hungary, and to an attempt at realising my twofold intention — of bringing unity into the operations of all the national

armies, and of putting an end to Kossuth's injurious influence on the progress of those operations.

This plan also enabled me to devote my personal exertions, during some days, exclusively to the management of the affairs of the war-ministry, without having to fear that any thing would thereby be neglected in the sphere of the operations of the main army; for, on the one hand, the supposition was highly probable, that the Austrian« — disconcerted by the defeats they had suffered during the April campaign — scarcely thought of daring an offensive step against us before the invasion of the Russians *en gros*; on the other hand, in order to be able to commence the attack on the hostile position on the Waag with energy, the enemy's advanced troops had previously to be driven back from the left to the right bank of the Waag, and then the preparations, always lengthy, rendered necessary by our great want of the equipments for bridges, were to be made, which should render the intended crossing of the Waag in the face of the enemy possible by us. Both tasks, in my opinion, could scarcely be accomplished before the time when I intended to return from Debreczin. In case, however, during my absence of several days from the army, any unforeseen circumstances should occur on the theatre of war, the chief of the general staff was empowered to issue, according to his own judgment, to the separate army corps such especial dispositions as in consequence of these circumstances were necessary to be instantly taken; all commanders of corps, divisions, and columns of the main army having been ordered to regard equally as my own the official signature of the chief of the general staff, who at the same time was chief of the mobile central office of operations.

CHAPTER X.

I HAD not been deceived in my expectation, that I should find an opportunity in Debreczin of expressing before several members of the peace-party my views on the consequences of the declaration of independence, as well as on the measures which should be taken without delay by all of us who did not agree to the separation of Hungary from Austria, whether on principle, or merely on account of its results, — in order to restore the constitution of 1848.

Scarcely had I arrived in Debreczin, when I received from one of the two representatives who in Ofen, a few days before, had warned me against accepting the portfolio of war, a pressing invitation to a confidential meeting with several who shared his political opinions.

This meeting accordingly took place on the very first evening after my arrival in Debreczin.

I was introduced by the representative alluded to into an assembly of from fifteen to twenty persons, who for the most part were unknown to me. Among those present with whom I had previously come in contact was Field-marshal Lieutenant Mészáros.

The majority of those present wished me to inform them, in the first place, what foundation there was for the intelligence, first brought to Debreczin by General Klapka, of the *prevalent* antipathy in the ranks of the main army to the declaration of independence.

Now this intelligence, when originally brought to Debreczin by General Klapka (in the beginning of

May), was in so far really untenable as that the discontent with the declaration of independence had not then been predominantly observable in the *whole* of the main army, but only in a smaller part of it — the seventh army corps.

But since then — especially during the unwelcome leisure at the siege of Ofen — the officers who had previously been in the Austrian service, and who were naturally enemies to the declaration of independence, had been so successful in their propagandism against it in the other army corps also, that now, in the beginning of June, I could, without the slightest departure from truth, most decidedly corroborate Klapka's accounts — at all events anticipated in the beginning of May — of the prevalence in the ranks of the main army of sentiments opposed to the declaration of independence.

With equal decision I declared Kossuth's assertion, that the stroke of policy of the 14th of April had been desired by the army, to be untrue.

I ventured to declare this, not merely from the fact, that Kossuth, when he at first made known in Gödöllő his longing for a political demonstration against the Olmütz octroyed constitution, was earnestly advised by me not to indulge this desire; I asserted it on the well-grounded supposition that Kossuth had received no answer to his inquiries touching the seasonableness of making such a demonstration from *any* of the commanders of army corps then present in Gödöllő, which could have authorised him to conclude that the army wished, nay positively demanded, the separation of Hungary from Austria.

Not from Damjanics; because an expression which he made use of in my presence on the 20th April (the

day after the battle of Nagy-Sarló) — "he should really like to know how far the independent Debrecziners would have run, had the Austrians, instead of us, been victorious the day before!" — shewed no particularly friendly feeling for the 14th of April.

Not from Klapka; because he actually — as was again confirmed to me just now — had in set terms reproached some representatives on account of the 14th of April, even supporting his reproaches by vivid descriptions of the antipathy prevailing in the army to the declaration of independence.

Finally, *not* from Aulich, or the then commander of the seventh army corps; because probably Kossuth had thought it superfluous to hear repeated twice over nearly the same answer as I had given him. For these two were under me while I was commander of the former corps d'armée " of the upper Danube," and in Kaschau took part in the known demonstration in my favour against Dembinski's being commander-in-chief. Now these antecedents could hardly have been unknown to Kossuth, and had most probably decided him not to ask the opinion of the two last-named commanders of army corps about the opportuneness of his longed-for demonstration, which was alike hostile to our constitution of 1848 and to that of the Olmütz octroyed.

It may still be objected, that Kossuth may have derived his conviction of the sympathy felt for his personal policy in the Hungarian army, concentrated in Gödöllő after the battle at Isaszeg, not from its leaders, but from the ranks of the different corps.

Indeed, it seems very likely that Kossuth, with sufficient leisure, might have succeeded in persuading the troops in Gödöllő to noisy manifestations of lively

sympathy for something similar to the 14th of April; just as he had once been successful, in the camp at Parendorf, in agitating Móga's army, which was totally disinclined to carry offensive operations across the Lajtha, within a few days to diametrically opposite sentiments. The wish, repeatedly expressed by Kossuth, especially in Gödöllő, to pay familiar visits to the various army corps in their quarters, also clearly betrayed that he was preparing a second edition of the camp-speeches which were so successful in Parendorf.

But perhaps the anticipation of finding in Gödöllő, instead of the national guards and volunteers of the Parendorf camp, an audience that had already smelt powder, and the modest doubt of the success of his oratorical efforts before an audience of *that kind*, or — what is much more probable — the fear of my *contre-coups* had frightened him from his intention; suffice it to say, the confidential visits to the camp did not take place, and Kossuth restricted himself in Gödöllő solely to witnessing the third army corps defile before him on its march against Waizen (on the 8th or 9th of April).

There was, it is true, on this occasion an animated shout of "Long live Kossuth, the saviour of his country!" which repeatedly greeted him from the ranks of the troops as they passed. Yet rightly considered, *this very* shout ought, as its consequence, to have made him feel disgust at any further thought of the *coup d'état* of the 14th of April, doubtless at that time already planned, and should have determined him to sacrifice his personal policy for the salvation of the fatherland.

But scarcely any of these details were mentioned at my meeting with the members of the peace-party. The assembly shewed that it had confidence in me; it seemed

to place implicit faith in my simple assurance that the Diet had been mystified by Kossuth; it asked no proof of it.

I now advised the immediate abolition of the law of the 14th of April, in order to save Hungary from the Russian invasion, and consequently from certain destruction; but received for answer the comfortless news, that the Diet had already adjourned, and would not meet again in Pesth till the beginning of July.

Some of those present accompanied this information — perhaps unintentionally — by casual remarks, from which I thought I must infer that it would not be unwelcome to the peace-party, if, in the mean time, the abolition of this law were to proceed from the army.

At a time when every conjuncture seemed to guarantee to its realisation eminently successful results, I had formed in my own mind the idea of the abolition, by means of a military *coup d'état*, of the Diet's resolution of the 14th of April.

This was, as is known, immediately after the complete relief of Komorn, and before the setting out of the main body of our principal army against Ofen, when the Austrian army was in full retreat; and the probability was undeniable, after a speedy reduction of the garrison of Ofen, of prosecuting the victory of the tri-colour banner over the black-and-yellow flag as far as the Lajtha.

To the fortunate issue of the April campaign, as commander-in-chief of the main army, I was at that time indebted for an authority, the weight of which would have sufficed to counterbalance any political Views opposed to mine prevailing in the country. After⁹²¹ equally fortunate May campaign, as far as the wes-

tern boundaries of Hungary, I might have reckoned with perfect certainty on dispersing the whole of the party of the 14th of April by the simple proclamation: "The declaration of independence is invalid! The constitution of 1848 for ever!" — if the army stood by me.

I leave it to the judgment of each individual to decide whether the main army would have stood by me or not.

Suffice it for me to affirm that, under the just-mentioned favourable conjunctures, I was firmly resolved, at my own risk, to dare the finishing stroke at the Diet's resolution of the 14th of April.

But the victorious advance of our main army as far as the Lajtha appeared to me the *indispensable condition*.

For the main army, in my opinion, needed this new confirmation of the renown of its arms, that its *nimbus* might secure to the said proclamation such a reception in the country as was necessary to frustrate every armed faction favourable to the declaration of independence.

The loss of time consequent upon the *regular siege* of Ofen, which had unexpectedly become necessary; the credible rumours of a considerable re-inforcement of the Austrian main army having meanwhile taken place, and the threatening proximity of the Russians; Aulich's unavoidable retirement from the theatre of war; and Klapka's declared partiality for the defensive; — all this made the accomplishment of that "indispensable condition" extremely doubtful; while, at the same time, the discovery of the peace-party, as well as the disclosures of the manner in which the Diet's resolution of the 14th of April originated, allowed me to hope that it might perhaps be set aside even in a regular parliamentary manner.

In consequence of this I relinquished the idea of the military *coup d'état* as absurd.

In concert with the peace-party, however, the taking up again of this idea seemed to me any thing but absurd; — after that, through the unexpected adjournment of the Diet, the possibility of getting at the declaration^d of independence in a parliamentary way appeared to be postponed to a time long before which the Russians could already be in the country.

But as conjunctures had become meanwhile far more unfavourable, I wished that the peace-party might first calmly look in the face all the dangerous consequences to be anticipated from the realisation of such an idea, before it declared itself in favour of it.

The remarks above referred to as cursorily dropt by some members of the peace-party during our conference, from which, as has been said, I thought I might infer the sympathies of the peace-party for the abolition of the new law of the Diet by means of a military counter-revolution, consequently induced me undisguisedly to discuss this step, together with its immediate probable results.

But scarcely had I begun to do so, when the assembly interrupted me with vigorous shouts of, "No military revolution! No government of the sabre!"

This was the *negative* result of my meeting with the men of the peace-party. I had expected a *positive* one, but in vain.

I entered the assembly full of joyous hopes. I left it undeceived.

I had confidently reckoned on finding the peace-party, though it had been obliged to yield by a bold stratagem of Kossuth's, still ready for action, and de-

terminated on a desperate counter-stroke. I found it entirely beaten out of the field, for the moment unfit for the contest, and apparently, even with reference to the later renewal of the struggle, without a firm resolve, without a definite plan. To me at least it had communicated neither. Possibly it may have omitted this only through excessive caution. This reserve, however, constrained me to suppose that the peace-party felt itself altogether too weak to resist successfully, either *in* parliament or *out* of it, its political opponents — the men of the 14th of April.

And so I could no longer remain in uncertainty as to the direction I had to give to my premeditated hostile activity against the continued existence of the new law of the Diet.

In parliament the peace-party had to be strengthened by the addition of new forces. To this end, the officers serving in the main army who had parliamentary qualifications, and on whose political sentiments I could rely, were urged to solicit most zealously their election as representatives for any places accidentally vacant.

Out of parliament I had to endeavour to deprive the party of the 14th of April of its most influential supporters. These were the leaders of the national forces isolated from the main army: Bem, Moritz Perczel, Dembinski, and, besides, Count Guyon, commander of the fortress of Komorn.

These had to be removed from their posts, and the vacant commands entrusted to men from whom at the decisive moment I had no reason to fear opposition in support of the declaration of independence.

I could accomplish this, however, only as acting minister-of-war, The conviction of this fully deter-

mined me to overcome the moral aversion I felt to taking the oath to a law, the overthrow of which, even in the most favourable case, seemed indispensable to the salvation of the great cause of Hungary.

CHAPTER XL

THE political relationship between Kossuth's views relative to the conditions on which the stability of the liberty of Hungary depended (see Chapter xxxiv. of Vol. I.) and the *coup d'état* of the 14th of April was not to be mistaken.

These views Kossuth had communicated to me in the beginning of March 1849; at a time when the octroyed constitution of Olmütz could not yet be known of by us.

In the face of this fact, the assumption that the *coup d'état* of Olmütz had been needed in order to call into existence that of Debreczin seemed untenable.

Kossuth might go on calling the latter a *constrained* demonstration against the former; I nevertheless remained convinced, that in Kossuth the embryo of the declaration of independence was already in a far-advanced state of development — only interrupted by Dembinski's unlucky *début* as commander-in-chief — when the octroyed constitution of Olmütz came into the world. I remained convinced of this, because those expressions of Kossuth in Tiszafüred (in the beginning of March, directly after Dembinski's removal) as to the

necessity of making Poland free, that Hungary might remain and that Europe might become so, had been too surprising to me at the time for them to have slipped from my memory.

It is known that these expressions had been called forth by my endeavour seriously to warn Kossuth against any departure from the legal basis of our combat in self-defence.

As distinctive marks of Kossuth's political tendencies, they were even then sufficient to force me into the most decided opposition to him; but they seemed to sink down almost to the significance of an inoperative private opinion, when Kossuth directly after assured me that he held it to be the most sacred duty of all who meant honourably by the country to venture on no step, the consequences of which might increase the power of the common enemy of us all.

On this protestation I suppressed all apprehension that Kossuth could allow himself to be seduced by his private political views into any step hostile to the existing constitution.

This protestation of Kossuth's, however, was not sincerely meant; it belonged only to the category of those well-known means by which he knew how to prevent any reciprocal approach between the army and the peace-party, and subsequently to execute his *coup d'état* — means, the frequent employment of which especially characterised Kossuth's tactics with regard to his political adversaries.

The *coup d'état* of the 14th of April shewed me, unfortunately too late, that where I had hitherto confided, there the most decided distrust would have been fitter.

At the same time I perceived that the result of this *coup d'état* was so palpably injurious to the just cause of Hungary, that I could not but accuse the man who had introduced it, either of over-haste or of an inordinate striving after the attainment of predominating personal objects.

The accusation of over-haste appeared to me to be deprived of its force by the circumstance already mentioned, namely, that Kossuth, six weeks before the 14th of April, was already working at the political fundamental idea of this *coup d'état*; without taking into account the conference which he had with me in Gödöllő (a week before the 14th of April) about its opportuneness, or the motives which induced me decidedly to dissuade him on that occasion from any such step.

The other accusation, on the contrary, has first to be weakened. Until now, as far as I know, this has not yet been done.

Hereby, I should think, is sufficiently explained the essential difference in the personal relation between Kossuth and myself *after* and *before* the 14th of April.

Before that day I submitted my will with full confidence to Kossuth's influence.

The tactics of which Kossuth had hitherto made use against the peace-party and myself forced me to adopt the same tactics against him.

My entering the ministry was the first employment of these tactics.

That Kossuth did not trust me — in this I could not possibly be deceived. It is a philosophical necessity to mistrust him whose confidence we have abused.

He mistook, however, the real motives of the counter-stroke which he feared from me.

His supposition, that I opposed his policy only from personal rivalry, was my most powerful defensive and offensive ally against him.

He doubtless supposed, that only my personal vanity (the author of the proclamation of Waizen) had been wounded by his *coup d'état*.

He believed at the same time that by appointing me war-minister, he had hit upon the real soothing balm for the sensitive wound; and when I had actually accepted the portfolio of war, he falsely imagined that the wound was already in a fair way of being radically healed — that my opposition to the declaration of independence was completely removed.

How Kossuth reconciled with this illusion my refusal to accept the distinctions intended for me in consequence of the taking of Ofen, remains, however, inexplicable. But that he nevertheless did labour under such an illusion cannot be denied, for the simple reason that he suffered the union of the powers of war-minister and of the chief command of the main army in my person — a union in the highest degree dangerous to his policy — till the moment when I myself perceived the necessity of delivering him from the bonds of that illusion.

CHAPTER XII.

IMMEDIATELY after the relief of Komorn, I had proposed to Kossuth to remove the seat of government into that fortress. He answered, that the government could not expose itself to the risk of being blockaded by the enemy; it must always secure the possibility of exerting a direct influence on the parts of the country not yet occupied by the enemy's arms.

On my arrival in Debreczin, after the taking of Ofen, I now learned that the seat of government was about to be transferred to Pesth. I endeavoured in vain to shew Kossuth that circumstances were all against it; that the government, now that the demolition of the fortifications of Ofen was commenced, would be exposed to danger from the enemy in the capitals not less than in Debreczin.

The removal of the government to Pesth — Kossuth maintained on the contrary — was indispensable, principally because the capitals figure in the national traditions as the seat of the real rulers of Hungary. The inhabitants between Pesth and Debreczin had very strikingly shewn to the government when fleeing last winter behind the Theiss, that with the traditional residence it had given up its right to their homage. The triumphal procession from Debreczin back to the capitals was intended to renew in the people this homage, which it had at that time refused to the government. The Hungarian was fond of pomp, and believed there was power only where he met with *pomp*. He (Kossuth),

in the consciousness of the victory they had gained, would every where harangue the people, and animate it to further glorious combats for its independence from Austria. Moreover — he remarked in conclusion — all the ministries had already packed up, and the most of them were by this time on their way thither. The Diet was adjourned, and summoned to Pesth for the beginning of July. A sudden change of these measures would make the triumphant conquerors suspected in the eyes of the people as fugitives again, would depress the public feeling, nay would soon spread terror and confusion throughout the country. He could not take upon himself the responsibility of the consequences of all this.

The ministries — that of war likewise — were in fact already occupied with their transference to the capitals when I arrived at Debreczin; and this circumstance alone convinced me of the uselessness of offering any further opposition to Kossuth's ardent longing for the solemn entrance into Pesth.

At the same time I was forced to suppose it was solely out of eager desire for the satisfaction of this longing, that Kossuth had been so strongly bent upon the taking of Ofen, as even to side with me against Guyon, in order to render the regular siege of that place possible.

My intention of removing Generals Bern, Perczel, and Dembinski, from the army, seemed to be practicable — without rousing Kossuth's suspicions against me — only with his personal assent and co-operation. In order to secure this, he had to be convinced of the indispensable necessity for bringing these commanders of troops again under the authority of the ministry of war.

He seemed to enter into my views; but strove in many ways against their consequences. Whether merely out of mistrust of me, or from dread of those persons, could not be known with certainty. Probably both reasons lay at the bottom of the difficulties which Kossuth raised against the energetic coercion of these generals, especially of Bern.

It is true he himself complained of the latter's dissipation of money, of his disturbing encroachments on the administration of the country, the arbitrary reduction in the price of salt in the country of the Szekler, the forcible transference of families of Hungarian peasants into Wallachian places (after their original inhabitants had been driven out) — measures such as were not even permitted to him (Kossuth) without the previous consent of the Diet, and which betrayed clearly enough Bern's inclination to play the sovereign in Transylvania. In spite of this — Kossuth thought — he was obliged seriously to dissuade from any energetic steps against Bern, because he had threatened to resign the chief command of the army in Transylvania the moment any of his measures were disavowed; but that to him Bern's remaining at his post seemed to be indispensable to the maintenance of Transylvania.

I saw that, with these views of Kossuth's about Bern, I ran the risk of falling into open conflict with him, if I insisted on the application of stringent measures against Bern. The necessity for giving way to Kossuth in this case, in order the more certainly to gain him for the steps I intended to take against Perczel and Beminski, appeared to me indisputable. I accordingly promised Kossuth to leave to him alone the regulation of all those administrative affairs in which contests were

to be feared between the war-ministry and Bern, and contented myself for the present with frustrating his intention of transferring to Field-marshal Lieut. Bem, besides the chief command over the army in Transylvania, also that over the troops of Generals Count Vecsey and Perczel, which were separately operating in the Banat and the Bácska.

The possibility of so frustrating this intention of Kossuth's, as that he not only did not guess the real tendency of the measure, but moreover must have felt himself obliged to me, was presented by the following circumstances.

Field-marshal Lieut. Vetter, still the really appointed commander-in-chief of the main army, had, as is known, fallen seriously ill just before the commencement of the April campaign; but in the course of the campaign — during the first half of the month of April — he felt his health already sufficiently re-established to enable him to resume the command of the main army. He also prepared without delay for so doing, and informed Kossuth of it; who had, however, in the mean time entertained the apprehension, that a sudden change in the chief command of the army might disturb the successful progress of the campaign, and used various means to hinder Vetter's departure for the main army, until the siege of Ofen. During it Vetter at last, it is true, arrived in the sphere of the main army; he did not, however, avail himself of his rights as its commander-in-chief, but stayed, as I heard, by turns in Pesth and in Gödöllő. Not till after the fall of Ofen did a reciprocal explanation — an oral one — take place between him and me. He declared, that now that the main army had become accustomed to consider *me* as its

commander-in-chief, he no longer thought of pressing his claims to this post, but said that he demanded from me the future minister of war, a compensation for the injury which had been done to his public honour by Kossuth's intriguing against his re-entering on the active duties of commander-in-chief — that is, his appointment to a post corresponding to the rank with which he had been invested.

This request of Vetter's seemed to me not only very reasonable, it was besides most agreeable to me, in order that I might profit by the embarrassment into which Kossuth had brought himself with respect to Vetter, and give him the means of reconciling him — justly exasperated at having been, to say the least, undeservedly slighted — by nominating him commander-in-chief of the army in the Bácska and the Banat.

Kossuth signed the decree for Vetter's nomination most willingly. He seemed in fact to have no presentiment of the real extent of my proposal; it appeared rather as if he felt himself greatly obliged to me for the excellent opportunity I had afforded him of repairing the wrong he had done to Vetter.

Simultaneously with this affair I pursued the strict submission of Generals Perczel and Dembinski to my orders as war-minister. The strong aversion of both of them to recognise a superior military authority, added to the any thing but friendly personal relations in which both stood to me, led me confidently to anticipate that the consequential execution of these measures would of itself be sufficient soon to render insupportable to them the further remaining at their posts. Nevertheless both shewed more tenacity than I had expected. Both must be removed. Kossuth seemed fortunately to be much

less convinced that they were indispensable in the field than he was in the case of Field-marshal Lieut. Bern.

In the removal of Guyon from the command of the fortress of Komorn I had far less difficulty. For it so happened that Klapka in person asked this post for himself in conjunction with the chief command over three army corps, and seemed also to be quite equal to it; while Guyon's well-nigh proverbial small stock of military knowledge stood in a tragi-comical disproportion to the duties devolving on the commander of a fortress. Accordingly, almost as a matter of course, the command of the fortress of Komorn was taken from Count Guyon, and intrusted to General Klapka; while Guyon was appointed commander of the corps of reserve which was just about being raised.

Kossuth had nothing *to* object to this change in the command of the fortress of Komorn; the more warmly, on the other hand, did he declaim against Guyon's being placed with the reserve. It was unjustifiable — he said — to employ the brave lion-hearted general in the reserve, when his place should be in the foremost line of the army; unjustifiable certainly to derive no advantage from powers like Guyon's just at the moment when the danger of the country appeared to be increasing threefold.

Nevertheless Guyon — the zealous repeater of Kossuth's political confession of faith of the 14th of April — remained with the reserve. Even had his political opinion been the reverse of what it was, he would not have escaped the reserve; for it seemed to me dangerous to entrust an *independent* command, in the face of the enemy, to a general who, as experience shewed, had his heart indeed in the right place, but not his head.

While I was endeavouring in the manner above described to purge the army from those partisans of the 14th of April who were at that time known to me, and were, as I believed, not to be too lightly regarded, I was surprised by the news of an event which deeply moved the army, nay the whole nation.

The Austrian Master of the Ordnance Baron Haynau, the successor of Baron Weiden in the chief command of the hostile army, announced to us the beginning of his activity in his new sphere by some executions. Two Hungarian officers, Ladislaus Baron Mednyánszky and Philip Gruber, prisoners, also fell a sacrifice to it.

CHAPTER XIII.

LADISLAUS BARON MEDNYANSZKY and Philip Gruber had belonged to the garrison of the fort of Leopoldstadt on the Waag. The fort, after a short bombardment, was surrendered in the beginning of February 1849 to the besieging Field-marshal Lieutenant Simunich. Mednyánszky and Gruber — as I afterwards learned — are said to have been the only men who declared themselves against this act. For this reason, after being made prisoners, their lot was a much harder one than that of their comrades. A court-martial sentenced both to death.

This happened while Prince Windisch-Grätz held the chief command in Hungary. But neither he nor his immediate successor, Baron Weiden, had this sentence carried into effect.

Only Baron Haynau did this. Mednyánszky and Gruber were hanged at Presburg in the fifth month of their captivity; after the rumours about their sentence being commuted to several years' imprisonment in a fortress had gained credit, and were rendered probable on many accounts, but chiefly by the unusual delay in the execution of the sentence.

These executions appeared to be not sufficiently justified by that act alone which was imputed to the condemned as a crime, after pardon had previously been granted to so many Hungarian officers taken with arms in their hands, who had formerly been in the Austrian service. They were intelligible at all, only if we either assume that Baron Haynau has inherently a peculiar predilection for such proceedings, and that these executions consequently stand in immediate connexion with himself, and would not have taken place under another commander-in-chief; or if we admit that they must be considered as repressive measures on the part of the Austrian government against the decision of the Hungarian Diet of the 14th of April. In the latter case it had evidently the appearance as if Mednyánszky and Gruber, though made prisoners by the Austrians in the beginning of February, had nevertheless been executed as accomplices of those men who full ten weeks later put the royal imperial dynasty of Habsburg-Lorraine under the Hungarian imperial ban.

The exasperation against Austria reached in consequence of these executions the culminating point.

I had — as is known — before the 14th of April, in a letter to Prince Windisch-Grätz, threatened that for every captive Hungarian officer put to death three Austrian officers should be sacrificed.

Kossuth in the name of the nation, and Klapka in the name of the army, now demanded of me that I should without delay execute this menace.

If I did, I must in future and for ever abandon my endeavours to thwart the Russian invasion by the abolition of the Debreczin declaration of independence and the tentative preparation for an agreement with Austria. But every higher motive to induce me to do this was wanting; since I had become convinced that the declaration of independence had no more in common with the will of the Hungarian nation, than a private pleasure of Kossuth's had with its welfare.

I consequently refused to execute this threat, and continued undisturbed my endeavours in the direction indicated, even when — on account of the general exasperation at the first-fruits of Baron Haynau's doings in Hungary, as well as on account of the feeling of invincibility probably as general — there were indeed scarcely more than timid sympathies to be expected for the idea of a return to the constitution of the year 1848, connected as it was prospectively with considerable sacrifices.

I prosecuted my purpose of dismissing Dembinski and Perczel from the active army, as well as the restriction of Bem to his forces in Transylvania, as zealously as this could be done without betraying too early the real tendency of these measures.

I caused such of the officers of the army as had parliamentary qualifications, and were opposed to the party of the 14th of April, to be repeatedly urged to solicit their election to the Diet.

I persevered also in my resolution to commence the offensive against the Austrian army: for the abolition

of the law of independence had not to resemble a victory which fear had gained over the giddiness of national arrogance, become superlative under Kossuth's infatuating influence; it had rather to bear the stamp of a voluntary manly act. Not under the incubus of apprehension for its own skin, but, on the contrary, after a calm estimate of those dangers which in consequence of its own acts threatened the life of the nation, and after a conscientious conviction that it was its duty to leave no means of salvation untried — had the Diet to declare that very law, with which it would perhaps afterwards have been most pleased, to be what it really was — incompatible with the true interests of the nation; then voluntarily to come back within the bounds of the rehabilitated constitution, and, however difficult this might be, with great and dignified self-abnegation offer to the Vienna government a peaceable arrangement, just at the moment of general confidence in victory and in spite of the public arrogance; but above all to make the national cause, led back in this manner on the ground of justice and equity, its *personal* one, if the answer of the Vienna government should be the signal for the last combat for life and death.

I should, it is true, have had to disavow all my experiences of the year 1849, in order to give myself up to the deception, that the majority of the representatives were competent, of their own free impulse, to accomplish what, as above mentioned, I expected from them: but I rested my hope on the peace-party, and on the effects of those measures, by the use of which I intended to enable this party to gain the victory in parliament.

Some of these measures — the purging of the army

as much as possible from those leaders who belonged to the party of the 14th of April; the strengthening of the peace-party in the Diet; the preparations for the offensive — were already in progress at the time when the executions of Mednyánszky and Gruber became known, and by the intense exasperation which they roused against Haynau and the Austrian government seemed to render fruitless all my endeavours.

It did not seem advisable to me to employ the other measures until after the Diet had recommenced its sittings. Not till then did I think I should come forward openly with my intentions against the party of the 14th of April, and avow myself undisguisedly an adherent of the peace-party; not till then did I hope to intimate, nor without success, to the Diet as well as to the Government, in the name of the army, that, with the same fidelity as hitherto, it would assuredly fulfil its duty, by defending to the last the positive rights of the nation; but that it felt not the least inclination to answer for the declaration of independence, deceitfully represented as having been demanded by it.

Thus it happened that, during my proceedings as war-minister, I concealed even from the peace-party what I intended to undertake against its political adversaries. Thus it happened that probably Kossuth and Szemere erroneously believed they had made in me an assured acquisition — the former for his 14th of April, the latter for his republic.

Szemere had perhaps taken the remark with which I had refused the rank of Field-marshal lieutenant (namely, that this dignity, so far as I knew, was not indigenous in republics), as a republican confession of faith. From this circumstance I also explained to my-

self, how it happened that I was elected deputy without having solicited it, and this by a district in which, to my knowledge, Szemere's name was very popular, mine not at all so. At least Szemere afterwards gave me clearly enough to understand, that I owed this surprise exclusively to his interference in my behalf with his electors.

Besides, since my entrance into the ministry, Szemere had endeavoured in a variety of ways to gain me over to a personal coalition with himself *against Kossuth*.

I, however, affected not to understand him.

I pursued the same course with Kossuth, so long as his desire for the chief command over the whole of the active national forces in Hungary and Transylvania made itself known only in modest allusions.

Kossuth at last thought he must speak more plainly; he did so, and was by me for a while encouraged in his hopes.

One consequence of this probably was, that he soon urgently pressed me to propose to him in my stead a commander-in-chief of the main army, as I had quite enough to do with fulfilling the duties of war-minister alone. This remark was incontrovertible; but I could not find the right man, that is, who would have been the right man for Kossuth. I proposed Klapka, whom I believed — as will be seen in Chapter xv. — I had meanwhile gained for the offensive. Kossuth declared that he did not agree in this choice. A better I could not then hit upon.

Then, again, Kossuth wished that I should devote myself personally to the conduct of the war-operations exclusively, and as war-minister be represented by a substitute. This request was agreeable to me. My

substitute in the war-ministry was confirmed without hesitation.

I had previously fixed the complement of the separate army corps at ten battalions of infantry, sixteen squadrons of cavalry, and five batteries — in all about 8000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and forty pieces of artillery.

The army corps was distributed into three divisions: two divisions of infantry, each consisting of five battalions and a battery of foot-artillery; and one division of cavalry, composed of the whole cavalry of the army corps and a battery of horse-artillery.

One twelve-pounder battery and one of horse-artillery formed the reserve of artillery, the employment of which in the field of battle belonged exclusively to the commander of the army corps.

The division had to represent as it were the operative *individual* of the army. Detachments of a considerable part of a division made by way of exception received the temporary appellation of "column."

Two or more army corps united under one chief command constituted an army.

One consequence of these definitions was, the final separation of the Kmety army division from the seventh army corps. The latter was organised, according to the new scheme, of those two-thirds of its original complement which had hitherto been united under Pöltenberg. At the same time the former Kmety army division was classified beforehand as an army corps, which was afterwards to be completed. Pöltenberg and Kmety were made generals.

During my personal participation in governmental affairs, Csányi, the minister of communication, proposed in the ministerial council, by a general amnesty to put

a speedy end to the labours — in many respects injurious — of the criminal courts of justice (*vészitörvényszékek*), which had been instituted for the vigorous punishment of treasonable crimes against the country. Also that the fugitives guilty of treason to the country, as well as the Hungarian subjects who were still serving in the hostile ranks, should be included in this amnesty, if they returned within a specified time to the reoccupied parts of the country.

Inconsiderately I had beforehand promised the proposer my vote in the council of ministers.

The deliberation, however, did not come to an end during the first session. I therefore gained time maturely to consider all the consequences of the proposed amnesty; and now declared myself *against* the amnesty, and only *for the abolition of the criminal courts of justice*.

I voted against the amnesty, because the government had not the means of giving validity to the act of grace. The pardoned persons would have come back; and the first-met troop of peasants (not to mention the amiable guerrillas) — having just been rendered fanatic against those who were pardoned by the agents of the very government from which the amnesty proceeded — would doubtless have felt themselves called upon, in spite of the amnesty, after as before it, to execute the summary penal proceeding of Lynch-law against the innocent returning persons.

The proposal of the amnesty failed.

Although it had been my well-considered determination not to make known the hostile sentiments with which I was filled against the existence of the law of the 14th of April until the next meeting of parliament; nevertheless I gave way before that time to the increas-

ing power of my exasperation at the manner in which Kossuth had called into being that law for the prospective destruction of Hungary.

Shortly before the commencement of the next offensive against the Austrian main army, there was added to those obstacles which — as we shall see afterwards — had retarded it so long, a failure of the most indispensable supplies of money, which became more felt every day.

My patience now gave way. In an official letter to Kossuth, in which I threw light on the disproportion between the considerable financial wants of the army and the insignificant means for meeting them, the declaration of independence received a well-deserved epithet — of course not an honourable one.

I meant the contents of this letter to come to the knowledge of the assembled council of ministers; and convinced as I was beforehand that Kossuth intended and was capable of either suppressing it, or of paralysing its effect in some manner, I had at the same time a duplicate of it transmitted direct to the minister of finance. Moreover I was careful not to fail of attending the sitting of the ministerial council at which it should be brought forward for discussion.

Kossuth received the ominous dispatch, and, as I had foreseen, would have gladly avoided communicating its contents to the ministerial council. That the minister of finance had a duplicate already in his hands, Kossuth did not know, when he invited me, immediately before the beginning of the approaching sitting, to follow him for the purpose of a private conference into his own apartment, which was separated from the consultation-room only by an antechamber.

Here he called me to account for the expression

used in my official letter censuring the law of independence. I justified it, by asserting that neither the nation nor its representatives, and least of all the army, for whose sake peculiarly the law had been proposed, had wished for it.

To weaken this assertion, Kossuth pointed to the addresses of homage which had flowed in on him since the 14th of April from all reoccupied parts of the country. With respect to this, I begged him to explain to me, what authorised him to estimate the worth of *these* addresses of homage higher than *those* which a few months previously Prince Windisch-Grätz had collected up and down the very same parts of the country.

Kossuth failed to give me any explanation.

That the law of independence had *not* been desired by the army, he did not venture moreover even to attempt to deny in this *tête-à-tête*. However, he did all he possibly could to induce me to retract and destroy the unpleasant official dispatch: I should consider, that my official attack upon the present law placed the existence of the ministry in question; and so forth. Not till I had assured him that the minister of finance would doubtless immediately lay before the council of ministers a duplicate of this dispatch, did Kossuth break off the conference, and we returned to the consultation-room.

The minister of finance had in fact the said duplicate ready, and now handed it over to Kossuth, with the surly remark, that only a part of its contents concerned himself.

The document was forthwith communicated in all its extent to the assembled ministers, and my not flattering opinion as to the opportuneness of the declaration

of independence was silently accepted by those present as a thing self-evident.

The ministry found nothing in my attack on the existing law of state, which, as Kossuth had feared, jeopardised its existence; but Kossuth might perhaps have been induced by it to take care that the financial wants of the main army, at least during the course of the next few weeks were not — *more consueto* — less attended to than those of some government commissaries, political agents, and other such.

And to obtain this was properly the primary object of my so sudden and unceremonious rising against Kossuth.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE events which had occurred on the theatre of war of our main army from the taking of Ofen till the middle of June were in substance the following:

The expeditionary column of Major Armin Gbrgei, at the time of the taking of Ofen just about marching towards Silein on the "Waag against the Austrian brigade of Major-general Barko, which had broken in through the defile of Jablunka, was — as the report stated — prevented from executing the intended expedition by the simultaneous advance (from Freystadl to Nyitra-Zsám-bokrét) of a part of the hostile troops under Major-general Herzinger.

About this time the first Russian divisions, approaching from Neumarkt (in Gallicia), made their appearance

in the Arva comitate. These were the advanced troops of the Russian corps under Major-general Sass.

In order to facilitate the protection of the mountain-towns, which had hereby been rendered uncommonly difficult, the strength of Armin Görgei's expeditionary column was increased by degrees to almost 3500 men and six pieces of artillery.

Major Görgei discontinued his incursions, and occupied only the direct approaches into the district of the mountain-towns, at Sztrecsen, Kralovján, Hermanecz, on the Sturecz, at Heiligenkreuz and Zsarnócz; his reserve, however, encamped at Perk, to the north of Kremnitz.

The other expeditionary column of the seventh army corps, which has been several times mentioned, observed meanwhile the main road between Freystadl (Galgócz) and Neutra, supported afterwards the operations of the first army corps by demonstrations against Freystadl, and at the same time kept up, as well as was possible considering the great distance, the communication of Major Görgei's expeditionary column with the main army.

The first army corps (General Nagy-Sándor), which had arrived from the camp at Ofen by Gran, Hull, and Komjáti in Urmény, in conjunction with the expeditionary column of the seventh corps, had undertaken a forcible reconnoitering of the passage across the Waag at Freystadl and Schintau (Sempte), which was occupied by the enemy.

The enemy evacuated the last-mentioned place together with the half-completed *tête-de-pont*, and retreated to the right bank of the Waag, destroying the bridge behind him. At Freystadl, however, he maintained himself. He reoccupied also — after Nagy-Sándor's

march back into his former position at Mocsonok and Urmény — the point of Schintau, and completed the construction of his interrupted fortification.

During the following days till the middle of June, the operations of the first corps — as far as I remember — were confined to observing the course of the Waag from Schintau to Tárnócz.

The second corps (Colonel Asbóth) and the third (General Knézich) had advanced from the camp at Ofen as far as Neuhäusel. The advanced troops of the latter occupied Tardosked, those of the former Tót-Megyer. Those of the third corps had to observe the Waag from Tárnócz to Farkasd, the others from Farkasd to Szémö. The main body of both army corps remained together in Neuhäusel.

After the reconnoitering of the points of Freystadl and Schintau, undertaken by the first corps and the expeditionary column of the seventh corps, however, the second corps marched from Neuhäusel by Guta to Aszód, threw a floating-bridge across the Neuhäusel branch of the Danube (below the mouth of the brook Feketeviz), and took charge of its defence against the hostile division posted at Szerdahely in the Great Schutt; while the third corps by itself had to observe the whole course of the Waag from Tárnócz as far as Szémö.

One part of the eighth army corps occupied Kormorn, the other the line between Aszod and Száp on the Danube.

The seventh army corps maintained itself at Raab.

The Kmety division had been disposed in the first half of June from Veszprém by Pápa to Tét, in order to form the extreme left wing of the position of the seventh army corps on the Raab.

From this point General Kmety attempted to surprise the Austrian column under the command of Major-general Weiss, which had advanced by itself on the road from Edeburg to Raab. This led to a bloody conflict at Csorna on the 13th of June. General Kmety conquered — the hostile commander remained on the field of battle — his defeated troops retreated towards Bösárkány.

General Kmety, by disposing one of his attacking-columns on the proper line of retreat of the enemy (the road from Csorna to Kapuvár), had intentionally forced him to the sideward retreat towards Bösárkány, on the supposition that the way thither was already occupied by a column of the seventh army corps. A similar column had in fact been directed by General Klapka, who acted in concert with General Kmety, to the territory between Bösárkány and Csorna; it arrived, however, too late. The enemy, pursued from Csorna, retreated consequently unimpeded as far as Bösárkány, evacuated finally this place likewise, retreated across the Rabnitz, destroyed the bridges, and thus escaped further pursuit.

General Kmety thereupon led his troops back to their original position on the river Raab, which he had to defend on the line from Rába-Szent-Mihály to Marczaltő.

The forces belonging to our main army in the middle of June (consisting, the garrison of Komorn included, of from 50,000 to 55,000 men) were consequently distributed on a line, which extended, in length more than thirty (German) miles, from Rosenberg in the Liptau, at first between the rivers Waag and Gran, then, crossing the little river Neutra, between it and the Waag to

the mouth of the latter in the Neuhäusel branch of the Danube, further a short distance along this branch upwards as far as Aszód, and from thence, in the direction towards Raab, across the Great and the Wieselburg Danube, and finally along the little river Raab as far as Marczaltö.

Opposite this line extended the position of the Austrian main army on the left bank of the Danube from Silein on the Waag along this river in a southern direction as far as Zsigárd, and from thence in a south-western direction over the Great Schutt to the Great Danube at Bös. *On* the right bank of this river the Austrian advanced troops in the Little Schutt and on the territory between the Weiselburg Danube and the Babnitz, were moved forward to beyond the height of Hochstrass against the position of our seventh army corps; those of the extreme right wing of the hostile main army crossed and somewhat avoided the road from CEdenburg to Raab at the height of Kapuvár.

AU the passages over the river Waag in the range of this position were in the enemy's power. Those at Freystadl and Schintau were rendered still more tenable by means of temporary fortifications.

According to the reports of our scouts, the reserves of the enemy — already re-inforced by a Russian army corps, which was said to be 16,000 strong — stood at Presburg, which had been made tenable; — the concentration of a particular Austrian corps on the Styrian frontier was in full progress, and moreover the extreme right wing of the Austrian main army (to the south of the Neusiedel lake and the Hanság) had been considerably strengthened; — the forces of the Russian Major-general Sass stationed in the Arva numbered from 10,000

to 12,000 men; — and besides very considerable Russian forces were concentrating themselves in Galicia at Dukla and Neumarkt.

The protection of the passages over the Waag at Frey-stadt and Schintau by temporary fortifications shewed the intention of the Austrians to debouch on both points with a part of the army, after the Russian army corps, breaking into Hungary across its northern frontiers, should have begun to descend into the interior of the country, and thus to form during the advance of the Russian army for a certain time its extreme right wing, as it were.

Considering as two separate series of operations, on the one hand the conquest of Transylvania by the allied troops, which, as I supposed, were exclusively destined for this purpose; on the other, the relief of Temesvár and Arad by the Austrian southern army, — the ideas which I formed beforehand relative to the plan of operations of the combined armies in upper Hungary were as follows:

On the part of the Russians:

Their invasion and advance on two principal lines of operation; the *one* (a western) from Neumarkt in Galicia through the Árva, Túrócz, the district of the mountain-towns, Ipolyság, Waizen, direct to Pesth; — the *other* (an eastern) from Dukla to Kaschau, and from thence according to the retrograde movements of our northern army.

On the part of the Austrians:

With the portion of the army debouching at Frey-stadt and Schintau — flank-movement with the Russian western army as far as the Danube, then investment of Komorn on the left bank of the Danube between it and

the Waag, in order to protect this investment, as well as the basis of the Russian operations, against a repellent attack on our part from Gran. The other greater part of the Austrian army to maintain itself in the Great Schutt and on the right bank of the Danube, until our main army, by the movements of the Russian western army, shall either be obliged to give way on the southern left bank of the Danube, or be confined exclusively to the right one. The corps concentrated on the frontiers of Styria at Fürstenfeld to advance simultaneously by Stuhlweissenburg towards the capitals; that in the first of the cases just indicated, the movement of our main army might not remain undiscovered; and in the latter, the crossing of the Danube at the capitals by the Russian western army might be facilitated; and moreover an offensive, if intended by us, against Vienna and Wiener-Neustadt, be frustrated in its execution.

I was in fact very uncertain as to the strength of the two\ expected Russian armies; but after the reports of scouts which have been mentioned, I found no reason to suppose that Russia would interfere with half measures. I knew still less about the time at which the Russian invasion *en gros* was really to be expected. The appearance, indeed, of the Russian advanced troops in the Arva shewed that this moment could scarcely be far off; it even seemed not improbable that the Russian armies would make their irruption before the re-assembling of the Hungarian Diet. But as I was without any certain intelligence upon the subject, I could not positively contradict the possibility of a still longer delay; and my conviction that Hungary was absolutely lost, as soon as Russia seriously interfered for its subjugation, determined me not to desist from the last attempt in my

power for saving it — that is, from those endeavours which had in view the abolition of the Debreczin law of independence of the 14th of April, with the intention of depriving the Russian intervention of its title of right, and thereby, if possible, of still preventing it from taking place — so long as the continued delay of the Russian armies left me even the least ray of hope for' a favourable result from these endeavours.

How the offensive against the Austrian army was connected with these endeavours, I have indicated in the preceding chapter.

It remains now only to explain why this offensive was not begun till the middle of June, — why not immediately after the taking of Ofen.

The clothing of the army had suffered very much during the April campaign; the foot-gear especially was in a state which gave reason to fear that after some forced marches, which not seldom appear necessary in operations on the open field, the number of battalions fit for service would be exceeded by the unfit. In Komorn (before the march against Ofen) the complaints of the commanders upon the defective condition of the clothing of the men had become so loud, that the serious doubts excited by this circumstance alone, whether we should continue the operations against the retreating Austrian main army, could have been suppressed only by a full appreciation of the enterprising spirit which animated the troops. This good disposition, it is true, had not deteriorated during the siege of Ofen, — but certainly the foot-gear had. The few days' marching from the camp at Ofen into the new positions well-nigh finished it. The besieging operations during the seventeen days spent before Ofen had,

it is true, left us time enough to remedy this defect; but the necessary means were not at our command. Kossuth had done much, surprisingly much, during the winter for the present supply of the wants of the army; but for their *regular* clothing no provision had yet been made. The government commissary, whom Kossuth had charged with procuring the needful supplies of clothing and equipment for the army, and who was under his own superintendence, promised much — did little — did least of all during the siege of Ofen. For this Kossuth himself was most to blame; for, just because he had taken upon himself to control the production of the clothing and equipment, but had somewhat too prematurely speculated on the entrance into Pesth, — the shoemakers and tailors working for the army had to begin *in spe* this ovation from Debreczin to Pesth in the beginning of May, and the work of these good people suffered thereby a very constant interruption; the, consequence of which was, that the army remained for weeks so defectively clothed, that it could not possibly answer the demands which would be made on it during the ensuing offensive operations.

The army had moreover suffered sensible losses numerically during the April campaign and before Ofen. Compensation for these losses appeared the more urgently necessary, as we must certainly expect to find the hostile army considerably increased.

Filling-up the gaps in an army on service with quite raw recruits — the constant fate of our main army — is well known not to be one of the most promising preparations for an offensive. Nevertheless the circumstances were of such kind that it appeared by no means possible to defer any longer making good the complement of

men in many cases. And moreover since Szemere (as minister of the interior) had officially assured me that from 10,000 to 12,000 recruits had already been levied as a compensation for the losses of the army, and an equal number for the reserve corps about to be formed, who were awaiting their destination; while Kossuth, on the other hand, spoke of the complete clothing, equipping, and arming of these men as of a thing done; — I thought I had better not begin the offensive operations until the ranks of the army were filled up — which, according to the official assurances of these gentlemen, could be done within a few days. Nay, I hoped even to be able to bring the reserve corps also into the district of the operations of the army before the opening of the campaign.

In order to begin and speed the formation of these corps as judiciously as possible, the *cadres* for their battalions — composed of the more distinguished officers, sub-officers, and privates of the main army — were immediately sent to the stations for their formation.

By the middle of June, however, scarcely half the promised recruits for the main army were on the spot; and the formation of the reserve corps was in a far worse plight, for the already-raised recruits were not — as Szemere had affirmed — awaiting their destination, but, on the contrary, the *cadres* of the battalions had to await the results of the levy only just set on foot; while of the supplies necessary for clothing, arming, and equipping these men, no traces were to be seen till about the middle of June.

Not less baseless than the official assurances of Szemere and Kossuth respecting it, had the latter's stereotyped asseveration, constantly recurring since the be-

ginning of April, proved to be, according to which the main army was to be recruited by from 12,000 to 16,000 men, who, as it was said, were unnecessary to Field-marshal Lieut. Bem.

I saw at last — too late unfortunately — that I had acted imprudently in delaying the long-intended offensive even for a single day, from relying on Kossuth's and Szemere's promises.

The unsuccessful efforts to be described in the next chapters, as fully as my defective recollections allow me, which were made by the main body of our army for the purpose of dislodging the enemy from his position on the Waag, were the beginning in earnest of this offensive.

But in case the political object, for the furtherance of which, as is known, this offensive was intended, should prove unattainable; that is, either if Austria, by the return of the Hungarian Diet from the law of independence to the constitution of 1848, should no longer allow to "be contested its rightful title to the aid of Russia for the carrying out of the octroyed constitution — or if the invasion of the Russian army should commence even before the assembling of the Diet; — in this case, according to the ideas which I had formed, as above pointed out, of the plan of operations of the combined armies, the same lines on which the divers parts of our main army had advanced were also assigned to them for the retreat.

The expeditionary column of Major Görgei had accordingly to retreat first to Waizen, and afterwards, according to circumstances, to Pesth or Gran; the other expeditionary column (of the seventh army corps) by Neutra and Yerebély into the valley of the lower Gran; the main body of the army (the first, second, and third

corps) to Gran; the mobile part of the eighth army corps from its position in the Great Schutt, as a matter of course, to Komorn; the seventh army corps into the fortified camp opposite Komorn; General Kmety, finally, on the Stuhlweissenburg road towards the capitals.

The last combat for Hungary — so I thought — was to be fought on the right bank; and in order to give it more enduring importance, a manufactory of arms and a powder-mill were to be set up in Komorn.

Opposite Gran, to secure the possibility of favourable events, the establishment of a *tete-de-pont* had been undertaken, and on the bank of the Gran itself the construction of bank-batteries. Previously the erection of similar batteries on the points most favourable for crossing the Danube below Gran, as well as a fortified camp on the Tihany peninsula on the north-western bank of the Platten lake, had been proposed.

The idea of this latter means of defence had been formed during the siege of Ofen — not by me, but by the government in Debreczin. Thus it seemed as if Kossuth was originally not averse to the idea of fighting the last desperate battle on the right bank of the Danube, and not in Transylvania, as was in prospect immediately before the April campaign.

I hoped to win him over completely for the carrying out of this idea.

CHAPTER XV.

ON the 16th of June Colonel Asbóth, commander of the second army corps, had to cross with a part of it the Neuhäusel branch of the Danube at Aszód, and to drive the enemy back upwards to the territory between the brook Feketcviz and the river Waag, in order to secure the crossing of the third army corps over the Waag, to be effected at Négyed.

The advance took place; the hostile forces, which occupied Királyrév and Zsigárd, were dislodged from both these places, obliged to retreat towards Pered, and lost thereby — according to Asbóth's report — three guns. Colonel Asbóth joined, by Farkasd and Négyed, the third army corps, on the opposite bank of the Waag.

^N But the enemy was re-inforced, and made an energetic counter-attack. The consequence of this was, that Colonel Asbóth in his turn evacuated Zsigárd and Királyrév. Those of his forces which had been disposed to Farkasd hastened meanwhile to strengthen the hard-pressed right wing of our position in Zsigárd, but found the village already in the enemy's power, and themselves separated from their main body retreating to Aszód, — a junction with it on the left being hindered by the marshes of the Holtvág, — and were obliged to draw back again to Farkasd; while Colonel Asbóth, after having lost, besides the three captured guns, three also of his own, gave up the further contest, and led his troops back into their former position on the Neuhäusel branch of the Danube.

While this was taking place on the right bank of the Waag, General Knézich stood with the main body of the third army corps on the left bank of the river, opposite Farkasd and Négyed. His sub-commanders urged him to cross the river with the boats which were at hand, and assist Colonel Asbóth. He refused this request, however, declaring that he had received no express orders to do so.

The separate parts of the second army corps in Farkasd consequently remained exposed alone to the hostile attacks. The enemy, however, did not molest them, probably supposing them to be the *tété* of the third army corps, which had already crossed to the right bank of the Waag.

On the same day General Nagy-Sándor, with the first corps, had to attack at Schintau, in order to attract the hostile forces to this point, and hinder as far as possible the re-inforcement of the right wing of the hostile position on the Waag. In this service he lost four of the guns of his twelve-pounder battery.

My expectations of finding in one of the three commanders of army corps, Knézich, Nagy-Sándor, and Asbóth, a compensation for Generals Damjanics and Aulich, were much lowered in consequence of the experiences of the 16th.

I now resolved to have the attempt at crossing repeated on the 20th of June by the whole of the second army corps. That it might not founder again, however, through General Knézich's want of independence, I intended personally to take part in this operation.

The dispositions for it had already been issued, when I received a letter from General Klapka, in which he dissuaded me from continuing the offensive, and re-

newed his original proposal to observe the defensive. This requirement on the part of General Klapka came on me very unexpectedly.

After my return from Debreczin, where I stayed only a few days — while Kossuth celebrated in Pesth his well-known entry as governor of the country, I had proceeded to Raab, in company with the chief of the central office of operations, in order to gain Klapka for the offensive on the left bank of the Danube.

I nevertheless did not think it advisable to communicate to General Klapka the ultimate political object on which my determination to assume the offensive at any price was really founded; because, from his views about its being still possible for Hungary to maintain itself on the basis of the declaration of independence, I concluded that he might not agree even in principle with my endeavours directed against the existence of the law of independence: for he believed in some intervention or other in favour of Hungary against Austria and Russia; while I considered the confession of this belief even then as the sign by which the adherents of the party of the 14th of April might be recognised with certainty.

But I thought I ought to keep secret from General Klapka not only the political idea which lay at the bottom of my urging to the offensive, but also the intention which determined me even to begin it on the left bank of the Danube.

This intention was — as has been already mentioned — to give the new commanders of army corps, Knézych, Nagy-Sándor, and Asbóth, as soon as possible an opportunity of shewing their capabilities as well as their moral independence in front of the enemy. But, as is known,

this intention was formed in me from having felt the necessity of finding a compensation for Generals Damjanics and Aulich, if the future performances of the main army were not to be far behind its exploits hitherto; since neither Klapka's talents as a general, although extraordinary, nor my own efforts, had seemed to me to be sufficient to render this compensation unnecessary.

In order to be able to speak with Klapka about all this *sans façon*, I ought to have been convinced that he would not be offended by it. But I was far from such a conviction, having not yet forgotten the disagreeable personal controversies that took place between him and Damjanics during the April campaign.

Moreover, during the conference in question with Klapka at Raab, not the least occasion occurred for disclosing to him the peculiar motives of my determination for the offensive in general, and for its being commenced on the left bank of the Danube in particular.

For after the chief of the central office of operations had briefly developed to General Klapka, in my presence, the outlines of this offensive, — namely, first to gain the line of the Waag; to regulate our further movements by those of the enemy, but at all events to aim at Presburg as the final object of our operations, and in case the enemy should — to protect that place — throw a considerable part of his forces from the right to the left bank of the Danube, to attempt on the right bank to reach Wieselburg and Hungarian Altenburg with the seventh army corps — Klapka at once declared, although about a fortnight previously the defensive had been proposed by himself, that he

nevertheless agreed in the execution of this plan of offensive operations.

I had no reason to ascribe this agreement to any other cause than the accordance of our opinions on the purely strategic part of the matter in question.

And hence it was that Klapka's letter, in which he advised me, after the unsuccessful undertakings of the 16th of June, to give up the offensive, came on me really unexpectedly: the more unexpectedly, as this letter did not contain a single well-founded objection either to the plan of operations itself or to the manner of its execution; but merely recommended the abandonment of the offensive in general, and the adoption of his plan of defensive operations, which had been laid aside.

In reading this letter I could not help supposing that its contents had been occasioned by some personal misunderstanding between Klapka and the chief of the central office of operations; and I requested the latter not to conceal it from me, if such were the case. He, however, assured me, he could not remember having given General Klapka any cause of discontent with him; unless it were that Klapka had been wounded by the adherence of the central office of operations to my order to consider the Kmety division as an independently-operative part of the army, while General Klapka claimed the chief command over it.

It is true General Klapka had in some measure a right to it; for, according to his plan of defensive operations, accepted by the council of ministers in Debreczin, and in consequence of his nomination as commander-in-chief of the fortress of Komorn as well as of the fortified camp and of the forces concentrated round Komorn and

at Raab, three army corps were to be united under his chief command, namely, besides the eighth army corps in Komorn, and the seventh at Raab, another, one of those three which — silently rejecting his plan of defensive operations — I had destined for the attack on the hostile position on the Waag.

In desiring the subordination of the Kmety division under his chief command, General Klapka consequently demanded only a compensation, and that an insufficient one, for the army corps withheld from him.

That this indemnification had not been adjudged him by the chief of the central office of operations — who acted according to my positive order to let the Kmety division operate independently — might doubtless have made him feel sore. However, in all sincerity, I could not discover the logical connexion between the certainly possible anger thereat, and the rejection of the idea about the offensive, which Klapka had unconditionally concurred in twelve or fourteen days before, as well as the taking up again the defensive idea, which ten or twelve days ago he had unconditionally abandoned; or, more correctly, I believed the possibly actual existence of a connexion, even though illogical, ought not to be assumed.

The circumstance, however, that General Klapka had so urgently advised me not *before*, but only immediately *after* the unsuccessful first attempt to gain the line of the Waag, to abandon the offensive, and, as a natural consequence, to resume the plan of defensive operations, — this circumstance recalled to my mind Klapka's undeniable peculiarity of being easily induced, by the difficulties of execution, to abandon resolutions formed.

It seemed to me as if the honour of having turned off Klapka's sympathies from the offensive back again to the defensive was due exclusively to the unfavourable results of the 16th of June.

After that day Klapka appeared to be convinced that 'it would not be possible to force the line of the Waag; I was not yet.

Had Klapka supported his conviction by the application to the case in question of the maxims and dogmas of tactics and strategy, he might perhaps have succeeded in inducing me to attempt the forcing of the line of the Waag — in another manner.

In wholly dissuading me from the offensive he would by no means have been successful under the then existing conjunctures.

As has been explained in the preceding chapter, only the commencement of the Russian intervention *en gros* could determine me to adopt this course.

This intervention had, indeed, commenced before the 20th of June, by the invasion of the Russian main army, from Dukla across the northern frontiers of Hungary, and actually in the most imposing manner; on which day — as will subsequently be seen — the attack on the Austrian position on the Waag, which miscarried on the part of the Hungarians on the 16th, was repeated. I did not receive the first news of this invasion, however, till *after the 21st of June*.

Thus is explained how it happened that I did not even on the 20th of June give up the intended offensive against the Austrians, although the Russian main army already menaced Kaschau; that my efforts *against* the law of independence of the 14th of April 1849, and *for* the constitution of 1848, were thereby destroyed,

and simultaneously with these efforts the hitherto special motives for this offensive bearing; and that Hungary — according to my conviction — began to agonize.

CHAPTER XVI.

FARKASD and Négyed, situated on the right bank of the Waag, had been ours since the 16th of June, and were occupied by detachments of the second army corps. This circumstance rendered possible the undisturbed formation of a bridge over the Waag at Négyed; and consequently on the 20th of June the third army corps could cross the river without hindrance, and take a direct part in the decisive attack, intended to be made this day on the right wing of the hostile position on the Waag.

The dispositions for this attack were briefly as follows:

For the second army corps (Colonel Asbóth) in the camp at Aszód: to cross the Neuhäusel branch of the Danube at Aszód, and advance against Királyrév and Zsigárd, while the detachments of this corps which were in Farkasd and Négyed advance simultaneously against Zsigárd.

For the third corps (General Knézich) in the camp at Tardosked: to cross the Waag at Négyed, and follow the detachments of the second corps which are advancing from Farkasd against Zsigárd.

For the first corps (General Nagy-Sándor) in Mocsonok: to make demonstrations against Schintau and

the adjoining part of the Waag; should circumstances be favourable, to attack in earnest, and attempt to gain the right bank of the Waag.

For the expeditionary column of the seventh army corps on the main road to Neutra: to make demonstrations against Freystadl.

General Klapka received orders, with a part of the eighth corps to undertake the protection of the bridge at Aszód against the enemy posted in Vasárut, to secure the line of retreat of the second corps.

Very early on the morning of the 20th Colonel Asbóth began with the troops of his corps which were in the camp at Aszód the crossing of the Neuhäusel branch of the Danube. When I arrived at the bridge of Aszód, the passage over the river was already effected, and the advance of the second corps against Királyrév and Zsigárd in progress. Satisfied for the present of the right execution of the dispositions, I here awaited General Klapka, who had likewise to arrive at the bridge of Aszód in the course of the same morning.

I had neglected, as unimportant, to send a written answer to his letter mentioned in the preceding chapter; but nevertheless, in order to obviate suspicions, I thought it advisable to make use of the favourable opportunity which was just about offering itself for a verbal answer. My verbal answer to Klapka had, however, to be confined to the simple remark, that the dispositions for the offensive undertaking that was just beginning had already been sent to the divers army corps when I received his letter. From the preceding chapter it must be sufficiently evident why I considered a fuller discussion of the contents of this letter as by no means advisable.

Consequently after I had by the above-mentioned remark, adduced in the form of an excuse, removed from General Klapka all ground for undefined suspicions, I quickly turned the conversation to the approaching events of the day; and it was agreed between us, that the principal attack just beginning on the right bank of the Waag should be seconded by simultaneous offensive movements in the Great Schutt, namely against the enemy at Vasárut. Finally General Klapka pledged himself to take the conduct of these offensive movements in person.

In the meantime the second army corps had encountered the enemy at Zsigárd: the conflict appeared not to be without importance, and I hastened to take part in it.

To the north of Királyrév and Zsigárd I found the second army corps alone in combat with two hostile divisions, one of which defended Pered, the other deployed in front of Alsó-Szély. Between them gaped a large interval: at least no position of troops could be seen on this line, to form as it were the hostile centre.

In like manner Colonel Asbóth had also distributed his forces chiefly on the wings.

Taking my route to the bridge of Aszód by Királyrév, I arrived first at the left wing of our line of battle. This wing — leaning to the left on the marshy brook Dudvág — was pressing its adversary back with all its might towards Alsó-Szély.

Our right wing, however, seemed to have met at Pered a far more obstinate resistance.

During my ride towards this wing my attention was especially occupied by three Honvéd battalions. They seemed to have to form with one battery and one squad-

ron of hussars the centre of our line of battle. But I found two of them in complete disorder, taking to flight; and the third just about following the bad example of the other two. These battalions had been ordered to support, by their advance against the southern and south-western skirts of Pered, the attack of the right wing on its eastern circuit. But they had allowed themselves to be shaken to such a degree by the fire of the hostile batteries posted to the west of Pered, that they were brought into the state of disorder in which I found them. Here immediate redress appeared most urgently demanded. One part of my escort surrounded the wayering battalion, to prevent, in the first instance, its entire dispersion; while another part, with the assistance of some hussars, was charged to put a stop to the flight of the two battalions which were already in disorder. The uninterrupted fire of the enemy's batteries rendered the accomplishment of these two objects very difficult. In order to make it possible, however, the most severe measures had to be employed against the disobedient battalions.

While this was in progress, Colonel Asbóth suddenly arrived in haste from the extreme right wing, consoled the deserting troops with the prospect of being supported by the third army corps just advancing from Farkasd, and invited them to secure themselves in a natural ditch situated still further back. Of course the effect of the coercive measures, which up to this moment had been not unsuccessfully employed, was instantly paralysed by this invitation. My followers had to redouble their efforts to restore order in the battalions, which were confirmed in their want of courage by the commander of their corps, and finally to lead them for-

ward to storm on the southern and south-western skirts of Pered.

The right wing, in spite of the spiritless conduct of the battalions of the centre, had meanwhile continued with increasing energy its attacks on the eastern circuit of this place, and had already obtained a firm footing in the interior of the village. Supported by the final advance of these battalions, it now succeeded — before the arrival of the third army corps on the field — in completely driving the enemy out of Pered. The village of Alsó-Szélly had been taken earlier and with less effort by our left wing.

After the loss of these two points the enemy renounced any further opposition, and retreated from Pered by Deáki, from Alsó-Szélly by Felső-Szélly towards Diószeg. Near the close of the contest he might also have been shaken by the emerging of the head of the column of the third army corps in front of Zsigárd.

This column was, however, not the whole of the third corps, but only about three-fifths of it, the remainder of it having been disposed on the right bank of the Waag up towards Sellye, for the purpose of endeavouring to cross the river somewhere thereabouts. But it was found to be impossible to do so in this direction.

These two-fifths of the third corps had consequently to march back again as far as Négyed, in order to join us; and as I thought it not advisable to undertake without them the further advance against Diószeg, and as their arrival at Pered, on account of the great circuit they had to make, seemed scarcely possible before night-fall, the continued pursuit of the enemy was stopped, and troops for safety only were advanced as far as Deáki and Felső-Szélly, and Sellye on the Waag was observed

by means of patrols, while a part of the second corps occupied Alsó-Szélyly and Királyrév, a part of the troops present of the third corps Hetmény, and the main bodies of both army corps encamped at Pered.

General Knézich had, in spite of the advice of the commanders of his division — as is known — hesitated to support Colonel Asbóth during the engagement on the 16th of June, merely on the ground that he had not received express orders to render this assistance from the central office of operations. For a similar though utterly untenable reason, the third army corps in the course of this day (the 20th of June) likewise arrived too late on the battle-field.

It was known to General Knézich that on this day I intended to undertake in person the conduct of the operations. He consequently thought he should receive from me on this occasion a quite special order of march; but as I had no suspicion of this settled idea, and consequently did not believe it necessary to send an especial order of march to the third corps, General Knézich was determined to let his corps from beyond the Waag again look on inactively at the combat, until at last his sub-commanders morally forced him to advance. With all this, he marched only a part of his forces over the standing bridge at Négyed — as has been mentioned — to the right bank of the Waag; the considerable remainder of them had — so he seemed to suppose — to effect the passage of the river at a spot where the necessary means for doing so did not exist.

This last circumstance could not have been unknown to General Knézich. As, however, in the dispositions for attack for the 20th of June — probably for the sake

of brevity — the details of the dispositions for the 16th were referred to, and in these the detaching of a part of the third army corps to the Waag, opposite Sellye, as a demonstration, was ordered; General Knézich might have supposed that he had to repeat the same detaching for the purpose of the real crossing over the Waag, ordered for the 20th of June.

That General Knézich could have supposed this, fully convinced me of the insufficiency of his self-reliance to answer those claims which must be made upon an independent leader of an army corps.

General Knézich, as chief of a division, under the command of General Damjanics, had performed many a distinguished service. Nevertheless, and just on account of his want of independence, he was not in his place as an independent commander of an army corps.

That in which General Knézich was so sadly deficient seemed to have been richly bestowed on Colonel Asbóth, namely, self-confidence; but he was wanting in that certain tact, by which the commander perceives on the battle-field how far he may allow his self-confidence to carry him, without burdening his troops with more than, from the state of their discipline, they are able to perform.

Of all the Hungarian leaders Aulich alone possessed this tact in a rare degree. As commander of the same army corps of which Colonel Asbóth was now the chief, Aulich had splendidly evinced this tact by his demonstrations during the April campaign against the Austrian main army concentrated before Pesth!

(Colonel Asbóth was serving then in the second corps, and assisted in those demonstrations under Aulich's guidance.)

This tact can hardly be taught; but may be learned by observation. Colonel Asbóth nevertheless had not caught it from General Aulich.

Full of personal courage, and animated — as I have mentioned — by unbounded self-confidence, Colonel Asbóth led his corps as he might have been justified in doing if the last of its Honvéds had possessed at least as much personal valour and not less self-confidence than his commander.

That the troops thereby lost their steadiness is easily conceivable; and also that Colonel Asbóth was least of all the man to restore it: of this he had just given me a proof in the last conflict.

He orders some battalions to advance in the most effective range of the well-sustained fire of hostile artillery. The battalions run away. Colonel Asbóth points out to the runaways a place of refuge situated still further back.

According to my views, this is the method of systematically teaching his troops to take to their heels.

The commander should either avoid advancing troops in the vehement fire of artillery, if they are not qualified for the experiment; or at the same time take appropriate measures for remaining master of the doubtful troops.

To spare a battalion (to post it as much protected as possible) which has to remain passive in the fire is the bounden duty of a commander. But a battalion which, Under similar circumstances, is destined to *activity*, *must not* be spared. If it spare itself (perhaps by running away measures must be taken of such a kind as will bring it forthwith out of the rain under the spout.

The proper measures for this purpose, it is true, are

neither soothing nor fondling. But at least they are not more inhuman than subsequent decimation, and do not, like it, hobble after the crime as a punishment, but mostly stifle it — if employed *a tempo* — in its rise, and are consequently more practical, in cases where their instant application is really necessitated and at the same time possible.

If troops are ordered to advance unprotected in the range of an uncommonly vigorous fire from a numerous hostile artillery, something of higher importance than the existence of the exposed troops must be the motive.

If this be not the case, then away with the commander who uselessly sacrifices his troops. But even if really exposed without a motive, they must *not* run away *with impunity*.

In what precedes I have pointed out that moment of the battle in which Asbóth's right wing had met with an obstinate resistance at Pered, while the left wing continually pressed the enemy back towards Alsó-Szélly, and took, after a short delay, this place likewise. At the same time the arrival of the third corps was soon to be expected. This was known to Colonel Asbóth; of the indicated position of affairs in the range of the battle a single glance might inform him.

Let us now see what Colonel Asbóth undertakes as independent leader of the combat.

He orders Pered to be forced.

This was, at all events, the last thing he ought to have done; because the forcing of a position is in general to be undertaken only when no other means of becoming master of it remains.

In the circumstances above mentioned the employment of this means was not in the least necessary; for

Asboth's left wing menaced already the natural line of retreat of the hostile army corps at Pered, which consequently, even without being forced, could not hold out much longer. Moreover the column of the third corps was already approaching. To turn Pered on the east, executed by the column of the third army corps, would have been far more dangerous to the enemy than forcing it, and besides could have been done at much less sacrifice.

Forcing is well known to be the highest price paid on the theatre of war for a place.

An independent commander who unnecessarily has recourse to forcing is a squanderer. Squanderers must be placed under guardianship.

In justification of Asbóth, it might perhaps be supposed that, with a lively recollection of his disaster on the 16th, and fearing the approach of hostile re-inforcements, as well as a repetition of delay on the part of General Knézich, he had wished, before the arrival of these re-inforcements, speedily to establish himself in Pered, in order to maintain himself more easily against the hostile superior forces, in case General Knézich should still continue to delay.

This supposition, however, was opposed by the following consideration.

If Colonel Asbóth had really apprehended the approach of hostile re-inforcements, he ought not, after all, to have advanced beyond the line of Zsigárd and Királyrév, but have contented himself with maintaining these two points. For here he stood almost an hour's march nearer to General Knézich; while the enemy was just as much further from his succours than in Pered and Alsó-Szély.

The forcing of Pered was consequently in no way to be justified.

This, however, only called in question Asbóth's capability as an *independent* leader of a hostile undertaking of *greater importance*.

But his procedure with the fugitive battalions, namely, the facts, that he had encouraged them to run still further, and then to end by hiding themselves, instead of bringing them to their senses by the most rigorous severity; that moreover he had given them at the same time the consoling assurance, that the brave third army corps would finish with the enemy, instead of urging them rather not to allow it to dispute with them the honour of the victory; — these facts led me finally to perceive that Colonel Asboth had not even the ability to maintain in the second army corps that discipline and that spirit, which it owed to the personal influence of General Aulich.

I have thought it necessary to enter into all these details to shew the motives which induced me to remove General Knézich and Colonel Asbóth in the course of the 20th of June from their charges as commanders of corps.

The command of the third corps was entrusted to Colonel (soon afterwards General) Count Leiningen; that of the second corps to Colonel Kászonyi.

At the same time the commanders of the infantry divisions of the second corps requested to be exempted from further service, on account of shattered health. The chief of the general staff of the corps had already done the same. Consequently in the afternoon of the 20th of June the four most, important charges of the second corps were transferred to new hands; — certainly

not a desirable circumstance immediately before a decisive conflict.

It will be remembered that I had judged it necessary to await at Pered the arrival of the smaller half of the third army corps, which had been detached on the left bank of the Waag. The further advance was not to begin till very early next day (the 21st of June), and simultaneously with it the forcing of the passage over the Waag at Schintau by the first corps. The commander of the latter (General Nagy-Sándor) received an order *to this effect late in the afternoon of the 20th* by two orderly officers, who started as couriers for the camp of the first corps directly after the taking by storm of Pered, which was about two o'clock in the afternoon; with it finished the day's battle.

Before nightfall (between the 20th and 21st of June), however, I received two reports, in consequence of which my resolution to advance the next morning aggressively underwent an important change.

These reports were: one from General Klapka, that he had in the mean time been defeated by the Austrians at Nyárasd in the Great Schutt; and another from scouts, that the Russian army corps, previously stationed *en reserve* at Presburg, had arrived at Diószeg during the forenoon, and was already marching against us.

Simultaneously a report arrived from the outposts, that the enemy had strongly garrisoned Sellye on the Waag. There was consequently no doubt that he would *himself* attack on the following day (21st of June). He could now do so with the probable prospect of a favourable result; for after the accession of the Russian corps to those troops which had been opposed to our second corps during the day, he was numerically superior to

us; and these troops formed besides, according to the reports of all our scouts, only the smaller part of the Austrian forces on the Waag, — the greater stood at Schintau, Szered, and Freystadl.

Under these circumstances it seemed to me more advisable not to advance next morning, but await the hostile attack at Pered without moving, and to pursue the offensive only in case we either remained unattached till noon of the 21st, or, on the other hand, were victorious. I was urged to this change in my former resolution by the following view of our present situation.

General Klapka was forced to remain on the defensive in consequence of the unfortunate issue of the battle at Nyárasd; while his adversary in the Great Schutt, on the contrary, had his hands free, and was crossing with the greater part of his forces to the left bank of the Neuhäusel branch of the Danube, to reach Királyrév in the rear of our two corps united at Pered. The danger these corps ran of thus losing their retreat to Aszód and Négyed must become the more imminent the further from these points of retreat they were engaged in serious conflict with the enemy, who stood directly opposite them and was numerically superior.

In our position at Pered this danger was as yet inconsiderable, because Királyrév and Pered are situated within the extreme battle-range of a force of from 15,000 to 16,000 men and 80 guns, — about the amount of the total strength of the second and third corps.

With such a force it was still possible without especial difficulty, simultaneously, on the one hand, at Pered, to restrain the too speedy southern advance of even a superior enemy; and on the other hand, at Királyrév, to get rid of a troublesome adversary. Nay, even if

this were not admitted, the common retreat by Négyed remained nevertheless secured to the two corps united at Pered, since Zsigárd (the central point of this line of retreat) is almost at an equal distance from Pered and Királyrév; and as the enemy, during his advance from Királyrév to Zsigárd, had to observe precautionary measures requiring much time, but which were unnecessary to our army corps on their march from Pered back to Zsigárd.

I repeat then, that the common retreat — if, in the worst but also most improbable case, necessitated for the two army corps united at Pered — by Zsigárd, Farkasd, and Négyed, was strategically secured to them already by the circumstance that, by advancing beyond Pered, they were not exposed to a doubtful conflict. And if I moreover mention, that this line of retreat — though terminating in a passage over the river — appeared to me even tactically not an unfavourable one, from its being unassailable in flank, and the not despicable points of support, Farkasd and Négyed, being situated on it, — I do so merely that I may give complete the series of considerations by which, on the 20th of June, I arrived at the conviction, that the situation, of the second and third corps at Pered was not more dangerous than in general is that of any force which is about to engage in a serious conflict with an enemy numerically superior.

This conviction, however, could not of course suffice by itself to determine me to bring on a conflict, which, although it appeared to have no extraordinarily unfavourable probabilities *against* it, seemed to have as few especially favourable ones *for* it. This conviction could in any case exercise only a passive influence on the

resolution to accept or to offer battle. It kept aloof at most the motives dissuading from such a resolution; it could not offer any *inciting* thereto. And consequently it still remains to be explained from what motives I came to the determination so unreservedly to accept or to offer battle on the 21st of June.

These motives were:

The apprehension of forfeiting the confidence of the army, if, after the advantages obtained over the enemy on the 20th of June by the second corps alone, I should give up again, on the following day, with the second and third corps, without a previous contest, the scarcely gained right bank of the Waag; —

The hope that the energetic attempts to cross the Waag enjoined on General Nagy-Sándor would not be without a favourable influence on the events of the next day; — and moreover

The necessity of learning something positive about the *qualitative* importance of the Russian intervention, even should it only have the effect of preventing the wide-spread rumours that the Russian troops who had already entered Hungary were merely disguised Slowake, Russniaks, Wasserpols, Hannaks, and such like, from obtaining belief in the army, and completely destroying its manly spirit, already seriously endangered by the stories about the impending interventions *for* Hungary.

With reference to the favourable influence of Nagy-Sándor's attempts to cross the Waag on the events of the next day, I had resolved on the following combinations:

Either the energetic attacks of General Nagy-Sándor might shake the enemy's intention of attacking us on the next morning at Pered. In this case likewise no advance towards our line of retreat was to be feared

from the Great Schutt, in spite of Klapka's defensive bearing, and consequently nothing would prevent us from continuing our offensive.

Or Nagy-Sándor's attempt to cross the Waag, in the rear of the enemy engaged in combat with us at Pered, would succeed; and then the moment was come for the second and third corps to exchange unreservedly the defensive for the offensive, because all care about their lines of retreat to Aszód and Négyed would seem to be rendered superfluous by the prospect, after the main body of the enemy was forced back, of being able to effect a junction with Nagy-Sándor, and thus, if necessary, to make use of his passage of the Waag as the common point of retreat for all the three army corps.

My dispositions for the 21st were accordingly as follow:

The second corps to take up its position between Pered and the little river Dudvág; the third corps between Pered and the Waag. The former to advance two battalions with two guns, and also some cavalry for the performance of the orderly and patrolling service, as far as Alsó-Szély. This column to evacuate the said place only on the approach of a superior hostile force, and then without an obstinate resistance. Should this happen, it is to retreat as far as Királyrév, occupy it, and charge itself besides from that time with the protection of the flank of the second corps, following it on its left in echelons in case of an advance.

The third corps to occupy the Puszta Hetmény with a small number of troops, in order to secure its right flank against a surprise by being turned. The task devolving on the latter to be, the observance, during the whole day, of the movements of the enemy on the bank

of the Waag. It has to follow the movements of the army in flank, without leaving the bank of the river.

The village of Pered, divided from north to south into two almost equal halves by a principal street, with its eastern half to serve as point of support to the left wing of the third corps, with the western one to the right wing of the second corps, and according to this arrangement to be occupied by divisions of both corps. The whole cavalry with its batteries to undertake the protection of the open ground between Pered and the little river Dudvág. The point of retreat of the second corps to be the bridge at Aszód, that of the third corps the one at Négyed.

The second and third corps, in the position at Pered indicated in these dispositions, were attacked in the forenoon of the 21st of June by Russian and Austrian troops.

Our outposts in Felső-Szélyly and those in Deáki and Alsó-Szélyly, had been obliged — the former *before*, the latter soon *after* daybreak — to retreat to Pered, on account of the approach of considerable hostile forces from the north and north-west against those points.

The two Honvéd battalions and two guns of the second corps, disposed at Alsó-Szélyly, retreated to Királyrév, according to the above-mentioned arrangement, and occupied this place, in which there had been till then only an insignificant post. Two strong hostile columns, composed of three kinds of arms, followed them after a considerable time, at short intervals from each other.

This was the hostile right wing. The centre simultaneously deployed before Deáki, the left wing did the same to the east of it, and in almost immediate commu-

nication with the centre; while his right wing was isolated by an interval of at least a quarter of a mile, and seemed about to turn the left wing of *our* line of battle.

But this manoeuvre, which, by the way, was not an unexpected one, having been already originally provided against by our cavalry being placed to the left in echelons, as well as by occupying Királyrév; the said movement of the hostile right wing could be left unheeded for the present, and we awaited the attack, without changing our position in the least.

This attack commenced with a brisk fire of artillery from the hostile centre and left wing, while only the foremost of the two columns of the right wing marched direct against Királyrév, but the hindmost halted in the prolongation of our deployed left wing, at about two gun-ranges distant from it.

The infantry divisions of the second corps (to the left) answered the hostile cannonade without moving, those of the third corps (to the right) while advancing. By this manoeuvre it 'was intended partially to divert from the second corps the very galling fire of the hostile centre.

It seemed, however, as if this measure would not be successful; for while the divisions of the third corps resolutely advanced, those of the second corps were soon shaken, began at last even to give way, and slackened their fire in the same degree as that of the hostile centre increased in vigour.

In the centre of the enemy an advancing might be remarked, which was not the case with his left wing.

From what precedes, it is evident that both lines of battle came by degrees into a fronting direction, oblique

to their original one, both right wings being advanced; so that the enemy's line of battle gained more and more a direction which formed a right angle with his natural line of retreat towards Diószeg; while our line threatened ultimately to fall into the direction of our points of retreat, which would soon be attainable *only* by a flank-march to the left.

This derangement of the lines of battle from their original principal direction — from east to west into that from north-east to south-west — was now the most unfavourable change for us; and it was necessary either to order the infantry divisions of the third corps to draw back, or to render possible the re-advance of those of the second corps. I was determined to try first the latter means.

A part of the cavalry division of the third corps was to fall upon the cavalry attached to the right wing of the hostile centre, the larger remainder to follow with the battery as a support; while the cavalry division of the second corps (in the array, to the left of that of the third corps) was simultaneously to direct its attacks against the column of the extreme right hostile wing, which, as just mentioned, menaced our left.

By the first of these cavalry attacks I hoped to oblige the hostile centre to a retrograde movement, and thus to disengage the infantry divisions of the second corps; by the second, to render possible the total isolation of the hostile column which had pushed forward as far as Királyrév.

The orders for this advance were scarcely issued to the two cavalry divisions, when I received a report that *Kiralyrév was in the possession of the enemy!*

Soon after the attack of the foremost column of the

hostile extreme right wing began in earnest on this village, not being sufficiently convinced that the staff-officer of the second corps who commanded there was to be relied upon, I had sent my adjutant, a captain of cavalry, Charles Kempelen, to the menaced spot, and charged him to take the command of the troops of occupation, and maintain the village at whatever cost.

Kempelen now reported to me, that he had found Királyrév already occupied by the enemy, and our two battalions, with their guns, on the retreat towards the bridge at Aszód. He had succeeded in overtaking, stopping, and leading them again to the storm against Királyrév; but he nevertheless despaired of regaining the place, unless a strong re-inforcement was sent to him.

The required re-inforcement, consisting of two battalions and two guns, under the command of the brave Major Rakovszki (one of the two commanders of infantry divisions of the second corps nominated on the preceding evening), started without delay from the line of battle at Pered for Királyrév; it being of the utmost importance to come as soon as possible into possession of this point.

After this diminution of our forces opposed to the central point of the hostile battle-array, the execution of the two attacks of cavalry just ordered appeared to be still more pressingly necessary.

On the news that Királyrév was lost, I changed nevertheless my original determination to lead in person the attack of the cavalry division of the third corps on the right wing of the hostile centre; charged the commander of the cavalry division of the third corps with the accomplishment of this task; and hastened to

Királyrév, before the advancing column under Major Rakovszki, in order to see with my own eyes whether and how far the line of retreat of the second corps was endangered by the enemy maintaining himself there.

On the preceding evening General Klapka had asked for a squadron of one of the old regiments of hussars, and offered in compensation two squadrons of the newly-formed regiment of "Károlyi" hussars. These had just arrived at Királyrév, when I was reconnoitering the enemy. I found him on the defensive; opposed to his reserves posted on the north of Királyrév the two squadrons of Károlyi hussars; and hastened back to Pered, after having finally convinced myself that no hostile advance was to be apprehended from the Great Schutt.

Large clouds of dust suddenly rose and rapidly advanced from Pered towards Zsigárd: they seemed to indicate the flight of the cavalry of the third corps.

I could now, for the present, no longer hope to render possible the advance of the infantry under Kászonyi (second corps); I had, on the contrary, speedily to resolve to order that under Leiningen (third corps) back as far as Pered. But Pered had to be maintained with concentrated forces until the news of Nagy-Sándor's successful crossing of the Waag in the rear of the enemy had reached the battle-field, as a moral succour.

The cavalry division of the second corps had just commenced its attack on the hostile turning-column on our left: it might succeed — that of the third corps be inspired with new courage — Királyrév be retaken from the enemy.

None of these preliminary suppositions — these indispensable conditions for maintaining ourselves at the

height of Pered — lay beyond the boundaries of the most common fluctuations of the fortune of war; none of these suppositions had in itself any particular improbability.

Consequently, while Colonel Leiningen retreated fighting towards Pered, I hastened to assist Colonel Kászonyi in animating to a manly perseverance his division, which had already been pressed back to this place.

But when I arrived at Pered, I found the position I had hoped to maintain already abandoned by the infantry and batteries under Kászonyi, which I had supposed still holding out, and the cavalry division of the third corps, which I thought was in flight, alone still stood its ground. It had, indeed, not succeeded in overthrowing the right wing of the hostile centre; but *not this cavalry division*, but the greater part of the entire artillery of the second corps, and moreover two of its battalions, had hereupon suddenly taken to flight, and raised those clouds of dust which so rapidly advanced towards Zsigárd. Four Honvéd battalions — the remainder of the infantry of the second corps stationed before Pered — obstructed by Colonel Kászonyi in their onward senseless flight, just at the moment of my arrival at Pered began to rally themselves in the rear of the cavalry division of the third corps, which was again ready to attack.

The western half of Pered and the small wood adjoining it on the north was consequently completely abandoned by us; the advance of the hostile centre was resolute and vigorous; the attempt to urge Kászonyi's four battalions again forward, and with them alone re-occupy the quitted points of support, would be evi-

dently, considering the ever uncertain conduct of these troops, unavailing; and according to my judgment, under these circumstances it was useless to think for a moment of further maintaining the battle at the height of Pered; on the contrary, the retreat of the Leiningen infantry divisions as far as gun-range *behind* Pered was now necessitated.

These divisions had meanwhile retreated into the woods to the north-east and east of Pered and occupied them. An attack with the bayonet by the hostile centre on the north-east of the wood had just been repulsed, when Colonel Leiningen received my order to evacuate Pered. His cavalry division, which, as has been mentioned, still continued standing to the west of Pered, supported by the now re-organised four battalions of the second corps, was charged, in order to protect this retreat, to prevent the too speedy pressing forward of the cavalry of the right wing of the hostile centre; the cavalry of the second corps, however, to renew their attacks on the repeatedly-mentioned turning-column of the extreme right wing — which had hitherto been ineffectual from the uncommonly firm resistance of some Russian battalions — and thus hinder the cavalry division of the third corps, and the four battalions of the second which supported it, from being menaced on the left and embarrassed in the execution of their task.

Colonel Leiningen began his retreat fighting, during it maintained his troops in exemplary order, drew on his cavalry division, and had his corps just marched up to gun-range south of Pered, when I rejoined him. again, for the purpose of arranging with him the following dispositions for the later part of the day:

" The third corps to observe the defensive, and in

the worst case fall back as far as Zsigárd; but there to take up the artillery and infantry of the second corps, which had been sent thither from the position before Pered — from want of ammunition, as was subsequently reported to me — and maintain itself firmly until the retaking of Királyrév.

" Colonel Kászonyi at the same time to unite the four battalions of the second corps led back from Pered with its cavalry division; protect with these forces the third corps against being turned in its left, and also keep up the communication with Királyrév.

" As soon as Királyrév becomes ours again, the third corps — re-inforced by the above-mentioned artillery and infantry of the second corps — to assume the offensive from Zsigárd, and the remainder of the latter corps from Királyrév."

I had not yet given up all hopes that the news of General Nagy-Sándor's successful passage over the Waag would soon arrive!

The urgent necessity for accelerating as much as possible the dislodgment of the enemy from Királyrév impelled me again to that point of the battle-field.

It is known that we had already four battalions and four guns concentrated before Királyrév under the command of Major Rakóvszki.

But however energetically Major Rakóvszki, as well as Captains Kempelen and Nedbal (the commander of one of the battalions present), animated the troops to the combat, the majority of the men, nay even officers, favoured by the high corn bounding the village on the south, had unobserved withdrawn from the fight; and of the four battalions I found scarcely one third in a condition fit for action.

The further attacks on Királyrév, undertaken with such small forces, threatened, like the previous ones, to be unsuccessful. A considerable re-inforcement of the storming-columns appeared, above all things, to be necessary. In order to render this possible, however, a regular chase had first to be made after the soldiers, who, dreading the fire, remained hidden in the high corn. All other efforts to force the demoralised troops to obedience had been unavailing; but this last and extreme attempt had the desired effect.

Major Rakóvszki and Captain Kempelen could soon with more considerable forces renew the storming against the southern and south-eastern part of Királyrév, while Captain Nedbal with the last remains of his battalion penetrated from the west into the interior of the village. Now began a continuous vigorous contest of *tirailleurs* and artillery. The merit of having decided it victoriously for our arms is mainly due to those three officers.

Királyrév was ours! An orderly officer hastened to Zsigárd, as had been preconcerted, with an order for the third corps to advance. Major Rakóvszki in the mean time pursued the enemy dislodged from Királyrév, drove part of his troops over the Dudvág, and put the remainder to flight towards Alsó-Szély; Colonel Kászonyi, with the four battalions and the cavalry division united under his personal command, who shortly before, in consequence of an unsuccessful attack of the latter, had retreated as far as to the height of Királyrév, was just about again leading his troops to the attack against the right wing of the hostile line of battle, already deployed to the south of Pered and now advancing against Királyrév, — when I received a written report from Colonel Leiningen, that he was turned on the right by a

strong party of the enemy, was thereby obliged to evacuate his position at Zsigárd, and was forthwith commencing his retreat towards Farkasd.

This report finally convinced me of the absolute necessity of giving up the day as lost, and with it the right bank of the Waag.

My order for the third army corps to advance, which this report had crossed, was now directly countermanded; and Colonel Leiningen was charged to continue his retreat as far as the opposite bank of the Waag.

Colonel Kászonyi had meanwhile attacked with the battery of his cavalry division the hostile forces just mentioned as approaching in the direction from Pered against Királyrév. I had the fire continued, however, only till the return of Major Rakóvszki from the pursuit of the hostile troops dislodged from Királyrév. Immediately after he arrived, the second corps began its retreat towards Aszód, which it accomplished without being disturbed during it by the enemy.

On the other hand, the enemy concentrated in the Great Schutt at Vasárut before nightfall made an attack on the position of General Klapka at Aszód, evidently with the intention of gaining the point of retreat for our second corps, the bridge there over the Neuh'dusel branch of the Danube, and by destroying it isolate the second corps on the right bank of the Waag.

But this attack was not begun till after the second corps had in part crossed the Neuhäusel branch of the Danube. The assailant confined his offensive activity to a cannonade, opened in the evening twilight, and briskly continued till darkest night, but which of course was not very dangerous.

Thanks to the firmness with which General Klapka

resisted the enemy, the second corps uninterruptedly executed its retreat to the right bank of the Neuhausel branch of the Danube, and dismantled the bridge it had crossed.

A part of the cavalry and artillery of the corps was immediately dispatched to Aszód, for the purpose of supporting Klapka; with the remainder of them and the infantry the line of battle was elongated on the right from Aszód to the river, a little above the bridge.

Our troops — those under General Klapka as well as those under Colonel Kászonyi — maintained their position. The enemy, convinced at last that his attacks were ineffectual, withdrew again towards Vasárut without having accomplished his purpose.

Aszód was now no longer of any strategic importance to us, after our offensive had been crippled by the decisive victory which the enemy had gained during the course of the day on the right bank of the Waag.

General Klapka and myself therefore agreed then and there on the evacuation of Aszód also; which was effected by the troops of the eighth corps (under Klapka) during the same night, by retreating sideways towards Apáczaszakállos on the road from Vasárut to Komorn; by the second corps, however, not till the following morning (22d of June), by retreating as far as Guta.

The second corps left behind it near Aszód only an outpost to observe the enemy.

I hastened in person on to Guta, with the intention of overtaking early in the morning of the 22^a the third corps at Tót-Megyér on the circuit by Naszvad and Neuhausel.

But in Guta I received the surprising information, that the part of the artillery and infantry of the second

corps, which on the preceding day, as is known, had taken to flight from the line of battle before Pered towards Zsigárd, had arrived during the night at the bank of the Neuhäusel branch of the Danube, opposite Guta. The order directing these troops to join in Zsigárd the third corps had not been able to overtake them, on account of the uncommon speed of their uninterrupted further flight from Zsigárd, by Farkasd and Négyed.

The bridge over the Waag at Négyed was overlooked by them in their haste; and thus they came at last into the desperate condition of being hindered from continuing their flight, on the left by the Waag, on the right by the Neuhäusel branch of the Danube, and in front by the confluence of both, while they had to suppose that the pursuing enemy was in their rear. The latter, however, evidently had no suspicion of all this, otherwise he would undoubtedly have attempted the destruction of these troops. Their transport by boats over the Neuhäusel branch of the Danube to the Guta bank could not be begun till daybreak of the 22*a*, and lasted, on account of the small capacity of the boats at hand, until late in the forenoon. "When it was fairly in progress, I left Guta again, to continue speedily my route to Tót-Megyer.

The second corps, as is known, had not been pursued on its retreat from Királyrév to Aszód; and this circumstance — added to the uncertainty in which I was as to what had further happened to the third army corps — created in me the uncomfortable apprehension that the enemy had immediately improved his victory by crossing the lower Waag on the offensive.

If this was the case, then what I judged to be at that moment our greatest danger, namely, the separation of the first corps (General Nagy-Sándor) and the two

northern expeditionary columns from the rest of our main army, could be prevented only by the most resolute resistance of the third army corps, and a forced retreat simultaneously executed by the columns threatened with isolation.

Arrived at Tót-Megyer early in the forenoon, I found, however, that what I feared had not taken place.

The enemy had in fact on the preceding evening thrown himself with the far greater part of his forces upon the third corps alone, had pressed it back at Farkasd, and even taken this point; but thereupon had suddenly stopped his advance, no further disturbed the retreat of the third corps across the Waag, only this morning (22d of June) occupied the village of Négyed, and shewed no signs of attempting to cross the lower Waag.

But during my stay of several hours in Tót-Megyer, a report arrived from the outposts stationed along the "Waag by the third corps, that the principal force of the enemy was marching up the Waag; and I was thereby again confirmed in my former supposition of an offensive movement to be expected at Freystadl and Schintau by a great part of the Austrian army, simultaneously with the invasion of the Russians *en gros*.

The enemy had indeed evacuated on the 21st of June the left bank of the Waag at Schintau, and was forced to confine himself to the defence of the right bank: but this might have been merely a consequence of the necessitated greater concentration of his forces for an attack on our second and third corps at Pered; while the total failure of General Nagy-Sándor's attempts — pretended to have been energetic — at crossing the Waag, undertaken on the same day, left no doubt that the enemy had at his disposal, besides the superior strength with

which he had attacked our two corps at Pered, considerable forces opposite Schintau and at Freystadl, which, added to those developed at Pered, made him appear to be in any case strong enough on the Waag to cross it even by himself with a good prospect of success, without having previously to await the advance of the Russian western army, supposed by us to be behind the corps which had broken into the Arva.

By the unfortunate issue of the battle at Pered, and its serious consequences — the loss of the laboriously prepared passages across the river — suddenly reduced to the defensive, I therefore saw the combination indicated of the greater part of our main army opposite the line on which, according to the data before us respecting the distribution of the hostile forces, their most important concentration was to be expected.

Accordingly the second corps had to march from Guta to Neuhäusel.

I returned in the course of the 22^d of June from Tót-Megyér to Guta, to make arrangements for this movement without delay. Its execution, however, considering the isolated condition in which I found the second corps, appeared to me for the present impossible.

The numerical strength of this corps had been reduced, by the losses it had sustained during the last two days, to 5000 men. These losses amounted — as well as I can remember — to nearly 3000 men, besides some guns.

Now the short duration of the engagements at Pered and Alsó-Szélyly on the 20th of June — which, truly, had been sustained by the second corps alone — appeared out of all proportion with these losses; and in the battle at Pered on the 21st of June the second army corps — its

cavalry division and about three battalions excepted — had throughout not done its duty so conscientiously as the entire third corps, which nevertheless shewed no loss of guns, and hardly more than 500 men.

On my return from Tót-Megy er to Guta, I had met near the latter place troops of runaways of the second corps.

This circumstance now revealed to me the real source of the uncommon losses of the second corps. I had moreover reason to apprehend a still further diminution in its numbers, if I made the second corps immediately march again.

Several days' rest seemed to me to be indispensably necessary for the preservation of what remained of it.

The second corps consequently continued until further orders in the camp at Guta; while the third corps meanwhile took up its former position on the Waag.

CHAPTER XVII.

IMMEDIATELY after the battle at Aszód, in the night between the 21st and 22d of June, I received — while still in Aszód — the first reports, that several Russian corps had broken into Hungary from Dukla across the northern frontier.

My apprehension, mentioned in the preceding chapter, that the enemy had neglected the pursuit of the second corps from Királyrév as far as Aszód, merely for the purpose of rendering his victory more completely

profitable by forthwith crossing the lower Waag, was only still more increased by these reports.

It is well known that I believed I saw as the most dangerous consequence of the apprehended crossing of the river the separation of those parts of our main army from the rest of it which were disposed to the north of the third corps.

So long as this danger existed, I could not leave the theatre of war; for not having previously thought of the possibility of it, I had neglected to issue, by way of precaution, to the leaders of the independent corps the orders necessary for averting it.

As, however, the enemy had not crossed the lower Waag, but, on the contrary, in the course of the 22d of June moved his main column down the river, — a movement by which, again, my original supposition of an offensive intended on his part at Freystadl and Schintau gained probability; and as the defensive manœuvres of the divers corps for this purpose were partly self-evident, partly had already been indicated; my personal presence on the theatre of war, as commander-in-chief, seemed also less indispensable for the next few days; while the very consequences of the dismal reports I had received in Aszód, about the now serious commencement of the Russian invasion *en gros*, imperatively obliged me to hasten to the capitals.

These reports, on a closer consideration — -as nothing was heard of a simultaneous advance of Russians from the Arva towards the mountain-towns — led me to the supposition, that the operations of the Russian main force were to be commenced *only* on the line from Dukla by Kaschau.

In this case — with my determination to transfer the

scene of the last combat for Hungary to the *right* bank of the Danube — the evacuation of the *left* without delay was necessitated, in spite of the Austrian offensive expected from the Waag.

But at all events these reports still needed confirmation. In the capitals, where all news, from the districts of the operations of those parts of the Hungarian forces which did not belong to the main army, arrived first, I hoped most speedily to be relieved from the painful incertitude to which I had been exposed by those rumours. I had also immediately to endeavour to get Kossuth's consent to confining the last battles to the right bank of the Danube, — if the irruption of the Russian main army into Upper Hungary had really taken place.

Early on the 23d of June I left Guta to return to Ofen-Pesth; but being delayed at Dotis (then the seat of the central office of operations) by the settlement of some business relating to the service which could not be deferred any longer, I did not arrive at the capitals till the 24th.

On the 26th — according to General Yssocki's account of the first important battle which he had fought against the Russians between Eperjes and Kaschau with our northern army, and in consequence of which the latter was obliged in future to retreat without opposition towards Miskolcz — no doubt any longer existed that the combined Russian main forces (assumed to be from 60,000 to 70,000 men strong) w^rere advancing irresistibly on the line from Dukla by Kaschau into the interior of the country. Simultaneously there had arrived from Transylvania reports of successive irruptions of considerable Russian corps from the northern and southern confines of the country.

The inroad of the Russian main army into Hungary at once deprived of any practical significance all my efforts for the rehabilitation of the constitution of the year 1848, and against the further continuance of the law of independence of the 14th of April 1849.

The counter-revolution, no matter whether proceeding from the army or from the Diet, in the face of the extent of country already abandoned, and almost without drawing a blade, before the Russian main army, could no longer elevate itself above the moral level of *a forced repentance* — as I had endeavoured to render possible by means of the late unsuccessful offensive against the Austrians — not to speak of the *want of success* — evident under the conjunctures mentioned — of this "last means of salvation."

From this time there was but one means left of salvation to Hungary — to vanquish the allied armies of invasion!

Was Hungary of itself equal to this task?

My conviction as a soldier unhesitatingly denied it; and the question "by what means Hungary could yet be saved," I considered already to be a useless one. As it had long been indeed! And that I had perceived this only now; that, although smiling at the credulity of those who confidently expected help from abroad, I had myself hitherto indulged in suppositions not less improbable, nay had allowed myself to be embarrassed by their influence even in my strategic activity as leader of the main army; — just therein lay the principal cause of the undeniable imperfection of my public conduct after the 14th of April 1849.

I ought long ago to have perceived that, from the moment when the Austrian army began to console itself

with the prospect of Russian aid, there was but one question for the champions of the constitutional rights of Hungary to solve, — namely the question of despair, *how* the deadly enemy could most effectively be met by our last convulsive effort.

I ought long ago to have directed all my thoughts and endeavours exclusively to the solution of this one question, indifferent whether the constitution of the year 1848, or the law of independence of the 14th of April 1849, was the banner under which the last strokes against the original enemy of Hungary should be struck. Painfully I felt the loss of the months which had passed unimproved.

I now reckoned the existence of Hungary only by weeks.

These at least must not pass unimproved. Even Aveeks sufficed for the accomplishment of a last desperate resolve.

On the evening of the 26th of June Kossuth summoned the ministers to deliberate on what was now to be done.

This was the last ministerial council at which I took part as minister of war.

The sitting was commenced by producing the reports which had arrived from Transylvania and Upper Hungary relative to the unexpectedly rapid progress of the Russian arms. The entire contents of these were communicated to the assembly. Hereupon Kossuth asked what the government should now do, — and looked first to *me* for an answer.

"Above all" — thus ran my proposal — "let the government no longer delay to reveal to the people the whole extent of the danger impending over Hungary,

were it only that it may not be surprised by the ignominious fate of subjugation during the transport of a premature confidence of victory.

" Simultaneously, however, let the government prepare to answer *personally* for the principle which it has hitherto advocated! Let it give, to the last contest for Hungary's independence, by its direct participation in it, the true significance of a national self-defence for its very existence! Let it declare itself ambulant, and join the main army, to stand or fall with it.

" Further, let it be convinced of the impossibility of conquering the united Russian and Austrian armies with its present means; and let it begin immediately to concentrate its whole force on the right bank of the Danube for a last stroke against Austria: the advance of the Russian army, on the other hand, let it try to retard only by endeavouring to enter into peaceable negotiations.

" Should the latter fail, let the abandoned parts of the country remain occupied by the Russians.

" If Hungary sinks under the united attacks of Russia and Austria, it is in the end indifferent to which of the two it first falls a prey: but it is not indifferent *which* of the two our last desperate counter-stroke descends upon.

" The rights of the nation were originally assailed by Austria, not by Russia.

" Let the government ponder this; and from this time aim stroke after stroke at Austria alone, so long as the distance of the Russians makes it still possible!"

When I had finished, Kossuth resumed.

He assented unreservedly to the first point of my proposal, namely, no longer to conceal from the nation

the danger in which Hungary was involved. The nation, he said, had hitherto at most evinced only a cheap enthusiasm — had done little or nothing for its deliverance. Now let it choose between slavery and manly resistance.

I could not comprehend what Kossuth was aiming at in these surprising attacks on the nation.

In my opinion it had hardly done less than any other people on earth would have done under similar circumstances. But least of all did it become Kossuth to complain of the nation, or "the people," as he used to express himself. Although as a whole it deserved the blame of always having dreamt more of its invincibility than it had done to confirm it, nevertheless *Kossuth* had no right to pronounce this blame. For it was he himself who had made the people believe that it had but to straighten its scythes and troop together planless, in order to annihilate the enemy.

With regard to the Russians indeed, the people let even the scythes rest. But here also Kossuth could not reproach it: for he himself had officially recommended the exercise of fasting and praying as an especial preservative against the Russians, and had conjured up by this governmental measure the discouraging illusion, that the Russians were something similar to pestilence and famine, against which nothing could be effected by defensive weapons.

I was consequently, as I have said, in the dark as to the object which Kossuth had in view — considering the unexampled submission of the nation *to* his will — in his unexpected attacks upon it. It appeared as if he had begun to speak *for* my proposal; which, however, contained only the three following demands:

1. The enlightenment of the nation as to the true state of the affairs of Hungary;

2. The *personal* responsibility of Kossuth and the ministers for the principle of the deliverance of the people;

3. A last desperate stroke at Austria.

What was the object of Kossuth's attacks upon the nation, in the face of these three demands?

Did he feel, perhaps, merely an urgent necessity for relieving his oppressed heart in some way? Or,

Were these attacks intended to lead to the conclusion that the nation did not deserve Kossuth to be personally responsible for its cause?

I feared the latter — I do not deny it. My still-fresh recollection of Kossuth's winter journey from Pesth to behind the Theiss justified me in this.

My determination was taken, in case Kossuth should betray a longing for a similar summer journey, — and I awaited quietly the fate of my proposal.

Kossuth seemed to be about to attack with all the weapons of his oratory the nation, which had so suddenly fallen into disrepute with him. He was just beginning with a not flattering apostrophe on it — when suddenly his valet entered with two good-sized bottles of beer, and apparently undecided which of the ministerial gentlemen he should first serve.

"What means this!" exclaimed Kossuth, stopping short in his severe remarks on the people, and angrily ordering the bewildered Ganymede out of the room.

I had unintentionally been the cause of this disturbing intermezzo; for just before the session of the ministerial council began, I had complained in the antechamber of extreme thirst. I certainly did not thereby intend

that the drink should be served to me during the conference, and moreover in such an immoderate quantity. Nevertheless I thought I ought to take the blame of the annoying interruption on myself.

Kossuth, in consequence of my self-accusation, shewed himself speedily appeased. He might moreover have felt himself, as regarded the ministers assembled in his dwelling, bound to fulfil the duties of a host towards his guests; and forthwith had more generous liquor, together with a corresponding luncheon, brought in.

The serious, taciturn council of ministers was speedily metamorphosed into a lively improvised *soirée* of men. The gloomy disposition of the former was suddenly changed into the cheerful, almost frivolous one of the latter. Kossuth did not resume his tirade against the people, but declared without more ado that he agreed in all points with my proposal. Several of the ministers did the same after him. My proposal was not rejected, — and yet I lacked the inward conviction that Kossuth and the majority of the ministers were in earnest in the adoption of it, not to speak of its resolute execution.

I lacked this inward conviction, because — in the face of the frivolity with which the majority of the speakers had discussed a question on which depended the only thing that still remained to be saved, *the honour of the nation* — I could not get rid of the suspicion, that I owed the favourable result of the deliberation in respect of my proposal, mainly to the officiousness of the above-mentioned valet and its inspiring consequences.

When I left the capitals next day — never again to set foot in them — the presentiment accompanied me, that Kossuth and the majority of the ministers would

deny by their actions, what they had promised me in the evening conference of the 26th of June.

At all events I was resolved to concentrate the main army on the right bank of the Danube, and strike the intended last stroke at the Austrians, should it even be with the latter alone.

The Austrians, however, had meanwhile concentrated themselves on the right bank of the Danube; and when I arrived on the 27th of June at the central office of operations in Dotis, I found the concentration of our main army on the Danube right bank, which I had resolved upon offensively, already in process as a necessitated defensive measure. Nay, even as a defensive measure it appeared to have been taken rather late for the maintenance of the line of the Raab.

The movement of the Austrians from the left to the right bank of the Danube had not, so far as I know, been foreseen either by me or by any body else in the Hungarian camp: but that this was the case became evident — from the information of scouts and the reports of the commanders detached on the Waag and the Great Schutt — only after it had been executed, and that the Austrians were already advancing to attack Pbltenberg and Kmety's positions on the Raab.

The latter was concentrated at Marczaltö, from four to five (German) miles south of Raab. It is known that, in case of being attacked and defeated, the capitals had been indicated as his place of retreat. But a change ought to have been made in this arrangement in consequence of my last resolutions, and General Kmety, even in the worst case, ought to have remained united with General Pbltenberg.

However, in the evening of the 27th a report arrived

at Dotis, that an Austrian corps had crossed the river Raab between Raab and Marczaltö in the course of the day, and advanced as far as the line of communication between the Kmety division and the seventh corps. The Kmety division seemed thereby to be already separated from the seventh corps; the position of the latter before and near Raab to be turned on the left; and a direct concentrated attack on it was to be expected on the following day.

Early on the 28th I left Dotis for Raab. When I arrived there, I found the position of the seventh corps to the west of Raab already vigorously attacked. General Pöltenberg had even abandoned his first position — an hour's distance from Raab *à cheval* of the Wieselburg main road and the little river Rabnitz — and retreated into the second, about half the distance nearer to Raab; because here, from its being less extensive, it was in General Pöltenberg's power to resist more energetically the hostile attacks with those forces which remained to him for the direct defence of Raab, after he had perceived the necessity of disposing a great part of his troops on the Pápa road.

For already, in the night between the 26th and 27th of June, General Pöltenberg — on the first news that the communication between his corps in Raab and the Kmety division in Marczaltö was endangered by an apprehended crossing over the river Raab at Móriczhida — had marched two battalions, four squadrons, and a battery to Tét to preserve it.

This column reached Tét about noon of the 27th of June, but found there two companies of the tenth Honvéd battalion belonging to the Kmety division. These troops, having formed the protection of the ex-

treme right flank of the division, had been separated from it by a hostile column, which, advancing from Edenburg, on the morning of that day had already effected its passage at Mõriczhida. They were just now retreating to Raab, in order to join the seventh corps.

The declarations of the officers of these two companies respecting the strength of the enemy, and the assurance that, immediately after crossing the river, he had taken the direction towards Tét, — caused the commander of the column of the seventh corps at once to march back again as far as Szemere.

In consequence of this information, General Pöltenberg now dispatched to Szemere, in the night between the 27th and 28th of June, one of the commanders of his infantry divisions, with the remainder of the division to which the two battalions already there belonged, reinforced by some squadrons. Considering the offensive movements of the enemy, which were meanwhile remarked on the Wieselburg main road, and menaced the front of Pöltenberg's position before Raab, it did not seem advisable to send thither more considerable forces.

Pöltenberg's whole force — consisting of the seventh corps, and a column of the eighth corps several days previously sent to Raab by General Klapka, in all about 11,000 men and forty guns — was consequently early on the 28th distributed on two points, nearly two miles and a half distant from each other.

Namely, about two-thirds (the right wing), under Pöltenberg's personal command, stood à *cheval* of the Wieselburg main road and the Rabnitz, for the defence of the town against the western (principal) attack of the

enemy; the remainder (the left wing), led by the above-mentioned commander of an infantry division of the seventh corps, stood at Szemere, and was charged — for the purpose of re-establishing the communication with the Kmety division — to attack the hostile corps which had arrived on the preceding evening at Tét, and if possible drive it from the Pápa road and back across the Raab.

The hostile corps, however, on the morning of the 28th anticipated the attack of our left wing. Almost simultaneously its commander received from the post of intelligence appointed to observe the line of the river between Raab and the height of Szemere a report that a hostile column, which had crossed the Raab at Babot, was advancing in the direction of Ménfő. The commander of the left wing consequently saw himself obliged to lead his troops from Szemere back to Ménfő, in order to prevent being himself separated from Raab. Still he was obliged to fight for some time during his retreat, as he was already attacked by the enemy coming from Tét, and was now hotly pursued part of his way. In Ménfő he intended to offer a more resolute resistance.

General Pöltenberg was already aware of all these unfavourable events, when I arrived at Raab and spoke with him. He nevertheless still entertained a hope that his left wing would be able at Ménfő to put a stop to the further advance of the enemy, until the succour which was expected from Komorn should arrive on the battle-field.

I had, however, become convinced that this succour, consisting of the second army corps and a small part of the eighth, would at most be able to reach Gönyő in

the course of the day, and could consequently think of a further holding of Raab only in case of an uncommonly favourable success to our arms at Ménfő.

I accordingly left to Pöltenberg the further defence of Raab, and hastened to undertake personally the conduct of the battle at Ménfő. But while on my way thither I met a hussar with a written report from the commander of the left wing, that the unfortunate issue of a short engagement at Ménfő had obliged him to enter on his retreat towards Szabadhegy. Under these circumstances, the town of Raab with its suburbs — even irrespective of the superior force with which the enemy had meanwhile commenced his attacks on it — could no longer be maintained; because through the retreat of the left wing from Ménfő to Szabadhegy, Pöltenberg with the right wing before Raab, by staying longer there, risked the loss of his line of retreat.

He accordingly received my order to evacuate Raab without delay, and lead his troops back as far as behind the Pigeon, an inn so named on the Komorn road.

While he executed this order with the right wing, the left was directed from Szabadhegy to Hecse.

From the latter point and the Pigeon inn I ordered the retreat in the direction of Acs in two columns, for the present as far as to the height of Gönyö.

General Klapka, who meanwhile had arrived from Komorn, led the left wing by Szent-Iván to Szent-János; General Pöltenberg the infantry and artillery of the right wing to Gönyö; while with the greatest part of the cavalry and a battery I took charge of the protection of the retreat.

The enemy pursued us as far as about the height of the eastern point of the Little Schutt.

The extraordinary numerical superiority which the Austrians had displayed during the course of the day caused me to determine to avoid as much as possible any decisive conflict until the concentration of our main army on the right bank of the Danube was completely effected; in the worst case — that is, if the Austrians, improving their victory, should advance without delay — to retreat with all the disposable troops on the right bank of the Danube into the fortified camp opposite Komorn; to confine myself to maintaining it; and not till the last division of the main army had come from the left to the right bank of the Danube to put forth our whole strength in a counter-stroke against the Austrians.

Accordingly, before daybreak on the 29th of June the seventh and second corps (the latter, if I mistake not, had with great difficulty reached Gönyö in the course of the 28th), together with the columns of the eighth corps, left their bivouacs at Gönyö and Szent-János, and continued their retreat as far as Acs; and on the 30th — having left outposts at Acs — arrived at the fortified camp.

A detachment of cavalry was sent to Nagy-Igmánd to observe the enemy on the Fleischhauer road, and obtain intelligence about the Kmety division, to which, on the evening of the 28th, I had sent an order from Raab by Szent-Márton to retreat to Komorn by Romand and Kis-Bér.

This detachment of cavalry, however, by the approach of a hostile corps had been forced in the course of the 30th of June to leave Nagy-Igmánd; whereupon it retreated towards the fortified camp.

The advanced troops of different corps at Acs had

been ordered to evacuate this point and the line of the "brook Czonczó only in the face of a superior enemy; and in this case to occupy that spur of the forest of Acs which lies between Acs and the fortified camp, and extends to the south towards Puszta-Harkály.

Now this was not done by the commander of these advanced troops.

For as, on the 30th of June, the approach of strong hostile columns towards Acs, simultaneously with the advance against Nagy-Igmand, had obliged him to abandon the Czonczó line, he also evacuated immediately the spur of the Acs forest, and hastened — without sending us previous intelligence — to reach the interior of the fortified camp, because he had taken the detachment of cavalry which was retreating at the same time from Nagy-Igmánd towards Komorn for a hostile one, and feared being intercepted by it.

The enemy coming from Acs followed him closely, and thus came into possession of the forest-spur without striking a blow.

It was important now to regain it, in which we succeeded without much difficulty, the enemy offering no great resistance, but after a short contest with artillery again returning to Acs.

Our advanced troops occupied the forest-spur, leaning to the right on the Danube, to the left — surrounding in a wide circuit the fortified camp — on the little town of O-Szony.

CHAPTER XVIII.

" STROKE upon stroke at Austria alone!" This was — I repeat it — after the invasion of the Russians *en gros*, the sole, last task for all parties in Hungary: the *possibility* or the *impossibility* of a victorious issue of the combat was the only point that admitted of discussion.

In the first instance, Kossuth had to avenge his declaration of independence, Szemere his republic, and the unfortunate defenders of the constitution of the year 1848 their constitution, and this less on Russia than on Austria.

In the next, the plan which would most surely effect this object would be, to destroy first of all the hostile army that stood nearest to the centre-point of our collective forces — consequently the Austrian — and not till we had succeeded in this to fall on the Russians for the same purpose.

This plan — considering the position of the hostile main army, and the probable advance of the Russians during our operations against the Austrians — had but the *one* disadvantage, that it endangered the line of retreat to the neutral territory of Turkey.

But Kossuth — without whose assent the energetic execution of this plan remained indeed only a pious wish — of his own free conviction had already, on the 14th of April 1849, destroyed the bridge behind the whole nation, and thereby justified the expectation, which was but an honourable one to him, that he him-

self no longer set any particular value on the said line of retreat.

The proposal which I made in the ministerial council on the 26th of June was consequently in some measure a compromise, offered by me — who believed the salvation of Hungary to be impossible — in the name of the defenders of the constitution of 1848 to the founder of independent Hungary with an undefined form of government (*Kossuth*), and to the discoverer of the republican element in Hungary (*Szemere*), who both still maintained their belief in the possibility of the salvation of the fatherland.

The compromise was accepted: however, as is known, under extraordinary influences, and in a manner not calculated to inspire me with confidence in the sincerity of those who accepted it.

And if on the 26th of June — on which day Kossuth and Szemere could scarcely have a presentiment of the offensive threatening us on the Danube right bank on the part of the Austrians — it already seemed as if these gentlemen were *not in earnest* respecting the execution of my proposals, — on the 29th I could unfortunately be quite sure of it.

For, after the events of the action on the 28th, related in the preceding chapter, the government ought immediately to have removed from Pesth to Komorn. However, the request to allow himself, if necessary, even to be shut up in Komorn had, as is well known, been very positively rejected by Kossuth at the end of April; and at the end of June, in the face of far more critical circumstances, truly a not more favourable reception awaited the same request.

The state of affairs seemed consequently to be almost

the same as if my proposal, made in the ministerial council on the 26th of June, had been forthwith rejected—in which case — as has been mentioned — I had already, by way of precaution, come to the fixed determination to attempt *with the main army alone* the performance of the one duty which in my opinion, was common to all parties in Hungary.

A perception of the duty of defending Hungary's last honour — of preventing its fall from being completely inglorious, led me to this resolution.

Considering the perplexity which had so suddenly manifested itself with regard to the question of the defence of the country, on the invasion of the Russians *en gros*, the danger of an inglorious fall really existed. But this danger, in my opinion, and judged from a national-military point of view, lay principally in the great probability of an uninterrupted victorious continuance of the just-commenced offensive of the Austrians; in case no advantage should be taken of the favourable opportunity offered at Komorn of forcing the defensive *once more* upon them, before the Russians could prevent it.

My firm resolve to remain even with the main army alone at Komorn, was consequently, it is true, not founded on the hope of thereby preventing the fall of Hungary, but nevertheless on the twofold conviction:

That the main army, mindful of its duty to the country, for the rights of which it had become surety, was bound by its own honour to yield to the Austrians only after the most desperate resistance; — and

That our offensive retaliation on the Austrians could not make itself so powerfully felt on any other point of the country as at Komorn.

Even on the 29th of June, however, I was not ac-

tually convinced of the impossibility of succeeding in uniting the troops of General Vysocki, which were retreating before the Russians, with the main army on the right bank of the Danube; or, more correctly, of inducing Kossuth to come himself to Komorn; for unless I succeeded in *this*, the former project, as may be conceived, would likewise be impracticable.

I had indeed no favourable result to expect from a renewed written detail of the reasons for my proposal made in the ministerial council on the 26th of June, considering that Kossuth had so decidedly declared his antipathy to the chance of being shut up in Komorn by the enemy; nevertheless I still hoped that Kossuth's sense of honour would react, and decide him to join the main army, if I — assuming as self-evident my determination that the final decision should take place on the right bank of the Danube, as well as his refusal to share the fate of the main army — were openly to recommend to him the salvation of his own person by flight.

This I accordingly did. At the conclusion of my short report on the loss of the line of the Raab, and the insufficiency of the forces then at our disposal for the direct protection of the capitals, I advised Kossuth at once to transfer the government — -if Komorn did not suit it — from Pesth to Grosswardein; on which occasion I did not leave him in the dark either as to the determination I have expressed, nor as to the resignation with which I intended to persevere in it.

Kossuth, however, did not come to Komorn; only his bitter complaint reached it, that I could not find a less insecure abode for him than the city of Grosswardein, -which might be taken within a few days and without impediment by the Russians posted on the Upper Theiss.

In this Kossuth was certainly right; but I confess that this complaint, equally naive as well-founded, was the last thing I should have expected. And the sad consequences of this sorrowful surprise perplexed or enlightened (the choice between these two expressions I leave to the reader) my judgment in such a manner, that harmonious co-operation with Kossuth appeared to me even in the last stages of our public action to be just as impossible as it would be to go hand in hand with two men, one of whom was ready to answer personally at any time and under all circumstances for his actions and any of their results, while the other endeavoured in every way to escape the inconvenient consequences of his deeds.

The following event also contributed essentially to that enlightening or perplexing of my judgment.

On the 29th of June, while my letter to Kossuth above mentioned was already on its way to the capitals, and I was in Acs taking the necessary measures for the further retreat into the fortified camp, two civilian officials suddenly arrived there for the purpose of burning down the village in virtue of their office. They declared they had been charged to do so by some government commissary, and moreover referred to a decree of the government, which had hitherto remained unknown to me, according to which a similar fate awaited all the habitations in the country, so soon as they had to be evacuated by our troops when retreating before the enemy.

Something similar, though more limited in its extent, had already happened in December 1848.

The reader is aware that at the beginning of our retreat from the Lajtha towards the capitals, all the

stores of hay and corn between Wieselburg and Raab lying nearest to the main road were destroyed by fire.

These devastations commenced experimentally (as we have seen, they were not continued further than to Raab) were perhaps excusable, on the one hand by the intention to delay the advance of the enemy; on the other by the illusion, which had gained the ascendancy, that the rural population were determined for ever to bid farewell to their habitations on the approach of the Austrians, or in other words, that we stood at the opening of a new age of the migration of tribes.

It is notorious, however, that the people evinced very little disposition for migration; and on this account it appeared to be unjustifiable to persist in carrying out the plan of devastation, erroneously introduced to further the defence of the country.

Of this Kossuth himself had been undoubtedly convinced in December 1848; otherwise he would probably have steadily continued the work of destruction, without paying much attention to my remonstrances. The little national desire for migrating that existed among his fellow-citizens was from that time consequently no secret to him; and within the six months that had since elapsed, the views of the country people with reference to the value of their immovable property could scarcely have been sufficiently changed to justify the conflagration-decree of the provisional Governor of Hungary.

I could therefore neither bring this decree into a causal connexion with the friendliness of his manner of thinking and acting towards the people, so wearisomely-often asseverated, nor with his belief in the possibility of saving Hungary.

But even apart from this circumstance, I could not discover either the *particular* beneficial result to be attained by this decree and its consequences, nor in general *any one* that would have been sufficient to justify such a means.

My conviction of the moral impossibility of a further agreement between myself and Kossuth was consequently to my own mind indisputable, and it urged me undisguisedly to declare to him in a letter dated from Komorn, the 30th of June, that the object of my contests up to this time had not been to further the interests of the government, but of the nation, and that I should be the first to lay down my arms, if I saw that *this object* would thereby be attained.

Before, however, I could receive Kossuth's answer to this declaration, I was surprised by the official oral intelligence from three deputies of the government (the minister of communication Csányi, General Aulich, and Field-marshal Lieut. Kiss), that it had been decided in the ministerial council, that the main army should move back as speedily as possible from Komorn to Ofen. And Csányi — effectively supported by Aulich, still more effectively by those friendly sentiments which I entertained towards these two men — succeeded in soon changing my opinions so much, that I gave up the resolution I had already formed to bring about the final decision at Komorn; nay I even thought I was bound no longer to adhere to my conviction of the moral impossibility of a further co-operation with Kossuth.

For Csányi and Aulich — -thanks to the very noble mode of their thinking and acting, which they had proved in many ways — possessed *my* confidence in so

high a degree, that their decidedly espousing the side of the government was felt by me as a reproach; and it now suddenly appeared to me that I had wronged Kossuth when I supposed — although supported by his conflagration-decree and his suspicious delay in joining the main army — that he had in view besides his own personal safety only the total devastation of Hungary — it is all one with what intention.

Accordingly I gave to the deputies of the government my sincerely-intended promise to carry into effect the resolution of the ministerial council as speedily as possible.

And the deputies immediately returned to Pesth.

The position of the main army (the Kmety division excepted, which, it is known, had been separated from it) on the 1st of July 1849 was as follows:

The second, third, and seventh corps were united in the fortified camp opposite Komorn; the first corps at Neuhäusel and the river Neutra upwards; the expeditionary column of the seventh army corps in Verebély and Neutra; while the expeditionary column under Major Armin Görgei, the outposts of which had meanwhile been pressed back from the upper Waag towards the district of the mountain-towns by detachments of the Russian corps occupying the Arva, left Perk and Neusohl on the above-mentioned day, in order to effect without delay, conformably to the last-received dispositions, its retreat to Komorn.

The march of our main army from Komorn to Ofen (to say the least, a daring enterprise — though perhaps not positively hopeless — in the face of the Austrian army posted on the Czonczó), in consequence of the above-indicated dislocations, which the chief of the

central office of operations had fully communicated in my presence to the deputies of the government, could not by any means be commenced before the 3d of July, and even then only on condition that the two expeditionary columns (together amounting to about 5,000 men and ten guns) should be destined, as a reinforcement of the garrison of Komorn, to remain separate from the main army.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE fortified camp on the right bank of the Danube, opposite Komorn, since the 26th of April (the day of the complete relief of Komorn) had been restored, nay partly strengthened by new works.

The most important of these was a strong redoubt, erected on the sand-hill which rises *to* the south in front of the *tête-de-pont* of the Danube, and held the place of the former object No. 8.

(All the objects in the fortified curve were designated by the continuous numbers from 1 to 10, commencing from the right point of support of the camp, the elevation of the bank above Uj-Szony — the Monostor or Sandberg.)

The other new erections consisted of some earth-works open in the gorge, thrown up before the extreme right wing of the camp (objects 1 and 2).

Of the corps united since the 30th of June in this camp (together scarcely 25,000 men, with about 120

guns), the part of the eighth corps which was present (four battalions) occupied the objects on the Monostor Nos. 1, 2, and 3, as well as the open works advanced to these objects; the seventh corps, under General Pöltenberg, the objects 4, 5, 6, and 7; finally, the third corps, under General Leiningen, the objects 8, 9, and 10, besides the *tête-de-pont* and the little town of O-Szbny, situated down the river; while the second corps, under Colonel Kászonyi, remained *en réserve* in the interior of the camp.

The Austrians, re-inforced — as we learned from a Russian soldier taken prisoner on the 1st of July — by the Russian corps which had been opposed to us in the engagement at Pered on the 21st of June, had occupied the line of the Czonczó since the 30th of June.

Early in the morning of the 2d of July they advanced towards our camp.

The commanders of our outposts nevertheless omitted to forward intelligence of it to the head-quarters (town of Kornorn). They probably supposed there was no serious intention on the part of the enemy.

Accordingly General Klapka and myself were informed of the menacing movement only by the cannonade commenced in consequence of it on the Monostor. Meeting on the way into the camp, we agreed immediately that *he* should take the chief conduct of the impending combat on the left wing (within the range of the third corps), *I* that in the centre and on the right wing (within the range of the seventh corps and of the troops from the Komorn garrison).

Urged by the necessity of knowing as quickly as possible from ocular inspection the state of affairs in our ranges, we rode at first together between the ob-

jects 7 and 8 beyond the line of the camp, and parted only when outside of it; General Klapka turning to the left towards O-Szöny, I to the right towards the Monostor.

The advance from Mocsa and Csém of extended hostile lines was to be remarked. They were, however, still far out of gun-range of our trenches. The extreme right wing of the enemy — pushed forward towards O-Szöny — menaced this point, and was just then attacked by a part of the cavalry division of the third corps.

But the battle beginning at the Monostor appeared to be far more active than that here.

While riding in a wide circuit round the fortified line, I now hastened towards the Monostor, and saw that the enemy developed very considerable forces, apparently preparatory to a direct attack also on our camp before Harkály and the southern spur of the forest on the river-bank, which extends between the brook Czonczó and the vineyards of the Monostor along the Danube.

Our outposts had both returned from Harkály and the southern forest-spur into the interior of the camp. But the enemy did not seem to be by any means satisfied with this result; and however incredible the supposition might be, that he intended a serious attack on our fortified camp, the impetuous advance of his extreme left wing from the forest by the river-bank against our point of support on the Monostor, backed, as I saw it was, by the simultaneous advance from the southern forest-spur, in the direction of Harkály, Csém, and Mocsa, seemed nevertheless to justify this supposition.

Being in possession of an uncommonly strong position, as ours was in the fortified camp, and in the face of an unmistakable superiority in the hostile forces developed offensively within our horizon, it would, in my opinion, be our wisest course to await in a purely defensive attitude the attack which, as I have remarked, seemed already energetically begun against the Monostor.

The offensive measures, however, which had been taken on our part at the Monostor before my arrival there, shewed that, during my absence, a contrary opinion with regard to tactics had probably prevailed.

In order, namely, to drive the enemy out of the vineyards and the forest by the river-bank, the greater part of the four battalions of the Komorn garrison had already been advanced; and to support this sally energetically, other four battalions of the seventh corps had been disposed, partly in the vineyards themselves, partly on the ground bounding them to the south, between the latter and the main road to Acs, on the left before the first entrenched line.

This instantaneous offensive demeanour certainly appeared to be justified by the prospect of repelling the attack of the *extreme* left wing of the enemy, which had pressed forward alone, before the hostile *inner* left wing and the centre could have advanced at the same height of attack against the objects entrusted to the seventh corps.

But the employment of infantry alone, without the co-operation of the other two principal arms, especially artillery, was not adapted to the purpose; and the disposition of the battalions of the seventh corps in the iree and open ground between the vineyards and the

main road to Acs, beyond the effective reach of the artillery of the camp, and in the face of the enemy advancing with all three arms, was completely disastrous to our troops only.

When I, returning by the main road to Acs into the camp, reached the Monostor, the injurious consequences of the isolated advance of these eight battalions had already become sensibly felt, as was evident from a report of my younger brother to the commander of his corps, General Pöltenberg, which had arrived almost simultaneously with myself in the camp. (The battalion commanded by my brother was one of those which were disposed on the open ground to the south of the vineyards.)

On the part of the enemy — thus ran the report — a rocket-battery and two of field-pieces were now in full activity, whereby the battalions on the open ground were hard pressed, while those in the vineyards (our extreme right wing) had already been obliged to give way.

On hearing this, I hastened forward into the vineyards, intending if possible to renew the combat, or at least prevent a disbanding.

While riding with this intention through the foremost open earthworks, I found them, to my comfort, already sufficiently strongly occupied by the part of the advanced four Komorn battalions which had been kept back *en réserve*, to guarantee their being held even in the most unfavourable case, that is, though our storming-columns should be completely defeated.

At about half gun-range distance from this intrenched line I encountered a wide-extended troop of fugitives. Their number scarcely amounted to half a battalion. The exertions of my ever-brave suite speedily put a

stop to their flight. This was the easier, as the hostile batteries posted to the left before us (on the open ground to the south of the vineyards) had just directed their fire principally against the earthworks in our rear, consequently cannonaded but slightly the line on which we threw ourselves (my suite and myself) against the disbanded troop; there was also no enemy visible in front of us at this moment. Next minute, however, the foremost of the hostile *tirailleurs* emerged from behind the nearest elevation of the undulating ground, from 150 to 200 paces before us, advancing at storming speed with crossed bayonets. We were in vain endeavouring to animate the troop - — which had scarcely been brought to a stand — to a counter-enterprise similar to that of the enemy. After a few seconds they again took to flight, and this time could not be stopped; they did not, however, take the former direction towards the intrenchments, but laterally to the Danube.

The Danube, when of its ordinary depth, leaves at the foot of the high and steep declivities of the Monostor a way along its bank, used as a towing-path, which is on an average as broad as an ordinary road. On the 2d of July 1849 its waters did not rise uncommonly high.

The Komorn battalions — shaken and discouraged by the brisk fire of artillery and the resolute attack of infantry on the part of the enemy — when fleeing over the steep declivities of the Monostor down to the towing-path had undeniably made a very fortunate choice as regarded their preservation from the attacks of the enemy. The path was obliquely commanded by a battery, erected on the upper point of the so-called *Kriegsinsel* (' island of war'), this point lying between the Monostor and the left point of support of the opposite

outwork, the Palatinal line; so that an advance along this path was rendered uncommonly difficult to the enemy.

The greater part of the advanced Komorn battalions was already in security, that is, on the towing-path, when I arrived with my attendants in haste, intending to renew the combat in the vineyards. The troop which had been interrupted by us in its speedy retreat to the intrenched line was only the small remnant of these battalions. Its suddenly taking the direction towards the bank of the Danube betrayed to us the common asylum of the rest.

We hastened to the brink of the declivity, which was almost inaccessible on horseback, and a single glance down on the towing-path deep below us convinced me of the uselessness of any further attempt to bring back the disobedient battalions to their duty by merely summoning them.

Thronged close together between the Danube and the declivity, they fled unobstructed down the stream.

The vineyards situated in front of the first intrenched line were consequently completely evacuated by us, and this intrenched line itself was menaced in a direct manner by the assault of the hostile storming-columns of infantry.

But knowing that this line was strongly manned, I believed it to be sufficiently secured, even without my personal co-operation, at least until I should have succeeded in putting a stop to the above-mentioned flight, the pernicious influence of which upon the behaviour of our troops generally I feared above all.

It might be foreseen that this could only be successfully accomplished while the fleeing masses were still in

the defile formed by the Danube and the steep declivities of the Monostor. Thither I now hastened in advance of the fugitives — taking my way over the Monostor across the two intrenched lines — had very speedily two pieces of artillery planted in the prolongation of the defile, and then returned again to the Monostor.

Not far from object No. 1, and a little behind it, the brink of the declivity projects towards the Danube. Here I was visible to the fleeing masses in the defile, as well as to the commander of the two guns on the outlet of it, who awaited my signal to fire.

In the mean time the battalions of the seventh corps — (among which was also that under the command of my younger brother), which had been advanced, like those of Komorn, but to the left behind them along the southern border of the vineyards and on the adjoining open ground — had also retreated out of the effective range of the hostile artillery, passing by the left flank of the first intrenched line in the direction of object No. 3 of the second line; — while I erroneously supposed that these battalions, fleeing across by the vineyards of the Danube had saved themselves at the same time with those of Komorn over the steep declivities of the Monostor down to the towing-path.

I was completely confirmed in this error by observing a Honvéd officer on horseback joining in the flight of these battalions, whose horse happened to resemble in colour that of my younger brother.

In consequence of this error I felt myself much shaken in my determination to drive this coward troop together with grape-shot, and resolved once more to entertain the hope that it would perhaps still be possible to succeed without making use of this extreme measure.

But all repeated attempts to obtain this by exhortations or menaces having, as hitherto, proved unsuccessful; further, the sudden beginning of an uncommonly brisk fire of musketry on the foremost line of intrenchments leaving no doubt of the energetic earnestness of the hostile attack on the Monostor; and finally, having to expect as the nearest consequence of the general concentrated offensive movement of the enemy — observed by myself — against our fortified camp, similar attacks on all points of it, and that the certainty of opposing them everywhere successfully seemed to me very problematical if these coward masses were allowed to disperse themselves in the interior of the camp, and recruit from among the rest of the troops partisans for the standard of the hare; — it was, in the view of the perilous situation in which the army must be placed by a defence of the fortified camp deficient in valour, the command of an iron necessity to become master at any price of these refractory masses.

Resigned to what was unavoidable, I gave the signal for firing to the commander of the two guns placed at the outlet of the defile.

Half way through it they attempted to continue their flight. Deterred by the effective discharge of a body of infantry of the reserve, which had been speedily dispatched thither, they now completely ascended the declivity, and arrived on the ground situated directly behind objects Nos. 1 and 2, where a detachment of hussars was ready to charge them, in order to drive them without further ceremony again forward to the first line of intrenchments.

I already believed that the moment of greatest danger to the army from the flight of the Komorn battalions

was almost past, when all at once the rest of these battalions (the troops occupying the first line of intrenchments), falling back *en débandade* through the interval between objects Nos. 1 and 2 into the interior of the camp, abandoned to the on-storming enemy, simultaneously with the first line of intrenchments, the objects mentioned on the *second* line likewise.

The detachment of hussars in fact fell immediately on both parties of the Komorn battalions, drove them forward again to the abandoned objects, and thereby forcibly obtained the momentary security of the most important point of our position. But the *first* line of intrenchments was already occupied by the enemy; and the recovery of it by storm was too essential and too imperative a service to be intrusted to the dubious valour of those battalions which had just now been obliged to be compelled by disgraceful coercive measures to the most necessary fulfilment of their duty.

I consequently charged with the accomplishment of this task the 48th battalion, ordered to advance from the reserve (the second corps at Uj-Szőny).

Led by its former commander, the valiant Major Rakóvszki (commander of an infantry division of the second corps), the brave battalion executed its advance in the hottest fire of the enemy, without stopping, to about 100 paces from the point of attack. The enemy did not hold out longer in the earthworks which he had shortly before taken by storm; the resolute attack of the 48th battalion was now changed into a vigorous pursuit; and as the lines of the hostile centre and right wing, which were deployed before Csém and Mocsá, had meanwhile not attacked our camp, the moment seemed not unfavourable for reacting with strength and

energy against the left wing of the enemy, which had advanced singly.

Accordingly, while the 48th battalion drove before it in the vineyards the enemy just dislodged from the first line of intrenchments, Major Rakóvszki dispatched after them the remaining battalions of his division; General Pöltenberg debouched with the seventh corps, partly on the main road to Acs, partly to the south of it; the infantry on the right wing, joining the Rakóvszki division — the cavalry on the left in echelons towards Csém and Mocsá — in the centre the batteries of the infantry divisions.

The hostile column, far advanced between the main road to Acs and the vineyards at the Monostor, now quickly turned in towards the southern spur of the forest at the river-bank. Before the open ground between this forest-spur and Harkály, the main body of the hostile left wing (those corps which menaced our camp from Acs) steadily awaited the attack of Poltenberg's artillery.

Here an active conflict of artillery now commenced, the issue of which remained doubtful until the advance of our infantry in the forest at the river-bank enabled us to plant two guns in the left prolongation of the line of the hostile artillery, whereby it would be taken in file, and with the simultaneous advance of our guns be forced to retreat.

In the meantime the lines of the hostile centre and right wing, the attacks of which on our camp I feared were to be expected every moment during the critical situation at the Monostor, had completely withdrawn from our view.

This circumstance — alike favourable and in itself

enigmatical to us — put it in our power, as we shall see, immediately to improve the advantages we had just obtained.

By this circumstance, namely, the corps of the reserve — the second (instead of the infantry of the Rákóvski division, the four Komorn battalions remained behind in the camp), which had hitherto had to secure the objects of the defence-line of the camp, that had been quitted by the seventh corps, against any attacks of the hostile centre and right wing — relieved from this now superfluous precaution, could be employed on the open field in augmenting our tactic superiority opposite to the hostile left wing — at least in part, as our left wing under General Klapka must nevertheless not be denuded of his reserve.

General Pöltenberg thus received a considerable reinforcement of artillery, and at the same time an order to continue with increased energy his attacks on the already visibly shaken left wing of the enemy, which was now separated by a great distance from the other corps.

In part to destroy the latter, if possible, before a hostile succour could arrive at the place of battle — was the primary object of this effort; the secondary was — to obtain thereby for the next few days, during which, as is known, the main army had to enter on its march to Ofen, the time necessary for the convenient execution of this operation.

General Pöltenberg hastened to execute the received order, first of all by doubling his artillery developed in the foremost line; secured it against attacks of the hostile horse by disposing a part of the cavalry of the second corps in the second line; advanced, and swiftly frus-

tration- one after another the repeated attempts on the part of the enemy from point to point to make a stand, he soon arrived on the open ground between Harkály and the southern spur of the forest at the river-bank.

Here the resistance of the hostile left wing, turned on its left meanwhile by the uninterrupted advance of our infantry — in the forest at the river-bank and the northern half of the southern forest-spur — seemed to be paralysed; for its columns avoided further combat, and, retreating towards Acs, hastened to gain the passages across the brook Czonczó.

A part of the cavalry, which, ready for action as the second line, followed our front of artillery, rushed rapidly forward by Harkály, in order to interrupt the junction between the left wing retreating towards Acs, and the other parts of the hostile army moved back in the direction of Igmánd and Mocsa. The main body of Poltenberg's cavalry, however — till then disposed in echelons towards Igmánd, for the protection of the flank, always at gun-range distance to the left in the rear — was ordered to pursue.

But the distress of the hostile left wing, singly exposed for several hours to our attacks, must already have reached its turning-point!

The main body of Poltenberg's cavalry could not undertake the pursuit; for, attacked by a strong column of cavalry, which had meanwhile hastened thither on the road from Mocsa, it had now quite enough to do to oppose the impetuous attacks of its assailants.

General Pöltenberg personally commanded in the obstinate cavalry engagement, and left the conduct of the principal line developed against Acs to the chief of the artillery of our main army.

He, solicitous about the line of retreat for his batteries on the left wing to the camp, at the commencement of the cavalry contest ceased to advance, but next moment was ordered immediately to go forward; for from our left wing I received a report, that the extreme right wing of the Austrians — before which O-Szony had been evacuated on the morning of the day, in consequence of a very unfortunate cavalry conflict (the third corps lost in it one of its batteries) — was making a resolute resistance to the attacks of General Klapka directed to re-conquering this point.

But the possession of O-Szony by us was the result of our intention to lead the main army from Komorn to Ofen; consequently to support General Klapka in his endeavours to regain this absolutely indispensable point from the enemy was now the most important duty of the right wing of the army, acting under my immediate command.

With the then position of our army, this support, however, could not be furnished in a direct manner; nevertheless it could and must be done by the employment of all our forces in an indirect manner.

General Klapka, without previous concert, seemed herein to share with me one and the same view. At least this was indicated by the fact, that — as I learnt at the same time — remarking the movement directed against the right wing of our army by that column of hostile cavalry with which the main body of Pöltenberg's cavalry was just engaged, and perceiving the intention of the former to cripple our offensive against the left wing of the hostile army by repeatedly attacking our seventh corps in flank and rear, — he sent immediately a part of the cavalry of the third corps to

assist General Pöltenberg, while he continued energetically himself with the infantry divisions of the same corps the attacks on O-Szöny.

By means of this succour, which it was necessary should arrive in the shortest time within the battle-range of the main body of our cavalry, Pöltenberg could prospectively be in a position to repulse in the most decided manner the attacks of the column of the hostile cavalry, nay even to assume the offensive against it, and thus protect to the left and in the rear the further advance of our principal line against, the left wing of the Austrians.

This advance (hitherto a mere repressive measure, rendered possible solely, nay even openly challenged, by the enigmatical disappearing of the parts of the hostile army which had been developed before Csém and Mocsá) was now destined to serve for turning off the hostile forces from O-Szöny; for only in this manner, it appeared to me, the *indirect* support afforded to the left wing of our army in its efforts to reconquer the place was possible with a favourable result.

I did not, however, overlook the circumstance that, on account of the uncommon superiority of his forces, it was possible for the enemy to paralyse simultaneously the advance of the right wing of our army as well as the intentions of the left against O-Szöny. Consequently, if this advance was to answer its purpose, energy must make up for what it wanted in material strength; it must force upon the enemy, by means of this energy, serious apprehensions about the continuity of his extended position.

If it made upon him the impression of an attempt to break through, then, and only then, the further task of

our right wing had to be considered as fulfilled; then the enemy must feel himself obliged to concentrate his *whole* force opposite the *right* wing of our army; then he must give up the maintenance of O-Szbnny.

The *intended* range, however, of my next following tactic dispositions — according to my own observation of the strength of the enemy on the morning of that day — need not really go any further than this. The thought of a *serious* attempt at breaking through, considering the great numerical inferiority of our forces, could only originate in, and at the same time be justified by, the supposition, that the enigmatical disappearance of the parts of the enemy's army developed before Csém and Mocsa was the commencement of the immediate continuance of the hostile operations against Ofen.

But this supposition I already found to be inadmissible, on the ground that the continuance of the operations against Ofen, so long as our army stood before Komorn, on the right bank of the Danube, appeared to me very hazardous; and hazardous, nay desperate enterprises — in the face of the Russian intervention — were indicated to us only, not to the Austrians.

After the extraordinary display of forces which the enemy made at the beginning of his cavalry attack on the main body of our horse, this supposition must be altogether left out of the question; for,

The obstinate combat brought on by this cavalry attack was still undecided, when to the left of the column of hostile cavalry (between it and Harkály) a considerable number of guns suddenly began to cannonade the main body of our horse.

General Pöltenberg posted to the right of the battle-line of the main body of his cavalry the two batteries

belonging to it, by the fire of which we were enabled to maintain ourselves on the battle-field.

But now the enemy attacked with a no less considerable number of guns the left flank also of our principal line advancing against Acs; while almost at the same time the detachment of hussars, which had been pushed forward beyond Harkály, began to retreat, and soon afterwards the inner left wing likewise of the hostile army impeded its retreat to Acs, already commenced without resistance, and renewed the combat by an attack of artillery on the front of our principal line.

I considered the collective force, to whose energetic interference the hostile left wing just now owed its disengagement, to be nothing more than the centre of the enemy; supposed his right wing was still at or near O-Szöny; and that I must consequently not give up the combat *yet*, in spite of the dangerous situation in which the right wing of our army was placed by the concentric attacks of the enemy, nay must partly even continue it on the offensive.

The battery on the left wing of the principal line was consequently drawn back, and placed so as to form a hook with the front of the latter, and almost ranging with the batteries of the main body of the cavalry. It had to act against the attack directed on the flank of our principal line. Its other batteries ceased at the same time to advance towards Acs, but were charged to maintain their position. Hereupon the two batteries of the main body of the cavalry were ordered to advance against the retired right wing of the artillery line of the hostile centre, in order to prepare the attack of the main body of the cavalry on this point.

The latter, after firmly repulsing the repeated attacks

of the column of the hostile cavalry, had speedily reformed its ranks and been considerably re-inforced by the succour from the third corps, which had meanwhile arrived. General Pöltenberg retained the command over it, and on my order now advanced to attack. At the very beginning, his left wing, being within the effective reach of the hostile guns, refused; while the right, less menaced, uninterruptedly continued its progress. Thereby the whole line fell into an unintentional change of direction to the left (towards Mocsá). Pöltenberg tried to remedy this inconvenience, but the hostile projectiles frustrated his endeavours, and the left wing remained further behind.

Cavalry has this important advantage over infantry, that though on the battle-field it cannot easily be kept to the fulfilment of its duty by coercive measures *en gros*, it is, generally speaking, more susceptible of impression from encouraging examples.

Aware of this by experience, I hastened to the left wing to harangue it, calling upon it to follow me closely — started at a quicker pace — and the advance immediately regained its original direction.

The officers of the suite then present, together with the hussars assigned to them, kept next to me.

At first my eyes were directed towards Mocsá (to the left). From thence I expected to see hasten hither the right wing of the Austrian army.

I could not distinguish, however, on the horizon in this direction any hostile lines, and now fixed my gaze exclusively on our object of attack.

This was the white line, sharply defined on the extreme right wing of the hostile centre, in which I thought I perceived Austrian cavalry on white horses.

The undulating ground, over which we were speedily advancing, made it alternately disappear and emerge again. Arrived at the last elevation before it, we now beheld unexpectedly only the rear of several divisions of Austrian light horse or dragoons, at the distance of about fifty paces.

Some hussars galloped past me to charge the fugitives.

At the same moment one of my near companions remarked that our fronts had remained very far behind us. I halted, that they might come up with me.

Simultaneously I noticed on my right a dark hostile front. The sun was just above the horizon. This front, turned towards me, was between where I stood and the setting sun. Dazzled by his rays, I could with difficulty distinguish, in spite of the short distance, only the kind of troops. I took them for lancers.

To their left stood the battery of the extreme right wing of the hostile centre, directing its uncommonly brisk fire against our advancing fronts. I saw that they would be endangered in their right flank by the lancers, if they continued to advance in the same direction. They were then still far enough back to avoid this danger by changing the direction to the right. This, however, must be executed without delay; consequently Pöltenberg had to be immediately informed of the danger which threatened him. But this was hardly practicable. To dispatch an officer to General Pöltenberg, or even myself to ride to him, seemed to me inadvisable. I thought that at this critical moment I ought carefully to avoid any step which might be taken for a signal to turn back; and as my voice could not be heard at the considerable distance — especially with the noise made

by the advance and almost uninterrupted thunder of the near hostile cannons — I had no other way left of making myself understood by General Pöltenberg but motioning with my hat.

While I was endeavouring — my gaze sharply directed on our advancing fronts — to perceive from their movements whether my repeated motioning towards the point which menaced danger was understood, I suddenly received a violent blow on the bare head, and felt that I was wounded.

From this moment I stood in need of my hat as a compress in the absence of any other bandage. Besides, our fronts had meanwhile approached too near to execute now the desired change of direction, and making signs any longer seemed just as superfluous as my previous efforts had been unsuccessful. At last the vehement fire of the hostile artillery also had unfitted the divisions for manœuvring.

Alarmed for the result of the attack, I awaited the arrival of the foremost divisions, determined that there the disadvantage of the unfavourably chosen direction for attack should at least be lessened as much as possible by the resoluteness of the attack itself. Meanwhile I availed myself of the time still remaining until the arrival of the first divisions, to have a temporary bandage applied by one of the officers of my suite; and remarked with satisfaction, that the battery of the right wing of the hostile centre had taken to flight. This raised for the moment my drooping hopes of a favourable result to the attack.

But the improvised surgeon, with the best intentions, could not for a good while get the temporary bandage completed. The attack swiftly rattled past me; and

when at last I was again in motion, even the hussars had come back.

Some officers, with rare devotion, assisted me to check the flight in its origin. In fact separate groups took courage and once more made front against the enemy, but were always carried away again by the dense pressure of superior numbers.

While I had been engaged with the bandaging of my wound, I had not been able to observe the progress of the combat in its most decisive moment; and consequently the cause of the flight remained unknown to me, until at last completely exhausted, and desisting from further efforts to stop the flight, I turned my attention again to the enemy, and remarked, besides the increased cannonade on the right wing of the hostile centre and the pursuing lancers, an attack also of artillery proceeding from the direction of Mocsá.

This latter circumstance caused me to hope that the right wing of the Austrians was on its march against the right wing of *our* army, consequently that they had already relinquished the maintenance of O-Szbný.

I was determined, by means of a renewed advance of the cavalry, to be certified of this; and desired General Pbltenberg, whom I accidentally met during the *débandade*, to hasten in advance of the fleeing hussars, and speedily reorganise them beyond the reach of the hostile artillery. He succeeded in this, still *within* reach of the battery pursuing us from the direction of Mocsá.

However, morally convinced of General Klapka's determination to run all risks for the retaking of O-Szony, I ascertained for certain that it had already been given up by the Austrians from the silence of the thundering of artillery on the left wing of our army.

And the renewed advance of the main body of our artillery, which I had intended, did not take place.

Only the nearest of our cavalry-batteries was ordered against the *hostile* battery, which, as it seemed, was advancing isolated from the direction of Mocsá.

Next moment, however, it voluntarily ceased firing, and thus concluded the day's hot conflicts.

Meantime I had received from the chief of the artillery of our main army, who had throughout been intrusted with the command of the principal line, a report that he had maintained his position; from the extreme right wing, however, news arrived that our infantry had advanced in the forest at the river-bank along the Danube upwards as far as the brook Czonzó.

This news in some degree consoled me for the bitter recollection of the disgraceful behaviour of the Komorn battalions at the Monostor, on the morning of the day.

But this intelligence caused me at the same time immediately to dispatch orders for a retreat to the infantry divisions posted in the forest at the river-bank and in the southern spur. These, with a perseverance worthy of being particularly mentioned, had conquered a place, the maintenance of which against the left wing of the Austrians, considering the position of their centre at that moment, would prospectively have been an undertaking as disastrous as, considering our predetermination to lead the army to Ofen, it would have been without a motive.

For securing to the left the retreat of these infantry divisions, the principal line and the main body of the cavalry remained till it was quite dark in the same position as both had occupied immediately before our cavalry attack.

The enemy, however, continued quiet. It seemed as if he considered that he had fulfilled his day's task when, by sacrificing O-Szony, he successfully opposed in its latter period, the counter-stroke of the right wing of our army against his left, which he had challenged, apparently unintentionally, by his own manoeuvres.

CHAPTER XX.

AFTER returning from the battle-field to my lodgings, I remained, by the doctor's orders, during three whole days without the least knowledge of current events, nay was even kept aloof from every matter connected with the service, and did not learn till the evening of the 5th of July, and then only accidentally, the causes by which the departure of our main army from Komorn to Ofen had meanwhile been delayed.

On that evening an officer of the head-quarters returned from Pesth to Komorn, and expressed a desire to communicate to me orally certain private news which I was impatiently expecting. The doctor gave his consent to this; and the officer, not aware that it had been forbidden to any one to speak in my presence about the public affairs of the day, incidentally mentioned some of the late occurrences at Pesth: a serenade in honour of Lieutenant-general Dembinski — the substance of several public speeches delivered on the occasion, partly to, partly by the individual celebrated, directed against me, and such like. As a natural con-

sequence of these communications, it was no longer possible to keep secret from me what had happened at the main army since my being wounded.

On the 2d of July 1849, immediately after the battle — so I now learnt — General Klapka, as well as every separate commander of corps of the main army, received a government dispatch with the decree of the governor of the country, Kossuth, dated the 1st of July 1849, wherein the appointment of Field-marshal Lieutenant Mészáros as commander-in-chief of all the troops in Hungary was announced, and the army called upon to render obedience to him. Simultaneously Kossuth's decree, addressed to me personally, arrived at my headquarters, by virtue of which I was removed from the army, to devote myself from that time exclusively to the management of the war-ministerial business.

In the situation of the main army with regard to discipline as well as strategy this government measure, considered in itself, nevertheless, made not the least change: for Klapka was already, without it, in consequence of my sudden unfitness for service, as the oldest general in rank of the main army, for the time being, likewise its real commander-in-chief; and as, on the one hand, he had been informed by me personally of the decision of the ministerial council to lead the main army without delay from Komorn to Ofen; on the other hand had received no counter-order from the commander-in-chief Mészáros; and finally, as the first army corps had reached Komorn by the 3d, or at latest the 4th of July; — it would in any case have been General Klapka's duty to arrange for the march of the army from Komorn to Ofen at the latest by nightfall between the 4th and 5th of July.

My recall from the command of the army, and the nomination of Field-marshal Lieut. Mészáros as commander-in-chief of all the Hungarian troops, appeared, however — so I was further informed — to the commanders of corps and their officers not to be sufficiently justified either by Kossuth's plenitude of power, or by the assent of the ministerial council, but least of all by the well-known services as general of Field-marshal Lieut. Mészáros; and General Klapka was thereby determined for the present to delay the departure of the army, but at the same time summoned the commanders of corps, divisions, and bodies of troops, nay even deputies of the officers of the divers bodies, to a conference upon the government measure.

The result of this meeting was — so it was further reported to me — a written declaration, in the name of the army, to the governor of the country, Kossuth, in favour of my still continuing at the head of the army; and the appointment by the assembly of Generals Klapka and Nagy-Sándor to present this document to Kossuth in person.

When all this came to my knowledge on the evening of the 5th of July, Generals Klapka and Nagy-Sándor were just expected back from their mission.

They soon returned with the government decree, which enjoined on me as a duty to choose between withdrawing from the war-ministry, or quitting the chief command of the main army.

The unequivocal proofs of esteem and confidence which had just been given me by the generals, staff and superior officers of the main army, decided me — on the supposition that I should soon again be fit for service — to secure to myself the reversion of the chief command

of the main army, that is, without delay to send in my resignation as war-minister.

At the same time I learned from Klapka that the government in Pesth had resolved, on the proposal of Pembinski, whom the commander-in-chief Mészáros had made his *alter ego*, to concentrate the whole mobile force on the Maros and lower Theiss, and only from thence to attempt the reconquest of Hungary. Should, however, this attempt miscarry, it was to be repeated from Transylvania, after a retreat had been effected thither, with still more concentrated strength.

In consequence of this communication I directed General Klapka, the commanders of corps, and the chief of the central office of operations, to assemble at my quarters on the following day, in order to advise with them about the next operations of the main army.

It can hardly affect the formation of a correct judgment upon the result of this consultation, which will be afterwards communicated, if I previously state, *how*, since the moment when the government deputies (Csányi, Aulich, and Ernest Kiss) left Komorn with my promise to lead the army with all possible speed to Ofen, I viewed my situation in general, and *how* in particular Field-marshal Lieut. Mészáros' nomination as commander-in-chief in connexion with my simultaneous recall from the army.

The reader is aware that on the 30th of June I had declared by letter to the governor of the country, Kossuth, that I was fighting not for the government, but for the nation, and that I was even prepared for its advantage to lay down my arms; or, in other terms, that I had refused unconditional obedience to Kossuth.

Now, while this declaration was being forwarded

from Komorn to Pesth, the just-mentioned government deputies were on their way from Pesth to Komorn, to induce me to yield to the government. After having succeeded, they returned immediately to Pesth.

In the meantime, however, my written declaration of the 30th of June must have reached the governor of the country, Kossuth; and I foresaw that, supported by it, in spite of my later verbal one, which Csányi, Aulich, and Ernest Kiss were to convey to him, he would risk any thing in order to remove me from the main army. I likewise did not for a moment doubt of his success. The sole obstacle he might have to encounter in attaining this object would be the non-assent of the ministerial council. But it was not unknown to me, that among my colleagues there was only one who possessed, on the one hand, the necessary confidence in me, and on the other hand the courage to vote against my recall from the army, when Kossuth should demand it. I had consequently to be prepared for being removed from the chief command, in spite of my verbal promise to march the main army from Komorn to Ofen, and felt the necessity of giving a public account of my acts for Hungary up to that time.

But as a diversified fate prospectively awaited me when far from the army, and as, I confess, I did not expect a favourable one, nay, as I had even sufficient reason to apprehend that the public justification of what I had hitherto done and left undone would subsequently be scarcely possible for me, — I availed myself of the time still left me during the liberty of my person, to put this justification on paper, that it might be ready in case of my being recalled, — an order which I was nevertheless determined to obey at any risk.

Very early on the morning of the 2d of July I began to draw up the justificatory document in the following terms:

*" From the Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief to the Council of Ministers at Buda-Pesth. **

" Komorn, July 2, 1849.

" During the advance of the Hungarian army from the Theiss to the Danube, nobody in Hungary had the courage, or even the assurance, to believe in a fortunate issue of this campaign. Nay, after the battle of Isaszeg, the affairs of Hungary, independently of the Russian invasion, were still in so critical a condition, that only persons richly endowed with a happy imagination and with optimist credulity could give themselves up to the visionary illusion, that Hungary was saved, and could now freely act for itself.

"Vain was my warning voice, not to become elated with good fortune, but to think how we might ourselves be strengthened, and not to provoke the enemy by arrogance. Vain was the conviction, which I then expressed before the present governor of the country, that the army, although the historical devotion of the Hungarians to their king had suffered a sensible shock through the octroyed constitution, was nevertheless fighting mainly for the preservation of the advantages acquired in March 1848. In vain I adduced in proof, that if King Ferdinand V. of Hungary, even immediately after a victorious

* This document is communicated in its original composition, with all the faults of style, here and there even running counter to logic, of a hasty rough-draft drawn up amid disturbing influences; because it can have any value as an historical document only as it was originally Written.

battle, suddenly appeared before the ranks of the champions for Hungarian liberty, confidently demanding from them protection and a re-establishment in his former rights, — the greater part of the Hungarian army at once and unconditionally doing homage to the king of their own free impulse, and actuated by a certain sentiment of justice, — the other part, the so-called republican party, at all events the smaller, doing the same after a short consideration, would make his cause their own. Vain was it for me to maintain that, although more profound politicians than myself saw Hungary's future prosperity blooming on the field of independence exclusively, nay in total separation from the house of Habsburg-Lorraine, this separation must not be forced, precipitate, but follow as a necessary consequence from the events themselves, and be in some measure demanded by them; that, in a word, a battle won was the best declaration of independence, and that this, *proclaimed* in the name of the nation, would only then be advisable when in the whole domain of Hungary an enemy was no longer to be found, and Austria should even then continue obstinately to refuse, as hitherto, any peaceable arrangement. It was in vain that I represented to the present governor of the country, when asked my opinion about his intended motion of the declaration of independence, that the army still contained very numerous elements which were kept together only by the oath taken to the constitution.

" In spite of all these true and well-founded representations, the 14th of April nevertheless saw the light. At the commencement I had only one answer to it, that the nation was thereby inevitably committed to a struggle for life or death, after it had, on the 14th of April,

destroyed all the bridges behind itself, nay had even rendered impossible any negotiation with Austria founded on the advantages acquired in March 1848.

" The *Sarló* 19th of April, when the Hungarian arms were victorious, seemed to have given the consecration of life to the *Debreczin* 14th of April; — from all parts declarations of homage streamed into the columns of the *Közlöny*, as so many magnanimous resolutions to partake in the struggle for life or death. Only that army whose victories at Hatvan, Bicske, and Isaszeg seemed to have called forth the 14th of April; that army whose presupposed sympathy for the total separation from Austria is said to have caused the ultimate result of the debate which preceded the 14th of April; that army, by whose desire — pretended to have existed — to originate, by means of its own dictatorial authority, something similar to the 14th of April, the still-irresolute representatives were frightened, and as it were morally forced to the decision of the 14th of April, — that army was silent. From it no document of homage was exhibited in the columns of the *Közlöny*. That army was silent; for it could not approve that its mission to deliver the nation, already so difficult, should be rendered still more so: it was silent, and nevertheless shed its blood at Komorn, on the ramparts of Ofen, at Raab, Csorna, in the mountain-towns, on this and the other side of the Waag, and in the Great Schutt, with a devotedness peculiar to it, for the cause of the oppressed people.

" Where, on the contrary, are the voters and authors of those numberless documents of homage, who appeared at first to abash the army — whose examples of written glowing enthusiasm for the combat for life or

death was represented as in some measure a reproach to the still-silent army by the present Governor of the country, in a letter addressed to me — what has become of these resolute combatants for life or death? What resistance did the enthusiastic Debreczin, the cradle of the 14th of April, make to a column of 4,000 Cossacks? Did it imitate the noble example of Erlau after the battle at Kápolna, which, without assistance expelled the victorious enemy, who had penetrated into it? or did it in consequence of a disastrous combat become a second Brescia?

The army, with that sound judgment which is mostly acquired on the field of battle, has considered all these declarations of homage as nothing more than what they really are — the bending of a feeble reed exposed to the wind; and therefore all these documents could not banish from this true army of martyrs the gloomy feeling that the 14th of April was precipitate, nay more than precipitate, — the arrogant challenge to a far stronger enemy. Therefore the army was silent, and myself with it....."

Here the thunder of the artillery from the hostile attack on our intrenchments at the Monostor interrupted me; and in consequence of the state of physical suffering in which I returned from the battle-field, the justificatory document, of which the introduction has just been given, remained incomplete.

The communication of this unfinished original rough-draft, and the cause of its origin, will suffice I think to prove, that I did not give way to the illusion that Kosuth would be induced to consider my previous written declaration of the 30th of June as superseded by my subsequent promise to lead the main army without de-

lay from Komorn to Ofen. Moreover, I most decidedly did not give this promise with the intention of diverting from myself the consequences of that written declaration, but solely and exclusively in the hope, awakened by Csányi and Aulich's animated assurances that there lay at the bottom of the concentration of the Hungarian forces near the capitals some well-considered resolution taken by the government exclusively for the welfare of the country; — that a retreat behind the Theiss and Maros was the real object, I did not learn, as has been mentioned, till the 5th of July, through Klapka.

I did not misapprehend the situation in which I had placed Kossuth by my written declaration of the 30th of June. On the contrary, I saw that, after this declaration, there remained for him, as Governor of the country, only one of two things — either to resign, or to remove me. There was no reason to suppose that he would choose the former: I expected the latter.

However, after Csányi and Aulich had so warmly espoused the side of Kossuth, I could as little expect the nomination of Field-marshal Lieut. Mészáros for commander-in-chief, as, after the unfortunate days of Pered and Raab, I could have anticipated the determined interference of the main army in favour of my continuing at its head.

This behaviour of the main army might, after all, have surprised Kossuth not less than it did myself; a proof of which is, the extremely false position in which he put himself in his first fright about it, when, a few days after my categorical recall from the army, he left it to my own judgment to decide whether I would continue or not in the chief command — of course only over the main army.

In passing, I must here mention a circumstance, the investigation of which seems to me calculated to shed a ray of light on the darkness of the history of those days.

Kossuth *officially* justified my recall from the army by the necessity of putting an end to the neglected state into which the war-ministry had fallen during my sojourn with the army; *non-officially*, by my having broken my word, given to the government deputies, to march the army without delay from Komorn to Ofen.

The official motive deserves no attention whatever for the very reason that Kossuth himself deemed more-over a non-official one necessary.

The latter, however, was alike superfluous and incorrect.

Superfluous, because my written declaration of the 30th of June fully sufficed to justify in a government point of view my recall from the army: incorrect, because it was an anachronism, and so of itself invalid; for my recall from the army, and the nomination of Field-marshal Lieut. Mészáros as commander-in-chief, dated from the 1st of July 1849, and on that day — as is evident from the conclusion of Chapter xviii. — Kossuth might indeed arbitrarily assume that I would break my promise to march the army as speedily as possible to Ofen, but could by no means assert that I had already broken it, unless this assertion should be based on facts which on the 1st of July lay still concealed in the lap of the future.

Now, however, Kossuth — as I apprehend the matter — justified my recall from the army by my presumed breach of promise, and not by my refractory declaration, because the latter was based on the injury done to the interests of the nation.

In the same letter of the 30th of June, in which I had made this refractory declaration, I mentioned likewise the well-known conflagration-decree, and maintained that the nation now no longer knew against whom it had to defend itself, whether against the Russians, the Austrians, or against the Hungarians themselves.

Thus Kossuth undeniably feared the public discussion of the various reasons for my refractory declaration, and thought it consequently more advisable to base my recall from the army on a fictitious motive, instead of on the only real one.

But while Kossuth was thus endeavouring, in an official and non-official way, to prevent the logical connection between his conflagration-decree and my refusal blindly to obey him from being generally known, it was himself who conjured up — especially in the ranks of the main army — the suspicion against him, that he had removed me from the chief command merely out of rivalry, if not even out of personal hatred. Besides, Kossuth overlooked the fact, that the appointment of Field-marshal Lieut. Mészáros as commander-in-chief was equivalent to an actual confirmation of this suspicion; and that by this choice each separate corps of the main army must feel injured in the person of its immediate commander. And I believe I shall hardly err if I consider a great part of that firmness with which the army declared itself against my being recalled, to have been the natural consequence of the general consternation at the unlucky choice of my successor. This consternation, however, Kossuth might certainly have foreseen, as it was by no means unknown to him that only *one* was in still worse repute with the army as a

general than Field-marshal Lieut. Mészáros, and that this one was no other than his (Mészáros') *alter ego*, Lieut.-general Dembinski.

Let us synoptically recapitulate from the details hitherto communicated the most essential events at Komorn, together with their causes and objects, in order to facilitate still more the comprehension of those which follow.

From Kossuth's decree, to reduce to ashes all places, as soon as we should be forced to evacuate them before the enemy, and from his refusal to join the main army at Komorn, I had become convinced that *he was incapable of perceiving what the nation was at that moment in want of; incapable, even if he had perceived it, of striving for it at the sacrifice of his personal interests.*

The influence of this conviction upon my acts is well known. I renounced all connexion with Kossuth; declared this undisguisedly *to himself*; and thus took a step which must necessarily lead to an open rupture between him and me, consequently prospectively to my defeat, as I took this step *for myself alone*, without the privity of any part of the main army.

I had no *made* party behind me. Kossuth alone could *make* a party for me, as matters stood. And he did so — not perhaps by my removal from the chief command of the army, but by transferring it to the duumvirate Mészáros-Dembinski; a measure which must be severely blamed even by his warmest partisans in the ranks of the main army.

The guarantee which Csányi and Aulich — men whom I highly esteemed — gave for Kossuth shook my conviction of his moral weakness.

I saw that the decisive step which I had taken against

him in consequence of this conviction — pernicious to me alone, if Kossuth shewed himself worthy of the guarantee of these honourable men — had been precipitate; but I could not undo it.

I promised to march the army to Ofen, and was determined to do so, solely on the ground that Csányi and Aulich had shaken my conviction of Kossuth's moral weakness.

Kossuth alone could confirm *again* and *for ever* this conviction. He did so — not perhaps by my removal from the chief command over the army, but by transferring it to the duumvirate Mészáros-Dembinski; a measure from which, in my opinion, there was not the least probability of the nation deriving advantage: not the prospect of thereby again nailing victory to the tricolor banner — for both men had already succeeded, by their previous services in the field, in placing it beyond all doubt, that *they* were as unfortunate generals as they were personally brave soldiers: not the probability of thereby restoring the disturbed unity in the chief command — for the main army, moreover, at that moment commanded by a partisan of the government, General Klapka, was just then in open opposition to the execution of this measure.

Nay, I was not even able to justify this measure by the supposition that Kossuth firmly believed that Hungary was saved, so soon as *he himself* should exert an immediate influence on the supreme direction of the war-operations — and that he was determined to secure for himself, at any price, the possibility of exercising such an influence; for if this was really his belief (no matter whether illusion or not illusion), he ought not to have delayed a moment, but have hastened in person to

Komorn, in order to secure to himself, before every thing else, the obedience of the main army.

Mészáros and Dembinski consequently were indebted for the honour of being played as last trump, with the motto "for the salvation of the country," neither to Kossuth's belief in the latter — for Kossuth had positively denied this belief beforehand by his well-known conflagration-decree; nor to Kossuth's anxious care for the preservation of the honour of the national arms — for it was not unknown to Kossuth, that this had hitherto been the most exposed by Mészáros and Dembinski; nor to Kossuth's zealous striving for unity in the army — unity implies confidence, but the main army had already with sufficient clearness given Kossuth to understand, that there existed in its ranks not a vestige of confidence in Mészáros and Dembinski; nor in general to any intention whatever of Kossuth's that I could perceive, which did not appear favourable directly to his personal interest — to that of the nation, on the contrary, only on extravagant suppositions.

To this comfortless conclusion I was moreover unfortunately brought by my consideration of the real Worth of that plan of operations which — communicated to me by Klapka, as is known — projected by Dembinski, and accepted by Kossuth and the ministerial council, laid down as the next step the concentration of all the Hungarian forces at the Maros and lower Theiss, and at the same time leaving behind in Komorn about 20,000 men, in order then, as it continued, to destroy with united power the Russians and Austrians *tour à tour*; or if this should not succeed, to gain, in the further retreat to Transylvania, the last point of the final reconquest in Hungary.

This plan of operations, in my opinion, contained glaring contradictions.

Dembinski intended the concentration of our forces opposite *one* of the concentric attacks of the enemy; since the sum total of our force was insufficient effectively to encounter *all* of them simultaneously.

Concentric attacks are hardly ever so managed as that corps of equal strength advance on the offensive on all the lines of operations. The reason of this lies first of all in the essentially different importance of the converging lines of offensive operations; which difference, again, is partly permanent, depending on unchangeable strategic local circumstances, partly merely transient, contingent on the plan of operations of the assailant.

The first duty of a general who would successfully oppose a numerically superior concentric offensive is, to discover the principal attack, and next to oppose it with all his might; while the defensive, opposed to the secondary attacks, is reduced even, in case of necessity, to mere observing. But if *two* principal attacks are to be opposed, each of which singly, combined with the secondary attacks, suffices to peril the victorious issue of the defensive, and the enemy threatens moreover *to* surround completely; then the only choice left is between "*va-banque*" and "suddenly giving up the defence of the country, to gain a safe asylum beyond it."

If he chooses "*va-banque*" then one of the two principal attacks — and this commonly that which is furthest removed from the centre-point of his own force — must meanwhile be treated as a secondary attack.

If he prefers "gaining an asylum," then both principal attacks are to be avoided betimes, the forces to be concentrated against a secondary attack, which will

he repelled, and thereby the line of retreat to a neutral territory secured.

In the first case all may be won, but all may also be lost — except military honour: this is for ever secured; and, observe, the honour of those arms, on whose sharpness indeed the cause of a nation exclusively depends, is the honour of the nation itself.

In the other case there is nothing more to lose; because there every thing else, military honour included — except an unendangered retreat from the theatre of war — had already been exposed.

To unite both cases is strategically as well as morally impossible.

Hungary was concentrically attacked. Secondary attacks were undertaken, in the north-east (Marmaros), east (Transylvania), south (Banat and Bácska), south-west (the Schümege and Zalad comitate), and in the north (Arva). Principal attacks, in the west (on the upper Danube), in the north (on the upper Theiss).

Each of the two principal attacks separately considered — combined with the secondary attacks just enumerated — certainly sufficed to make very doubtful the final success of the defence of the country; the danger of being enclosed on all sides also was not to be mistaken; and only in the south-east a neutral territory offered a safe asylum, but on the way thither the directions of the southern and eastern secondary attacks crossed each other, — the hostile fortress of Temesvár stood!

Thus, a few days after the battle of Pered, was the situation of Hungary viewed by me.

I consequently now saw before us only the alternative of "*va-banque*" or "retreat into Turkey;" chose

the first, and brought forward in the ministerial council of the 26th of June my proposal to seek immediately a final decision on the right bank of the Danube, in a desperate attack on the main army of the Austrians alone; and meanwhile merely to observe the principal attack of the Russians, and to stay it in its further advance at most — if possible — by opening negotiations.

Nevertheless Kossuth might consider the retreat into Turkey far more suitable to circumstances.

And the protection of this retreat was the peculiar and sole value of Dembinski's plan of operations.

In it I found the theory above shortly developed — of the sudden giving up (in the operations) of the defence of the country, to gain a safe asylum beyond it — sentence after sentence practically applied; for the concentration of the whole Hungarian force (deducting about 20,000 men as garrison for Komorn) at Szegedin, on the point of contact of the lines of the Maros and lower Theiss, while the Russian main army was stationed at Miskolcz, the Austrian at Komorn, evidently meant — to avoid *betimes* both principal attacks: and that Dembinski would succeed by this operation in repelling the southern secondary attack — that mainly menacing Szegedin, consequently his line of retreat into Turkey — (the Austrian southern army under Ban Baron Jellachich), and thereby secure to himself and his patrons a passage to a neutral territory, of this I did not for a moment doubt.

But I really must doubt the sincerity of the assertion, that this concentration on the Maros and lower Theiss was *only the strategic arrangement for the destruction of both hostile main armies*; nay even that the further retreat to Transylvania, in case of the worst,

was *nothing else than the beginning of the reconquest of Hungary.*

For if Dembinski was in earnest about the ruin of the hostile main armies, he could not possibly intend to begin the work of destruction simultaneously against both; he must at all events be content to destroy them separately, one after the other. But then he could not overlook, that with each retrograde step towards Szege-din he made the accomplishment of this task progressively more difficult; as well moreover as that he could not expect any position of the hostile main armies to be more favourable than that was which they occupied when his plan of operations was first projected — but certainly increasingly more unfavourable.

For at that time the Russian army was posted near Miskolcz, the Austrian on the Czonczó line, consequently separated by a distance of more than thirty miles and the Danube.

General Vysocki retreating before the Russian main army with his troops could reach Komorn by means of forced marches — leaving a small column before the Russian vanguard to observe it — ere the main body of the Russians crossed the Danube. Simultaneously it was possible also for the Kmety division *to* rejoin the main army at Komorn, at worst by Ofen; and Lieut.-general Dembinski would gain consequently at Komorn, the local circumstances being very favourable, at all events several days' time for attacking the Austrian army with force and probable success, even before he could be directly assailed by the Russians.

The possibility of assuming, under equally favourable circumstances, the offensive against the main army of the Austrians or Russians, according to Dembinski's

plan of operations, could not be assumed, either at a later period or in another quarter of the country — especially at Szegedin or on the way thither; because,

1. The strategic position of both hostile main armies to each other — as has already been pointed out — with each new day and each retrograde step of Dembinski's must become progressively more unfavourable for his offensive intentions.

2. It was not possible for Dembinski to concentrate in time with an offensive intention at Szegedin, or on the way thither, a greater number of troops fit for action than at Komorn.

3. Dembinski immediately after leaving Komorn would nowhere find those favourable local circumstances, partly natural, partly prepared, which favoured him at Komorn.

Remark upon the first reason: the two hostile main armies were stationed, the Austrians on the Czonczó line, the Russians near Miskolcz, at an almost equal distance from Szegedin, the point chosen by Dembinski — in the pretended offensive intention — for the concentration of the Hungarian forces. Our main army, however, was encamped at and north of Komorn, consequently further from Szegedin than the two hostile armies.

The larger half of our main army, ordered to the last-mentioned point, might, it is true, by forced marches, not only overcome the disadvantage of the greater distance, but even gain on the hostile main armies an advance of two or three days on the march to Szegedin. This, however, did not in the least prevent the marcher likewise of the latter from Miskolcz and the Czonczó line simultaneously towards Szegedin, and

coming during the two-thirds of this operation so near each other, that Dembinski could execute no offensive stroke whatever against either of the two hostile armies without being himself immediately attacked by the other in much shorter time than this seemed possible at Komorn.

On the second reason: the Hungarian forces were distributed in the country, to the best of my knowledge, in the beginning of July 1849, in the following manner:

a. The main army (together with the garrison of Komorn, but without the Kmety division), about 45,000 men, at and north of Komorn. (The Kmety division, separated from it, about 5,000 men, in the district of Stuhlweissenburg.)

b. The Vysocki corps, from 9,000 to 10,000 men, between Pesth and Miskolcz.

c. The Kazinczy division, from 6,000 to 7,000 men, in the Mármaros.

d. The corps of the reserve, proposed to reach 10,000 men, partly still in its training stations, partly about concentrating itself on the line between Pesth and Szolnok, partly already employed as re-inforcements of the following corps d'armée:

e. The army of Field-marshal Lieut. Vetter in the Banat and the Bácska.

f. The army of Field-marshal Lieut. Bern in Transylvania.

g. The troops in garrison at Peterwardein, Arad, Munkács, Déva.

The latter, as well as those 20,000 men whom Dembinski ordered to be left from the main army in Komorn, as a matter of course cannot be included in the concentration at Szegedin; so likewise the Kazinczy

division, because Dembinski would expose himself to the danger of being attacked by both hostile main armies in Szegedin itself, in case he should mean to delay the intended offensive until the arrival thither of the Kazinczy division. Finally, the armies under Bern and Vetter also were just as little at his disposal for the offensive concentration round Szegedin as the troops of occupation and the Kazinczy division, because Dembinski in his plan of operations had already assigned to each of them its quite distinct duty.

For the army of Bern had to defend Transylvania; while that of Vetter had to guard the lower Danube from the mouth of the Theiss as far as Orsova, to destroy Ban Jellachich, to relieve Peterwardein, to conquer the plateau of Titel, and to take Temesvár, for which purpose it was in fact, as was reasonable, to be strengthened by a part of the main army (the Kmety division), and moreover, unless I mistake, also by some sections, already equipped for service, of the corps of reserve. Consequently Dembinski could not think either of employing the army under Bem in an offensive from the Maros or lower Theiss against the Russian or the Austrian main body; because Transylvania, as the last point for the reconquest of Hungary, was to be maintained at any cost, in case the destruction of both hostile main armies from the lower Theiss and Maros should not prove successful: nor could he calculate on the co-operation of that under Vetter until the taking of Temesvár and Titel was effected; because the capture of both was indispensable, according to his plan of operations, to secure the basis of this offensive. But if Dembinski assumed that Vetter would not need *more* time for the reconquest of the plateau of Titel and the

fortress of Temesvár, than he did for the concentration at Szegedin of his remaining disposable forces, and the two hostile main armies for simultaneously and directly menacing this point of concentration, he must have been far more sanguine than even Kossuth, which seemed to me, by the way, hardly possible.

Consequently there remained to Dembinski — having destined the Kmety division for a re-inforcement of the army under Vetter, and 20,000 men from the main army, according to his own orders, to be left as garrison in Komorn — for the offensive concentration at Szegedin only —

Of the main army . . .	about 25,000 men.
The Vysocki corps . . .	„ 10,000 „
The corps of reserve. . .	„ 10,000 „
Total.	45,000 „

while he could assemble at Komorn, as I have already incidentally shewn —

Of the main army (together with the Kmety division, but after deducting the original garri- son of Komorn)	42,000 men.
The Vysocki corps	10,000 „
Total.	52,000 „

therefore about 7000 more than at Szegedin.

In this comparison I have intentionally included the corps of reserve with its full number for the concentration at Szegedin, because I am not quite certain whether any of its divisions were really already employed to strengthen the army under Vetter. I have also pur-

posely omitted to take into account, in the concentration at Komorn, the possibility of an at least partial junction of the corps of reserve; because, after all, I am not bound, in justification of my opinions, to stretch probability to its extreme limits.

I must nevertheless remark, that the reserve corps of 10,000 men, reckoned among the forces for Szegedin, would indeed *numerically* correspond to an equal number of troops of the main army appropriated to Komorn, but could by no means be considered equivalent to them in respect to their *usefulness and the dependence to be placed on them in the battle-field*; because the corps of reserve — the *cadres* excepted — consisted of quite raw recruits, and moreover was still in process of equipment. If this be taken into consideration, the assertion can hardly appear unfounded, that the force of 52,000 men for the concentration at Komorn — in comparison with the total force of 45,000 men estimated for that at Szegedin — even under otherwise equal strategic and tactic conjunctures, would lead us to expect with certainty services in the field very far exceeding its numerical majority of 7000 men.

But if Dembinski intended to increase his offensive army about to be concentrated at Szegedin by summoning the militia, and believed that in this way he should make up not only for its numerical but also for its moral inferiority, presenting a striking contrast to the forces which could be concentrated at Komorn, — he resembled the farmer who, to obtain a more abundant harvest, should exchange his fruitful fields for a much larger extent of sterile ground, and would undoubtedly afterwards be amazed at the absurdity of his speculation.

On the third reason: the simple remark will per-

haps be sufficient, that Komorn, considering the then position of the theatre of war, was with regard to the offensive — for of this alone can we here speak, after Dembinski had so decidedly announced the offensive tendency of his plan of operations — strategically as well as tactically the most important point in the country; that Komorn, with its fortified camp, secured to Dembinski the possibility of recommencing anew, even should it repeatedly miscarry, the offensive, so long as his war-materials and his moral strength sufficed; that at Komorn a victory over our army could never re-act further than to the actual point whence the offensive had been commenced; while the untenableness of Szegedin and of the locality around it presented no possibility whatever, considering the offensive intended to be undertaken from thence, of meeting successfully the destructive consequences to our army of a hostile victory.

These are the most essential of the considerations which led me to the conclusion, that Dembinski had been occupied least of all with *strategic-offensive* ideas when he projected his plan of operations, and that he himself was as far as possible from believing in the sincerity of his protestation that the retreat to Szegedin, proposed by him, was founded on an offensive intention against one of the two hostile main armies.

Finally, the idea of continuing the retreat, if things came to the worst, as far as Transylvania, and thence to begin the reconquest of Hungary, scarcely deserved, I should think, a serious consideration. After all, *this* idea, as well as that of destroying both the hostile main armies in succession from Szegedin, seemed to have been placed so strikingly in the foreground merely to mask — as already intimated — its only practical tendency,

namely, *to secure the line of retreat to a neutral territory*. Thus I could assign to the plan of operations in question no higher value than what was proper to that practical tendency.

It is true, in superficially considering our strategic situation, there might be joined to the idea of concentrating our collective forces on the Maros and lower Theiss the assumption that thereby a tenable defensive position would be gained, and with it the possibility of saving Hungary by prolonging the contest. But this assumed, in my opinion, at least that the main force of the Austrians remained near Komorn, in spite of the departure, which could not be concealed, of the greater part of our main army; further, that the fortress of Temesvár and the plateau of Titel came into our possession before the arrival of those parts of our main army at Szegedin which were designed for the concentration; finally, that the longed-for intervention from abroad in favour of Hungary be in train. And the very precariousness of these suppositions — indispensable nevertheless to this assumption — was another confirmation of my perception that the practical value of Dembinski's plan of operations consisted solely in securing the departure of several individuals, *from the country already given up as lost*, to a safe asylum.

Consequently Kossuth — in spite of his repeated asseverations, how willingly he would die for his country, — that this was not even a merit on his part, as he could not live either abroad or in Hungary, if it should fall into slavery — in spite of these and similar asseverations, by accepting Dembinski's plan of operations, as well as by his conflagration-decree and his fear of transferring himself to Komorn — had now suddenly betrayed his

double intention, in the first place to save his own life, and next, from a secure distance, continually to incite thousands after thousands of his fellow-citizens to death and destruction for a principle, for which he himself, however, felt not the least vocation to die. I, on the contrary, was convinced, and am still, that *not to flinch* from dying for a cause, for which we have incited oiled thousands of our fellow-citizens to die, is the highest honour we can do ourselves here below; — I was further convinced, and am still, that, considering the situation of Hungary at that time, it was a benefit which the heads of the revolution ought to have conferred on their country, a proof of regard which they owed to the honour of their nation, by the exposure of their own lives to bring the contest *speedily* to an end which, although unfortunate, could not have been *inglorious*.

Penetrated with this conviction, I had recommended the government to transfer the scene of the final decision to the right bank of the Danube; had blamed the repeated summoning of the militia, nay even, as far as my personal influence extended, had actually prevented it; and finally — when I was constrained to see that Kossuth was morally incapable of participating in my conviction and acting in conformity with it — had undisguisedly declared to him, that my purpose was to remain at Komorn, even with the main army alone.

Thereupon, as is known, I was removed from the chief command.

The surprisingly energetic espousal of my side by the main army, however, procured for me again the necessary power of acting according to that declaration; and I was already firmly resolved to do so, when General Klapka, the commanders of corps of the main army, and

the chief of the central office of operations, assembled at my quarters for the appointed council of war.

I had nevertheless not to over-estimate the significance of this espousal of my side by the main army; had by no means to mistake the considerable share, which possibly, nay most probably, the general exasperation at the choice of the new commander-in-chief, and perhaps also the more lively friendly feeling awakened towards me in consequence of my having been wounded, might have had in occasioning this espousal of my side; had, finally, not to overlook the still-existing dangerous rocks on which my project might founder.

These rocks were, first of all, the evident sympathy of the two oldest generals of the main army (Klapka and Nagy-Sándor) for the measures of the government, especially for those just mentioned; and the not-insignificant influence which both these men in their high position (especially General Klapka as my substitute in the command) could exert on the disposition of the army.

The circumstance most unfavourable to my project, however, was, that the consequences of my wound prevented me from personally fulfilling the duties of commander; for thus I was completely deprived of the uncommon advantage of prevailing upon the main army as a body, by the double power of an energetic personal guidance and my own example, to separate its further destiny from that of Kossuth — as I was convinced, an absolutely honourable course — not from that of the nation.

Had I been at this time fit for service, or should I soon again have been, I would certainly not have held a Military council, but, knowing the power of deeds, would

have acted. I would now have led the united army according to my original project — little heeding the sympathies of Generals Klapka and Nagy-Sándor — straightway to attack the position of the Austrians; and simply by doing so should most certainly have paralysed any influence exerted by those generals on the disposition of the army hostile to my project: for then, in order to agitate for the retreat, consequently against the attack, they must necessarily occupy an ambiguous position as soldiers, and would soon find occasion bitterly to repent that they had not remained silent.

But as I was now obliged to leave the actual conduct of the army to General Klapka, and was at the same time convinced that he would the more certainly avail himself of the authority of the superior command against my will, as he might perceive in the decreed concentration at Szegedin a homage paid to his own idea of protracting the combat, in the confident expectation of a saving counter-intervention of the west of Europe, — a corresponding resolution of the military council appeared to me to be the only means of gaming General Klapka to the execution of my project; and I might moreover be contented, that General Klapka had not beforehand positively denied the *competency* of the military council, called together by me, to come to any conclusion contrary to the express superior command.

Next, all depended on succeeding in obtaining such a resolution of the military council.

This, however, appeared to me to be no easy matter; for I certainly was sensible that it would be quite impossible to mask the real basis of my intention to seek with the main army the final decision at Komorn — namely, my utter despair of the possibility of a material

salvation of the originally just cause of Hungary — so soon as I disclosed this intention itself, in the form of a proposition for debate, to the military council. And since I was convinced in respect of only two members of this assembly, that they had already felt like myself not merely the impossibility of a material salvation of the cause of the nation, but also the inward command to strive for its moral salvation, or — which is just the same — for the preservation of its military honour at all costs, I could not but see that the faintest ray of hope kindled in the minds of the other members of the military council — perhaps by Klapka's inevitable pointing at the great probability of a speedy saving counter-intervention — might shake my proposal to its base, and cause it to be rejected.

In order to prevent this, I thought it advisable to *conceal* the real tendency of my proposal — immediately to begin the offensive against the Austrians.

Accordingly, hoping by this manœuvre to weaken Klapka's expected objections beforehand, I supported my proposal by starting from Klapka's opinion, founded on the illusory belief of a saving counter-intervention, that the combat should be protracted as much as possible.

The principal materials for supporting this view I drew direct from Dembinski's plan of operations just spoken of.

I began by exposing those faults of it which chiefly rendered a prolonged energetic defensive doubtful, and called the attention of the council especially to Dembinski's serious strategic mistake of having chosen the •Banat as the basis of his future operations; a part of the country, in which — considering that for the most

part the disposition of its inhabitants was hostile to us — but small resources for an energetic continuance of the combat could be found; of which the lines of defence (Maros and lower Theiss) facing the two principal hostile attacks are broken in a salient acute angle (at Szegedin), neither tactically strengthened by a tenable place, nor even strategically easy to be defended, and to the left without support so long as the plateau of Titel was in the hands of the enemy; finally, of which the most important point (the fortress of Temesvár) was likewise still occupied by the enemy.

I further gave it as my opinion, that, considering the just-represented strategic state in the Banat, it was useless to think of a lengthened successful resistance; that for making a change in this, however, scarcely sufficient time would be gained, if the main army joined in the general retreat to Szegedin, and, as might be expected, should be immediately followed by both hostile main armies; that consequently these must be stopped at any cost in their further advance to the south, if indeed the necessary time was to be secured for effecting a favourable change in our precarious strategic situation in the south, and thus the desired prolongation of the combat be rendered possible; finally, that the main army by means of its strategic position was able of itself, partly in a direct, partly in an indirect manner, to stop both hostile main armies in their further advance to the south of the country, it was to be hoped, long enough for Temesvár and the plateau of Titel to be conquered, the war-supplies distributed in the country to be laid up behind the Maros and lower Theiss, the defence of the rivers in their whole extent to be regulated and strengthened by temporary fortifications, con-

sequently until the most indispensable conditions for a longer resistance were fulfilled.

Hereupon I proposed that the main army should remain at Komorn, and immediately assume the offensive against the Austrians; since by doing so, the main body of the Austrians would be directly, and that of the Russians indirectly, kept far from the Maros and lower Theiss.

Lastly, I endeavoured, by dwelling upon several advantages, sometimes even improbable ones, of a successful progress of this offensive, to render my proposal plausible, in its consequences doubtless a perilous one, even to those members of the council who were perhaps still looking hopefully to the future. I might, however, have gone rather too far therein, and thus have awakened Klapka's suspicion of the sincerity of the motives by which I had supported my proposal.

However this may be, the fact is that General Klapka opposed me, and moved that the principal part of the main army, which had been designated for the concentration at Szegedin, should leave Komorn forthwith for the left bank of the Danube; because only by concentrating as speedily as possible all our forces — said Klapka — could the country still be saved; but that the result of my proposal would be the separation of the main army from the government, consequently likewise from the remaining national armies united with it.

The probability of Klapka's final assertion was too palpable not to make me fear the result of the voting on my proposal, especially as I was uncertain what might be the extent of the hopes entertained by the majority of the council.

I consequently again rose, to prove that by my pro-

posai the junction of the main army with the government and with the other Hungarian armies was by no means rendered impossible, because after having broken through the line of the Austrians on the right bank of the Danube, no hostile obstacle whatever could any longer prevent this junction. The question on which the council had to decide was not "junction or not junction?" but rather, "whether the desired junction should be attained by flight or by fight?"

The former was no doubt the easier. Whether it was also the more honourable, on *this* the council might decide.

This turn saved my proposal to assume without delay the offensive against the Austrians on the right bank of the Danube. It was unanimously accepted by the military council; with the stipulation, however, carried by the majority, that after an attempt to break through, whether successful or unsuccessful, the junction of the greater part of the main army, which had originally been ordered for the retreat to Szegegin, with the government and the other national forces should be executed as the next object of operations.

It is true that this stipulation rendered impracticable my intention of repeating in Komorn once and again the attack on the position of the Austrians, should it, as was possible, prove unsuccessful; nevertheless I must be contented to have obtained at least thus much, that the favourable opportunity would not pass by altogether unimproved, which was offered to our main army for an energetic counter-stroke against the Austrians near Komorn, and a return of which, according to the then strategic conjunctures, was very doubtful.

General Klapka, who, with the amendment of the

majority, likewise voted for my proposal, secured to himself thereby the chief management of the attack on the main army of the Austrians, which was fixed for the 9th of July by the same military council.

So much the more did it surprise me, when, in the course of the 7th of July (the military council had been held on the day previous), the first army corps (Nagy-Sándor) suddenly started from Komorn for Bátorkeszi, followed immediately by the third and seventh army corps, to execute, in spite of the decision of the military council of the preceding evening, the retreat to Szegedin on the left bank of the Danube.

I could explain this to myself only by assuming, either that General Klapka and the commanders of corps in the council on the previous day had merely pretended to vote for my proposal — perhaps out of consideration towards me, to save me a mortification by which my physical suffering might be increased — but had secretly adopted General Klapka's proposal; or by attributing the departure of the first army corps from Komorn to an intrigue of Generals Klapka and Nagy-Sándor against my person.

In the former case I was in future superfluous at the head of the army; in the latter the intrigue of Generals Klapka and Nagy-Sándor must be thwarted.

These considerations determined me now to renounce voluntarily and promptly the command over the army.

The consequence was, that, still in the evening of the 7th of July, a deputation, consisting of officers from all the divisions of the army present in Komorn, waited upon me to request me, in the name of the main army, to resume the command.

I thought it was my duty, under the circumstances

just described, to explain to these officers, above all, my position in reference to the government.

I disclosed to them the real mysteries of the discord between myself and Kossuth. I called their attention especially to the fact, that I stood at that moment in open opposition to him, because I saw in the general retreat to the south, ordered by him and his commanders-in-chief of the army, nothing but the commencement of a disgraceful flight from the country; while I was of opinion, that the main army, in order to fulfil honourably its duty to the country, for the rights of which it had become surety, had resolutely to attack the enemy which was just then posted opposite it, and not avoid him, in order that it might in good time be able to participate in this flight. I further gave the officers to understand, that their requesting me again to take the command over the main army was equivalent to approving of my open opposition to the government; that though they (the deputies of the army) were acting, it is true, hardly against their moral, yet probably they were against their material interests, as I had already bound up my life with the cause, and that whoever in future intrusted himself to my guidance must prepare himself to do the like; finally, that on account of the debility of my physical condition, the same personal services as I was formerly able to perform were no longer to be expected from me. But if the main army — thus I concluded my declaration — in spite of all this desired to have *me* for its commander; would likewise fulfil the stipulation, which I made to it in this case, — namely, leave Komorn only after a courageous attempt to defeat the main force of the Austrians; and if I should be again fit for service at that time; — then I would deem

it to be my honourable duty to resume anew the command over the army.

The deputies were satisfied with this declaration. The departure of the first army corps to Bátorkeszi proved accordingly to have been the consequence of an intrigue of Generals Klapka and Nagy-Sándor. The latter had immediately to lead his corps back again to Komorn; while the former declared himself nevertheless ready to execute the resolutions of the military council of the preceding evening.

On the 9th, however, the attack on the position of the Austrians on the right bank of the Danube, fixed, as is known, for this day, was not executed — and was postponed till the 11th. As a reason for this delay, I was informed, that even *late* in the morning of the 9th of July — consequently several hours after the time appointed for the commencement of this advance — the troops were not yet prepared to march; though the extraordinary movement in our camp had already been remarked and signalled on the part of the enemy. That the 10th of July had passed over unimproved, might perhaps be explained by the probable intention of General Klapka first to abate the watchfulness of the enemy, increased in consequence of what he had observed on the 9th.

At last, on the 11th of July, the general attack of the Hungarian main army, commanded by General Klapka, was directed against the position of the Austrians circularly surrounding our fortified camp from the mouth of the Czonczó as far as Almás.

To gain the Czonczó from its mouth to Igmánd was the day's task.

It remained unaccomplished; and two days after

(13th of July) the first, third, and seventh army corps (the expeditionary column of the latter included), with the expeditionary column under Armin Görgei as vanguard, departed from Komorn to the left bank of the Danube, in order to execute, now under my personal command, as the next object of our operations — according to the resolution of the military council of the 6th — the junction with the forces which were concentrating in the south of the country; — while the second and eighth army corps remained in occupation of Komorn and the fortified camp, under the chief command of General Klapka.

CHAPTEK XXL

THE forces with which I left Komorn on the 13th of July, for the purpose of effecting a junction, on the left bank of the Danube, with those concentrating in the south under Field-marshal Lieut. Mészáros, consisted of the first army corps (Nagy-Sándor), the third (Count Leiningen), the seventh (Poltenberg), and the column under Armin Gbrgei, in all, as well as I can remember, about 27,000 men.

This junction we were to endeavour to effect first of all by means of forced marches by Waizen and Gödöllő.

For this purpose the column under Armin Görgei (as vanguard) had started in the evening of the 12th of July from Komorn to Bátorkeszi. It was followed, in the night between the 12th and 13th by the first corps, at daybreak of the 13th by the third and seventh corps.

This order of march was observed unchanged as far as Waizen.

The train set out from Komorn in a single line, by Bátorkeszi and Kövesd on the Gran, as far as Szobb on the Eipel. Thence, however, only Armin Görgei's column and the first corps (because they constantly marched during the night) took the shortest route to Waizen by Zebegény and Nagy-Maros; while the third and seventh army corps turned the Maros defile on a mountain-road from Szobb by Maria-Nostra.

This precautionary measure seemed necessary, because the Austrians — whose patrols, in the course of the previous day, had unceasingly observed, from the right bank of the Danube, our march between Kövesd and Hellenba — during the night might dispatch some guns to Visegrád, and thus on the following day very sensibly harass our march through the Nagy-Maros defile open towards the stream.

The predetermined halting stations were: for the 13th, Bátorkeszi; for the 14th, Hellenba, Damásd, and Szobb; for the 15th, Waizen.

Early on the morning of the 15th of July Armin Görgei's column reached the height of Waizen, and found there the outposts of the Russian cavalry regiment of Musulmen and Caucasian mountaineers, which occupied the town, but which, after a short outpost skirmish, retreated in the direction of Aszód.

The town of Waizen is situated close to the left bank of the Danube. Its extent alongside the stream, whose course is here from north to south, may be about a quarter of a mile, and is in all parts very narrow. The railroad from Pesth to Presburg is here laid mostly on a causeway and parallel with the bank of the stream,

but outside the town, which it separates from the hilly ground bounding it on the east (the last western spurs of the Cserhát), and permits the communication between this ground and the town only at some points. Waizen consequently appears to be compressed as it were between the Danube and the causeway of the railroad. Through the middle of the town lengthways the main road from Upper Hungary to Pesth leads, which previously joins the Veröcze high road, on which we were advancing, and then, at about gun-range before reaching Waizen, crosses by means of a wooden pile-bridge a deep ditch, which is impracticable for cavalry and wagons on account of the steepness of its banks.

Armin Görgei's column, after it reached the main road, had forced back, as mentioned, the hostile outposts, and thereby caused the Russian cavalry regiment to evacuate Waizen, marched with its main body through the town, while its vanguard was pursuing the enemy, and took up a position further to the south, near Hét-kápolna. The first corps, which had followed it, encamped in its rear.

From the gently undulating ground at the river-bank, becoming wider down stream, there rises an eminence, at first bare (seen from Waizen, it appears conical), at the distance of three quarters of a mile to the south-east of the town, between Duka and Szöd, the continuation of which, in numerous eastern windings, reaches the ridge of the Cserhát. On the north-east of this bare eminence, in a rather narrow valley, lies the village of Duka on the brook Gombás; south-west, however, and more in the direction of the Danube, is the village of Szöd. Between it and the eminence the ground is covered with vineyards. We called the latter

simply the "Szöd vineyards and the bare eminence "the Duka mountain." For the sake of brevity I retain these appellations in what follows.

The brook Gombás flows in a straight direction from Duka towards Waizen as far as the south-eastern outskirts of the town. Thence it turns to the left between Hétkápolna and Waizen towards the Danube. Not far from this turning-point it is crossed by the railway, and further down, shortly before it falls into the Danube (at the south end of Waizen), by the main road. Its bed is marshy, and at that time could be crossed on foot without danger by the troops only in two or at most three narrow parts, namely, on the space from Duka to the railway bridge near Waizen.

The ground between this brook and the Danube (forming the left banks of both) is gently undulating, and also free and open. The railway alone crosses it; but only at some places hinders the movements of cavalry and artillery. On the right bank of the brook Gombás, on the contrary, the ground soon becomes hilly.

Armin Görgei had occupied the Duka mountain with his vanguard returned from the pursuit. Thence about noon of the same day (15th of July) the advance of considerable Russian forces of all kinds of arms was remarked in the south-east. At the first news of it, Armin Görgei speedily left the camp at Hétkápolna with the main body of his column, advancing across the railway towards the Duka mountain and the Szöd vineyards, in order to secure to himself those two points before the arrival of the Russians. This, however, was impossible, the advance of the enemy having been discovered much too late. Consequently not only had our outposts already been driven from the Duka moun-

tain by numerous swarms of Cossacks, but even the columns of the enemy had broken into the Szöd vineyards, before Armin Görgei with his main body was able to reach the place. Now he could only render the debouching of the hostile columns from the vineyards in some measure more difficult, but by no means prevent it. In a short time he had opposed to him a force several times superior to that of his column (from 3000 to 4000 men, with ten guns), which at first pressed him back, till on his right General Nagy-Sándor with the first corps, leaning to the right on the Danube, advanced on the line of battle, and re-established the disturbed balance of the combat.

Meanwhile General Leiningen accelerated the approach of his troops. About three in the afternoon he arrived with them at the height of Waizen, turned the town on the east, hastened on the right bank of the brook Gombás at gun-range beyond the prolongation of our line of battle, took up a flanking position against the hostile right wing, and by the brisk fire of two batteries paralysed the further attacks on Armin Görgei's feeble column.

Hereupon the enemy attempted an energetic attack with cavalry on our first corps. The first regiment of hussars (Kaiser), ordered forward by General Nagy-Sándor to a counter-attack, gave way before the enemy's superior numbers; nevertheless the shock which seemed to aim at dispersing our right wing relaxed, through the firm perseverance of some of our batteries.

From this moment the enemy evidently confined himself, in spite of the brisk action of our artillery, numerically superior to his, to maintaining himself on the open ground before the Duka mountain and the

Szöd vineyards, which he had conquered by at first pressing back Armin Görgei's isolated column. And as *our* day's task, on account of our troops being uncommonly fatigued, must likewise be a purely defensive one, the further course of the combat, which continued for several hours, was characterised on both sides only by a fire of artillery, well sustained till nightfall.

Towards evening the enemy began to evacuate the field by degrees, drawing off his right wing across the Duka mountain, the rest of his line of battle through the Szöd vineyards.

Nevertheless his troops for security occupied these grounds.

Before night set in between the 15th and 16th of July, General Pbltenberg with the seventh corps and the army train likewise reached Waizen; but was directed to remain *en reserve* in the rear of it (at its northern extremity).

The resoluteness with which the enemy had attacked our position at Waizen, and his obstinate perseverance, in the effective range of our superior concentric fire of artillery, induced me to suspect that behind the corps which had just been beaten from the field, there was a near and strong reserve, and to anticipate on the following day a still more powerful attack.

I could consequently choose between preventing this attack by attempting to break through towards Gödöllő, or awaiting it at Waizen, and thus subordinate the beginning of the attempt to break through to the result of the next day's combat.

Considering our peculiar circumstances — that the troops were too fatigued to commence immediately the attempt at breaking through, and moreover were even

without provisions for the following day (the 16th); further, that no dependence whatever could be placed on procuring them as they were needed during the operation, though where the troops then were they might probably be supplied for at least one day in advance, in the course of the following day, by means of the contributions already commenced in and around Waizen; — considering these circumstances, I determined to await in the position maintained before Waizen the hostile attack to be expected on the morrow.

But when, contrary to expectation, up to early in the afternoon of the 16th of July no attack had taken place; though the advanced hostile troops continued to occupy the Duka mountain and the Szöd vineyards; and as the reports of scouts agreed in stating that the camp of the hostile corps, which had been opposed to us on the preceding evening, and had since been considerably re-inforced by constant arrivals of fresh troops on the road from Azód, was stationed near Hártyán; I thought that, at all events in the course of the 16th, I must obtain the greatest possible certainty as to the probability of our intended attempt at breaking through being successful — and fixed four in the afternoon as the time for commencing this undertaking.

This was to consist of a forced reconnoitering towards Hártyán, executed by Armin Görgei's column.

However, before the time appointed, an advance of serried troops on the part of the enemy took place on the Duka mountain and in the Szöd vineyards; Duka itself was likewise occupied by him; and at the same time I heard from a trustworthy source that the greater part of the Russian main army was already posted directly opposite us, between Hártyán and Szöd.

The forced reconnoitering which had been commanded was now superfluous; nay it must on no account be executed, because it might easily involve us in a general engagement with the enemy, and thereby indirectly prevent the carrying out of the determination, to which I had suddenly come in consequence of the information I had received relative to the strength of the hostile forces concentrated before us.

This determination was nothing else than at once to give up the idea of breaking through towards Gödöllő, and attempt a junction between the corps under my command and our southern forces on the circuitous route by Lossoncz, Miskolcz, and Tokaj.

I chose this route, because it was scarcely possible for the Russian main army, which was at that moment concentrated in front of our position, to obstruct us in it. The Russians, it is true, on the line by Gyöngyös were only twenty-one (German) miles from Miskolcz, while we were twenty-five on that by Lossoncz. But as the enemy could not know with certainty that *Miskolcz* was our next object of operations until he had pursued us as far as Vadkert, he could not possibly reach this point with his main forces before us. For between Vadkert and Miskolcz there exists no shorter communication than by Lossoncz, if we except one of almost equal extent, but much less practicable — I mean the route by Romhány, Berezel, Pata, and Gyöngyös.

With all this, I did not forget that it was possible we might find the road by Lossoncz to Miskolcz occupied by the Russian corps which in the beginning of the month had penetrated from the upper Waag into the district of the mountain-towns; besides which, it did not seem to me probable that we should encounter

no hostile opposition at all: but — according to the information I had received relative to the total strength of the Russian army of intervention, and considering the strategic position of the hostile main body — such an opposition could not be made by any force sufficient to render doubtful the success of our *new* attempt at breaking through.

Only the *combination* — certainly very probable — of such an opposition with a continuous energetic pursuit from Waizen might, nay must be destructive to us.

But, notwithstanding this probability, I could not prefer the attempt at breaking through towards Gödöllő to that towards Tokaj; because, even assuming an equally unfortunate issue to both operations, by the latter the greater part of the Russian army of intervention would be kept distant from the southern theatre of war far longer than by the former, or, in other words, the possibility of employing the southern forces *against the Austrians alone* would be secured to Dembinski. My further persevering in the attempt to break through towards Gödöllő would have offered to the Russian commander-in-chief — who, according to my information, had at his disposal then and there a force at least twice *mine* — a favourable opportunity to defeat me so completely, that for the total destruction of my troops a small part of his main body sent in pursuit would suffice, while the larger part would be immediately disposable for the offensive towards the south. If, on the contrary, we avoided the momentarily menacing superior attack of the enemy, by means of a rapid, organised retreat towards Lossoncz, for the purpose of afterwards breaking through by Miskolcz and Tokaj; then the Russian commander-in-chief could scarcely spare

sufficient forces for the uninterrupted and permanent turning of his operations towards the south, in case his purpose was (as I supposed) to destroy my troops *on this side the Theiss*; for, in my opinion, he could hope to effect this only if he, not regarding for the present the south of the country, should send his main body close after us from Waizen, simultaneously opposing to our head either the northern Russian corps, or some other part of the army — perhaps lying in the neighbourhood of Miskolcz — in order to delay us, *coûte qui coûte*, until his main body had succeeded in overtaking us.

In the most favourable case, we could escape this danger only by gaining an advance over the pursuing hostile main body, which must be considerable enough to secure to us the time necessary for overcoming all the accumulated obstacles to our retreat behind the Theiss.

Any considerable advance, however, (whether it would be sufficient for the purpose indicated could evidently at present not be known), was to be gained from our position before Waizen only by means of a nightly retreat; because as the enemy surveyed from the Duka mountain not only our entire position, but even the line of retreat (the main road from Waizen to the upper comitates), we could not mask our retreat in the day-time in any way.

To maintain our position before Waizen till nightfall was consequently a necessity equally unavoidable and embarrassing; — embarrassing, because the enemy might at any moment attack us with uncommon superiority, and thereby prevent me from executing my intention of deceiving him, by retreating during the night.

Fortunately, however, he stopped the advance which,

as was mentioned, he had begun between three and four in the afternoon on the Duka mountain and in the Szöd vineyards, while still out of the reach of our artillery and afterwards remained quiet.

About seven in the evening I thought we had then no further attack to fear that day (the 16th of July), and sent for the chief of the general staff, the commanders of corps, and my elder brother Armin, that I might orally communicate to them my resolutions, as they have just been stated.

After this had been done, I proposed to the commanders of corps to leave it to chance to decide which of the three army corps should cover the departure of the others from the position before Waizen.

This proposal was accepted, and the lot fell upon General Leiningen, who with his corps (the third) was to have the charge of the rear-guard during the next twenty-four hours.

Based on this decision, I ordered the retreat to be commenced with the twilight in the following order: at the head the seventh corps (Pöltenberg), with the army train; then the first corps (Nagy-Sándor), and after it Armin Görgei's column, in uninterrupted succession; the third army corps (Count Leiningen), however, as rear-guard, was not to follow till after midnight (but still before daybreak of the 17th of July); further, in order to prevent the enemy's patrols from discovering our retreat during the night, the first and third corps, as well as Armin Görgei's column, had to leave behind them on their departure from the position the outposts (all cavalry) stationed before it, with an order not to hasten after the army till *after* daybreak.

I fixed an hour after midnight for the departure of

the third corps (the rear-guard), because by then the other parts of the army, together with the army train, could have passed the serpentine way across the Waizen mountain, about half a (German) mile to the north of Waizen, and thus have got far enough in advance of the rear-guard, always assuming that the movements of the troops were not delayed by any unforeseen hindrance. This, however, without my having had any presentiment of it, w⁷as unfortunately already prepared, at the very time when I gave the just-mentioned order for retreat to my sub-commanders.

My departure from Komorn had as its immediate consequence, that all the politically compromised civilians who were living in the neighbourhood, and who happened to have greater confidence in my lucky star than in that of General Klapka, joined the army — unfortunately not on foot or on horseback, but in carriages. The example of these unfortunates found on their way thither imitators in abundance, and this to such a degree that the army by the 14th of July (the day after its departure from Komorn) was burdened with the unwelcome appendage of several thousand vehicles of various capacity. Considering the prospective impossibility of getting rid permanently of this calamity, there remained no other means for securing freedom to the movements of the army as far as possible than forcibly to join these vehicles with the army train (which could be dispensed with during action) and the riding sutlers in one body, and to include in the calculation of operations their disposal, regulated by circumstances, on points which, as secure as we could make them, lay outside the range of the manoeuvres of the army. This had been done on the 15th of July. The command of this body, to which

was added an escort sufficient to maintain order on the road and in the camp, was intrusted to a superior officer of the general staff, who happened not to be indispensable to the army. On the 15th of July he received directions to remain with the train till further orders at Toronya, about two miles to the north-east of Waizen. Now in the evening of the 16th — after the retreat by Lossoncz had been decided upon — the train had to be conducted from Toronya by Nógrád to the line of retreat of the army, and in advance of it as far as Vadkert. In the course of the 16th, however, rumours had reached Toronya, that the Russians had been destroyed on the preceding day before Waizen, and — what was certainly not improbable — that Austrian troops had crossed at Gran from the right to the left bank of the Danube. In consequence of these reports the train and its commander left Toronya without orders, to save themselves from the dreaded Austrians in the immediate vicinity of the army, already supposed to be victoriously advancing towards Gödöllő; and by the time the order to lead the train from Toronya by Nógrád to Vadkert was about being sent to its commander, the thousand upon thousand vehicles were again in Waizen.

This indeed was a circumstance which might delay our retreat for several hours, consequently till late in the morning of the following day, and, considering the immediate proximity of the hostile army, might result in the fatal defeat of at least the third corps. In view of our critical situation before Waizen, I was nevertheless obliged to adhere to my original determination, and commence the nightly retreat, even at the risk of the above-mentioned danger.

Accordingly the unexpected news of the presence in

Waizen of the train did not make any change in the already issued orders for retreat; but it put an end to the consideration which had hitherto been shewn by me towards the unfortunate fugitive civilians out of natural compassion, sometimes even at the expense of my duty as leader of the army.

From the preceding description of the situation of Waizen and its immediate environs, the reader knows of a brook there, which, in itself insignificant, but having high and steep banks, rises in the near mountains, and flows towards the Danube at about gun-range north of the town. This local impediment consequently was situated directly in the rear of the army, and had to be crossed during its retreat. The only means of doing this was the wooden bridge, over which runs the main road from Waizen to the upper comitates, our line of retreat. This obstacle, it is true, might also be avoided; but not in the night-time without inevitable danger to the order of the retreat; because there was at that time no moonlight, and not to betray our nightly manœuvre to the enemy, we were obliged to dispense with any lights. For a second bridge, however, we had no materials at hand; besides, the time that remained was insufficient for the construction of even a less considerable bridge with *unprepared* materials, as I had resolved on the retreat by night only a few hours before its commencement, and had not previously thought of the necessity for such a manœuvre. The army, indeed, carried with it the staple of a bridge of four supports taken from the Austrians; but, considering the probable vehemence of the enemy's pursuit, it could not be employed in the formation of a bridge without the risk of losing it; and, taking into account the number of not insigni-

ficant waters by which our new line of operations was intersected, I wished to preserve to the army its sole portable bridge for future use in cases possibly still more critical. Under these circumstances the whole army must consequently pass the one bridge in the retreat from its present position. This was, after all, connected with no more uncommon difficulties than in general any nightly retreat on a single road. It was only necessary to prevent interruption! But this very task — practicable with an orderly mobile force relieved of all superfluous vehicles, by choosing an order of march whose breadth does not exceed that of the defile to be passed — -with the presence of several thousand vehicled fugitives, each of whom, thinking only of his own safety, wished to be foremost, where the strategic instinct common to all led him to scent the greatest security against danger in the direction taken by the troops; — with the presence of such elements and in *such number*, namely, to prevent all interruption during the retreat — seemed to me absolutely impossible without the use of Draconic measures against the unfortunate fugitives.

At dawn of the following day (the 17th of July) I was, however, alas, already conscious that this feat had not been accomplished, in spite of all the Draconic measures I had not failed to have recourse to during the night.

Hardly had the seventh corps, on the evening of the 16th of July, begun the retreat by defiling over the bridge, when the herd of vehicled fugitives, immediately guessing the meaning of this manœuvre, likewise began to move from their encampments — partly in the interior of the town, partly north of it, close to the seventh corps

— towards the saving bridge. Lines of hussars kept off the lateral pressure on the main road, to preserve it clear for the troops. With the increasing darkness and the growing desire of the alarmed mass to get for safety across the bridge, the duty of these lines became ever more difficult, and during the night they were repeatedly broken through in several places. At each irruption, in a twinkling the main road was choked up with vehicles. To make the stream flow back was impossible. It could scarcely be dammed up again along the main road. Those vehicles of every description, which, in consequence of such irruptions, were once on the main road, in order to prevent a still greater delay had each time to be arranged as speedily as possible and taken into the marching column of the troops. This measure, which was absolutely unavoidable, became a source of very frequent and lasting interruption; for hardly had those fugitives, whom chance favoured in the repeated irruptions through the lines, passed over the bridge, than they were no longer in any haste. Relieved from the torment of fear for their own skin, they soon found the sweetest consolation for their lately endured sufferings in a sound sleep. Their animals had of course still less reason, without an external impulse, to refuse rest and repose; and even to the troops the opportunity of snatching a short bivouac on the road was not always unwelcome.

The seventh corps, the army train, the first corps, and Armin Görgei's column, were to have passed after midnight not only the bridge, but also the winding road across the Waizen mountain. Instead of this, however, even at daybreak (17th of July), besides the seventh corps only a small part of the army train and the first

corps had passed the bridge. The greater part of the army train — closely hemmed in by the fatal private equipages — could not even be got in motion; while the rest of the first corps, followed by Armin Görgei's column, was just about forcing its way through the crowd of vehicles that reached far back into the town.

At the extreme northern end of Waizen a carriage-road branches off from the main road in an eastern direction, across the railroad, which runs close along the latter, on which likewise it is possible to reach Rétság and Vadkert, although with much more difficulty than on the main road itself.

Besides the main road I originally intended to make use also of this secondary one between Waizen and Vadkert for accomplishing the nightly retreat. I was, however, deterred from doing so by the consideration, that from the divergence at first of both lines the army would be divided just at the most critical moment of the retreat into two columns separated several miles from each other and by impracticable hilly ground. Subsequently, when informed of the presence, alike disastrous and unexpected, of the vehicled civic fugitives in "Waizen, I thought I could employ this carriage-way at least for removing these unfortunates out of the range of the manœuvres of the troops. But even this could not well be done; for the whole mass of private vehicles, in order to gain this road, would have had to cross the main road, and this — from peculiar local circumstances — in a single column, one vehicle at a time; by which the retreat of the two-thirds of the army which were encamped south of Waizen would have been delayed at least five or six hours, and consequently it would have been impossible to effect it under

cover of night. So that this secondary road had to be left the whole night without advantage being taken of it. But now the multitude of private vehicles, in spite of all counter-measures, was already in unlimited possession of the main road, and therefore the use of this secondary one had become imperative, in order more quickly to remove out of the way of the troops advancing from behind, the vehicles densely thronged together on the main road.

The strategic instinct of the vehicled fugitive civilians, however, strove against the requirement to seek for safety on a road along which no troops had advanced before them. The fear of being thereby separated for ever from the protecting proximity of the army, — the fixed idea, "only he who passes the bridge is saved!" caused a general passive resistance, the object of which was the maintaining of the main road, and the tenacity of which scoffed at the severest measures of coercion.

Consequently the situation of the greater part of our army about dawn of the 17th of July, already sketched in what precedes, given synoptically was somewhat as follows:

One half of the first corps, closely followed by Armin Görgei's column, in the interior of the town, hindered on all sides by a crowd of vehicles literally unbounded not only from continuing the retreat, but also in its movements generally; the third corps, on the contrary, outside the town — one half on the causeway of the railroad in a long narrow marching-column, the other half descending in sections along the brook Gombás towards the railroad. So that of these parts of the army, in spite of the threatening proximity of the enemy, only the latter half of the third corps was able to act; and

even it at the moment was not in a condition to do any thing considerable towards the protection of the columns wedged in the interior of the town.

Moreover, General Nagy-Sándor before his departure from the position south of Waizen had drawn-in his out-posts, and thus rendered a surprise on the part of the enemy possible.

With the first dawn of morning some Russian cavalry regiments rushed on to Nagy-Sándor's former position, and, not meeting with any resistance, reached, unimpeded and unobserved by us, about the height of Hétkápolna. Here they stood already in the rear of the advanced troops who — according to the dispositions — had been left behind in front of his evacuated position by Armin Görgei.

The latter indeed discovered the menacing attack time enough to prevent a surprise of their main body, already on its toilsome retreat through the crowd of vehicles in the interior of the town. But on these troops themselves the sudden emerging of the enemy in their rear had made the discouraging impression of a successful surprise; and to the bad consequences of similar impressions belonged, among other things, the constant disposition of the surprised troops to see spectres.

Armin Görgei, informed of the hostile advance, without hesitation led the main body of his column from the interior of the town against the enemy; made good his position near Hétkápolna; disposed his falling-back advanced troops as a protection to the extreme flank on the left towards the brook Gombás; and — for the purpose especially of apprising the third corps as speedily as possible — immediately attacked the approaching hostile masses with artillery. He succeeded in stopping

them for some time, nay even in pressing them back. His extreme left wing, however, still labouring under the moral after-pains of the late surprise, imagined meanwhile that it saw in the men of the third corps on the other side the brook Gombás the enemy's turning troops, and in consequence took to flight towards the southern principal entrance of Waizen, and soon carried with it the whole cavalry and artillery of the column. Armin Görgei, unable to stop this *débandade*, and himself led astray by the erroneous report of his left wing, drew back likewise the battalions, already abandoned by the cavalry and artillery — not through the town, however, but close to the bank of the Danube.

The enemy with celerity and rare valour took advantage of this sudden falling off in our resistance; broke into the town itself before the cavalry of Armin Görgei's column recovered from its fright, and in the first assault captured four guns. A part of the infantry of the column, however, had soon regained its courage, and now hastened from the Danube into the interior of the town to the place of the greatest danger; almost simultaneously a battalion of the third corps appeared on the menaced point from the opposite direction (the railroad); and three of the lost pieces were instantly retaken from the enemy: one remained in his possession, and this he succeeded in securing, although immediately driven out of the town, and obliged by the third corps to continue his retreat towards Szód.

For General Leiningen, on the first discharge of cannon from Armin Görgei's column, had one half of his Corps immediately advanced again on the right bank of the brook Gombás up towards Duka, while he himself hastened forward with the other half along the railroad

on the ground situated between the brook Gombás and the Danube. Informed during this movement of the enemy's presence in Waizen, Count Leiningen dispatched one battalion (as we have seen, it came just in time to assist in recapturing the lost guns) into the interior of the town, while two companies were detached by him to occupy speedily the southern outlet, with the intention of cutting off the retreat of the hostile cavalry who had broken into Waizen. The town, however, had already been evacuated by the enemy when these companies reached their destination. And not till now did it become evident that the enemy could scarcely have intended a serious continued attack, but at most a reconnoitering of our strength and position. Only to the accidental circumstances, that General Nagy-Sándor, when leaving his position, had drawn-in his outposts in a manner alike inconsiderate and arbitrary, and that the cavalry of Armin Görgei's column had taken our troops for the enemy's, was this advance indebted for a result which certainly resembled a successful surprise.

Moreover, we also owed to the just-related conflict, in spite of the significant loss which we therein suffered, an advantage which in our then situation was by no means to be despised.

I have before mentioned the peculiar obstinacy with which the luckless proprietors of the private vehicles which were densely thronged together at the northern end of Waizen, in spite of the palpable impossibility of getting away speedily on the main road, had been striving against the intimation that they were to leave it, and take the eastern by-road to Vadkert. An end was now suddenly put to this opposition by the cry of terror: "The Cossacks are in the town!" and still more

by the brisk discharge of musketry which was simultaneously heard. The persevering cannonade which soon afterwards began, at the advance of the third corps, finally aroused likewise those fugitives who had already crossed the bridge from their indolent feeling of safety, and stimulated them to greater speed. In consequence of these moral influences of the conflict on the minds of the civilians, the departure of the masses of vehicles out of the range of the manoeuvres of our troops was accelerated in more ways than one.

And while General Leiningen with one half of the brave third corps energetically pursued the hostile troops of surprise on the ground between the brook Gombás and the Danube to near the Szöd vineyards, and forced the enemy by this resolute demeanour, as well as by the simultaneous advance of the other half of his corps on the right bank of the Gombás, to the preparatory development of his whole force, involving a new loss of time; and while both halves of the third corps disputed every inch of ground in giving way to the greatly superior enemy; — the whole mass of private vehicles was successfully removed out of the range of the troops, nay even the rest of the army train was set in motion. The latter, when General Leiningen had again effected his retreat as far as at the height of Waizen, was already advanced beyond the windings of the road on the Waizen mountain. This remainder of the army train was closely followed by the rest of the first corps; while Armin Görgei's column, designed to support the third corps when drawing back fighting, partly on the main road over the bridge, partly on the open tract of ground to the east of it and of the railroad, occupied the slopes covered with vineyards projecting south-east of the

Waizen mountain, for the purpose of forming here, in the next phase of combat, the extreme left wing of the rear-guard position, to be taken up by one-half of the third corps on the southern declivity of the Waizen mountain, below the winding road.

The enemy advanced one part of his forces on the right bank of the Gombás and directly east of the railroad, to attack the position of Armin Görgei's column; with his main force, however, he marched simultaneously through the town of Waizen, and debouched from its northern outlet at the moment when the last sections of the third corps were passing over the bridge. The brisk fire of artillery, which he forthwith directed against this point, was perhaps intended to prevent us from destroying the bridge. It was, however, unsuccessful: the bridge was burnt down; and the delay thereby caused to the pursuit of the enemy on the main road secured to the half of the third corps, which had been destined for the rear-guard position on the Waizen mountain, the time necessary for marching up.

This position, whose left wing was formed by Armin Görgei's column, which had previously occupied the south-eastern projecting declivities of the Waizen mountain, was now maintained against the energetic attacks of the enemy until the other half of the third corps had gained an advance of about half a mile, in order to obtain the time needed for taking up, further back, but still before Rétság, a second rear-guard position, in which the troops just now in action were to be waited for, and relieved from the rear-guard service.

To continue the rear-guard combat on the Waizen mountain beyond the point of time indicated, seemed to me not advisable, because I thought I must apprehend

an advance on the part of the enemy directly against Vadkert, on the by-road leaving Waizen in an eastern direction, and consequently, with a longer remaining on the Waizen mountain, the endangering of the further retreat to Lossoncz. Vadkert had already been fixed, according to this combination, as the point of retreat for the day.

The retreat from the position on the Waizen mountain was accordingly opened with fighting, after about an hour's combat by Armin Görgei's column, which was far advanced in position, and for this very reason was more violently attacked, and continued in like manner by the whole rear-guard as far back as to the position of the second half of the third corps, which now, entering on the rear-guard service, encountered the hotly pursuing enemy, and thereby delayed him again until that half of the third corps which had just been relieved, together with Armin Görgei's column, had reached Rétság.

In Rétság I charged the seventh corps (General Pöltenberg) with the protection of the further retreat as far as Balassa-Gyarmat, and determined at the same time on breaking up Armin Görgei's column, with the intention of employing its contingent so as to equalise, as far as possible, the striking differences in the strength of the three army corps.

The enemy closely followed that half of the third corps, which had long resolutely opposed him before Rétság, and commenced his next attack with briskly cannonading the place — evidently on the supposition that it was still occupied by us. The natural consequence was that Rétság caught fire on several points.

General Pöltenberg with the seventh army corps had meanwhile taken up a tenable position on the heights

behind Rétság, and maintained it until nightfall in spite of the uncommonly violent artillery attacks of the superior enemy.

Just at the commencement of this contest our main body started from Rétság to Vadkert. When darkness had put an end to the combat, it was followed by General Poltenberg with his corps as far as about half distance between the two places, which here begun its nightly bivouac in compact battle-array *à cheval* of the road. The main body encamped the same night (between the 17th and 18th of July) at Vadkert.

The further retreat to Balassa-Gyarmat was not begun till daybreak of the 18th. At the same time General Poltenberg evacuated his bivouac (between Vadkert and Rétság), and followed our main body at the distance of about half a mile without interruption or being overtaken by the enemy, till he had crossed the brook Lókos, which, flowing from Cserhát to the river Eipel, crosses the main road between Vadkert and Balassa-Gyarmat, nearer to the former place.

On the commanding right bank of this brook General Poltenberg had his corps marched up in an advantageous defensive position in order to await the pursuing enemy, and delay him some time; thereby to enable our main body again to get further in advance.

From the moment that the seventh corps had been drawn up on the right bank of the brook Lókos until the night between the 20th and 21st of July, I took not the least part in the conduct of the army. Since the evening of the 16th having again personally led and superintended its movements, it had not been possible for me to avoid great exertion even of my physical strength. In consequence of this the wound in my

head got worse again. On the morning of the 18th I was completely unfit for service, and remained so during the course of the next two days.

CHAPTER XXII.

IN this state of unfitness for service, into which I had fallen on the 18th of July, I was brought the same day as far as Lossoncz, and on the following to Rimaszombat. Here I remained from the evening of the 19th till the morning of the 21st. An uninterrupted rest of twenty-four hours alleviated my physical suffering at least sufficiently to enable me in part again to fulfil my duties as leader of the army — in so far as this was possible under such extraordinary circumstances as the then existing ones, and in a condition which still continued to cripple every *higher* physical as well as moral exertion.

In the afternoon of the 20th I received the first report of the events which had happened in the army since the morning of the 18th. They were in substance as follow:

General Pöltenberg, after he had given battle to the pursuing enemy in the forenoon of the 18th with the seventh corps at the brook Lókos, for the purpose of delaying him, and had thereupon retreated fighting as far as Balassa-Gyarmat, was relieved there from the rear-guard service by General Nagy-Sándor with the first corps.

Unlike Generals Leiningen and Pöltenberg, General Nagy-Sándor neglected his duty as leader of the rear-guard. Instead of delaying the enemy in his pursuit as often and as long as possible — even at the cost of sensible losses — and thereby securing to the main body, if no more, at least the time indispensable for feeding the horses of the cavalry and the train, — he commenced his function as commander of the rear-guard with a precipitate retreat, and was with his own corps (the first) always literally at the heels of the main body (the third and seventh corps).

A. F. Ludány, halfway between Balassa-Gyarmat and Lossoncz, had originally been destined by the chief of the general staff as a resting-point for our main body. But as it had not been possible to find out on the whole extent from Balassa-Gyarmat to A. F. Ludány any position which appeared sufficiently tenable to General Nagy-Sándor for protecting the proposed bivouac of the army at the latter place, the main body — of course closely followed by General Nagy-Sándor with the first corps — had to retreat during the day more than half a mile further, namely, to beyond the river Eipel at Ráros.

On account of the too great exhaustion of the troops (the distance from Waizen to Ráros, which had been made within two days, amounts to ten miles), it was indispensably necessary to stay here for the night. General Nagy-Sándor, with the first corps, had to maintain the defile of the bridge at Ráros, easily defensible, only till dawn of the next day (19th of July), while the main body of the army bivouacked a short distance further behind, on the main road.

However, a false alarm — such as happens almost every night when before the enemy — sufficed to impose on General Nagy-Sándor to such a degree, that he evacuated the position at Ráros during the pitch-dark night; thus forcing the main body at the same time again to commence the retreat.

And what had not hitherto been effected by the extraordinary hardships of the last two days, the critical situation at Waizen, the repeatedly unequal combat with a far superior enemy, nay even the peculiarities of an uninterrupted retreat in the face of the pursuing foe, absolutely demoralising even the best troops — namely, the loosening of the bonds of discipline in the third and seventh army corps — General Nagy-Sándor now accomplished within the shortest time, by allowing himself to be so miserably shaken by a false alarm in the scrupulous performance of the duty entrusted to him of providing for our security.

The darkness of the night, the drowsiness of the officers and men, exhausted to the last degree, were circumstances in which a panic terror — as it had been spread throughout the camp of the main army by General Nagy-Sándor's senseless flight before a phantom — could hardly fail to be followed by the complete dissolution of the third and seventh corps, consequently of two-thirds of the army; and as the condition of the first corps may be conceived not to have been remarkably orderly, the army in fact owed its continued existence only to the fortunate accident, that the enemy, who had energetically continued the pursuit with superior forces as far as Balassa-Gyarmat, had suddenly desisted at about a mile beyond it; whereby, on the following day (the 19th), the rallying at Lossoncz of the troops

dispersed in all directions was possible. Our losses in men and horses, however, far exceeded in number the victims of an extraordinarily hot day's battle.

Moreover, the unavoidable massy appendage to the army of the equipaged fugitives had contributed its full share towards increasing the confusion during the nightly surprise executed with rare success by General Nagy-Sándor on our own main body. In order to get them out of the way of the army, at least for the next decisive days, they were again combined into a train, separate from the army train, and, under an escort, sent on a by-road, which flanked on the north the further line of operations.

In the afternoon of the 20th of July, when I was first informed of these events of the last two days, the seventh army corps was at Rimaszombat, the third at Osgyán, and the first as rear-guard at Apátfalva behind Lossoncz. The chief of the general staff had thought it necessary immediately to give General Nagy-Sándor — who had hitherto done any thing rather than meet the requirements of a commander of the rear-guard — an opportunity in this service — in case the pursuit should be recommenced on the part of the enemy — to save his honour by accomplishing at least half as much as had been done by Generals Leiningen and Pbltenberg in the course of the 17th and 18 th of July.

I could not but approve of this measure the more, as the above disposition of the three army corps, during the new phase on which our operation had entered on reaching the point of Lossoncz, seemed to me, on the whole, to be the most judicious.

From Waizen as far as Lossoncz our operation had been very simple both in object and execution. Our

only aim was to gain the points of Balassa-Gyarmat and Lossoncz if possible before the arrival there of the northern Russian corps, which had entered through the Arva. And the means recognised as indispensable for the successful accomplishment of this task were, as we have seen, speed in the retrograde movement, and repeated combats by the rear-guard *à tout risque*, for the purpose of impeding as much as possible the pressing on behind of the hostile force, destructive to the order of the retreat.

From Lossoncz onwards, however, the execution of our operation was certainly complicated, though the final object was not. It had as hitherto to be protected in the rear, while at the same time the obstacles in front of it must be removed.

The first task, perilous as it had been during the retreat from Balassa-Gyarmat, now seemed suddenly to be the *less difficult* of the two; after that the supposition respecting the hostile counter-operation, which I had entertained while in Waizen (that the enemy would constantly follow us closely with his main body), had been proved, by the relaxation in his pursuit, which had become perceptible by the evening of the 18th of July, to be erroneous; and that instead of this supposition, it was now to be assumed that the enemy had divided his main body on the 17th of July (when still at Waizen), had followed us with one half only as far as the first passage across the Eipel behind Balassa-Gyarmat, from thence, however, had turned aside by Szécsény, Lócz, and Pásztó to Pétervására (with the intention of preventing a possible breaking through on our part towards the south), while he had immediately directed the other half of his main body, in forced marches, on the

Gyöngyös road towards Miskolcz, in order to hinder us from breaking through on the east.

(The energetic pursuit as far as the first passage of the Eipel behind Balassa-Gyarmat, near Hugyag, might have had the tactical object, to profit as much as possible by the victory at Waizen; and at the same time the twofold strategic one, to render impracticable to us, on the one hand, a return to Komorn, on the other — perhaps assuming the probability of an attempt to break through in a southern direction by Gyöngyös or Hatvan — a flank-march to the left, supposed to be intended on our part, by Szécsény and Lócz, into the valley of the Zagyva.)

Consequently the sudden relaxation of the hostile pursuit, combined with the simultaneous information of scouts, that the northern Russian corps was already on its march from Altsohl towards Lossoncz, led me to the conclusion, that the strategic position which the enemy was now striving to take up, and which he hoped to reach in good time, might perhaps be the following:

Rimaszombat — Northern corps.

Pétervására — That part of the main body of the army which had pursued us till the evening of the 18th.

Miskolcz — The rest of the main body.

It was further to be expected that the enemy would secure to himself, whatever it cost, the possibility of reaching the point Miskolcz with the remainder of his army before us; that he would do all in his power to delay our march to the same point; that we should accordingly encounter opposition probably at the first important river-passage — perhaps at the Sájó, between Dubicsány and Vadna.

In the face of these probabilities, however, I could by no means mistake the far higher importance of the task of the van-guard than of the rear-guard. For even if the latter completely failed us — as had been the case at Káros — the final aim of our operation (the eastern breaking through by Miskolcz and Tokaj) could nevertheless be attained, if the van-guard performed its duty, and prevented the accumulation of an equal hostile force at Miskolcz, by gaining this point betimes, in spite of all opposing efforts on the part of the enemy. But if the van-guard refused, then the last possibility of breaking through was lost — even if the rear-guard did its part ever so gloriously.

Consequently — mindful, moreover, of the rule to keep the best sub-commander with his troops *en réserve* for the moment of the final decision — I could not but acknowledge the dispositions given to the three army corps by the chief of the general staff during my total unfitness for service to be most excellently adapted for the purpose. General Nagy-Sándor was the least capable of the commanders of corps, and at the same time the least to be relied upon: to him, under the above-developed conjunctures, *only the rear-guard* of the army could be entrusted. The performance of the duty assigned to the leader of the van-guard might be expected from General Pöltenberg with much more certainty than from General Nagy-Sándor; whilst General Leiningen, the best of all, must necessarily remain *en reserve* with his corps.

For the 21st of July General Pöltenberg, with the seventh corps, was accordingly ordered from Rimaszombat in advance to gain the passage over the Sajó, between Dubicsány and Vadna; General Leiningen, with

the third corps *en réserve*, from Osgyán to Putnok; General Nagy-Sándor, with the first corps, as a protection in the rear, from Apátfalva to Rimaszécs.

CHAPTER XXIII.

IN the night between the 20th and 21st of July two Russian officers appeared in Rimaszombat; a captain of hussars, Katlarow, and a lieutenant of artillery, Count Rüdiger.

They had been dispatched on the evening of the 20th as trumpets by the Russian Colonel Chrulow, at first only to the commander of our rear-guard, at Apátfalva. General Nagy-Sándor, however, directed them to me personally, and directed the chief of his general staff to escort them to the head-quarters.

When before me, they declared that, in consequence of an order from the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Field-marshal Prince Paszkiewicz, they had been charged by the commander of corps and general of cavalry Count Rüdiger, and directly by the commander of the vanguard Colonel Chrulow, to summon me, in the name of his majesty the Czar, to order my troops to lay down their arms, to disperse, and every man to return to his own home; — unless we complied, we should immediately be attacked by the Russian army.

I asked in the first instance to see the credentials of the trumpets.

They possessed nothing of the kind, and asserted that they had received only an oral commission.

I hereupon remarked that, without credentials, it was impossible for them to convince me of the authenticity of their mission.

They, on the contrary, opined that there was time enough for this; I should only, for the present, conclude with them an armistice of forty-eight hours to open the negotiations.

The mere *threat* of an attack had come on me rather unexpectedly after the events of the 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th of July, and had led me forthwith to conjecture that the summons to lay down our arms was but the mask of the real commission. The sudden proposal of an armistice of forty-eight hours seemed to confirm this conjecture; — to obtain this armistice appeared to be the real object of the negotiation; — the aim of the armistice, however, could be no other than the delay of our retreat.

Hence I deduced the gratifying conclusion that the enemy already despaired of gaining time enough the point Miskolcz; and I of course thought of any thing rather than of accepting the armistice.

But hoping to elicit from the two trumpets, in the course of a more prolonged conference, some involuntary revelation relative to the position of the hostile army, I resolved to defer as long as possible a positive refusal of the armistice.

I consequently made as if I entered into the idea of laying down our arms; nay, in order to render the deception as complete as I could, and to induce the trumpets to speak as much as possible, I even requested them plainly to inform me, whether we might not

expect any positively favourable conditions in case of laying down our arms.

Only one of them, Count Rüdiger, spoke German. He was generally the spokesman; and after a short dialogue with his comrade, unintelligible to me, he offered, in reply to my question, the two following conditions:

1. For the men: free departure to their homes, where they should remain exempt from any constraint to further military service.

2. For the generals and officers: the same, and an unobstructed passing over into the imperial Russian service with such rank as they held in the Hungarian army.

I explained to Count Rüdiger, that the army required above all things a guarantee for the future of *the country*.

Hereupon he thought himself justified in promising also the intercession of the Czar with the Emperor of Austria for the country.

The declarations of Count Rüdiger were laconic; moreover he shewed himself sparing of words. The comedy began to weary me, as the prospect of learning any thing of importance as to the position of the Russian army was ever more and more enveloped in clouds by the taciturnity of the count.

Captain Katlarow was evidently far more communicative than his comrade; he spoke, however, only Russian and French, in the latter of which I cannot converse without extreme difficulty.

Nevertheless I determined to try my luck with Captain Katlarow, and to continue the further conversation with him. I found a suitable opportunity of doing so by requesting Count Rüdiger to write down the stipulated conditions.

While he was occupied in complying with my request, I chose as an opening to the conversation with Captain Katlarow the question, whether he would forward a letter from me to Prince Paszkiewicz.

" Then you accept the armistice!" Captain Katlarow interrupted me.

After this interjection I no longer doubted that an armistice was the only object of the trumpets.

Captain Katlarow had followed me on to the slippery ground, to which I intended to allure him, more quickly than I had expected. I hastened to take advantage of this favourable circumstance.

With the armistice, I answered, we are all in good time; and added — beating about the bush — as a reason, that the Russian army was just now executing movements which obliged me for the present uninterruptedly to continue the retreat.

" But it will not be possible for you much longer to continue your route," replied Captain Katlarow in evident haste; " for *you* march this way," (he accompanied this proof by drawings with his finger on the table,) " and *here* arrives Rüdiger, *here* Tschegodajew, and *here* follows Grabbe."

The drawings with his finger perfectly corresponded, on the one hand, with the information of the scouts, that the northern Russian corps (Grabbe) was marching from the mountain-towns against Lossoncz; on the other hand, with our supposition, based on their intermitting in the pursuit, that a part of the hostile main body (Rüdiger), having turned off from Balassa-Gyar-Biat to the south, was operating against us by Péter-vására; while the remnant of the main body (Tschegodajew) was attempting to reach Miskolcz before us.

The coincidence of the finger-drawings of the Russian trumpet with my conjectures as to the hostile plan of operations appeared to me to be more than accidental.

I could not possibly expect detailed explanations from a subordinate officer of the hostile army. I contented myself, therefore, with what I had learned; and the only thing I still thought desirable was to delay the return of the hostile trumpets to their camp, in order that General Nagy-Sándor, who had to evacuate his rear-guard position at Apátfalva at daybreak on the 21st of July, might gain an advance in the further retreat. This was obtained as a matter of course; the trumpets declaring themselves ready to take a letter from me to Field-marshal Prince Paszkiewicz, (namely, my written reply to the summons to lay down our arms, and to accept an armistice,) and I needed a certain time to draw it up.

In the ministerial council of the 26th of June, I had, among other things, proposed to the government, that while the Austrians were attacked with all our might, it should enter into negotiations with the Russians, were it only to compromise them with the Austrians, and thereby, for our advantage, give more foundation to the want of agreement, from which — as the history of war shews — the operations of allied armies generally suffer.

Personally, however, I felt no inclination to take the initiative in the execution of this proposal. But now, as the Russians had begun to negotiate, I certainly thought the occasion favourable for realising, at least experimentally, my own original idea. I accordingly secured to myself the opportunity of a further exchange of trumpets between our army and that of the Russians, by requesting, in my written answer to Prince Paszkie-

wicz, a delay of forty-eight hours for the definitive declaration to the request to lay down our arms, under the pretext that I must previously consult the army itself, whether it was willing to lay down its arms on the stipulated conditions. The offered armistice, however, I declined, on the feigned reason that our troops were not familiar with this usage of war.

The reader is aware that I had believed the invitation to conclude an armistice to be a mere stratagem, the object of which was to retard our retreat, for the purpose of enabling a Russian corps to prevent us from pursuing our route to Tokaj.

This offer of an armistice was certainly a stratagem; but its final object — as was subsequently evident — a much more insignificant one than that supposed.

The Russian Colonel Chrulow had been charged, with three squadrons of mixed cavalry and two guns, to recommence the pursuit of our retreating army, interrupted in the evening of the 18th of July.

With this feeble column Colonel Chrulow on the 20th of July reached Lossoncz, and found himself next moment directly opposite to a Hungarian army corps of about 9,000 men and forty guns (our first corps at Apátfalva), consequently in evident danger of being destroyed, since he was distant some days' march from every support.

It was this danger which Colonel Chrulow was striving to escape by negotiating.

Colonel Chrulow, in spite of the isolated situation in which he found himself, with his small forces in face of our first corps, ran, after all — of which he could certainly have no presentiment — positively not the least danger; because it happened by chance, fortunately for

him, that General Nagy-Sándor was then the commander of this corps, and that he — to judge by his conduct in the night between the 18th and 19th of July at Ráros, where no enemy had been opposed to him — was even glad not to be attacked by Colonel Chrulow.

After the Russian trumpets, with my written answer, the substance of which I have indicated above, had left the head-quarters again, in the course of the night between the 20th and 21st of July, and were escorted back to their camp, I had to consider whether I should communicate or not to the army the negotiation into which I had entered with them.

The prospect of the demoralising consequences, which must follow the scandal of a general discussion about the expediency of an act of submission, spoke *against* its promulgation.

It was, however, impossible to prevent it from becoming generally known that hostile trumpets had appeared at the head-quarters, and this was the first time such a thing had occurred. There was no doubt that it would give rise in the ranks of the army to more extravagant conjectures about what had been the real object of the hostile trumpets, the deeper the genuine truth of the matter remained enveloped in darkness.

I had seriously to fear that my silence about the matter in question would only nourish the suspicion that I was in treacherous communication with the enemies of the fatherland.

This suspicion did not date originally from the days of July at Komorn. Its first source was likewise neither in my refusal to take reprisals for the executions at Presburg; nor in the fact that the garrison of Ofen had not been put to the sword; nor in the siege of Ofen,

and the simultaneous interruption of the offensive against the Austrian main army; nor in my declared endeavour not to conduct the war in a manner contradictory to the character of the nation; nor in the removal of Dembinski from his office, which had taken place at Tiszafüred in the beginning of March; nor on the battle-field of Kápolna; nor, finally, in the efforts — which had become generally known — of the Austrian Field-marshal Prince Windisch-Grätz to induce me to desert the cause of Hungary. The fact to which I mainly owed the suspicion of treacherous or at least self-interested efforts is older than all the just-enumerated occurrences. My first open opposition to Kossuth's policy, by means of the proclamation of Waizen, communicated in the first volume of these notes, was that whereby I had challenged the hydra of calumny against me.

It was not unnatural that all who honoured in Kossuth the founder of an independent state, Hungary *in spe* — above all, he himself — in consequence of this proclamation became my bitter enemies. And as, in spite of the power which they had over my person, they wanted the courage to take *open* revenge on me, they attempted to do so insidiously, by causing me to be suspected in the manner just indicated; wherein they were of course not in the least prevented by the postulate for intentionally rendering any one suspected — the disfiguring of the facts.

Thus at first it was *not denied* that I was in a certain degree accessible to the proposals of Field-marshal Prince Windisch-Grätz; then a version about the battle of Kápolna was fabricated — of course with Dembinski's personal co-operation — according to which I was said to have known how, on the first day of the battle, so to

arrange for the second day as that an unfortunate issue was unavoidable. A not less successful version of Dembinski's retreat behind the Theiss, and his being removed from the chief command over the army, again pointed me out and *my* presumed intrigues as the principal cause of the circumstance, that the abilities of the old Pole as a general had remained untried, that he himself for the present could not become commander-in-chief of the army. Finally, my endeavour to conduct the war in such a manner as — in the opinion of the best officers of the army — was calculated to preserve unsullied the honourable character of the nation; the interruption of the spring campaign by the investment of Ofen; the subsequent pardon of the Ofen garrison; the refusal to take reprisals for those executed at Presburg; and, to crown all, the days of July at Komorn, with the certainly frightful demand that the government should in their own persons become surety for the cause of the nation; — all these facts were one after another worked up in the same manner as the battle of Kápolna and Dembinski's removal had been, and by degrees combined into a system of proofs which should leave not the least doubt that my aim was assuredly not the cause of the fatherland, but, on the contrary, either my own elevation to the dictatorship, or perhaps only an accumulation of merits in the eyes of the Austrian rulers.

In this " either or" lay crowded together certainly much evident nonsense: nevertheless it had already found belief even among a part of those troops which were under my personal command. It is true this part of the army was not a compact one, and mostly consisted only of such individuals or separate bodies of troops as had happened at some time or other to be so

unfortunate as to violate their duty on the battle-field immediately under my own eyes. The distrust of me, proclaimed undisguisedly, as ever, by this small part of the army, had certainly always produced with the greater part of it an effect diametrically opposite to the intended one. But the reason of this lay simply in the circumstance, that no single one of all the calumnies which had hitherto been directed against my person could be supported in the version given of it by any fact generally known to the army. And I was by no means unaware, that the first act on my part, the particulars of which might offer the slightest ground for a positive suspicion of the purity of my intentions, would immediately furnish the most gigantic aid to the mania for proselytising among the parts of the army devoted to me. To keep secret the substance of the conference between the hostile trumpets and me *would have been* such an act, and would unquestionably have been accompanied by the result mentioned; for the army was in a critical, nay most unfortunate situation, — and misfortune disposes the mind to distrust.

Under these circumstances I could not possibly doubt whether it was less disadvantageous to conceal or to make known the summons addressed to me by the hostile trumpets. Nay, I had already rendered it absolutely impossible to conceal my conference with the Russian officers: for — convinced of the necessity of carefully avoiding all secret contact with hostile negotiators, if I did not wish wantonly to risk the confidence of the army — after the trumpets had entered my room, I intentionally left the door wide open, that the subsequent conversation might take place in the presence of the *personnel* on duty assembled without selection in the

adjoining room, and that consequently not the smallest matter could be discussed between me and the hostile officers without witnesses.

To communicate officially to the army the conditions under which — according to the terms of the Russian trumpets — we were immediately to lay down our arms was moreover not merely advisable, it was decidedly commanded by duty; because thereby any exaggeration in the rumours of the pretended advantages which Russia seemed to offer in return for our submission was rendered impossible, and consequently the demoralising effect of the stipulated conditions, considering their evident worthlessness, was certainly reduced to a minimum.

It appeared to me far more difficult to decide *in what form and manner* the negotiations into which I had entered with the hostile trumpets should be communicated to the army; and I saw the necessity of advising about it with Count Leiningen and several of the highest and tried staff-officers of the army.

The question was, whether the judgment of the army about the expediency of laying down of our arms should be anticipated, or not, in the official publication of the hostile summons to this act; that is, whether the enemy's summons should be simply communicated to the army as a question already answered by a refusal, or laid before it as a still open question for a direct answer.

The result of the deliberation was a decision for the latter measure; because an opportunity seemed thereby to be afforded for obtaining certainty respecting the spirit of the first corps — which during the last few days had fallen into great disrepute — calculated either to tranquillise us, or to justify its dissolution. General Nagy-Sándor, by his dastardly conduct in the

rear-guard service, but especially by his fatal abandonment of the position at Ráros in the night between the 18th and 19th of July, had already succeeded in rendering not only himself suspected of a disinclination for fighting, but likewise the first corps entrusted to his command; and this to such a degree, that there was felt to be no improbability in the assumption, that the first corps would be inclined to lay down its arms immediately, in spite of the wretched nature of the Russian counter-engagements.

The danger — in view of this assumption — of risking the existence of the army by laying before it this open question nevertheless did not exist; as a negative answer to the requirements of the Russian trumpets might be expected with certainty from the third and seventh army corps (Count Leiningen and Pöltenberg); and consequently the presupposed assent of the first corps alone must remain in a minority; and the only consequence it could have would be the sad but at the moment preservative necessity, immediately to dissolve this corps, which had shunned engaging the enemy, and incorporate its constituent parts in the other two army corps.

However, the fear to which the consequences of Nagy-Sándor's untrustworthiness had given rise was fortunately not justified by the answer of the first corps. Like those of the third and seventh, it was in the negative.

If I remember rightly, there existed between the declarations of the last two corps and that of the first merely the one difference, that only in those two, and not in this, the guarantee for the preservation of the constitution sanctioned in the year 1848 by King Fer-

dinand V. was pointed out as the postulate of a peaceable arrangement. But as the documents in question are not in my possession, I cannot, on an indistinct recollection, vouch for the actual existence of this difference; — although it is hardly conceivable that an official declaration of the first corps, commanded by Nagy-Sándor (Kossuth's personal partisan), would contain a voluntary appeal to the state-law set aside by the law of independence of the 14th of April.

In the answers of the third and seventh corps, however — thus much I distinctly remember — this appeal was contained in express terms, as it was also in my declaration to Prince Paszkiewicz, which — composed in the spirit of these answers, and rejecting the requirement, made to us by the Russian trumpets, to lay down our arms — had been sent on the 22^a of July from the headquarters at Sajó-Szent-Péter by means of two trumpets to the camp of the next hostile column closely following us, to be forwarded to the commander-in-chief of the Russian army.

CHAPTER XXIV.

ON the 21st of July the seventh corps reached Dubic-sány and the passage across the Sajó, the third corps Putnok, and the first Rimaszécs, without the seventh having encountered, or the first been overtaken by the foe.

But on the same day it was reported by scouts at the head-quarters in Putnok, that Miskolcz was in possession of the enemy.

On this intelligence, we resolved to advance to the attack on Miskolcz with the seventh and third corps, whilst the first corps should prevent the Russian column that was following from Lossoncz from crossing the Sajó between Dubicsány and Vadna, and to this end should not follow the third and seventh corps further than the last-named point.

In the event of the attack on Miskolcz proving unsuccessful, a concentric flank-march to the left, by Szikszó and Medgyaszó towards Tokaj, as a last attempt to re-establish the communication with the southern forces of the country, was determined on; although, to make this manoeuvre possible, with an enemy victorious in front and pursuing in the rear, it was prospectively necessary to expose, on the one hand, a part of the first corps at Vadna, and, on the other hand, a part of the seventh at Miskolcz.

(The diversion of our movements towards the north, perhaps to destroy the enemy's stores in Kaschau, and after that to strike through the Mármaros comitate to Transylvania — considering my firm resolution to execute, at whatever cost, if at all practicable, the decision of the Komorn military council of the 6th of July — was one of those operations which ought to have been dictated to me solely by the enemy himself — and this by the timely frustration of *all* attempts to gain the left bank of the Theiss by Tokaj.)

Accordingly on the 22^a of July the army crossed the Sajó between Dubicsány and Vadna, and advanced on the right bank of the river — the seventh corps by Sajó-Szent-Péter to within a mile of Miskolcz; the third corps, the head-quarters, and the army train (followed by the train of the fugitive civilians), "as far as

Sajó-Szent-Péter; the first corps to Vadna. The march was flanked on the left bank of the Sajó by a secondary column of the seventh corps, disposing its most advanced troops to the left as far as Szikszó (on the Kaschau high road), to the right as far as the passage across the eastern branch of the Sajó at Sajó-Vámos; whilst the advanced troops of the main column reconnoitered the passage across the western branch of the river at Szirma-Besenyő, then a second one across the eastern branch at Arnót, and finally Miskolcz itself.

The result of these reconnoiterings — namely, the unexpected certainty *that Miskolcz and its environs had been vacated by the enemy on the 20th*, and the simultaneous report of the scouts *that Tokaj was held by Hungarian troops* — was, that Miskolcz, together with Mindszent and Csaba, and also Diós-Győr — the two first situated to the south, and the last to the west, of the Gyöngyös high road — were occupied in the course of the 22^a of July by the main column of the seventh corps; and that the day after (the 23^d) the following movement was executed by the army.

The seventh corps drew up its secondary column from the left bank of the Sajó, and advanced from Csaba southward — the main body as far as that point of the Gyöngyös high road where the carriage-road branches off from it to the left through Mályi to Nyék; the advanced troops, however, part as far as Nyék, part (on the said high road) near to Harsány.

The third corps, with the head-quarters, advanced from Sajó-Szent-Péter by Miskolcz; then striking into the Kaschau high road, crossed the Sajó at P.-Zsolcza, and thence down on the left bank of the river as far as A.-Zsolcza. The next service of the third corps was

to take up a position on the Sajó from where it falls into the Hernád at Onod as far as Arnót (above F.-Zsolcza).

The first corps vacated Vadna, and followed behind as far as Sajó-Szent-Péter, where one-half of the corps remained as rear-guard, whilst the other half, forthwith crossing the Sajó, marched in an easterly direction to Szikszó, undertaking the observation of the Sajó from Arnót upwards.

The army train, with the train of the fugitive civilians, was directed from the camp at Sajó-Szent-Péter to Onga, by way of Sajó-Keresztur, Szirma-Besenyő, and Arnót, and at the same time the construction of a bridge over the Hernád at Gesztely was undertaken. As soon as it was passable, the train of fugitive civilians, and also that part of the army train which could just then be dispensed with, were ordered immediately again to continue their march to Tokaj from Onga, and further on by Gesztely as far as Szerencs.

The object of these movements was, consequently, the establishment of the army on the left bank of the Sajó in the line of Szikszó to Onod, and, at the same time, the protection of the march against hostile attacks from the south and north.

In the two preceding chapters I have communicated those conjectures respecting the enemy's plan of operations to which we were led by the supposition that he intended to make it impossible for us to get across the Theiss at Tokaj. These conjectures had, as is known, led us to apprehend opposition by the time we reached the Sajó between Dubicsány and Vadna, but at all events at Miskolcz. And now we found even Miskolcz undefended; while we learnt, moreover, that the enemy

— *i. e.* a column of from 4000 to 5000 men, with some artillery — by the 20th of July had left the said point for the south; on which day our van-guard had reached only Rimaszombat. At the first glance it certainly appeared from all this that our conjectures on the enemy's plan of operations were wrong.

But as the apprehended counter-operation — namely, that from Waizen by Gyöngyös to Miskolcz — was indisputably the most ruinous to us, so, considering the accounts received relative to the strength of the Russian main army, we thought that our having escaped the effect of that counter-operation was more correctly explained by assuming that the enemy had really begun it, but in consequence of various delays had been short of time, than by presuming that he had chosen from the first a less advantageous plan of operations.

Any other plan of operations for the Russians than that of reaching Miskolcz from Waizen before us, seemed to be questionable from our idea of the number of the hostile troops alone. For the united strength of their forces which had entered Hungary by the Carpathians had never been estimated by any one — either by the government, or by paid or unpaid scouts — at above 70,000 men; and when we reached Miskolcz, it was even said that one-third of these had already been carried off by the cholera. Although the latter report bore the stamp of exaggeration, yet from circumstantial inquiries into the divers phases of the number of sick in the enemy's hospital, which had been removed a few days before from Miskolcz to Kaschau, it was at least proved that the Russian main army — according to our reports of its whole strength — could now number scarcely more than 60,000 men.

But with this force, though still very considerable, and certainly twice that of our army, the Russian commander, after we had deprived him of the basis of his operation by gaining the line from Szikszó to Onod, found himself in a position which must determine him (as we thought) in the first place to a direct attack with his whole strength on our position on the Sajó.

It was a logical consequence of this view, that the not improbable position of the Russian main force (possibly not far from the passage of the Theiss between Poroszló and Tiszafüred), anew threatening our scarcely gained junction with the southern forces, gave us little concern. For as soon as the Russian commander saw the necessity of securing to himself, against all contingencies, success in his attack on our position on the Sajó, it was impossible that, if our estimate of his forces was correct, he could wish at the same time also to force the passage of the Theiss between Poroszló and Tiszafüred. But we were certain that this passage could be won only by force, because we were not only acquainted with the local position, which was very favourable for preventing the enemy from crossing the river at that point, but also because we had received certain intelligence that Tiszafüred and the still more southerly points for crossing the Theiss, as well as Tokaj, were occupied by Hungarian columns.

From our above-developed suppositions at that moment it must be evident to the reader how I arrived at the conclusion of permanently interrupting the further retreat to Tokaj on the Sajó, in case a resolute offensive movement on the part of the Russians against Miskolcz from the south should be placed out of doubt.

If this, contrary to our expectations, were not to

happen, then I should have to suppose that the enemy was ignorant of our stopping on the Sajó, and that he preferred to gain the left bank of the Theiss at Tiszafüred by Poroszló, before we could reach it at Rakamaz by Tokaj; and in this case I was resolved to leave behind the first corps at Miskolcz, in order to secure this strategic point against that part of the enemy's army which was advancing upon us from Rimaszombat; with the third and seventh corps, however, to undertake a diversion from Miskolcz towards the south — thus giving the Russians the choice, either to leave open to us a passage towards Szegedin on the right bank of the Theiss, or to desist from their operation by Poroszló against Tiszafüred, and first to force us back again towards Miskolcz, then over the Sajó, and directly towards Tokaj, on our original line for breaking through.

I certainly cannot defend myself against the charge of having once more given opportunity for a dangerous combination; but so long as the Russian main army did not shrink from the operation against Tiszafüred, while we still remained on the Sajó, I must, after all, despair of regaining on the *left* bank of the Theiss a junction between the army under my command and the southern forces of the country; because the Russians from Tiszafüred — where they were much nearer to the point Debreczin than we who were on the Sajó — could easily have forced us to change the direction of our retreat from Miskolcz, by Tokaj, Debreczin, and Gross-Wardein, to the Ranat. I had, in fact, no choice: I should in that case have had to undertake the diversion from Miskolcz towards the south, in order somehow to create on either bank of the Theiss new chances in favour of the intended breaking through towards the south.

Meanwhile the next events, under the constant influence of the illusion that the Russian main army was scarcely 60,000 strong, grouped themselves in such a manner that I came to the erroneous opinion (as I should think must be apparent, without any explanation of mine, from the subsequent operations of the army under my command), that the Russian commander had either never intended to operate beyond the Theiss, so long as we remained there, or that he had again given up this plan in consequence of the threatening advance of our seventh corps from Miskolcz towards the south.

It is now almost superfluous particularly to mention, that this advance, besides the covering of the march of our army on the left bank of the Sajó (on the line of Szikszó to Onod), had also the object of a forced reconnoitering. This was to furnish us with information whether Miskolcz or Tiszafüred was the *next* object of operation of the Russian main army.

By the 20th of July, as is known, the hostile garrison of Miskolcz had left this point, while our van-guard was still ten miles from it. Patrols of the seventh corps, however, informed us on the 22d of July, that hostile outposts were stationed at Harsány (two miles to the south of Miskolcz, on the high road of Gyöngyös): they were evidently those of the garrison of Miskolcz. Now the circumstance that this weak column no longer felt it necessary to make way for us, at a distance of ten miles, led us to suppose that it had found a support. Whether this support was the main body of the principal Russian army, or merely a column to protect in flank the main body already operating against Tiszafüred — to find out this was the business of General Pol-

tenberg, he having been ordered to commence on the 23d of July the above-mentioned southern advance towards Nyék and Harsány.

At the latter place, in the course of that day, his advanced troops were briskly attacked from Vatta, and pressed back along the high road as far as the eminence situated in the south-west of Görömböly. Here, however, the enemy encountered a part of the main troop of the seventh corps, which in the mean time had hastened forward from the camp at Görömböly, and now avoiding any further contest, he again retreated forthwith to Vatta. He seemed to have intended a mere reconnoitering. For the next day (the 24th of July), however, a serious attack on the position of the seventh corps was evidently in prospect.

General Pöltenberg received orders to await the enemy on the spot, unconditionally to accept battle, to give way only to a superior force, and in this case to draw back to the position of the third corps on the left bank of the Sajó.

For the protection of this retreat, should it happen, against the Russian corps approaching from Rimaszombat, one-half of the first corps remained in Sajó-Szent-Péter. Diós-Győr likewise continued to be occupied by a column of the seventh corps; as in general the position which our army had taken up on the 23d of July was left unchanged for the following day.

CHAPTER XXV.

IN the night from the 23d to the 24th of July, a lady travelling in a carriage was stopped at our outposts, and on her asserting that she had a letter for me, she was conducted to the head-quarters at A.-Zsolcza.

The contents of this sealed letter, addressed to me personally, were as follow:

" *Balassa-Gyarmat, le 19 juillet, 1849.*

" MONSIEUR,

" Les troupes placées sous mes ordres se sont trouvées en présence de celles que vous commandez; la fortune des armes s'est prononcée en ma faveur. En vous suivant, j'appris partout sur mon passage, que vous ne vous refusez point de rendre, avec une parfaite loyauté, pleine et entière justice à la valeur de mon corps d'armée. Ce procédé de franchise de votre part m'impose le devoir de vous donner une preuve de l'estime que m'inspire votre caractère de brave militaire; et c'est à cette fin que je me suis décidé à vous adresser la présente communication. Vos talens ont sans doute su faire surmonter de graves difficultés à votre corps d'armée; mais vous ne vous dissimulerez point, qu'en ce moment un danger imminent le menace. Je viens donc vous offrir, Monsieur, en toute confiance, la voie des négociations. Veuillez m'indiquer les conditions auxquelles vous jugeriez possible de faire cesser une lutte désormais inégal pour vous, et je m'empresserai de solliciter à cet égard les ordres de S. A. M. le Commandant

en chef de l'armée imperiale russe. Je n'ai pas besoin d'ajouter, qu'elles seront posées avec toute la justice qui distingue mon illustre chef, et que votre honneur de brave guerrier ne subira la moindre atteinte.

" Recevez, Monsieur, l'assurance de ma considération la plus distinguée.

(Signed)

" LE COMTE RÜDIGER,

Commandant en chef d'un corps d'armée de troupes russes."

As near as I can remember, I answered Count Rüdiger to the following effect:

That if the safety of my troops and of my own person was alone concerned, I should by no means be disinclined, on honourable conditions, to hold out the hand of peace.

That, however, the salvation of Hungary was concerned, the political existence of which the Emperor of Austria and those about him intended to destroy; to which destruction his Majesty the Emperor of Russia — apparently misinformed of what the better and greater part of Hungary wished and still wishes — had also of late unfortunately given his powerful support.

That therefore we must fight until our peaceful fellow-citizens were saved from the danger of subjugation, or we ourselves were destroyed in the unequal contest.

That this was my answer as a soldier and as the commander of the troops entrusted to me by the state.

That I hoped every leader of Hungarian troops thought as I did in this respect; in which case it would be difficult to pacify Hungary by partial treaties with individual leaders of the army.

But that I should consider it to be my duty to open

and smooth the way for the commencement of secret negotiations between the provisional government of Hungary and the Russian Field-marshal Prince Paszkiewicz, if the latter would be pleased to let me know on what conditions Hungary could make peace with his Majesty the Emperor of Russia; and that in this case I thought I could shew a result more desirable for Russia than even the completely successful subjugation of Hungary could present.

I communicated to Count Leiningen, as well as to the chief of the general staff, and several superior officers of the army who were accidentally present at the headquarters, this reply to Count Rüdiger, the whole substance of which has been related above; and afterwards delivered it sealed, and addressed to the above-named commander of the Russian corps, to the same lady through whom I had received his letter.

She thereupon left the head-quarters at A.-Zsolcza late in the afternoon of the 24th of July. I had advised her to return to the Russian camp by way of Szikszó and the position of our first corps, because the way by Miskolcz, which she at first wished to take, was occupied — as we shall see in the next chapter — by the seventh corps, at that time already in retreat on the left bank of the Sajó. She followed my advice; but not reaching Szikszó before night was setting in, she resolved to stay there till daybreak, and addressed herself directly to General Nagy-Sándor, with the request that she might be accommodated with suitable quarters for the night, at the same time informing him of the object of her journey.

Nagy-Sándor immediately suspected some treachery in my correspondence with the commander of the Rus-

sian corps; communicated this suspicion to several of his staff-officers, and was strengthened by them in his intention of becoming acquainted with the contents of my letter to the Russian commander. But he had not the courage to do this openly. General Nagy-Sándor thought it more advisable secretly to purloin the sealed letter, and after it had been opened, read, and re-sealed, to restore it in the same way to the possession of the unsuspecting lady. But before she set out again on her journey from Szikszó, she accidentally noticed that the impression of the seal on the envelope was no longer the same as when she received it from me, and communicated this discovery just as casually to a staff-officer of the first army corps, who, not being of the same political opinions as Nagy-Sándor, and, as a matter of course, not informed of what had happened to the letter, learned from his companions how the seal had been changed, and brought me information of the affair, with the well-meant intention of putting me on my guard against Nagy-Sándor. But I ignored the whole transaction; for otherwise I should have had to punish General Nagy-Sándor for an act by which he had undoubtedly succeeded, though unintentionally, in restoring among those officers whom he had himself made suspicious of me their original confidence in my purposes and actions. On the 24th of July, the trumpets that had been sent from Sajó-Szent-Péter to the camp of the Russian Colonel Chrulow with my answer to the summons to lay down our arms returned from their mission. They had found his column already joined by a second under General Sass; and in both camps met with a reception suitable to their office. For the Russian leaders observed towards our trumpets those usages of interna-

tional law which, as history tells us, are never infringed with impunity, even under the pretext that the enemy is a rebel.

I must here add, that Captain Katlarow and Count Rüdiger, when present as trumpets in our camp, had no hesitation in exchanging arms with two officers of my suite. General Sass and Colonel Chrulow, assuming that I had made this exchange with Captain Katlarow and Count Rüdiger, took the opportunity of delivering their pistols to our trumpets as a counter-present for me. I, however, could not overlook the motive of this chivalric attention, and therefore repaid it by sending, on one of the following days, into the nearest Russian camp, two pairs of my own pistols directed respectively to General Sass and Colonel Chrulow.

CHAPTER XXVI.

GENERAL PÖLTENBERG with the seventh corps — as has been mentioned in Chapter xxiv. — had immediately repelled the Russian corps which, on the 23^d of July, had advanced aggressively from Vatta along the high road of Gyöngyös as far as the eminence of Görömböly, and had hereupon received orders to maintain his position during the following day likewise.

In the forenoon of the 24th of July, however, such trustworthy information arrived at our head-quarters relative to the strength of the Russian forces directly opposed to our seventh corps, that I thought I might now consider it certain that the next object of the ope-

ration of the Russian main army was Miskolcz (not Tiszafüred). I therefore deemed it superfluous to expose our seventh corps any longer to the danger of an attack by a superior force, and ordered it without delay to retreat by Miskolcz to the left bank of the Sajó.

But on the part of the Russians, and from the same direction as on the *23d* (namely from Vatta), a resolute attack on the position of General Poltenberg at Görömböly had already been made, before this order to retreat could reach him.

General Poltenberg, after a hot contest of several hours' duration, which he had courageously sustained against the hostile superior force, on the eminence to the south-west of Görömböly, was forced to retreat by the emerging of a strong hostile turning-column on his left (at Mályi). He effected this, still fighting, along the high road as far as Miskolcz, and — after he had here been rejoined by the column detached to Diós-Győr — on the Kaschau high road as far as F.-Zsolcza on the left bank of the Sajó.

When General Poltenberg arrived here, as darkness was setting in, he received instructions, with the seventh corps, to occupy the line of the Sajó from A.-Zsolcza down the river as far as Onod in the course of the night; while Count Leiningen concentrated the third corps between A.-Zsolcza and Arnót.

That half of the first corps which had been left behind in Sajó-Szent-Péter on the *23d* of July as rear-guard of the army, but on the *24th* to protect the line of retreat of the seventh corps, was now likewise disposed on the left bank of the Sajó for the purpose of rejoining the other half of the corps posted at Szikszó;

where General Nagy-Sándor had for the present to remain with the whole first corps, to ward off an attack, which might possibly be directed from Putnok, against the right flank of the army, and to secure, as before, the Sajó line above Arnót as far as Sajó-Vámos.

The head-quarters advanced at nightfall of the 24th to Onga, and in the morning of the 25th to Gesztely.

The enemy had pursued our seventh corps in the evening of the 24th only as far as Miskolcz. In the forenoon of the 25th, however, he advanced from Miskolcz to the Sajó, and obstinately attacked the position of the third and seventh corps, confining himself almost exclusively to the active employment of his numerous artillery. But along the carriage-road from Sajo-Keresztur to Arnót (on the right wing of the third corps) he essayed a brisk attack with cavalry. It failed, however; as did also the efforts, though extraordinary, made by the artillery to dislodge the batteries of our centre. One of the hostile batteries especially distinguished itself by the rare boldness with which, rushing forward close to the river-bank (opposite A.-Zsolcza), it gained a position protected against the fire of our batteries, and moreover from which the line of the latter was taken in flank. From this point the enemy's battery was very destructive to our left centre, and its removal appeared ultimately imperative at any cost. Lieut.-Colonel Gózon, of the seventh corps, undertook this critical task. With about fifty volunteers of his battalion he waded across the Sajó, pushed undetected his way through the wood at the opposite river-bank, and suddenly fell upon the two battalions camping on the western edge of this forest, as a protection to the battery posted not far off. The stroke succeeded so

completely that both hostile battalions blindly took to flight. The battery made all haste to overtake its guard; and thus the balance of the combat was immediately restored in the range of our left centre, and continued so during the remainder of the engagement.

This balance the brave General Pöltenberg and Count Leiningen knew how to secure for themselves on all points of their disproportionately extended position by a circumspect and timely employment of their forces; and several hours before nightfall the attacks of the enemy were completely crippled.

Both army corps, the seventh and third, had firmly maintained the line on the Sajó. The enemy nevertheless could arrive unobstructed in the rear of our position by means of crossing the Hernád during the night below the point of its junction with the Sajó.

We might thereby be forced to enter on the further retreat behind the Theiss, and that under the most unfavourable circumstances. Nay, supposing the enemy intended to execute this turning-manoevre with adequate forces and speed, we had cause to apprehend even the total loss of our line of retreat towards Tokaj, and consequently the reward of all those inexpressible efforts which the army had made since the evacuation of Waizen.

From this apprehension originated the determination to draw back the army from the Sajó to the left bank of the Hernád before daybreak next morning (26th of July).

The order of succession of the army corps remained unchanged in their new disposition on the Hernád. In its centre the third corps was disposed at Gresztely and Kák; on the right wing, from Csanálos to Baksa, the

first; and on the left wing, from Hernád-Németi to Köröm, the seventh corps. Patrols of the latter observed the further course of the Hernád till it falls into the Theiss. The head-quarters went to Szerencs. The unnecessary army train as well as the fugitive civilians were ordered back by Tokaj to the left bank of the Theiss. On our retreat from Waizen to Miskolcz several officers had deserted from the army. Some of these gentry had meanwhile been apprehended at Szerencs. I judged it needful in our circumstances to sentence these unfortunates to death.

The enemy justified only in part our supposition that he had intended to turn our position on the Sajó from Onod by Köröm, and to force us out of the line of retreat towards Tokaj. He attempted in fact to pass the river between Onod and Köröm, but not till the 26th of July, consequently too late to effect this object, and moreover with so little energy that the feeble column of the seventh corps, forming the left wing at Köröm, succeeded by itself in maintaining the left bank of the Hernád at that point.

This attempt to cross the river was the only undertaking of the enemy during the course of the 26th of July, that we heard of. All the reports of our patrols, as well as the information of the scouts, agreed that the hostile army was neither advancing nor retrograding from Miskolcz. Consequently it appeared as if the arrival of General Grabbe from the mountain-towns was waited for, before the energetic continuation of the offensive operations against us. And since we remained so much the more under the influence of the erroneous assumption, that on the previous day, on the Sajó, the main body of the Russian principal army had been

opposed to us, as no report causing apprehension had arrived from Tiszafüred, — I resolved to stay on the Hernád until I should be forced to continue the retreat behind the Theiss either by a superior direct attack on our position, or by a southerly side-movement of the supposed main body of the Russian principal army.

To this conclusion I was brought, on the one hand, by the intention of facilitating the retreat of the Kazinczy division to the Banat, which, in contradiction to Dembinski's well-known plan of concentration, still continued inactive in the Mármaros; on the other hand, by the conviction that — considering the present strategic state of affairs in the south of the country, as well as the impossibility of shaking off the Russian main army — I should be able to secure the existing chances for a favourable turn of affairs on the lower Theiss and in Transylvania only by means of delaying my further retreat all I could, not by hastening it.

The strategic state of affairs in the southern theatre of war, according to the latest information of the government and some private communications, was as follows:

The Ban Baron Jellachich, in consequence of a defeat sustained in the middle of July at Hegyes, had evacuated the Bácska with his army, and confined himself, on the left bank of the Danube and the right of the Theiss, to exclusively maintaining the plateau of Titel. The defile of Perlasz — by taking advantage of which, the defeated Ban, in order to redress himself in some degree, might have attempted a diversion from Titel to the right bank of the Theiss — was in our hands; the fortress of Peterwardein in part relieved. The retreat of the Ban was followed by the attempt, on our part, to conquer the plateau of Titel, and completely relieve Peterwardein.

These undertakings, however, had to be abandoned when scarcely begun; for the southward advance of the Austrian main army from Pesth towards Szegedin induced the provisional government to order back to Szegedin the greater part of the very forces which had been destined for these enterprises, where, united with the corps of reserve and that of General Vysocki under the chief command of Dembinski-Mészáros (formerly Mészáros-Dembinski),* they were to co-operate in the offensive intended, as was said, against the Austrian main army.

With regard to Transylvania — from the general intimations, partly official, partly private, which I had received relative to the state of affairs there — this at least was to be considered as certain, that Field-marshal Lieut. Bern did not yet despair of maintaining the territory, although half of it was already lost.

Consequently, on the one hand Transylvania, on the other the line of the central and lower Theiss, were certainly not yet given up, though no doubt seriously menaced; and moreover the fortress of Temesvár — in the centre of the territory to be defended simultaneously both east and west — was still in the enemy's possession: this was, synoptically, the strategic position in the south of Hungary, as deducible from the news communicated to me up to the 26th of July.

A change in this undeniably precarious condition, favourable in some way or other, must now begin, in my opinion, with the fall of Temesvár, so as to render possible especially the re-inforcement of the mobile

* When this change in the chief command properly took place, I cannot indicate with certainty. I merely infer, from other vivid recollections, that it must have belonged to the last days of July.

army on the lower Theiss. For from the circumstance, that though the Ban Baron Jellachich had been defeated and forced to evacuate the Bácska, yet that it had nevertheless not been put out of his power to reappear at any moment in an offensive attitude on the right bank of the lower Theiss — -a considerable part of that army, being indispensable for the eventual protection of Szegedin and of the lower Theiss (against the Ban in the south), must be withheld from the northern offensive to be opened from Szegedin against Baron Haynau, and the success of this offensive must consequently beforehand appear doubtful on account of the insufficiency of the forces disposable for the purpose. It is true that the news from Szegedin represented the parts of the mobile army on the lower Theiss, destined for this offensive, as a total force of 50,000 men. According to my calculation, however, there were to be found among the pretended 50,000 men scarcely 30,000 organised troops, including the corps of reserve, which was not yet in all its parts completely equipped for action. The remaining 20,000 men might perhaps have been "militia" (respecting the practical value of which in war-operations, see Vol. I. chap. iii.); if they did not even owe their harmless existence to an official *error calculi*.

From an offensive undertaken with 30,000 men against the Austrian main army re-inforced by a Russian corps, not much, indeed, could be expected. But as soon as Temesvár had fallen, this army of about 30,000 men could certainly be raised to nearly 60,000, by means of drawing on our besieging corps (General Count Vécsey) and the recruits lately levied, and to be equipped with the arms taken at Temesvár. It must now, I should think, be sufficiently plain why I saw in the fall of that

fortress the nearest postulate for assuming that a favourable turn in the strategic state of affairs in the south of Hungary was to be anticipated.

But then *to* render possible the taking of Temesvár, the further maintenance of the central and lower Theiss and of Transylvania, at least of its south-western part, was indispensable: finally, the accomplishment of this task demanded *that the Russian main army should be kept as far distant as possible from the line of the Maros*; for in the same degree as it approached the Maros, Transylvania and the line of the Theiss must become less tenable, for the simple reason, that the Russian main army would gain with the Maros simultaneously the possibility of attacking our army in Transylvania, as well as that at Szegecin, directly in their rear.

My determination to remain at the Hernád was consequently justified not only by the necessity of resting the army, extremely exhausted in consequence of the forced retreat; not only by the intention — far from being of little importance in those days of general scarcity of men — of gaming for the combat the Kazinczy division, about 7,000 strong, which was stationed inactive in the Mármaros. This determination to maintain the position on the Hernád as long as possible had, as I have above explained, a *strategic motive*; and I should have resolved upon it under the same conjunctures, even if the retreat from Waizen had not exhausted the physical powers of the army, and if the opportunity had not offered itself to augment the really active forces of the country by those 7,000 men of the Kazinczy division.

Whether the motive of my determination to interrupt the retreat to the Banat, in the position on the Hernád, was strategically correct, is certainly a ques-

tion, which cannot now be unqualifiedly answered in the affirmative. This motive rested on the assumption of the twofold possibility offered by our position on the Hernád, according to circumstances, either to oppose during a certain time the attack made with all its force by the Russian main army on our front, or to frustrate the alteration in our retreat (namely by continuing it betimes), intended perhaps by means of a critical flanking manoeuvre from Miskolcz by Tiszafüred towards Debreczin. The assumption of this twofold possibility, however, was based on the well-known supposition that the Russian main army numbered scarcely 60,000 men, consequently that that part of the army which encamped on the 26th of July at Miskolcz was its main body.

Now admitting that this supposition was correct, and at the same time bearing in mind the strategic position above indicated — so far as it was known to me on the 26th of July — of all the armies operating in Hungary, there can be objected against my determination to remain on the Hernád scarcely any thing of importance.

This very supposition, however, (how it originated has already been explained), was totally erroneous: for the whole number of the forces at the disposal of the Russian general against the three army corps united under my command amounted to 120,000 men; and consequently on the 26th of July we had by no means the main body, but only about a third of this force opposed to the front of our position on the Hernád, while the main body with its advanced troops had reached on the same day Tiszafüred in our left, and was therefore above six miles nearer to Debreczin than we were. The distance from Tiszafüred to Debreczin is

nine miles; while our army, in its position on the Hernád, was somewhere about sixteen miles from Debreczin.

Under these circumstances my staying on the Hernád was certainly a strategic folly — but an unanticipated one; an aimless endangering of the last possibility of re-establishing a junction with the southern forces by an uninterrupted speedy continuation of the retreat — but an unconscious one.

I have already superficially indicated above how it happened that I could stay on the Hernád in spite of the occupation of Tiszafüred by about 20,000 Russians, which had taken place on the 26th of July; on that day, namely, I was not informed of the hostile advance against Tiszafüred. How it happened, however, that even on the morning of the 27th no report had arrived at the head-quarters in Szerencs about the forcing of the left bank of the Theiss at Tiszafüred, though it had been begun on the 25th, — to explain this I must leave to the unhappy commander of that column, whose mission it had been to occupy Poroszló, to observe the enemy on the right bank of the Theiss, and to defend the passage from Poroszló to Tiszafüred.

CHAPTER XXVII.

I HAD not omitted to send to the government in Szegedin a circumstantial report relative to the exchange of trumpets which had taken place between the Russian army and that under my command.

It is known that this answer to the commander-in-chief of the Russian army of intervention contained an appeal to the constitutional law for Hungary sanctioned in the spring of 1848 by King Ferdinand V.

This appeal — apart from its accordance with the leading reason of my personal participation in the war against Austria — *was dictated by the army.*

Nevertheless Kossuth blamed this appeal as a demonstration, originating from me alone, against himself and his work, the declaration of independence of the 14th of April.

I put up with this blame, however, without answering it, because I did not wish still further to widen the breach between me and Kossuth, but, on the contrary, aimed at rendering him as much as possible accessible to those counsels which I had partly already given, partly intended to give him, as most nearly affecting the interests of the nation, and as being all that, under the then existing circumstances, could, according to my conviction, still be realised.

My perception of what was still attainable by the nation — its near abolition as a state being inevitable — and which moreover was indispensable to the nation to give it a high moral bearing in the face of its comfortless future, and consequently of which it had need above all — this perception remained the same as it had been when my proposal was made in the ministerial council of the 26th of June (at Pesth), as well as my resolution to remain with the main army at Komorn; — that Austria, even under the wings of Russia, should once more feel the sharpness of Hungarian arms!

Under what conditions the probability presented itself to me of seeing this moral want of the nation still

satisfied; how I had unfortunately to perceive that I should have to perform, in the most favourable case, only an indirect part in the satisfaction of this national want, since, being directly opposed to the Russian and not to the Austrian army, to take a direct part in the offensive operation against the latter, I should have been obliged to expose to the former the basis of the operation (the Banat), but that then the intended offensive counter-stroke against the Austrians could be only a transient, not a lasting one; — all these circumstances I have already mentioned in the preceding chapter.

It remains only to remark, that I thought an indirect support of the offensive preparing at Szegedin against the army of Baron Haynau likewise possible from the garrison of Komorn, and that I was thereby induced — after my determination to maintain the position on the Hernád had been taken — to send a letter to General Klapka, informing him of the breaking-through of my army, presumptively already successful, and stimulating him to activity. But as this letter had to traverse a part of the country occupied by the enemy, it seemed to me necessary to take the precaution of confining it in its weightiest part to the most general indications; the more so, as General Klapka's proved sagacity led me to anticipate a right comprehension of my hints, however general might be the terms in which they were expressed.

Klapka's energetic demeanour on the line of communication between the Austrian main army and its basis of operations; the fall of Temesvár; the further maintenance of the south-western part of Transylvania by Field-marshal Lieut. Bern; and the continued hampering of the Russian main army on the upper Theiss by

the forces united under my command; — these were circumstances, with the timely coincidence of which there might be expected — even without extravagance — from an offensive against the army of Baron Haynau, though not the preservation of the existence of Hungary as a state, nevertheless the satisfying of the above-explained moral want of the nation; — if Kossuth, at last discovering Dembinski's incapacity, should entrust to more skilful hands the guidance of this offensive, and at the same time conquer his own morbid inclination to exert a direct influence on the progress of the war-operations.

To induce Kossuth to do the first, and not to leave undone the second, was the object of those counsels which I now wished to gain him to reflect upon. My hope of success, however, was but faint; for I did not conceal from myself that Kossuth's hostile feelings towards me, in consequence of the well-known events at Komorn, had probably become sufficiently strong to decide him to do just the contrary of what I advised; without taking into account the peculiar circumstance, that I could not advise for Dembinski's removal from the chief command without exciting in Kossuth the suspicion that I did so probably not from a well-founded conviction of Dembinski's incapacity as a general, but merely with the intention of rendering possible the re-acquisition of the staff of command for myself, and consequently of a power in the state by means of which, on occasion, even the authority of the civil government might be called in question.

Nevertheless I advised Kossuth to remove Dembinski from the chief command; for I felt an inward impulse not to leave untried any means for the promotion of what I conceived to be the moral welfare of

the nation. The injurious effects of Kossuth's direct encroachments on the conduct of the war-operations I passed over for the present, however, in cautious silence, partly that I might not hurt his personal vanity, and thereby lose all; partly because it seemed to me as if these encroachments — so long as Dembinski was still at the head of the war-operations on the lower Theiss — were really harmless, or at least, as regarded the success of our arms there, scarcely more injurious than Dembinski's own strategic dispositions.

Hereupon I received from Kossuth a private letter, in which he declared, among other things, that unfortunately he could not deny Dembinski's incapacity as a general; and that he believed the best way to get rid of him would be, if he himself joined the army, and personally conducted the operations according to my counsels.

I received besides an official invitation to be present, on the 27th or 28th of July, at a personal conference with Kossuth and the then war-minister, General Aulich — I do not now exactly remember whether in Kardszag or Kis-Ujszállás.

Of course I could not understand whence Kossuth had all at once acquired the unbounded confidence in me which was displayed in his declaration that he was willing to conduct the operations according to *my* counsels; the sincerity of this declaration also, in view of the Komorn events, as well the genuineness of the feelings with the outpouring of which he regaled me in the private letter, was highly doubtful; and I resolved not to honour it with any reply.

The official invitation to a personal meeting with Kossuth and the war-minister, on the contrary, was the

more wished for by me, as I thought that Kossuth, in the presence of a witness such as General Aulich, would probably hesitate to promise more than he intended to perform.

On the morning of the 27th of July I accordingly left the head-quarters at Szerencs, to hasten, by Tokaj, Nyíregyháza, and Debreczin, to the place of meeting.

In Nyíregyháza, however, I found a written report from the commander of the Tiszafüred column on its way, to the effect that the day before, a Russian corps had crossed the Theiss between Poroszló and Tiszafüred; and this news obliged me to forego the meeting with Kossuth, and return immediately to my head-quarters at Szerencs.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

WHEN, on the morning of the 27th of July, I left the head-quarters at Szerencs, to repair to the place of the proposed meeting with Kossuth, no change whatever had been remarked by our patrols and scouts in the position of the hostile corps (the presumed main body of the Russian corps d'armée), which had remained inactive during the preceding day at Miskolcz. At that time there had likewise been no report received at the head-quarters — as I have distinctly stated in Chapter xxvi. — of the enemy having forced the left bank of the Theiss at Tiszafüred.

I had accordingly indulged the hope of being able to leave the army for forty-eight hours (this space of time I fixed for the meeting with Kossuth, including

the journey there and back), without being particularly apprehensive that any hostile undertaking could essentially prejudice our strategic position on the Hernád; — for it is known that we explained the remaining inactive at Miskolcz of the presumed main body of the Russian army by the apparently not improbable intention of the hostile commander to await, before the next significant undertaking against us, the arrival of his army corps under Grabbe, which was hastening thither from the mountain-towns.

This repetition, though wearisome, of circumstances sufficiently known from what precedes; as well as once more mentioning that we estimated the whole Russian main army at no more than 60,000 men; together with the supplementary remark, that we were informed of its real force (about 120,000 men) only *post Jesta*, that is when we were Russian prisoners, — may serve here as a natural explanation of the fact, that though the news I had received on the 27th of July in Nyíregyháza, about the enemy having effected his passage across the Theiss between Poroszló and Tiszafüred, certainly disagreeably surprised me, it by no means caused me to despair of the possibility of our further retreat to the line of the Berettyó (the point on the left bank of the Theiss where we next intended to halt), but merely shewed me the necessity of instantly beginning the retreat, and so foregoing the re.-inforcement of the army by the Kazinczy division. I did not despair of the possibility of executing the retreat, because I erroneously conceived that the main body of the hostile army was posted at Miskolcz, and that the part of it which had crossed the Theiss at Tiszafüred could consequently scarcely be strong enough to succeed in preventing us

from marching through the plain of the Theiss to the river Berettyó; but I thought it necessary to begin the retreat immediately, because with the left bank of the Theiss at Tiszafüred we should have lost the possibility of hindering or even controlling the accumulation of the enemy's troops on this strategic point; so that by our longer remaining on the Hernád an opportunity would have been afforded to the Russian commander to establish himself suddenly with superior forces on our ground of retreat, and to press us back either to Transylvania laterally, or even into the Mármaros, thereby to all appearance for ever separating us from the southern armies of the country.

The complete evacuation of our position on the Hernád moreover could not be deferred, as in the course of the 28th of July several mutually confirmatory reports arrived at the head-quarters at Szerencs from the valley of the upper Hernád, placing beyond doubt the southern advance, rumoured the day before (from Kaschau towards Tokaj), of a fresh Russian corps (Baron Sacken), which had shortly before broken into Hungary. By this corps, in the moment of its arrival on the left bank of the Hernád at Hidas-Németi, the position of our army appeared to be strategically turned in its right flank; Tokaj, with the only prepared passage to the left bank of the Theiss available to us, to be next menaced; and already, merely to secure our retreat to the latter, we were obliged to draw back from the position on the Hernád as far as the point of junction of the roads between Zombor and Bodrog-Keresztur, Mád and Tarczal. But apart from the tactic unfavourableness of the local circumstances, remaining longer at *this* point could not have been strategically justified, if the left bank of

the Theiss at Tiszafüred had still been in our power. For with the emerging of a fresh Russian corps between Kaschau and our army, the longer keeping back of the latter completely lost that significance, which — as we, underestimating the enemy's strength, might hope — was to render him apprehensive of the basis of his operations, prevent him from turning our left by Tiszafüred, and cause him to undertake a direct attack on our positions on the right bank of the Theiss; in which case I certainly should not have considered it impossible to prevent the further southern advance of the Russian main army on the upper Theiss for some time.

On the 27th of July, during my absence from the army, an advance of hostile cavalry from Miskolcz by Onga took place against the position of our third corps at Gesztely and Kák. This undertaking, however, soon proved to be a mere reconnoitering; as the hostile divisions, however quickly and daringly they attacked our outposts, nevertheless decidedly avoided any serious conflict, and finally evacuated even Onga.

The day after, the third corps was very violently attacked in its position by a Russian corps of strength equal to itself, which had approached likewise from Miskolcz by Onga against Gesztely.

Count Leiningen confined himself, indeed, to the defensive; but it was a defensive which obliged the enemy to evacuate the field of battle after a contest of several hours, leaving behind his wounded men.

This time it seemed as if the enemy's attack on our position had been meant in real earnest. The choice of the point of attack also seemed to indicate this; for it cannot be denied that, with the left bank of the Hernád at Gesztely and Kák, a great part of our army,

namely the left wing, would also have been lost, as soon as the enemy energetically pursued his victory. In evident contradiction, however, to the earnestness of the enemy's intention — which, on account of the vehemence of the attack, could not be mistaken — to break through the centre of our line on the Hernád, stood the numerical strength of the assailant, which was altogether insufficient to overcome the notorious difficulties of such undertakings.

And this striking disproportion between the means and the apparent object of this attack on the 28th of July was a circumstance, the only possible plausible explanation of which filled us suddenly with a lively apprehension that we had perhaps *already* let slip the favourable moment for the continuation of our retreat from the Hernád across the Theiss to the river Berettyó, and should now scarcely be able to reach it, or at all events only with extreme efforts.

That the enemy had *blindly rushed upon* us on the 28th of July at Gesztely, we could not accept as an explanation of his vehement onset; because he had already reconnoitered on the previous day this very point, had found it strongly occupied by us, and our troops there quite the reverse of disinclined to fight; and consequently, the energetic opposition which he had met with on the 25th of July on the Sajó being fresh in his mind, he could by no means be authorised to expect a less energetic resistance on the Hernád.

It seemed to us far more reasonable to explain the attack of the 28th of July on the centre of our position on the Hernád, by assuming that the Russian commander — knowing the basis of his operations to be secured in future by the corps of Baron Sacken, which

had lately broken into Hungary — had begun during the 27th of July to put his (presumed) main body in march from Miskolcz to Tiszafüred; and that the attacks on Gesztely on the 27th and 28th had merely been demonstrations, in order to mask this flank manœuvre.

According to this, the (presumed) main body of the Russian army, which on the 26th was still encamped at Miskolcz, on the 28th could certainly have crossed the Theiss between Poroszló and Tiszafüred, and have executed the strategic turning of the left flank of our army, which, awaiting the direct attack, was still on the Hernád from Baksa to Köröm. There was consequently no longer any hope of passing Debreczin without danger. It was necessary to choose a line of retreat to the river Berettyó deviating in an eastern direction from the route by Debreczin, and moreover to strive to make up for the time lost on the Hernád, if possible, by means of forced marches. In consequence of the energetic vigour with which Count Leiningen had repelled the last attack on Gesztely, the retreat of our army seemed fortunately to be secured against any pursuit at least from the Hernád by Tokaj to the left bank of the Theiss.

Accordingly, at nightfall of the 28th of July the army left its position on the Hernád, and reached Vas-kapu (on the left bank of the Theiss, on the road from Tokaj to Nyíregyháza) in the course of the 29th, and Nyíregyháza itself on the 30th.

Meanwhile we were informed that the enemy had not proceeded from Tiszafüred towards Debreczin, but up the Theiss; intending, as it seemed, to render impossible our further retreat, if we remained any longer on the Hernád, by straightway occupying the left bank of the Theiss opposite Tokaj.

We could learn nothing positive about an advance of the enemy towards Debreczin till our arrival at Nyíregyháza, nor even during our short stay there. The probability of this movement was, however, too great for us to assume with certainty that it would be possible to effect without danger our further retreat on the route by Debreczin.

The main body of our army, consisting of the third and seventh corps, was consequently at Nyíregyháza turned eastward from the way to Debreczin on the road by Nagy-Kálló, Nyir-Adony, Vámos-Pércs, Nagy-Léta to Kis-Marja (on the left bank of the Berettyó); while General Nagy-Sándor with the first corps, which had not once been engaged with the enemy since Waizen (15th of July), had to form the flank-guard of the army, and for this purpose continue his march on the route by Debreczin, and further by Derecske and Berettyó-Újfalu to the left bank of the Berettyó; but arrived there, immediately to undertake the occupation of the latter *à cheval* of the road to Gross-Wardein.

In order to render the combined movements of the main body and the flank-guard compatible with the two-fold consideration of gaining betimes the river Berettyó, and preserving the army from heavy losses, the following dispositions for the march were issued:

July 31 st, the main body to Nagy-Kálló, the flank-guard to Hadház.

Aug. 1st,	„	Nyir-Adony,	„	„	Debreczin.
2d,	„	Vámos-Pércs,	„	„	remain at Debreczin.
3d,	„	Nagy-Léta,	„	„	to Derecske.
4th,	„	Kis-Marja,	„	„	Berettyó-Újfalu.

The leader of the flank-guard (General Nagy-Sándor) was expressly ordered to avoid any serious engagement

with a superior hostile force: in case he should encounter such force before reaching Debreczin, by a lateral retreat to the main body of the army; in the contrary case — that is, if his corps should be attacked by a superior force after having reached Debreczin — by speedily continuing the route of march indicated to him as far as Berettyó-Ujfalú.

According to this disposition, the main body of the army on the 31st of July and 1st of August — so long, namely, as there was still a possibility of a hostile movement *before* Debreczin — could not remain at an equal height with the flank-guard; it must, on the contrary (compare the corresponding stations for the 31st of July and 1st of August) give to the flank-guard so much advance as was absolutely necessary to prevent its retreat to the main body of the army from degenerating into a flank-march; because otherwise the flank-guard — supposing that a superior enemy advanced against it from Debreczin towards Hadház, or was awaiting it before Debreczin — would have had to choose between either allowing itself to be destroyed or separated from the main body.

In case General Nagy-Sándor should find Debreczin either not yet occupied at all by the enemy, or already vacated by a feeble column which had perhaps been separately advanced (both cases were conceivable, if the hostile main forces had really marched from Tiszafüred up the Theiss); then he had to aim principally at procuring, by means of patrols advancing far on all communications leading from Debreczin towards the Theiss, the most exact information possible relative to the movements of the enemy. Whether the flank-guard should remain during the 1st of August in Debreczin,

or might rest there — according to the dispositions for the march projected in advance — even on the 2d of August, — to judge of this I must leave to General Nagy-Sándor's discernment. The express order to avoid any unequal contest with the superior enemy had to serve him therein as a rule. If he was menaced, even immediately before his arrival at Debreczin, by a preponderating force, he had to avoid it — as already pointed out — on the road to Derecske, and at once inform the main body of the army of it, that it might by an early forced march escape the danger of being taken in flank from Debreczin, and again reach an equal height with the flank-guard.

Thus ran the instructions given to General Nagy-Sándor in Nyíregyháza, before he left with the first corps the main body of the army for the purpose of forming its flank-guard during the march to the Berettyó.

On the 1st of August he reached Debreczin without danger, and reported that he had learned the enemy was stationed with about 15,000 men at Újváros — three miles to the west of Debreczin on the road to Csege.

On the 2d of August the main body of the army arrived at Vámos-Pércs.

I was prepared to learn further from General Nagy-Sándor that the enemy threatened an attack from Újváros with superior forces, and that the first corps would very probably be obliged to leave Debreczin in the course of the day. There arrived, however, at the head-quarters neither any such report from General Nagy-Sándor, nor the slightest indication of the situation of the first corps at Debreczin, which — as was evident afterwards — was greatly endangered even on the morning of the 2d of August by the enemy's approach

from Újváros; and I was consequently justified in supposing that no hostile advance from Újváros against Debreczin had taken place — that the enemy, preparing for a decisive blow at us, was probably first concentrating the main body of his army at Újváros.

But in contradiction to this supposition a remarkably brisk thunder of cannon was suddenly heard early in the afternoon from Debreczin. To discover as soon as possible the significance of the unexpected conflict, patrols of cavalry were immediately sent towards Debreczin.

After an hour or two's duration the cannonading ceased; of the patrols dispatched, however, none came back. Just as little did I receive in the course of the afternoon from General Nagy-Sándor any explanation of the enigmatical occurrence.

Under these circumstances no satisfactory idea of the state of affairs at Debreczin was to be gained. The apprehension that the first corps had suffered a defeat was contradicted by General Nagy-Sándor's *previous* silence. A hostile advance from Újváros against Debreczin could not have remained undiscovered in broad daylight; and General Nagy-Sándor was not the man to consider a menacing hostile movement as unworthy of speaking about: he had hitherto always seen before him too many enemies, never too few, and at no time omitted in cases of danger threatening to ask very assiduously for further orders how to act.

The hope of news of victory, however, was contradicted by Nagy-Sándor's *subsequent* silence. It was not like him to be so long in announcing his victory. It was much more in accordance with his personal peculiarity to assume that in consequence of a defeat, he

had become bewildered, and had forgotten his most urgent duty as leader of the flank-guard.

The non-return of the patrols of hussars sent towards Debreczin spoke equally for defeat and for victory. In the first case they might have perished; in the latter, for joy at the unexpected success of our arms, they might have located themselves in the first, best *csárda*, in a state of unfitness for service.

In this painful situation it seemed to me wisest to remain with the main body of the army at Vámos-Pércs till daybreak; for only here could I expect, till the appointed time, Nagy-Sándor's report, or the final return of one of the patrols sent towards Debreczin; and without knowing what had really become of General Nagy-Sándor and the first corps, I could not possibly change the dispositions for the march, projected beforehand and communicated to him — according to which the main body of the army was not to leave Vámos-Pércs till the 3d of August — without apprehending that the derangement, which perhaps already existed in the combined movements of the main body and the flank-guard, might possibly be increased.

The advance of the main body from Vámos-Pércs towards Debreczin would have been the least appropriate measure I could have taken either *during* the cannonading or *after* it. The twofold strategic object at which I had been steadily aiming since our departure from the position on the Hernád (namely, to gain betimes the river Berettyó, and to preserve the army from heavy losses), I believed was attainable only by avoiding as far as possible any encounter with the Russians on the territory between the Berettyó and the Theiss — not by seeking for one. Starting from this conviction, I

had distinctly forbidden General Nagy-Sándor to accept any critical combat whatever.

If he had attended to this prohibition, then it was a victory he had just gained — probably over a weak hostile column which had approached separately — and the whole affair was quite in order, except the uncertainty in which I remained respecting it. But if he had not attended to this prohibition, then, considering his well-known want of decision in independent situations when before the enemy, it might be only the consequence of some neglect of which he had been guilty as leader of the flank-guard, and in that case I was likewise without any means of judging to what extent he had infringed my express prohibition; then it might as well have been 50,000 as 15,000 Russians by which he had been taken by surprise; then the main body, although it had set out for Debreczin at the beginning of the cannonading, might not only have arrived too late to prevent the first corps from being defeated, but it might even have exposed itself to the very danger from which it intended to save the first corps. In order to undertake this movement with the main body, under these circumstances, during the cannonading, I should have had to give up first of all the nearest strategic objects, which I had hitherto aimed at, or to convince myself that they could afterwards be attained.

But after the sudden cessation of the cannonading there was no motive for this movement of the main body. For if General Nagy-Sándor had conquered, then the main body was superfluous at Debreczin; if he had taken to flight, then an advance of the main body towards Debreczin would only cause its separation from the flank-guard, and, moreover, the loss of

the last possibility of reaching the Berettyó before the Russians.

I consequently resolved to maintain the point Vámos-Pércs till daybreak of the 3d of August, in case I should not sooner receive news from the flank-guard.

At last, shortly before the time fixed, a report reached the head-quarters at Vámos-Pércs. The chief of the general staff of the first corps announced from Berettyó-Újfalu, that General Nagy-Sándor, in consequence of an overpowering attack, had been obliged to retreat from Debreczin as far as Berettyó-Újfalu.

The main body consequently started without delay for Nagy-Léta; halted there at midday; and the same day, 3d of August, continued its march — - which, in default of the flank-guard, was flanked by small detachments of hussars — as far as Kis-Marja.

Now if General Nagy-Sándor, conformably to the dispositions, remained with his corps behind Berettyó-Újfalu on the Berettyó *à cheval* of the road to Gross-Wardein, and had not suffered any considerable losses at Debreczin, of which I was still uninformed, then the untoward occurrence of the preceding evening was really much less serious in its consequences than I had at first feared.

Soon after my arrival at Kis-Marja, however, I learned that General Nagy-Sándor had already deemed it necessary to give up even the line of the Berettyó, and to retreat uninterruptedly further on towards Gross-Wardein. At the same time I received some authentic indications of the disordered state of his corps. He had quite lost a great part of his artillery, which, wandering about in the district through which the main body was marching, had fortunately been discovered by its patrols.

I now saw that, under these circumstances, I must abandon the idea of interrupting the southern advance of the Russian main army on the Berettyó, the course of which, moreover, in the dry season — as was evident — hinders the communication only on some points. After General Nagy-Sándor had retreated in the course of the day from Berettyó-Újfalu (if I remember rightly) as far as Mező-Keresztes, and as I could not conceive but that this had been done in consequence of the Russians vehemently pressing after him; I considered it dangerous for the main body to stay longer at Kis-Marja, because thereby the Russians would be enabled, considering Nagy-Sándor's anticipated unenergetic resistance, to reach Gross-Wardein before the main body of our army, and thus cut off its further retreat to the Banat.

I accordingly moved the main body, during the night between the 3d and 4th of August, from Kis-Marja towards Bihar, in order to be able to reach Gross-Wardein with it in the course of the 4th, should it prove necessary.

I learned, however, in Bihar, that the first Russian patrols had not pressed further on in the evening of the 3d than Berettyó-Újfalu; so that General Nagy-Sándor had no reason whatever for retreating in the morning of that day from Mező-Keresztes. Just as little reason was there now to force the main body — which, in consequence of Nagy-Sándor's senseless retreat, had been obliged to march from daybreak till late in the morning of the 4th of August, a distance of seven miles — on the same day two miles further on to Gross-Wardein. It did not, therefore, arrive at that place till the day after, when it joined the flank-guard, the remnants of the first corps, which had meanwhile been re-assembled.

With good reason I may be asked, how I came to tolerate General Nagy-Sándor, in spite of his negligent conduct before Waizen, where, in the night between the 16th and 17th of July, when departing from the camp, he had taken with him the outposts contrary to my express order, and had thereby rendered possible the hostile surprise which ensued; — in spite of the serious violation of duty of which he was guilty as commander of the rear-guard on the 18th and in the night between the 18th and 19th of July, in compelling the main body of the army to an uninterrupted continuance of the retreat, commencing from Balassa-Gyarmat, not only so long as the Russians were hotly following, but even after this had ceased to be the case — instead of securing the possibility of the rest absolutely indispensable, as constantly as Generals Leiningen and Póltenberg had done before him — until he was forced at last by his comrades to halt at Ráros, and occupy the defile there, which could easily be defended, but which he nevertheless abandoned in wild disorder during the night, though he had not been attacked, and thereby placed the whole army in a condition in which its further existence might have been jeopardised even by a single patrol of Cossacks; — in spite of the defeat which he had brought upon his corps at Debreczin by disregarding my prohibition against engaging in any doubtful contest with the superior enemy; — finally, in spite of the senseless retreat as far as Mezo-Keresztes, by which this defeat was followed: — how I came, in spite of all these striking proofs of manifold incapacity, still to tolerate General Nagy-Sándor in the army; this question may certainly with good reason be put to me, who at one time proceeded with such an iron severity

against the commanders of corps, Colonel Asbóth and General Knézich; to me, who in general, during my official life, had not known how to gain for myself the honey-sweet surname of the "mild" and "indulgent."

This question may find an answer in the following:

None of these events, except one, had occurred immediately under my own eye. The explanations of them which I subsequently received — according to the source whence they came — were not unessentially different from each other; their true nature could therefore by no means positively be placed beyond all doubt in a *summary way*. Moreover General Nagy-Sándor knew how to exculpate himself from the most important part of the blame with which he was charged in these cases, by always alleging some circumstances the credibility of which could not be contested.

In this manner he excused his retreat to Mező-Keresztes (on the 3d of August) by the low moral condition of his troops; which could the less be denied, as a part of the officers of the first corps fled from the scene at Debreczin in an uninterrupted course as far as Gross-Wardein, one other part still further, — as I afterwards learned, as far as Arad.

In like manner he excused the fact, that on the 2d of August at Debreczin he had not avoided the superior attack of the Russians, by enumerating circumstances which implicated exclusively the commander of his troops for security advanced from the camp at Debreczin towards Újváros. He was certainly obliged to admit that he had been surprised by the Russians in broad midday; but he could also detail the measures he had taken to prevent such a surprise, and could prove that the insufficiency of these measures was not to be

ascribed to him. He could, it is true, scarcely deny that the hostile attack had not found him in the place of honour in front of his corps, but in the place of honour at a patriotic banquet, which had been given to him and the body of his officers by the gentry of the city of Debreczin; but in answer to this he could very aptly remark, that the hostile attack would most certainly not have found him at the banquet, but in front of his corps, if the commander of the troops for security had fulfilled his duty.

In the same way he excused his flight from Ráros, representing it as a necessity forced upon him by the confusion, which most enigmatically suddenly prevailed among his troops and throughout the mass, to such a degree, that, among others, almost all the cavalry and draught-horses had run away at one time, as if they were mad; in consequence of which he was obliged, in order *to* pursue with his whole corps the runaway horses, to evacuate without delay the position he had taken up for the maintenance of the defile at Ráros. In these circumstances it was no small merit in him, that he had not had the draught-horses unyoked. Thus at least the horses could not run away without removing from the danger threatening from the enemy the whole artillery of the first corps. From the danger threatening from the enemy?! — doubtless; for General Nagy-Sándor originally justified his flight by maintaining that he had already been turned in his position at Ráros by the Russians; and only when the untenableness of that assertion had been proved by the simultaneous cessation of the hostile pursuit, he thought that not Cossacks but wolves might have been the enemy by which he imagined he had been turned and surprised in the night.

In the face of this incertitude on the part of Nagy-Sándor in indicating the danger which had impelled him to that most disastrous nightly flight, the necessity for it was indeed not sufficiently established, and it had undeniably the appearance as if in the night between the 18th and 19th of July General Nagy-Sándor's heart had sunk far below the level of manliness; the circumstance, however, that during that night more than a hundred hussars' horses, belonging to the first corps, had been lost, furnished an irrefragable proof of the boundless confusion which must have prevailed among the troops of the first corps; and General Nagy-Sándor asserted, that he had left no means untried for putting a stop to the ever-widening dispersion of his corps; that he had at last been forced to continue the retreat during the night, in order to keep his corps in some measure together; the former assertion, that his position at Ráros had been turned by the Russians, as well as the latter one, that his camp had been alarmed by wolves, he had not brought forward in justification of the flight, but as an excuse for his troops — and so forth.

In this manner he excused the fact, that in the course of the 18th of July, after he had succeeded General Pöntenberg in the rear-guard service at Balassa-Gyarmat, he had not in a single instance checked the hostile pursuit by the employment of all his power — as it was his duty to do — this fact he excused from the enormous superiority of the hostile forces pressing on closely after him.

Neither here, nor at Ráros, nor at Debreczin, nor finally in the flight to Mezö-Keresztes, had I been personally present; a direct knowledge of the circumstances of the moment was consequently wanting to me, so that

I could not judge of the responsibility of Nagy-Sándor, dependent thereon, for those acts of his, the consequences of which seemed nevertheless to deny that he was competent for the important post of a commander of corps.

Quite different had been the case with the two commanders of corps Knézich and Asbóth (before Pered on the 20th of June). There the conditions for an instant penal proceeding certainly existed: on my part, a direct perception of the matter on the spot; on the part of those liable to penalty, an absolute impossibility of laying the blame on others.

In order to be so circumstantially informed of the amount of Nagy-Sándor's blame in the disasters enumerated, as was needed for pronouncing a sentence with full conviction of its justice, I must have instituted a legal inquiry. For this there was evidently neither time nor opportunity.

I could have put in force the summary penal proceeding against Nagy-Sándor only in the one instance at Waizen: here there was no excuse. I had made him personally responsible for leaving behind the outposts established in front of the range of his camp. The outposts nevertheless departed. He could not possibly throw the responsibility of this upon any other person. And indeed it may appear as if I had been guilty of remarkable weakness in favour of General Nagy-Sándor, in intrusting him, in spite of this disobedience, any longer with the guidance of an army corps under such uncommonly critical circumstances as ours then were. I had, however, good reasons for this measure.

That General Nagy-Sándor was the least competent

among the commanders of corps belonging to the army under my command, was certainly no secret to me long before the days at Waizen. But just as little was it unknown to me that the appointment of one of its chiefs of division to the post of commander of the first corps gave still less ground for hope than did the allowing Nagy-Sándor to continue in the post already confided to him. Consequently, in order to intrust the first corps to an undoubtedly more skilful guidance, I should have been obliged to appoint one of the chiefs of division of the third or seventh corps in the place of General Nagy-Sándor: from this experiment, however, I was decidedly dissuaded by my sad experience, on the 21st of June, at Pered, with the second corps, in consequence of a similar measure. After this experience, it appeared to me, in our desperate situation before Waizen, to be more advisable to retain to the first corps its old commander, though of little capacity, than to give to it instantly a new, even if undoubtedly a more skilful one, who, equally unacquainted with the peculiar spirit of the corps in general, as with that of every separate subdivision in particular, might, it is true, guard against tactic, though not against disciplinary mistakes: but in critical cases (I speak here from my own experience) disciplinary mistakes in a commander are mostly far more dangerous than tactic ones.

Consequently when, notwithstanding General Nagy-Sándor's indifferent trustworthiness and other fitness for the command committed to him, I did not remove him from it at Waizen, I yielded merely to the pressure of present circumstances, under the feeling that this measure, proportionately the least in its effects, would be the less disadvantageous, as I was at the same time de-

terminated in future personally to control him in the fulfilment of important missions. The physical condition in which the consequences of my strenuous personal participation in the events at Waizen placed me unfortunately rendered the carrying out of this latter determination impossible.

Great were the material losses which the first corps sustained on the 2d of August at Debreczin — far greater still the moral ones. Taking into account the latter, I could not possibly any longer tranquilly intrust General Nagy-Sándor with the protective service during the further retreat.

The first corps had accordingly to set out first from Gross-Wardein towards Arad, on the 6th of August; with the third and seventh corps, however, I intended to remain during the day at Gross-Wardein, that General Nagy-Sándor, with the first corps, might gain an advance of one day's march, and thereby, being removed out of danger from the enemy, get a few days' rest, which, in my opinion, both himself and his corps needed, that they might in some degree recover from the discouragement under which they were evidently labouring in consequence of the defeat at Debreczin.

However, in the forenoon of the 5th of August, in Gross-Wardein, I received a decree of the war-minister General Aulich, from which I concluded that Lieut.-General Dembinski had not assumed the offensive against the army under Baron Haynau — as I had been led to suppose by the earlier news from Szegedin — but, on the contrary, had already, on the first of August, given up the right and confined himself to the defence of the left bank of the Theiss; further, that I must now accelerate my retreat all I could, without

heeding the Russian main army, and at the same time inform the government beforehand on what day the army under my command would reach Arad.

This decree decided me to have the first corps start from Gross-Wardein towards Arad in the course of the 5th, the third and seventh on the 6th of August. Without delay I sent to the war-minister the information that one-third of the army would arrive at Arad on the 10th, the remainder on the 11th.

On the retreat from Gross-Wardein to Arad, I received a second decree of the war-ministry, the substance of which was, that Lieut.-General Dembinski had already given up likewise the left bank of the Theiss, and had been ordered to retreat towards Arad, where the junction was to take place between his army and mine. I had consequently to expedite my march in such a manner as to reach Arad at least with one part of it by the 9th.

In compliance with this decree, I contracted the still remaining stations in such a manner that General Nagy-Sándor with the first corps arrived at Arad on the 9th, the third and seventh corps on the 10th of August.

CHAPTER XXIX.

IN order not to confuse the account of the retreat from the Hernád to Arad, it was necessary to pass over in silence, in the preceding chapter, several simultaneous circumstances, rumours, and events, which, how-

ever, had exerted no influence on the progress of the campaign.

But before giving a supplementary relation of these circumstances, rumours, and events, I must point out my personal position to the army under my command, as well as to Kossuth and his political partisans and adversaries in the country.

The reader knows that during the last days in Komorn I had found by experience that my conviction of the impossibility of saving Hungary, and my consequent perception that our next patriotic duty was to terminate alike quickly and honourably the hopeless combat, were *not* shared by the majority of the coryphei of our main army when it was still assembled there. Nevertheless, by means of a decision of a military council, I had attempted — as has been stated in relating the last occurrences at Komorn in Chapter xx. — to oblige the main army to fulfil this duty: it is likewise known that I was unsuccessful therein — that the decision of the military council of the 6th of July limited my proposal (the main army to remain at Komorn and attack the Austrians), by accepting Klapka's amendment (after the attempt at breaking through the position of the Austrians — whether successful or not — the junction of the greater part of our main army with the government and the forces about concentrating themselves in the south of the country, to be fixed on as the next operation); — further, that the majority of the military council had not even been in earnest about the experimental *one* attack on the position of the Austrians; and that on the following day, without my previous knowledge, the departure of the army on the left bank of the Danube had been commenced; that in consequence of this I had resigned

the command, but, at the request of the deputies of the army, had promised to resume it, on condition that the attack on the forces of Baron Haynau, resolved upon in the military council, was put in execution; — finally, that notwithstanding the negative result of this attack, made on the 11 th of July under General Klapka's chief command, I was by no means released from my word of honour, given to the deputies of the army, to resume the command, and now (in the sense of the same decision of the military council, the carrying out of which I had made the condition of my resuming the command) to lead the greater part of the army — in spite of my openly expressed conviction of the forlorn hope of this measure — on the left bank of the Danube to join the government and the forces to be concentrated in the south of the country.

My position as commander-in-chief was consequently guaranteed not by the authority of the provisional government, but, on the contrary, in open opposition to it, solely and exclusively by the confidence of the army in my person, — a confidence, however, which could not be founded on any kind of hope for salvation directly or indirectly excited or fostered by me.

After the departure from Komorn I remained passive in my behaviour towards Kossuth and his partisans; and when the provisional head of the country nevertheless felt moved to agitate against me even in his public speeches, I considered this to be nothing more than the after-pains of the terror which might have seized upon him in consequence of the well-known invitation to Komorn.

With Kossuth's adversaries external to the army under my command I had no connexion whatever; his

opponents present with the army were my subordinates, they *must* remain passive, and they did so. That declaration, which had been dictated to me by the army as the answer to the Russian summons to lay down our arms, had indeed the serious significance of an aggression against Kossuth; but was of no avail so long as the champions of the constitutional-monarchical principle, as well as the partisans of the unexpressed form of government (of the 14th of April), were forced by the dangerous superiority of the common external enemy to a *reciprocal toleration*. Besides, Kossuth's astonishment at this declaration of the army was certainly more than naive; since he could not possibly have forgotten that the main army had never thought of making him happy by an address of homage.

More than what precedes, relative to my position as respected the army, Kossuth, his opponents and partisans, during the retreat from Komorn to the Hernád, had not become clear to me.

I shall now proceed to throw some light upon those circumstances, rumours, and events, which, as belonging to the period of our sojourn on the Hernád and the further retreat to Arad, exerted no influence on the movements of the army I commanded, and were passed over in silence in the last chapter.

Kossuth's enigmatical reconciliatory private letter, already mentioned, and the official invitation to the proposed rendezvous in Kardszag or Kis-Ujszállás, did not long remain without a commentary: rumours from Szegedin spoke of a general discontent with the services of the chief command Mézsáros-Dembinski, and of lively sympathies, which, in spite of Kossuth's agitations against me, declared themselves now suddenly for

my nomination as commander-in-chief of all the forces. Moreover I received almost at the same time a private letter from the first minister, Bartholomäus von Szemere, in which he gave me to understand that now was the favourable moment to overthrow Kossuth, and that if I liked I might share the supreme power with him (Szemere).

The origin of Kossuth's enigmatical reconciliatory letter to me appeared accordingly to have been as follows:

Kossuth, indirectly accused by public opinion of having done something injurious to the national cause by creating the chief command Mészáros-Dembinski, might have felt the necessity of preventing at any cost the indirect public accusation from being changed into a direct one, perhaps already menacing to become so.

The appropriate means for doing this — if the rumours about the change of the general sympathy in my favour were correct — could truly be no other than a comedy of reconciliation with the new favourite of the public, arranged by Kossuth himself. But that there must be something in the rumoured change of the public opinion, of this Szemere's above-mentioned letter furnished me with a proof which was scarcely to be doubted. Szemere's personal hostility to Kossuth was no secret to me; at least, from the malevolent manner in which Szemere always spoke of Kossuth whenever chance had brought us to a *tête-à-tête*, I could not do other than conclude that he was less a political than a *personal* adversary of the provisional head of the country; — and the circumstance that Szemere, whom my always equally reserved behaviour towards him could by no means have authorised to suppose that he had

succeeded in gaining my esteem, much less my confidence, — that Szemere, who could not possibly have already forgotten the useless efforts made by him, during the honeymoon of his nascent republic, to gain me to a *liaison* against Kossuth, — that Szemere thought now was the proper time to venture again on an attempt at this *liaison*; — this circumstance certainly could not be explained otherwise than by admitting that the rumours about the lively sympathy of the public opinion for me were supported by facts.

The authentic confirmation of these rumours, however, I received first from the communications of a representative, who, coming from Szegedin, arrived at Nagy-Kálló on the very same day as that on which I reached it with the main body of the army. This was on the 31st of July.

These communications were to the effect, that the majority of the Diet had proposed to the provisional government to transfer to me the chief command over all the troops; and an affirmative answer had thereupon been given to the Diet by Szemere, in the name of the provisional government. But at the same time I learned from this representative that on the 28th of July the Diet had determined on a dissolution for an indefinite period, and that the majority of the representatives had in fact already left Szegedin to join my head-quarters.

I thought that I perceived in the proposal of the majority of the Diet the influence of the peace-party. But as, notwithstanding the pressure of circumstances, *my* nomination as commander-in-chief had not yet taken place, I could not but doubt the sincerity of the answer which Szemere had given to the Diet in the name of the provisional government. This doubt I believed I ought

the less to conceal from the representative, by whom the communications in question had orally been made to me, as his other declarations shewed me that he and the majority of his colleagues had formed no small expectations from my nomination as commander-in-chief. This doubt, however, was not felt by the representative. With no less confidence than himself, his colleagues also might have received Szemere's official answer; and thus the rumour that the provisional government had already transferred to me the chief command over all the troops, together with all the expectations connected with it, were soon generally spread, and seemed, moreover, to be justified by the simultaneous journey of two members of the provisional government to the camp of the army under my command.

These members of the government were Szemere and the minister of the exterior, Count Kasimir Batthyányi. They arrived on the 1st of August at my head-quarters in Nyir-Adony. The first opportunity, however, I gave them of holding a conference with me was at Vámos-Pércs (the next station), in the afternoon of the following day. For I thought it a punishment quite appropriate to Szemere's above-mentioned letter to overlook him in a marked manner for a time, and thus expose him to the sarcasms of the officers present at the head-quarters.

Count Batthyányi, as Szemere's companion, had accordingly to suffer with him; but I had intended the punishment for the latter alone. For in order intentionally to expose the minister of the exterior to the treatment which his colleague Szemere received in the head-quarters, I should have wanted beforehand positive reasons (which I in fact had not) for supposing that he

was privy to Szemere's letter, or that he perhaps even agreed with it.

Of the official significance of the sudden arrival of both ministers at the head-quarters I had not at first been informed. That the object of this mission was my nomination as commander-in-chief, as had been generally supposed, appeared to me highly improbable, considering the *entente peu cordiale* between myself and the provisional government, now relieved of the Diet. But, on the contrary, I did not for a moment doubt that Szemere had not come without the positive intention of sounding the effect of his private letter, and accomplishing, if possible, in the shortest way the league Szemere-Gbrgei *contra* Kossuth, covertly projected in this letter; and Szemere did not at all allow himself to be deterred, by the sarcasms of those surrounding me, from confirming this opinion about the personal object of his arrival at the head-quarters: — the first question he addressed to me at Vámos-Pércs, on the occasion of an accidental *tête-à-tête*, was in fact, *whether I had received his letter*.

This *tête-à-tête* between myself and Szemere was brought about contrary to my intention, when I conducted both ministers to my room — at last acceding, on the afternoon of the 2d of August, to their desire for a conference with me — and Count Batthyányi, as if by chance, stopped behind some minutes, leaving me alone with Szemere.

Shortly before, the cannonading, which indicated to us in Vámos-Pércs the attack of the Russians on our flank-guard at Debreczin, had ominously suddenly again ceased, and I was in consequence very restless.

In a more favourable disposition of mind I could

hardly have resisted the temptation to ridicule the truly rare confidence with which Szemere had put this question to me, in spite of the treatment, any thing but inviting, which he had just met with from me and those about me. The painful incertitude, however, in which I was as to the issue of the conflict at Debreczin, saved Szemere from a new well-merited chastisement.

After having simply answered in the affirmative his question (whether I had received his letter), I thwarted Szemere's probable intention of questioning me still further relative to its contents and tendency, by a quick counter-question about the rumour of my nomination as commander-in-chief of all the troops. For this Szemere might not have been quite prepared; since he at first asserted, that the cause of this rumour was altogether unknown to him; and after I had told him what I had learnt about it on the 31st of July at Nagy-Kálló, he admitted that the choice of me as commander-in-chief had in fact been spoken of in the Diet, but declared as wholly without foundation the rumour that a motion had been made by the Diet concerning this choice, as well as that an affirmative answer had been given by him in the government's name.

At that moment Count Batthyányi interrupted the *tête-à-tête*; and I now learnt the real object of the official mission on which the two ministers had been sent by the provisional government.

This was no other than to make use of the last means for the salvation of the formless State of Hungary, independent of Austria (dating from Debreczin the 14th of April 1849), that is, to offer the crown of Hungary to the dynasty of Romanow.

The reader — from what has hitherto been communi-

cated of my life and acts — might perhaps be of opinion that my proposal in the ministerial council of the 26th of June (if possible only to negotiate with the Russians, but to attack the Austrians simultaneously with all the forces at our disposal) was the origin of this last idea of salvation.

This opinion, however, would be contradicted by a circumstance which has not yet been mentioned, namely, that Kossuth, long before the 14th of April 1849, consoled those who even then despaired of the salvation of the country with the assurance that he had already entered into diplomatic negotiations abroad, having for their object, that in the worst case the Duke of Leuchtenberg should ascend the throne of Hungary, binding himself to govern constitutionally, under the protectorate of Russia.

It might indeed be answered to this, that the Russian intervention and the official crusade-sermon against it existed as *faits accomplis* between the time in which the honour was conferred on the Duke of Leuchtenberg of serving Kossuth as a last resource, and the day on which Szemere and Count Batthyányi were charged with the said mission, — that consequently Kossuth's parading of his foreign diplomatic connections was doubtless nothing more than one of those numerous impostures by which he thought it necessary often to degrade himself so remarkably in the interest of "the liberation of Europe." Against this conclusion I certainly could not make any weighty objection.

But I should nevertheless be obliged to deny the correctness of the supposition that the provisional government had been led to that idea, which was now about being realised by the two ministers Szemere and

Count Batthyányi, by my proposal in the ministerial council of the 26th of June; for if the provisional government had hit upon this idea on the 26th of June in consequence of my proposal — moreover by a quite illogical and arbitrary interpretation of it, — then this circumstance could not possibly have remained a whole month without producing the least real consequence: such a consequence, however, exists nowhere in the acts of the provisional government during the interval of time from the 26th of June to the end of July 1849.

To judge by the experience I had acquired relative to the manner of thinking and acting of Kossuth and Szemere (the two members of the provisional government most eminent by position and influence), the ministerial decision, dating from the last days of July, in consequence of which Szemere and Count Batthyányi suddenly emerged in my immediate vicinity with the well-known mission, was brought about by the co-operation of the following circumstances:

1. At the end of July even Kossuth and Szemere's hopes of a favourable result from Dembinski's offensive operations — intended against the Austrians, as was said — began gradually to fail: a proof of this was the undisguised way in which Kossuth agreed, in his private letter to me, in my unfavourable judgment on the chief command Dembinski-Mészáros.

2. The provisional government received about the same time, in quick succession, my reports —

- a) on the summons to lay down our arms made by the Russians to me, and my reply thereto;
- b) on the breaking through the line of operation of the Russian main army by the three army corps acting under my orders, already supposed to be

accomplished with the gaining of the line of the Sajó;

c) on the correspondence between the Russian Count Rüdiger and myself. This report — if I recollect rightly — was accompanied by a suggestion that two men, invested by the government with full power, should be sent into my immediate vicinity; or at least that it should be told me what I was to do, in case my answer to the letter of the Count should be followed by the Russians proposing some conditions of peace.

3. Simultaneously the well-known exchange of arms was rumoured abroad in Szegedin. The importance of this act was exaggerated. I was said to be already on the best terms with the Russians; their negotiators were continually moving to and fro in my head-quarters; the officers of the army under my command were fraternising with those of the Russian army; the war was continued only for form's sake, as it were, and peace between Hungary and Russia would have been made long ago if the government had allowed me to act as I liked; with the government, however, the Russians would have nothing to do; the salvation of the country was conceivable only in a peaceable way and only through me; for only with me — the undisguised opponent of the declaration of independence of the 14th of April 1849 — would the Austrians as well as the Russians treat; and so on.

Deceived in the expectations which Lieut.-General Dembinski, as a general, had been appointed to justify; and well knowing the depressed condition in which Field-marshal Lieut. Bem was in Transylvania — consequently without the hope of continuing to maintain

himself in the Banat even defensively, much less of offensively breaking out of it; not less well informed of the numerical superiority of the Russian main army over the forces united under my command, and although inexhaustible in projecting plans of war-operations calculated infallibly to destroy the Austrians as well as the Russians, yet doubtful himself of their practicability; in the midst of this comfortless situation surprised by the letter of the commander of the Russian corps, Count Rüdiger, to me, and considering it to be nothing less than an indubitable proof that the Russians were seriously thinking about concluding a profitable peace with Hungary separately; fully confirmed in this supposition by the rumours enumerated under point 3, nay by these rumours even induced to suspect that I intended to come to an agreement with the Russians on my own account, and to leave the provisional government shelterless; finally, not quite secure also against the twofold illusion, that Hungary was certainly still to be saved by negotiations, but that the enemy would treat only with me; and thus, on the one hand, urged by the public opinion to the way of pacification, supposed to be open; on the other, fearing to become shelterless, in case the negotiations, which were said to be in the best train, should in future be left *to me alone*; — Kossuth, supported by Szemere, was determined to take into his own hands the negotiations with the Russians, and in case of necessity even to sacrifice the crown of St. Stephen; for only by offering *more* than I could do (the crown not being in my possession), could Kossuth and Szemere hope to induce the Russians to make peace with *them* (Kossuth and Szemere, that is, the provisional government), not with me.

This determination, consequently, could not have been long and maturely considered; we can conceive and judge of it only as come to in despair; especially as Kossuth must thereby involve himself in most critical situations as regarded the Poles — his exclusive fellow-champions for "the freedom of Europe." This dangerous consequence also had by no means been overlooked by Kossuth; and principally to avoid disagreeable collisions with the Poles, the real object of the official mission (Szemere and Count Batthyányi's into my immediate vicinity) was kept secret. But as the mission itself could not possibly remain unknown, Kossuth had it rumoured that Szemere and Count Batthyányi conveyed to me the nomination of general-in-chief of all the Hungarian forces. This device had moreover the advantage, that it thereby seemed as if the growing public sympathies for my person, as well as the rumoured pretensions of the Szegedin population (to give me full authority in the "saving" negotiations with the Russians) had, been respected, and consequently that the suppressed spirit of the people could again in some measure raise itself; an advantage, to gain which Kossuth, it is well known, shunned scarcely any means. That the rumours about my nomination as generalissimo, as well as about my being now free to treat according to my own judgment for peace with the Russians, must unavoidably expose him to the danger of coming into conflict with the Poles (thanks to the small sympathy I had hitherto shewn for them), — this Kossuth had not to fear so long as Lieut.-General Dembinski and Field-marshal Lieut. Bem received no orders from me — so long as he (Kossuth) kept *in petto* the real nomination of Field-marshal Lieut. Bern as commander-

in-chief of all the troops in Hungary and Transylvania, and with it the infallible means for convincing the Poles, at any moment, of his faithfulness towards them — and so long as he secured to himself, by keeping secret the real object of Szemere and Count Batthyányi's mission, the possibility of inducing those Poles, who might be rendered suspicious by these rumours, to believe that Szemere and Count Batthyányi had been sent to me only to prevent intended treachery on my part, and consequently as guardians, as it were, of "the freedom of Europe." With all this, however, it is not yet explained, how Kossuth could calculate on reaping advantage from the negotiations with Russia, without in the end *nevertheless* exposing the Poles, and with them "the freedom of Europe." And for this very reason we must assume that his determination — to offer the crown of Hungary to the dynasty of Romanow, with the simultaneous project (afterwards really executed, as we shall see) of entrusting to a Pole the chief command over all the Hungarian armies — had been formed in the delirium of sudden despair and absolutely without reflection.

By this I do not mean to say that I had wholly abandoned the idea of treating with the Russians for peace. On the contrary, I even now acknowledge this idea — if it could have been realised — to have been the only one from which, under the then existing circumstances, none of the parties armed in the country against Austria would have dissented.

For the partisans and defenders of the law sanctioned by the King, the overthrow of which was the real object of Austria — for the sole party in the country which had any thing positive to lose — it could

scarcely be difficult to make choice between Russian sovereignty and privileged incorporation with Austria, as soon as they considered that Russia, if it thought seriously of acquiring Hungary, must necessarily also intend to retain it in her possession.

The party of the "unexpressed form of government" had nothing to lose, not even a principle — as their title indeed betrays — unless it were that of being independent of Austria; and this principle, they might be certain, remained intact to them under Russia's sovereignty.

The true republicans, finally, could only gain in wide and ample Russia what they had in Hungary — a missionary sphere of action.

For the Poles indeed it must have been difficult to choose between Austria and Russia: "the freedom of Europe" here as well as there was given up! But what the Poles did, after Russia did not make peace, they could just as well have done in the contrary case. Besides, I was speaking above only of those parties who inhabited the country. And so long as the facts — that my name suddenly began again to become popular after the appeal to the constitution of the country of the year 1848 had been dictated to me by the army under my command, as an answer to the Russian summons to lay down our arms, and this document, together with the letter of Count Rüdiger, and the exchange of arms, had become publicly known; further, that Kossuth personally had come to the determination, not perhaps to accede to the proposal of the Russians, but himself to make proposals to them; finally, that Szemere personally carried out this determination, without either himself or Kossuth having been disavowed for this act

by the parties of the "republic" or of the "unexpressed form of government;" — so long as these facts are not refuted, I must adhere to the declaration, that the idea of treating for peace with Russia — if it could have been realised — was, under all the then existing conjunctures, the sole saving one, and as such recognised by all parties in the country which shared in the combat against Austria.

This idea, however, could *not* be realised so long as the Russians only desired us to lay down our arms, but made no proposals for peace; and I certainly cannot compliment Kossuth and Szemere for overlooking this circumstance.

The first conference with Szemere and Count Batthyányi at Vámos-Pércs, which betrayed to me the already formed resolution of the provisional government to give even the crown of Hungary for peace with Russia, was in substance as follows:

Szemere, the real actor in the mission (Count Batthyányi's co-operation seemed to be confined to that of translator) began by asking how far I had already got in my negotiations with the Russians.

I replied, that this could not be unknown to the government, seeing I had sent it a copy of the correspondence between Count Rüdiger and myself.

But since then, said Szemere, I had, as the government had learnt, repeatedly exchanged trumpets with the Russians.

As I thought that Szemere, in the presence of his colleague, stood no longer before *me* as Kossuth's artful rival, but as the organ of the government, I took very seriously this question betraying distrust, and indeed considered the whole conference to be strictly official;

and endeavoured (as I certainly should not have done if I had had a contrary opinion of the significance of the meeting) circumstantially to explain to the ministers the estimate to be formed of the reports of my "having repeatedly exchanged trumpets" with the Russians, if the government did not wish to give way to silly illusions. I assured the ministers that I had come in contact with no Russian trumpet, except in the known instance at Rimaszombat; that the pistols of Lieut.-General Sass and Colonel Chrulow had been brought to me by our own trumpets — the same as had gone from Sajó-Szent-Péter to the next Russian camp with our answer to the proposal to lay down our arms; that my second sending of trumpets to the commanders of the Russian advanced troops had for its object solely to enable me to make the return demanded by their chivalric courtesy; that consequently those reports of my "having repeatedly exchanged trumpets" with the Russians could only refer to the fact — not known to myself till afterwards, and which certainly redounded to his honour — that Count Leiningen, as conqueror of Gesztely (on the 28th of July), had permitted the trumpet, whom the Russians had sent to him out of subsequent anxiety about the fate of their wounded men whom they had left behind on the field of battle, to convince himself personally of the conscientiousness with which these unfortunates had already received from our worthy surgeons such attention as was necessary.

Szemere now further inquired, whether it did not seem to me nevertheless that the Russians were not disinclined to enter in earnest into negotiations with us, and that offers of peace were to be expected from them.

To this I answered, that I had not yet formed any

opinion on the diplomatic speculations of the Russians; but that thus much the provisional government might consider certain, that if the Russians had felt a desire to make peace with us, they would hardly have left my answer to Count Rüdiger, inviting them thereto, without a reply, as was really the case; that consequently the provisional government would wait in vain for a proposal of peace from the Russians; that if the provisional government wished to negotiate, or at least convince itself whether the Russians had any inclination thereto or not, it must itself take the initiative, with a proposal of conditions of peace clearly and distinctly expressed.

Szemere in consequence resolved immediately to draw up a letter to Prince Paszkiewicz, and hand it to me to be forwarded to the Russian camp.

Late in the evening of the 4th of August, in the station at Bihar, a single Russian officer (Lieutenant Miloradowicz) arrived at the head-quarters, as trumpet, sent by Prince Paszkiewicz, with the double commission to furnish the Russian officers who were our prisoners with the money necessary for their more suitable maintenance, — and to return to me those arms which I had sent to the camp of the Russian corps posted at Miskolcz on the 26th of July, as counter-presents for Lieut.-General Sass and Colonel Chrulow.

Prince Paszkiewicz — so the trumpet declared — deemed it inadmissible to permit his generals and officers, in the face of the alliance existing between Russia and Austria, to accept presents from the enemies of the latter.

To this I replied, that in my present position I deemed it not less inadmissible to accept presents for which I

could make no return; that consequently Lieutenant Miloradowicz would have the goodness forthwith to receive the arms which had been sent to me in the form of presents by Lieut.-General Sass and Colonel Chrulow, and restore them to their former owners.

To do this — the trumpet said — was opposed to his notions of honour; and he preferred, on his own responsibility, to go back with my counter-presents sent for Lieut.-General Sass and Colonel Chrulow, and report what I had said — consequently without accomplishing his mission.

And thus this matter ended. But in order to execute his first-mentioned commission, as the prisoners were escorted with the army-train, and it was stationed on the 4th of August at Gross-Wardein, the Russian trumpet had to go there: this was not practicable, however, that night, it being very dark in consequence of the rainy weather which had set in; he therefore remained for the night in Bihar, and was conducted to Gross-Wardein next morning.

Szemere and Count Batthyányi hastened thither, in advance, on the 4th of August, and had already completed the diplomatic letter to Prince Paszkiewicz when I arrived with the head-quarters and the Russian trumpet. Consequently the return of the latter to the Russian camp furnished an opportunity for sending this letter, with an introduction by me, to its destination.

In this introductory note the often-mentioned letter of Count Rüdiger was indicated as the occasion of this step being taken by the provisional government.

The contents of the letter made on me the impression of an open complaint against Austria, and a disguised invitation to Russia to take advantage of the se-

rious rupture between Austria and Hungary by making peace with the latter. Being asked by Szemere my opinion of the practical value of this letter, I remarked that it would hardly repay the trouble he had taken with the rough-draught. The Russians — thus I supported my unfavourable judgment — would most probably answer this invitation as they did that contained in my reply to Count Rüdiger — with silence only and an uninterrupted prosecution of their war-operations; but this seemed not to be sufficiently clear to the provisional government: it had consequently to expect no result whatever from this letter.

Now it is impossible for me to decide whether Szemere had been convinced by me; or had been induced to strive more energetically for the object of his mission, perhaps in consequence of General Nagy-Sándor's defeat at Debreczin, and of the news that Lieut.-General Dembinski had already given up Szegedin, as well as of the uninterrupted continuance of the retreat to Arad of the army under my command. The fact is, that he invited me again to a secret conference with him and his colleague on the evening of the next day (6th of August) in the station Gyapjú.

Szemere opened the conference by declaring, that, as I was decidedly of opinion that the Russians should be forthwith invited to negotiate, and at the same time conditions more advantageous to them be indicated — he had drawn up a new letter to Prince Paszkiewicz, and was desirous of having my judgment upon it.

By this introduction Szemere evidently acted as if he had been urged by me to repeat the attempt to enter into negotiations with Russia, and moreover as if the determination of the government, in virtue of which

Szemere had despatched the Gross-Wardein letter, and was about to follow it by a second, was in some manner a concession made to me personally.

The perception of this matured in me the resolution to make the ministers feel that I did not mistake the tendency of their mission, and at the same time shew them the folly of their endeavours. Beforehand, however, I let Szemere read without interruption the rough-draught of which he had just spoken. It was a paraphrase of those passages of the Gross-Wardein letter which had made upon me the impression of the conscious "disguised invitation to Russia." My judgment on the value of his paraphrase was similar to that which I had given on the Gross-Wardein letter.

Szemere, evidently piqued, now asked me what it was, then, that I wished to be said to the Russians.

Hereupon I declared to him, that I felt no need whatever to have any thing of the kind said to the Russians, because I was convinced they would not negotiate with us; and that even if I was not yet convinced of it, to be so would cost me only the slight trouble of fancying myself in the position of the Russian general. That with such a force as he had at his command, I at least would not negotiate; and that I had no reason to suppose the Russian under-estimated his superior force. It therefore lay with *the government* — not with me — to obtain a still more distinct answer than Nagy-Sándor's defeat at Debreczin to the question, whether there were, or were not, any terms on which Russia would make peace with Hungary; and consequently the government had *so* to put its question to the Russians, as that *no* answer would finally nevertheless be *one*. Let the government plainly offer to the Czar the crown of

Hungary; and even if no answer at all were given, thereto, it would assuredly not be able any longer to doubt of what it wished to convince itself.

Szemere thought, on the other hand, that it was not usual to express oneself so explicitly in a diplomatic document. Nevertheless he must admit that the rough-draught lying before us said too little. He would immediately alter it: I might meanwhile appoint the trumpets; in choosing which, care should be taken that both of them by their personal qualities authorised the hope of a favourable result from the mission entrusted to them. At least one of the trumpets, by his high rank, should give as it were a guarantee to the enemy that we were in earnest in the proposals of peace and the advantageous conditions offered. The other, again, should possess the necessary knowledge, and the corresponding talent as a speaker, to be able to give in the hostile camp the most thorough explanations upon the historical relation of rights between Hungary and Austria, and by contrasting it with recent events to place beyond doubt as well our right to take *any* step against Austria, as to shew the sincerity of our proposals to Russia.

In consequence of my undisguised declaration, which openly exposed the provisional government, I thought I must be prepared for a sudden breaking-off of the conference on the part of the ministers, as well as for a final abandonment of all further attempts at pacification. The striking proof which Szemere had now given me, contrary to all expectation, of the diametrically opposite effect of the utterance of my sentiments, surprised me consequently to such a degree, that I could not forbear answering to the just-received instructions about the qualities desirable in the trumpets, by proposing

that Szemere himself should start as trumpet with the new letter to the Russian camp, combining as he did in himself the advantages of high rank, talents as a speaker, and an intimate acquaintance with the historical relation of rights between Hungary and Austria.

Szemere did not approve of this; he objected, that his personal safety did not appear to be sufficiently guaranteed in the camp of the Russians.

If this was his opinion — I answered — I wished he would not in future expect me to order any person of high rank in the army to perform the duty of trumpet; as it was impossible for me to conceive how the safety in the Russian camp of any other person of high rank was more guaranteed than that of the minister; he (Szemere) must therefore bestir himself to gain one of the commanders of corps — perhaps General Pöltenberg, as he spoke French — for the trumpet-service, which appeared dangerous to him (Szemere). If General Pöltenberg declared himself willing, I should have no objection to his undertaking this service.

The ministers hereupon broke off the conference, and went to alter the rough-draught of the new letter, and seek for General Pöltenberg in his camp.

The latter declared himself ready to go as trumpet to the Russian camp; and left the army with, his suite on the morning of the 7th of August, after he had received the dispatch for Prince Paszkiewicz directly from the ministers. How the new letter turned out, after the alterations resolved upon in it, I did not know. The ministers dispatched it *without having previously communicated it to me*. Nor did they again honour me with their confidence during the whole of the subsequent march to Arad.

CHAPTER XXX.

WHEN the army under my command had been established on the Hernád, and I had been informed of the state of affairs in the south of the country, I had perceived — as the reader will recollect — that to obtain possession of Temesvár was now the next object of the strategic activity of the chief command Dembinski-Mészáros, of Field - marshal Lieutenant Bern, and of myself.

Dembinski-Mészáros had consequently to maintain the lower Theiss, Bem at least the south-western part of Transylvania, and myself to keep the Russian main army at a distance from the line of the Maros.

Should it happen, however, that one of these three tasks had to be abandoned, — in order that *one* energetic stroke against Austria, even were it the last, might precede Hungary's approaching fall, the further protection of the siege of Temesvár must give way to the higher object of rendering possible such a stroke.

A perception of this seemed likewise to be expressed in those decrees of the war-minister which determined me in Gross-Wardein not to interrupt the retreat of the army, accelerated in consequence of General Nagy-Sándor's defeat, but to continue it unstopped further towards Arad, nay even to force it in its latter half. For Arad had been pointed out in these decrees as the common point of retreat for Lieut.-General Dembinski's army, and for that which I commanded. Consequently at Arad — as I understood the meaning of these

dispositions — in the worst case, even with the simultaneous raising of the siege of Temesvár, the concentration of both armies should take place, and the Austrians, without regard to the Russian main army, should be immediately after attacked with superior force.

When, on the 9th of August, I arrived with the first corps at Arad, I learned, however, that Lieut.-General Dembinski — having been defeated on the 5th at Szőrez by Baron Haynau — had directed his retreat, contrary to the instructions of the war-minister, not towards Arad, but towards Temesvár; and that consequently the army under my command had to continue its march uninterruptedly further towards Temesvár, in order to join that of Dembinski.

As to the reasons which might have determined Lieut.-General Dembinski to retreat to Temesvár, I received no explanation either from Kossuth or from the war-minister: I could only guess them from facts which I learned afterwards. Nevertheless, with all my uncertainty of the cause, the circumstance that Dembinski's army on the 9th of August was *not* at Arad, and *no longer* between Arad and Szegedin, of itself sufficed completely to lower the expectations I had originally associated (when in Gross-Wardein) with the proposed concentration of both armies, — expectations which had to be reduced even during the retreat from Gross-Wardein to Arad to an extremely modest limit; various unfavourable rumours from the camp of Dembinski having by degrees reached me. According to these rumours, the chief command Dembinski-Mészáros seemed to enjoy the confidence of the army just as little as the former (Mészáros-Dembinski); and as I knew by experience, that decisive moments decompose even the best-

organised army, if it has no confidence in its leader, I could not possibly suppose that Dembinski's army, after the defeat at Szőrez, was in *that* disciplinary condition in which it ought to be, to co-operate adequately in the offensive intended by me against the Austrians, when the junction of both armies had been successfully effected. My expectations from this offensive — which therefore were by no means extravagant — in consequence of Dembinski's army having retreated towards Temesvár (instead of towards Arad) were now completely abated; because this arbitrary change of the point of retreat, delaying the junction of the two armies at least two days (the distance from Arad to Temesvár is six miles), Dembinski's army remained all that time the longer exposed *by itself* to the attacks of the Austrians, and, should they be aware of their advantage, it might be pressed back even beyond Temesvár, before it could be possible for the three army corps under my command to reach this point.

Consequently, by Dembinski's retreat to Temesvár (instead of to Arad), the postulate of the intended offensive against the Austrians — the junction of our armies — was already rendered doubtful; and by the afternoon of the 10th of August I was to be furnished with sufficient reason to apprehend that the Austrians knew how to improve energetically the advantage offered them by Lieut.-General Dembinski.

For on the morning of the 10th of August, General Nagy-Sándor, with the first corps, had already broken up his bivouac at Arad, in order to advance on the road to Temesvár on this day as far as Vinga, and on the following day to join Dembinski's army concentrated at Temesvár. Nagy-Sándor was followed by Generals

Leiningen and Pöltenberg, with the third and seventh army corps, on the 10th as far as Arad, which were to reach Vinga on the 11th, and on the 12th to effect their immediate junction with Dembinski's army.

The head-quarters of the army had to remain during the 10th still in Alt-Arad.

In the course of the afternoon of this day the following reports from General Nagy-Sándor arrived at head-quarters.

" 10th August, 12 o'clock noon.

" The enemy, composed of all kinds of arms, is posted behind Dreispitz on the eminence. During our forcible reconnoitering he briskly cannonaded us with two batteries. A wounded officer had previously arrived from the direction of Temesvár, and informs us that a battle was fought yesterday, in consequence of w^hich our troops must retreat towards Lugos. I ask, how far my mission extends, in case I should be attacked by a superior enemy. My present position is on this side Dreispitz near the vineyards, and I observe a defensive bearing; I expect consequently very speedily further orders. Hostile columns are at this moment seen on the eminence beyond Dreispitz, a part of which, consisting of cavalry, is moving towards the Maros in my right flank.

(Signed) " NAGY-SANDOR."

The second (later) report was as follows:

" The enemy is advancing with superior forces. Further orders are required with all possible speed; the more so, as he threatens to turn our right flank.

(Signed) " NAGY-SANDOR.

" Dispatched at one o'clock afternoon."

On the first of these reports I sent orders to General Nagy-Sándor resolutely to accept the combat, and fight manfully. In case, however, he should be repulsed, he had to draw back *à cheval* of the road to Neu-Arad, and cover this point, together with the passages across the Maros.

But the second report determined me to hasten in person to the battle-field; because, from Nagy-Sándor's statement of the superior forces of the enemy, as well as from his repeated request for further orders — in a case like the present, in which, considering the simplicity of the situation, this demand was quite superfluous, — I was unfortunately obliged to suspect that, as usual, he was deficient in that presence of mind and resolution, without which the military honour of his corps must be compromised.

While in the streets of Alt-Arad, I encountered a further report that General Nagy-Sándor was already in full retreat. A desire to obtain beforehand some knowledge of the ground, which was altogether strange to me, led me first of all on to the glacis of the fortress: here, however, I incidentally received an invitation from Governor Kossuth to be present at a ministerial council just about to take place; and consequently I could not in person hinder Nagy-Sándor from continuing his hasty retreat, which had already been prosecuted to within sight of Neu-Arad, but had to confine myself merely to repeatedly reminding him, in the worst case to maintain at least Neu-Arad.

The circumstance, that a hostile corps dared to advance in an offensive manner towards Arad, with Temesvár in its rear, seemed to confirm the assertion of the wounded officer, contained in Nagy-Sándor's first report,

according- to which the Austrians had forced Dembinski on the previous day to retreat from Temesvár towards Lugos.

Nevertheless Kossuth opened the ministerial council, in which I had been called upon to take part, with the assurance that he had received from a trustworthy source news that Dembinski's army had gained a victory at Temesvár on the previous day (the 9th of August) over the Austrians. The latter had been the assailants; and Dembinski, at the commencement of the combat, was indeed again about abandoning the field, when Field-marshal Lieut. Bem had suddenly arrived on the battle-field, immediately taken the command, and from the already ordered retreat had without delay assumed the offensive. So it is reported — continued Kossuth in his communications — by two officers of Dembinski's army, who were wounded just at the time, of Bem's arrival on the field of battle, and who continued to observe for some hours, from the spot where their wounds were dressed, the uninterrupted advance of our troops afterwards. When these two officers — Kossuth further related — were removed from that place to be conveyed to Arad, the combat was not yet ended; nevertheless, it might be supposed without improbability, that, after the general change in the state of affairs in our favour caused by Bem's sudden appearance, the day had remained ours.

This supposition, I remarked, appeared indeed to be contradicted by the direction from which that hostile corps advanced against Arad, before which Nagy-Sándor was just now retreating: however, it was quite possible that the governor might be better informed about the events which had taken place on the preceding evening

at Temesvár, than I, who had received directly contrary news respecting them; and it was the more desirable for us that the assumed victory of Dembinski's army should be confirmed, as in that case the Austrian corps which was now pursuing Nagy-Sándor would probably be destroyed within twenty-four hours; since I intended to cross the Maros with our third and seventh corps during the night, and advance even offensively at day-break in the direction towards Temesvár. But now — I further remarked — I must ask to have it explained, how it was to be understood, that Field-marshal Lieut. Bern, who I thought was in Transylvania, suddenly appeared on the 9th of August on the battle-field of Temesvár, and in the presence of Lieut.-General Dembinski took upon himself the command of the latter's army. From an earlier communication of the governor's — I continued — at was known to me that Bern on the 31st of July had sustained a severe defeat at Marosvásárhely;* of later victories of our armies in Transylvania, however, I had heard nothing whatever; the state of affairs there could consequently not possibly be such as to render superfluous the personal presence of Field-marshal Lieut. Bern within the sphere of the operations of his own army: how then could he quit his post in Transylvania? how could he command at Temesvár an army, the guidance of which was entrusted to Lieut. - General Dembinski?

* It should be, "at Schäsburg" (in Transylvania). Bern's report to Kossuth on the defeat he had sustained there on the 31st of July might have been dated from Marosvásárhely (because Bem immediately after the defeat had hastened to Marosvásárhely), and Kossuth might have erroneously taken the place where the report was written to be that at which Bem was defeated. My news of this event, however, were derived only from Kossuth.

Kossuth replied to this, that at the time when he invited me to the well-known rendezvous (in Kardszag or Kis-Ujszállás), he had already perceived the necessity of intrusting to one man the chief command over all the forces of the country, and had desired the meeting with me mainly for the purpose of consulting me about the choice of a commander-in-chief; but as this meeting did not take place, and his confidence in Dembinski's abilities had day after day been more shaken, it appeared to him necessary for the salvation of the country to place the conduct of the army in the Banat very speedily in more trustworthy hands; and thus Bem was called for in person to the Banat, in order to make good again, if possible, what Dembinski had undone.

From this explanation it could not yet be inferred who commanded the army in Transylvania in the stead of Bern, or what was the position Dembinski was now occupying in the army of the Banat; generally, in what form Bern's recall from Transylvania to the Banat had been made: I therefore asked again for an explanation of all this.

Kossuth's earlier statements on the events of the war at Temesvár betrayed clearly enough the twofold tendency — 'to cheer the spirits of the assembly, depressed in consequence of Nagy-Sándor's retreat, and at the same time to point out Bern as the very man who had been appointed by Providence for the glorious salvation of the fatherland. Now there can be no doubt that it was difficult for the governor to answer my question — who commanded the army in Transylvania in Bern's absence? — seeing there was now no army in Transylvania! — consequently he preferred no longer to conceal that he had already made Bern commander-in-chief.

From the circumstances in which we then were, it had not been difficult for me to foresee that the principal matter in this ministerial consultation would be the choice of a commander-in-chief. Of course Kossuth's communications about the war-events at Temesvár, and the declaration that Bein commanded Dembinski's army while he was present, could not fail to strike me the more, as this circumstance was incapable of explanation otherwise than by the previous appointment of Bern as commander-in-chief. I was consequently justified in suspecting that the convocation of this ministerial council was again merely a mock-show of Kossuth's; that, *without consulting the ministers*, he had long before arbitrarily filled the very post, on the appointment to which, pretended only now about to be made, the assembled council of ministers had to decide. At the moment, however, when Kossuth's communications about the war-events at Temesvár betrayed to me the fact that Bern had already been appointed to the chief command, I was still without any certain proof that I was right in supposing that Bern had really been appointed *without* the previous knowledge of the ministers. It was possible also that the only object of the present consultation might be, on an understanding with the ministers, to make sport of *me alone*.

The sole drift of my repeated request for an explanation of the enigmatical position of Bern and Dembinski as related to the service, was that I might be certain whether, in this ministerial council, I alone was to be mystified by the whole government *personnel*, or together with me the ministers also by Kossuth alone. The truth, as we shall soon see, lay between the two: it was by no means all the ministers; one of them, the minis-

ter of communication, Csányi, at least (perhaps even more), was elected with me to be present, as Kossuth's *dupe*, in the consultation about the choice of a commander-in-chief.

Scarcely had Kossuth — compelled thereto by my repeated questions — avowed that he had already appointed Bern commander-in-chief, when Csányi declared this nomination to be contrary to law, because it had not the counter-signature of a minister.

Kossuth replied, that this was not the case, as it *had* been countersigned by a minister, namely, by the war-minister (Aulich).

Csányi retorted, that the war-minister was not justified in doing so, as it could not be unknown to him (Aulich), any more than to the governor himself, that it was not Bern, but *myself*, who had been proposed to the Government by the Diet for the post of commander-in-chief, as well as that the president of the ministers, Szemere, had, in the name of the Government, given their consent to this proposal of the Diet.

Csányi's latter assertion was now contested, by Szemére, who maintained that he had *only* answered, that the Government acknowledged the proposal to have been made.

Csányi again remarked, that *this* answer could only be considered by the Diet as assenting; that the Government, after it had given this answer, had merely to choose the *time* for nominating a commander-in-chief; and that he (Csányi) must consequently persist in his declaration, that Bern's nomination to the chief command was contrary to law.

The other ministers, like myself, did not feel it necessary to take part in this discussion.

Csányi's opinion being no longer contested, the minister of justice, Sabbas von Vukovics, rose and declared that the question, *who* should be entrusted with the chief command of all the troops, was an open one; the speedy settlement of which, though undeniably urgently demanded, was dependent, in his opinion, on the previous adjustment of certain differences between the provisional government and *myself*. It was, for instance — continued Vukovics, in his declaration — not unknown to the government that most of its steps underwent a caustic criticism in the camp of the army commanded by me, nay mostly in my immediate vicinity; that in general all the opinions and observations about the provisional government which were made among the officers of the said army seemed to be calculated to degrade the highest civil authority existing in the country as much as possible in the eyes of the army, and to render it by degrees accessible to the idea of a "military despotism," and such like. I had, therefore, first of all to clear myself from the suspicion, that these phenomena hostile to the government, in the ranks of the army commanded by me, were intentionally brought about by me, and that they were the reflex of my political opinions, the signs of my personal endeavours: I had to do this without delay, as he was convinced that the ministerial council then assembled could not proceed unembarrassed to the choice of a commander-in-chief so long as this suspicion rested on me.

I had long ago been aware of the suspicion of the provisional government, that a military despotism was the final aim of my endeavours and those of the army. Kossuth stood at the head of the government, and had himself invented the fable of these endeavours, in order

to urge the Diet to the declaration of independence; and it had happened to him with this fable as it usually does to children with the bugbear which they rig up to frighten their comrades, and at which at last they begin to be frightened themselves. I had likewise been for some time past prepared to see start anew into life all kinds of government measures, which, dictated by this suspicion, might aim even at my removal from the army, and its dissolution. The earnest request of the minister of justice, however, that I would clear myself by a *simple declaration* from the suspicion under which I seemed to lie in the eyes of the government, came on me indeed very unexpectedly; for I could not see how all at once a *simple declaration* on my part could suffice to accomplish that which, with all my former declarations, so often repeated to Governor Kossuth, I had not succeeded in doing. The intimation of the minister of justice, that the government had become suspicious of me only through those phenomena hostile to it which had been remarked in the army, in the form of caustic criticisms on certain government measures, and so on, — this intimation came still more unexpectedly on me; for I could not possibly suppose that the minister of justice had lost all recollection of the radical disagreement, dating only from the beginning of July, between the main army and the government, — a disagreement which doubtless must have caused the government the greater apprehensions for its continued existence, as its two members most eminent by their position and influence (Kossuth and Szemere) had not the moral capacity to convince the army that they had been induced to cause this disagreement, if probed to the bottom, by any thing else than by the want of re-

solution to throw down the bridge, as once behind the nation, so now behind their own worthy persons also.

The complaint of the minister of justice about those phenomena in the camp as well as in the head-quarters of the army under my command were certainly not unfounded.

Government measures, such as the fasting and crusade sermons against the Russian intervention, — the decree to burn down all places which had to be evacuated by us before the enemy, — the creation of the chief command Mészáros-Dembinski, and afterwards of Dembinski-Mészáros, — the official announcement that France had declared war against Austria, — the farce (not even original) of deciding on the emancipation of the Jews, and on the equalisation of rights for all nationalities, at a time when there remained to the government itself but one single place of refuge in the country, and even that one only for a few days; — these and similar government measures certainly were never favourably judged of by those nearest me.

Neither by Kossuth's peculiar predilection for a *camarilla*, which was calculated sensibly to injure alike his personal and his official authority; nor by the striking contrast between what Kossuth said and what he did; nor by his accessibility to any prater, however extravagant, especially to any tale-telling; nor by his frequently forgetting that though at liberty to be ever under petticoat-government as the father of a family, yet that it was never allowable as the Governor of Hungary; nor by his extraordinary apprehension of any personal danger, and his nevertheless persevering efforts to unite in himself the chief command and the dignity of governor; nor by his insatiable longing for

ovations of all kinds and at whatever cost; nor by his method of raising the spirit of the nation — among other means, by fabulous reports about the doings of the army, compared with which its real deeds appeared quite unworthy of mention; nor (speaking now of Szemere) by his programme for a republican government, ridiculous by the side of its political antecedents; nor by his endeavours to organise the bands of guerrillas, protected and fostered by him, into a kind of thoroughbred republican army, the command over which he had beforehand destined for himself; nor by the artifices employed by the minister of the interior for augmenting these bands of guerrillas to the detriment of the completion of the already existing, though *not* republican army; nor, finally, by his efforts to gain me over for a duumvirate *against* Kossuth; — by none of these or similar facts (I must confess) were the officers in the camp and at the head-quarters of the army which I commanded, transported to admire either Kossuth or Szemere. On the contrary, these two persons, especially Szemere, were very often the objects of such remarks as were by no means compatible with the respect due to the bearers of the highest powers of government, and before whom indeed the *nimbus* of authority of the whole staff of the provisional government had by degrees to grow pale; although the names of some of its members were never mentioned by the army, while others of them were, and not without respect.

Nevertheless, in my opinion, the minister of justice was by no means obliged to explain these disrespectful remarks about the two heads of the provisional government, or the unfavourable judgments about such and

similar government measures, by the arbitrary supposition, that *I was striving for the military dictatorship*, and that I had originated the phenomena hostile to the government to smooth as much as possible my way to absolute power. The minister of justice, without touching upon the moral worth of my endeavours, might have deduced the origin of these phenomena quite simply and very logically from the differences at Komorn between the main army and the government, — even if he were not willing to admit that these unfavourable judgments were *just*, and the disrespectful remarks about Kossuth and Szemere *very striking*. And the minister of justice might still have accused me — if it must be so — directly *on the basis of the differences at Komorn*, of striving for absolute power; whereby he would moreover have had the advantage of being supported by a proved fact (namely, that of my disobedience), and have been spared any tale-telling in sustaining his accusation against me.

But now that the minister of justice preferred a quite imaginary mode of proof to that which was at least apparently a real one, he led me to suppose that he was much more concerned altogether to ignore the Komorn differences (in which indeed the provisional government had not played an advantageous part) than to sustain his accusation against me. The latter was perhaps also merely a consequence of the irritation of the minister of justice at the contemptuous reception, of which he had probably already been informed, his colleague Szemere had *deservedly* met with at Nyir-Adony in the head-quarters of the army under my command; and in this case I should possibly never have been called upon by the minister of justice, if he had

known *how* his colleague had drawn upon himself this reception.

But be this as it may, it was quite impossible for me to discover what *attainable* object the minister of justice had in view, when he asked me so decidedly to weaken by "a simple explanation" the suspicion that I was striving for absolute power.

Convinced that it would be useless to comply with the demand of the minister of justice; convinced that, after all the explanations I had formerly given to the same effect to Kossuth had been unsuccessful, a more favourable fate could not await a repetition of them, — I replied, that the government might, if it pleased, speedily place me before a council of war, if there were valid reasons for the suspicion just uttered against me; but that it need not expect I would ever answer to mere calumnies such as those now cited by the minister of justice, and to suspicions deduced from a like kind of rumours. After all, I added, my personal presence at the consultation about to take place relative to the choice of a commander-in-chief seemed to me to be quite improper, since I myself might possibly be among the candidates for this post.

After I had made this declaration, I quitted the ministerial council (the *last* at which I was present in Arad, or elsewhere); and as Nagy-Sándor was no longer harassed by the Austrians in his position before Neu-Arad, I returned forthwith to Alt-Arad to the headquarters, for the purpose of issuing the dispositions for the nightly preparation for the attack which, as I had declared in the ministerial council, was to be made on the Austrian corps posted opposite our first corps before Neu-Arad, in consequence of Kossuth's communication,

that our troops were victorious at Temesvár on the 9th of August.

CHAPTER XXXI.

WHEN Szemere and Count Batthyányi orally reported to the government in Arad the way in which they had been endeavouring to enter into negotiations with Russia for peace, they made the remark, that their proceedings had been blamed by me as insufficient.

I was present when they made this report; and as Kossuth desired to know the reason of my censure, I declared before him and the assembled ministers — in the very same spirit as on the occasion of the last conference with Szemere and Count Batthyányi (at Gyapjú, on the evening of the 6th of August) — that the government, in its project of entering into negotiations with Russia, ought not to overlook, that it, not Russia, needed a peaceable arrangement, and that consequently it had to make distinct proposals to the Russians, but had not to expect them from the Russians; that, further, it, not Russia, desired to know for certain whether the adversary was generally disposed for pacification; that, finally, it, not Russia, was pressed for time, and therefore must make such tempting proposals to Russia, that even if the Russians should continue silent, it might at least no longer want a definitive answer to the *preliminary question* in the attempts at negotiation. But this preliminary question was just, whether Russia had any such intentions as the idea of making peace with that state presupposed. To answer this question,

the Gross-Wardein letter of the ministers Szemere and Count Batthyányi, as well as the rough-draught, on the practical value of which these ministers had, at Gyapjú, desired to have my judgment, seemed to me to be insufficient. To answer this question definitively and with the speed demanded by present circumstances, I believed it to be necessary that the provisional government should offer to the Czar the crown of Hungary, not disguisedly, as the ministers had done in the above document, but *undisguisedly*.

I well remember that Kossuth assented to this view; that none of the assembled ministers contested it; and that while I was still present, a government decision corresponding with it was come to. I also distinctly remember a later oral communication of Kossuth's, in which he said that he had already found a man (neither a member of the army nor of the government, however) who was ready to forward the letter, drawn up in accordance with this government decision, to the Russian commander.

What I at that time thought, and do still think, of the idea of making peace with Russia, if practicable, I have sufficiently explained in Chapter xxix. There also, however, I blamed the heads of the provisional government, that they had mistaken the impossibility of realising this idea; nay, that to the last they had given way to the hope that Russia would not be able to resist the temptation of acquiring the crown of St. Stephen.

I *blame* the heads of the provisional government; and yet it was *I* who plainly called upon them to send plenipotentiaries to carry on the negotiations which had apparently already been introduced by the letter of Count Rüdiger to me at the head-quarters; and yet I

failed to prevent the ministers Szemere and Count Batthyányi in their well-known activity as the provisional government's negotiators for peace, although I had the power to do so; nay, in Arad, according to all appearance, it was *my* declaration which brought on that ministerial decision, in consequence of which the provisional government was resolved entirely to unmask itself to Russia.

True I called upon the provisional government to charge itself with the management of negotiations which had apparently been already opened. The motive for this summons, however, was less my hope of any favourable result from these negotiations, than my apprehension of raising Kossuth's distrust in me to the highest degree if I omitted this summons. And I was so much afraid of heightening this distrust, because I unfortunately knew of no single important act of his, called forth by this sentiment against me or the army under my command, which in its results had been advantageous to the national cause.

True I did not hinder Szemere and Count Batthyányi in their efforts to induce the Russian commander to enter into negotiations; on the contrary, I actually assisted them, and afterwards even brought about a government decision, the carrying out of which would leave nothing more to be desired by the Russians in Hungary. It was, however, not the delusive belief of a pacification with Russia which had determined me thereto.

When Szemere and Count Batthyányi, just after the first conference they had with me at Vámos-Pércs on the 2d of August, busied themselves with the composition of the Gross-Wardein letter, with a zeal which —

in consequence of my remark, that if the provisional government desired to negotiate with the Russians, it must at all events take the initiative — seemed not to be justified, only because I had sent in immediate advance of this remark a circumstantial report about the exchange of trumpets which had taken place between the Russians and us, and because from this report the want of foundation for any supposition that the Russians felt inclined for pacification had become self-evident; then I no longer doubted for a moment that Kossuth and Szemere had ceased to expect the salvation of the fatherland from the last efforts of the nation; or from the declaration of war on the part of France against Austria, which had been officially published as a settled point; or from the alliance, ready for completion, as was said, with Janku and Sztratimirovich, — but exclusively from a pacification with Russia \ and just as little did I doubt that if the efforts of Szemere and Count Batthyányi to induce Russia to make peace should be hindered by me, the nation would for ever cling to the delusion that Hungary could assuredly have been saved by these efforts. And this foresight it was, which decided me not to paralyse the activity of these negotiators for peace, but, on the contrary, urgently to recommend to the heads of the provisional government, after I plainly perceived their tenacious clinging to their "last" idea of salvation, the full disclosure of their views with respect to Russia; for I was convinced it then mattered very little whether Kossuth and Szemere committed in politics one prank more or less; but *this* still was of the highest importance, that the nation should once for all get rid of the illusory belief in the strength of the Kossuth-Szemere policy, — that Kossuth and Szemere might

themselves furnish to it a proof per *absurdum*, that the thought of Hungary being independent of Austria is one that may be left to the gossips, until the realisation of the states-congress at Verona, announced to the Diet by Kossuth, as will be remembered, in Debreczin (on the 13th of April 1849), in which the political physiognomy of Europe was to be changed. But the idea of making Hungary a republic would still be only a topic for the gossips, even if this congress of Verona should have accomplished its mission to the fullest contentment of Kossuth himself.

CHAPTER XXXII.

IN the evening of the 10th of August, the dispositions for the nocturnal preparation for the attack on the Austrians before Neu-Arad, intended to be made at daybreak on the 11th, were already dispatched to the divers corps, when I received an invitation from Kossuth to repair without delay to a personal conference with him in the fortress.

I went as desired; and found the Governor in the same room which I had left several hours before, that I might not embarrass him and the ministers by my presence in the choice of a commander-in-chief. Now the ministers were gone, and Kossuth was alone. He felt a desire for a *tête-à-tête* with me. I saw him on this occasion most probably for the last time in my life.

My supposition, that Kossuth had sent for me to communicate to me the latest decision of the government respecting the choice of a commander-in-chief, and then

perhaps to consult with me about the next warlike operations, — soon proved to be erroneous. That I had been chosen commander-in-chief in the ministerial council which had just taken place, I did not learn till I was in Carinthia; and it was no longer the future about which Kossuth began to conjecture during this conference — it was *the past*.

After Kossuth had synoptically recapitulated the really splendid results obtained by his talents and unremitting zeal, without which the defence of the country, even opposed to Austria alone, would have been paralysed, he maintained that, to drive out of the country at once both the Russians and the Austrians, only one thing had been wanting to him — my confidence! He made mention of the time (the beginning of March, at Tiszafüred) when he had asked me to tell him openly if I wished to possess the highest power in the state; he would in that case create a party for me — that party should be all Hungary. He mentioned at the same time also the answer I had given him to this inquiry (namely, that he had no rival to fear in me); but said that I had not then been *candid* with him, so that it had been impossible for him to come to an understanding or to unite with me; and that exclusively in consequence of this, Hungary, instead of destroying her enemies, had herself come to the brink of destruction.

Many and multifarious things Kossuth said to the same effect; shewing me how much easier it was for him to impute to me the blame of the ruin of the fatherland, than repentantly to confess that he had induced the nation to give up a good right for an idea, to realise which the forces of the nation were insufficient.

The perception of this opened to me the unlucky

prospect of having probably to serve in future as the governor's scape-goat. However, from the absurdity of his assertion, that the mere doubt of the sincerity of my assurance that I was not striving for the highest power, had prevented him (to whom, as he himself protested, the crown of might was a crown of thorns) from coming to an understanding with me, from uniting with me, that is, *not* to proclaim the forcible separation of Hungary from Austria, — I at the same time indulged the hope that Kossuth (thanks to his peculiar logic) could hardly have failed by this time to take again from me his own proper sins.

I also confined my reply to simply assuring Kossuth, that the negative answer I had given him in the beginning of March at Tiszafüred to his question, whether I should like to reign in his stead, *was certainly sincere*, though he had a doubt of it; and that I was of opinion, the cause of Hungary would scarcely have fallen so low, if in the consideration of my counsels for maintaining the just rights of the nation he had not allowed himself to be perplexed by his unfounded doubts of my sincerity.

When Kossuth began to speak of the gigantic results of his public activity, of the obstacles that had prevented us from conquering the allied troops — in a word, of the past, I suspected that he had determined to speak also of the Komorn differences between us. However, *before* the conference, he neither seemed to have come to this, nor indeed in general to any determination whatever of importance, except, at most, *to sound me*, whether and what resolutions *I* had already formed as to the immediate future. For after I had briefly answered, as has been mentioned, his retrospec-

tive glance into the past, he put to me in uninterrupted succession the following questions:

Above all things, he desired to know how I should take it if the government were to transfer the chief command to Field-marshal Lieut. Bern.

I assured him that I should consider the nomination at this moment of a non-Hungarian as commander-in-chief to be equivalent to my removal from the command of the army under me, and would immediately retire from my post; because, in order to take part still further in the war, I needed the guarantee that it would not continue to be carried on, when any *moral* result was no longer to be expected — only for personal, not national interests.

Hereupon Kossuth wished to know what I intended to do, in case the news he had received of the victory of Dembinski's army at Temesvár should be confirmed — the junction of the army under my orders with Dembinski's effected — and the chief command over both armies were to devolve upon *me*.

In that case — I replied — I should combine the whole of our forces, and direct my attack against the Austrians alone.

But if the Austrians have been victorious at Temesvár? Kossuth finally asked.

Then I will lay down my arms — was my answer.

And I shoot myself! — replied Kossuth.

I took this in earnest, and began to dissuade him from the desperate idea. I spoke of the possibility there was of his being still useful to the nation even abroad. I urgently recommended him to prefer flight to suicide. Nay, I endeavoured to shew him that the preservation of his life was a patriotic duty. And this

it really was; but in *what* sense it was so, Kossuth seemed to have no perception.

It was Kossuth's patriotic duty to recant his political doctrine of the 14th of April 1849; for he could not invalidate the principle derived from experience, that nations as well as individuals lose themselves when the object after which they strive is an unattainable one. Now the object which Kossuth on the 14th of April had set before the nation, he could not possibly any longer call an attainable one, after he had himself put beyond doubt that Europe was in fact not for, but *against* the revolt of Hungary from Austria.

But that Hungary *alone* would be able to maintain itself against Austria *and* Russia, this Kossuth himself had *never* believed.

A proof of this was the strenuous efforts he began immediately after the 14th of April, and regularly continued, to deceive the nation in respect of the danger threatening it from Russia; efforts which succeeded so well, that, among others, even Field-marshal Lieut. Bern yielded to this delusion, and lost the mountain defiles of Transylvania before he had even an idea of their being seriously menaced.

A proof of this was Kossuth's parading — carried so far as officially to blind the nation — of the immense influence which he pretended he could exercise upon foreign policy against Russia and Austria; the result of which influence for Hungary, however, with all its immenseness, was not to be victory over Russia and Austria, but (according to Kossuth's own assertion) only a peace based *on freedom* — an *honourable* peace, though purchased with *sacrifices*.

Consequently, even with the assistance of the ex-

pected intervention of the "west" of Europe, *not victory* over Russia and Austria, but merely a peace bought with *sacrifices*, which could only be *the honour and freedom of the nation!* (or what else could it be? perhaps Kossuth notes?)

And was it ever really believed by Kossuth that "his people" was strong enough to vanquish the Russians as well as the Austrians?

Kossuth, in fact, had not even to deny a conviction in order — mindful of the last patriotic duty which it was still in his power to perform — to recant his doctrine of the 14th of April 1849.

That he would nevertheless fail to fulfil this duty knowingly and intentionally, I did not for a moment doubt. But he might fulfil it *without* knowing it and *without* intending it, by sparing his own life, by early taking heed to its safety.

Hence my earnest endeavours to dissuade him from the desperate idea of suicide, and to induce him to flee; for I feared that the nation would scarcely resist the certain temptation forthwith to consider Kossuth's death (even by his own hand) as setting the seal to that doctrine, from which the nation must necessarily turn away, unless it had a mind to share the very fate of those whose efforts were directed to an unattainable object.

The consolation that my endeavours were successful — if not superfluous — must, however, be withheld from me for some time yet. Kossuth seemed not to be willing to accede to any of my representations respecting the preservation of his life, as well as its safety by flight. Soon afterwards he dismissed me, without communicating to me the desired change in his desperate project.

Before midnight I had returned again from the fortress to the head-quarters in Alt-Arad.

A few hours later, Kossuth sent for my information a report of General Count Guyon relative to the issue of the battle fought on the 9th of August at Temesvár by Dembinski's army with the Austrians.

According to the language of this report, written by Count Guyon himself, Dembinski's army no longer existed.

By this final result of Dembinski's retrograde operation from Szöreg to Temesvár (instead of to Arad) the last probability of a successful offensive against the Austrians was destroyed.

The further continuance of our active resistance to the armies of the allies could now at most promote personal, no longer any national interests.

Therefore, directly after the receipt of Count Guyon's report to Kossuth, I resolved, with the army under my command, which had been strengthened in Arad by a division of reserve, to lay down our arms, that an unbloody end might be put as speedily as possible to a contest henceforth without purpose, and that the country, which I could no longer save, might at least be freed from the horrible misery of war.

I took this resolution with the full conviction of performing no *half* deed in executing it: for the army under my command was now the *principal* army of Hungary, and *its* conduct must prospectively the more certainly become the guide for all the isolated lesser bodies of active forces still existing elsewhere in the country, not excepting the garrisons of the fortresses; as Kossuth himself agreed with my resolution to lay down our arms, and there was consequently no reason

to apprehend that he would agitate against a general imitation of the example I was determined to set.

My supposition that Kossuth would agree to the laying down of our arms was by no means an arbitrary one.

At the moment when I explained to Kossuth that I was determined to lay down our arms as soon as the news which I had received about the defeat of Dembinski's army was confirmed, he was in the strictest sense of the word *master of my life*. The interview at which I made this declaration took place, as is known, in his own apartment in the fortress of Arad. The commander of the fortress was Damjanics. Since the Komorn differences he was among my decided adversaries. The garrison of the fortress consisted of troops that scarcely knew me by name. There could not exist the slightest sympathy on the part of these troops for my person. The suite with which I had hastened on Kossuth's summons into the fortress consisted of one adjutant. Kossuth nevertheless allowed me unobstructed to return from the fortress to the head-quarters in Alt-Arad. He had not even attempted to dissuade me in any way from the eventual resolution of laying down our arms. It is true he had declared he was resolved to shoot himself, if I laid down our arms. This declaration, however, considering the little personal sympathy I had shewn him since the 14th of April 1849, could not be expected to shake me in my resolution; I considered this pathetic declaration, rather, only as a natural consequence of Kossuth's repeated asseverations, that he could neither live out of Hungary nor in it, if it sunk into slavery.

If Kossuth had been decidedly opposed to the laying

down of our arms, he could not possibly have allowed me to quit the fortress of Arad.

The circumstance, however, that Kossuth did not combat my resolution to lay down our arms either by adducing reasons against it, or otherwise, proved no *more* than that he might have been already convinced, during our interview, of the impossibility of saving the fatherland. And the fact of my unendangered return from the fortress of Arad to the head-quarters in Alt-Arad served likewise, strictly considered, merely to prove that Kossuth perhaps foresaw that by removing my person he would at most have brought on something even worse than the laying down of our arms, resolved upon by me in the event of the defeat of Dembinski's army.

But Kossuth knew of my intention, at daybreak of the 11th of August to attack the Austrian corps before Neu-Arad; I had plainly and distinctly declared this intention in the ministerial council assembled in the forenoon of the 10th; during our interview (which took place immediately after this ministerial council, late in the evening of the same day) I had already informed Kossuth of the dispositions issued for the intended attack; further, the governor — after my decided declaration, in case the defeat of Dembinski's army should be confirmed — could not possibly be in doubt that I intended to undertake the attack on the Austrians at Neu-Arad only if in the course of the night I should receive from Dembinski's army either an authentic *favourable* report or *no authentic news whatever*. And nevertheless Kossuth, a few hours before daybreak of the 11th, sent me, for my information, Count Guyon's report *unsealed*, consequently evidently after he had read it.

If Kossuth had been for the continuation of the combat, and not for the laying down of our arms, he must have kept secret the contents of this report. Least of all would he have communicated it to *me*.

Having nevertheless done the latter, and moreover without adding to the report — the original of which he sent me — a single word with his own hand dissuading me from the surrender, or even charging the bearer of the dispatch to do so, — I should necessarily have been obliged to get from the clouds, if not the assumption that Kossuth was *for* the surrender of arms, yet certainly the inference that he was *against* it.

Nevertheless I could not possibly suppose in Kossuth an inclination to take a personal part in the laying down of our arms, in the face of his intended suicide, which he had disclosed to me. And as it was of course important for me to avoid even the appearance of the resolution to surrender being one of treachery to the country, an act of rebellion against the highest authority in the state, I addressed a written invitation to the Governor formally to resign and transfer to *me* the supreme power.

I took this step in the expectation that Kossuth would not overlook, that though as far as he personally was concerned, it was all one whether he committed suicide as Governor of Hungary or as a simple private individual, yet that it was not the same as regarded the tendency of the laying down of our arms.

But instead of resigning, Kossuth acted as if he had not received my invitation at all, and sent me an official letter signed by himself as Governor and with a ministerial counter-signature, according to which the provisional government definitively transferred to me the chief

command over all the troops of the country, and moreover unlimited power to conclude a peace — but only with the Russians.

Immediately after the receipt of this decree, which under the then existing circumstances was utterly worthless, I went to the minister of communications, Csányi. I had already previously informed him of my resolution to lay down our arms, and call upon Kossuth to resign, and transfer the supreme power to me. Csányi approved of the motives of these resolutions. I now requested him to shew to the Governor how absurd it was to appoint me commander-in-chief of all the troops at a moment when the forces which had hitherto been at my disposal were not increased a single man «by this nomination; and how much more absurd it was moreover to empower me to conclude a peace with the Russians, when we were in a situation destitute of even the *fundamental condition* for entering into negotiations about peace — *the possibility of a further successful resistance*. I also requested him to represent to the Governor, that it would be much less prejudicial to his personal dignity, if, convinced of the impossibility of being useful to the nation in his present position, he resigned it freely, than if he exposed himself to the danger of a public humiliation by foolishly wishing to retain the appearance of a power, the reality of which had already been destroyed in consequence of the enemy's victories.

Csányi promised to exert all his influence to induce Kossuth, together with the ministers, voluntarily to resign. And he kept his word; for early in the afternoon of the 11th of August the deed of resignation, signed by Kossuth and the majority of the ministers, was in my possession.

The transmission of the supreme power to my person was clearly and distinctly expressed in this document: I was not to take the place of the provisional government, however, till the evening of the same day. This precautionary measure of Kossuth's — by the way, just as unworthy as superfluous — seemed to indicate either that he had not at all needed my representations of the preceding evening during the well-known interview (to spare his own life, and, above all, to take early steps for his safety from the enemy), or at least that he had not been insensible to them.

Kossuth speedily confirmed this indication: an officer, whom I had dispatched to him soon after receiving the deed of resignation, to take possession of the insignia of the state, returned without accomplishing his mission, and reported that the Governor had already taken his departure.

I know nothing of the fate of the insignia of the state afterwards.

Before evening of the 11th of August, the resignation of the provisional government, and the union of the supreme civil and military power in my person, was made known to the public by the two following proclamations, which I give in a German translation.

" TO THE NATION.

" After the defeats that have lately befallen the nation, all hope is at an end of our being able any longer to continue with success the combat in self-defence against the allied powers of Russia and Austria.

" In such circumstances, the preservation of the national existence and the guarantee for its future is now

solely to be expected from the leader at the head of the army; and, as I am thoroughly convinced, the further continuance of the present government is not only useless, but even prejudicial to the nation. I accordingly inform the nation, that, moved by that pure patriotic feeling which has led me to consecrate all my efforts, my whole life, exclusively to the fatherland, — in my own name, as well as that of the ministry, I hereby resign; and transfer the supreme civil and military power to General Arthur Görgei, until the nation, in virtue of its right, shall enact otherwise.

" I expect from him — and I hold him responsible for it before God, the nation, and history — that he will use this power, according to his best ability, for the salvation of the national existence of our fatherland, for its welfare, and for guaranteeing its future.

" May he love his fatherland as disinterestedly as I have loved it; and may he be more fortunate than I have been in securing the prosperity of the nation!

" By actions I can no longer be useful to my fatherland. Could my death avail for its well-being, joyfully would I sacrifice my life.

" May the God of clemency and justice be with the nation!

"Louis KOSSUTH, Governor.

SABBAS VUKOVICS, Minister of Justice.

LADISLAUS CSANYI, Minister of Communications and Public Works.

MICHAEL HORVÁTH, Minister of Public Instruction.

" *Fortress of Arad, A ugust 11th, 1849.*"

" CITIZENS!

" The provisional government of Hungary no longer exists.

" The Governor and the ministers have to-day voluntarily resigned their offices.

" Forced by this circumstance, besides the military chief command, I have to-day provisionally assumed the civil power also.

" Citizens! All that can be done for the fatherland in our difficult position, I shall do, whether it be by arms or peaceably, as necessity shall dictate; at all events, in such a manner as to diminish the sacrifices which have already been so great, and put an end to persecution, cruelty, and murder.

" Citizens! The events are extraordinary, and the blows of misfortune have fallen heavy upon us. In such a position it is impossible to calculate beforehand. My advice and wish is, that you return peaceably to your dwellings; and even if the enemy takes possession of your town, offer no resistance, nor otherwise take part in the combat: for the security of your persons as well as of your property is most probably dependent upon your remaining quietly in your own homes, engaged in peaceful occupations.

" Citizens! That which God's inscrutable decrees have destined for us, we shall bear with manly resolution, and in the hope, founded on our own conviction, that a just cause cannot always be lost!

" Citizens! God be with us!

(My signature follows.)

" *Arad, the 11th of August 1849.*"

In the first sentence of his farewell proclamation Kossuth declares that every hope of continuing any longer with success the struggle in self-defence against the allied powers is at an end. Nevertheless he declares immediately afterwards, in the next sentence, that under such circumstances it was still possible to save the existence of the nation, nay even to secure its future. The "*how*" Kossuth conceals from the nation. He informs it only "*by whom*" namely, by the leader who stands at the head of the army.

The army, however, which Kossuth in all reason must have meant, was in fact no other than that which had hitherto been commanded by me. The Transylvanian army, according to Kossuth's own assertion, and the Dembinski or Banat army, according to Count Guyon's report, recognised as authentic by Kossuth himself, had both already ceased to exist.

By this army alone — greatly exhausted as it was by the forced retreat from Komorn to Arad (about 80 German miles), and by the battles and encounters which had taken place during it — the fatherland was now speedily to be reconquered, after three armies had not been able to maintain it.

But no — not from the army, only from the leader at its head, Kossuth expects, and even from him not the reconquest of the fatherland, but only the preservation of its existence as a state; but for this he is made responsible by Kossuth before God, the nation, and history, the more certainly as Kossuth transfers to this leader at the same time the power in the state entrusted to himself and to the ministers — after every hope of continuing any longer the contest in national self-defence against the allied powers had already been destroyed.

Kossuth may have had his particular reasons for leaving the nation in the dark about the "how" of its salvation to be expected from me (the leader at the head of the army). We cannot, however, suppose that he himself was in the dark about this "how," without rendering him suspected of having wished to mask by the proclamation in question merely the real motive (were it so?) of his resignation and flight — namely, his inmost conviction that the nation in fact was no longer to be saved by any means, not even by his death.

But however probable this supposition, and however strikingly the tendency of Kossuth's proclamation, derived from it in like manner, harmonises with the necessity felt by him, and which had before then been repeatedly evident, always to find excuses for himself, — we should nevertheless expose ourselves to the deserved reproach of hostility to Kossuth, if we gave way to this supposition — that he was himself in the dark about the "how" it was possible *still* to save Hungary — without having previously made use of all the facts known to us, by means of which this supposition might possibly be shewn to be erroneous.

And some such facts are certainly known to us. Kossuth had formed and carried out the resolution of entering into negotiations for peace with the Russians. Further, he had resolved, on the 9th or 10th of August, to offer *quite undisguisedly* the crown of Hungary to the dynasty of Romanow. He had done for the execution of this resolution as much as time and circumstances permitted him. For this purpose a letter to the Russian commander had been drawn up by himself, if I mistake not, or he had caused it to be drawn up (probably by the president of the ministers Szemere, already practiced

in this department). He had personally endeavoured — and, as he assured me, not without success — to find some one to forward the letter to the Russian camp.

With a matter, on the success of which no hopes are dependent, it is not usual to occupy oneself so zealously.

Kossuth *believed*, consequently, at the moment in which he wrote his farewell proclamation, in the possibility of saving the fatherland by negotiations for peace with Russia.

Herein, at the same time, lies the key for understanding this proclamation, which without it would have no meaning at all. For only in the firm belief of the possibility of concluding peace with Russia, could Kossuth speak in one and the same proclamation of the unsuccessful further combat and the possible salvation of the fatherland.

That Kossuth, even after I had called upon him to resign, still entertained this belief, is shewn by the full powers to conclude a peace which he gave me, as an evasive answer, as it were, to my invitation to him to resign. The resignation which nevertheless afterwards took place does by no means prove that Kossuth had seen the absurdity of his belief in consequence of the representations which I had requested Csányi to make to him. Csányi had not promised me to communicate to the governor *my* views about the value of the said full powers: his promise was merely, that he would do all he could to induce Kossuth and the ministers to resign voluntarily. *How* he accomplished it, we do not know. In view of the tendency of the surrender of arms, on which I had resolved, and in view of Kossuth's most probable disinclination to sanction this tendency by his personal participation in the act of surrendering,

Csányi — perceiving from the national point of view the moral necessity for the resignation of Kossuth and the ministers — might possibly not have hesitated to make use of such means to induce Kossuth to resign, as were quite contrary to those I had proposed. However little he may himself have been deceived as to the futility of the idea of saving the political existence of Hungary by means of concluding peace with Russia, Csányi, aware of Kossuth's spasmodic clinging to this idea, might, in this case, have urged on him (to induce him to resign) just the said idea, and represented to him that the Russian commander would hardly be inclined to negotiate with him (Kossuth), though probably he might with me — (in favour of which was the fact, that the diplomatic dispatches of Szemere and Count Batthyányi had been forwarded to the Russian camp exclusively under my name). Consequently the process of Kossuth's voluntary resignation might perhaps have been as follows:

Kossuth *believed* in the possibility of concluding a peace with the Russians at the expense of the Austrians, and thereby of saving the political existence of Hungary, nay, of securing its future. In like manner he believed that the Russians would negotiate only with me — not with him. But Kossuth might have suspected that, in the treaty to be concluded, I intended to take care of the interests of the army only, not of those also of the whole nation, of the state. (My declaration, that I was determined to lay down our arms, Kossuth, from the moment when I called upon him to resign, might have taken merely for what I should have taken his declaration, that in that case he would shoot himself, if I had known then what I know now, namely, that his repeated asseverations — that he could neither live in nor

out of Hungary if it was reduced to slavery — were never seriously meant.) Kossuth consequently considered it to be his patriotic duty to ignore my invitation (to him to resign), and to dismiss me merely with the dignity of commander-in-chief, and full powers to conclude a peace. So long as he still stood at the head of the government, I should scarcely dare (so he might have hoped) to conclude a treaty with the Russians, which would expose the nation. After some hours' reflection, however, he might have perceived, that his continuing to retain the dignity of governor was the very thing that would render it impossible for me to come to any other treaty with the Russians than one which had regard to the interests of the army alone; because so long as *he* held the state-rudder, I could act in the negotiations for peace neither as dictator of Hungary, nor as representative of the provisional government (with which the Russians would have nothing to do), but solely as general-in-chief. But the perception of this must assuredly have rather determined him *formally* to resign, as by this act he incidentally acquired the right to render *me* responsible for the salvation of the fatherland — -before God, the nation, and history.

Now if we compare this process of the development of Kossuth's voluntary resignation with the contents of his farewell proclamation, we cannot without injustice withhold from him (viewed from Kossuth's position) the acknowledgment that it appears by no means to be, what it might be taken for at *a, first* glance — namely, an intentional mystification of the public.

But when, in order to save the honour of this proclamation, we cast a *second* glance, beyond its limits, upon the facts which had preceded it, and from which it as

it were originated, we simultaneously conceded to our opponents the right to cast yet a *third* (controlling) glance upon the facts which followed, and which contradict the consequences developed from the facts that preceded, thus endangering anew the scarcely saved honour of this proclamation.

Our opponents, namely, can maintain — and, alas, consistently — that Kossuth, in case he had resigned only in order to render possible the salvation of the country through me, that is, to enable me to conclude a peace with Russia at the expense of Austria — a peace which was not only momentarily to save the political existence of Hungary, but also to guarantee it for the future, — that Kossuth in this case ought to have likewise enabled me to *buy* this peace, there being no longer any hope (as Kossuth himself avows in the first sentence of his proclamation) of *gaining it by fighting*; consequently that Kossuth, well aware that I had to offer to the Russians for the saving peace, besides the army and my own person and some Kossuth notes, absolutely nothing as purchase-money, not a foot-breadth of ground which the Russians or Austrians either did not already possess, or could not take possession of within a very short time, in the face of the uselessness of our further resistance, confirmed by Kossuth himself (in his proclamation); that Kossuth, knowing all this quite well, ought to have placed at my disposal at least *that* by means of which he himself intended to buy the peace (in case the Russians had negotiated with him) — namely, the insignia of the state; that he ought the less to have withheld these from me, as he himself laboured under the general illusion, that the enemies of the fatherland would negotiate only with me, because the army under my com-

raand had exclusively recognised only the constitution of the year 1848, sanctioned by King Ferdinand V., never the *coup d'état* of the 14th of April 1849, — consequently that Kossuth, from the point of view of this illusion, could not possibly deny that the delivery of the insignia of the constitutional kingdom of Hungary would very probably be the object of the principal reciprocal condition to be made on the part of the enemy.

Now from the single fact, that Kossuth had *not* delivered the insignia of the state, our opponents might certainly deduce the fatal conclusion, that the object of his voluntary resignation was quite other than to render possible the effecting of a saving peace with Russia; consequently that Kossuth's farewell proclamation was no *more* than a mask for the *real* motive of the voluntary resignation, a last official blinding of the nation.

This conclusion, in spite of its undeniable consecutiveness, may nevertheless be weakened by simply referring to those dangers by which Kossuth might have seen himself threatened, to the endangering of his life, on the 11th of August. If we recall first of all Kossuth and his partisans' notorious apprehensions that *I* was mischievously plotting against his life, — apprehensions which must have excited the more terror, as they were connected with the fact that *I* had once studied *chemistry*; if we further recall the proximity of an Austrian corps to the fortress of Arad, where Kossuth then sojourned; and finally, Kossuth's very probable apprehension, after Count Guyon's report, of next day, perhaps, seeing the way to Turkey (from Arad by Lippa and Lugos) blocked up by Austrian expeditionary columns; — we shall accuse our opponents, if not of posi-

tive wrong, at least of the highest injustice towards Kossuth, if they do not admit that though these threatening dangers did not shake his patriotic resolution to deliver up to me, with the highest power, the insignia of the state also, yet that they might nevertheless have prevented him in some measure from executing it; according to which, the retention of the insignia of the state would be to be considered by no means as premeditated, but only as *accidental* — merely an oversight, as it were, and explicable from the haste with which Kossuth had effected his departure from Arad. And we can maintain this with the greater positiveness, as we calculate confidently on finding in Kossuth himself our surety for the correctness of this assertion. But we must be very cautious (and advise Kossuth to be the same) — perhaps from too anxious solicitude for the honour of the farewell proclamation — not to render more *sharply* prominent the bewildering influence of these threatening dangers (no matter whether imaginary or real) on Kossuth's actions of the 11th of August than is just necessary to excuse the non-delivery of the insignia of the state. For in that case we ourselves should furnish to our opponents the most dangerous weapons against us; we should enable them, namely, fully to establish *the* assertion, that Kossuth, after all, had intended to save by the voluntary resignation only his life, and by the farewell proclamation only his popularity: — by the voluntary resignation, his life, — for he feared I should hinder his flight so long as he was still governor; by the farewell proclamation, his popularity, which seemed to him to be endangered by the *voluntary* resignation: the nation might suspect him of having voluntarily resigned from cowardice; he must prevent

the suspicion of the nation, by assuring it that he did it from patriotism.

And our opponents would then, alas, be supported by the accordance of this assertion with the character of the farewell proclamation. For the latter was, in any blind; although, according to our opinion above expressed of its origin, possibly an unintentional one.

This proclamation was a blind; not, perhaps, because Kossuth therein made a parade of his patriotic sentiments, but because he held out to the nation a prospect of deliverance still — of something impossible under the then existing circumstances.

We have already mentioned from what idea Kossuth must have set out in order to venture this. It only remains to investigate *why* this idea (that *I* should conclude a saving peace with Russia) was an *untenable* one.

Kossuth, as is known, believed that it was not possible for him, but only for *me* to succeed in making a treaty for peace with the Russians, because they negotiated only with me, not with him.

Now, in the first place, Kossuth had not a single fact at his command, from which he could come to the conclusion that the Russians would *negotiate* with me.

Such a fact could evidently only have been some negotiation *already entered into with me* on the part of the- Russians.

But the Russians had only summoned me *to lay down our arms*; and this is just the opposite of what can reasonably be called *negotiating*. Even the letter of Count Rüdiger, contained in Chapter xxv., attentively considered, is nothing more than a polite invitation to lay down our arms; not to speak of the circumstance

that Count Rüdiger was only a sub-commander of the Russian main army, and that negotiations of any importance must necessarily have come from the commander-in-chief (Prince Paszkiewicz). The exchange of arms, too, was merely a warlike courtesy, followed by no results whatever.

But assuming that Kossuth did nevertheless attribute to these events an importance, from which he believed he was authorised to conclude that the Russians would not hesitate to enter into negotiations with me, he could not possibly predict, without an optimist ignoring of certain circumstances well known to him, that the benefits of the negotiations, supposed to be opened in earnest between the Russians and myself, would ever be able to extend beyond the limits of *the personal interests of the army*, and become *political*, answering to Kossuth's idea of salvation.

Yet the Russian commander had even hesitated to allow Lieut.-General Sass and Colonel Chrulow to accept my presents, merely because he suspected in them a political demonstration against Austria. Yet the letter of Count Rüdiger (the sole source of those chimeras, which, propagating themselves in Kossuth's fancy, finally gave birth to the fixed idea of saving the state of Hungary under Russian protection) did not contain the least allusion to the political relation of Hungary to Austria; and my answer, which certainly very distinctly treated of this relation, as well as the diplomatic letter of the ministers Szemere and Count Batthyányi, had hitherto remained unanswered.

Kossuth might, however, either have been so in love with his own political doctrine, that it was impossible for him ever to perceive its impracticability; — or after

Bern's defeats in Transylvania, Nagy-Sándor's at Debreczin, and Dembinski's at Temesvár; after the constant want of sympathy on the part of Europe; and after the fruitless endeavours of Szemere and Count Batthyányi to negotiate for peace, — he might perhaps at last have perceived it. But he had not the necessary strength of mind openly and frankly to announce to the nation (instead of deluding it with newly invented possibilities of salvation) in his farewell proclamation, — " It can never be!"

On the other hand, Kossuth, in the face of the above-described and to him well-known indifference of the Russians to our diplomatic importunities, would scarcely have dared to maintain that the Russians were ready to conclude — not with him indeed, but with *me* — a peace guaranteeing the political existence and the future of Hungary. Kossuth would rather have sought for an explanation of the circumstance, that the Russians exchanged trumpets with me, but not with himself or Szemere, neither in an especial sympathy of the Russians for my person, or for the constitutional-monarchical confession of faith of the army I commanded, nor in an antipathy (perhaps instinctive) to his or Szemere's personality, or to the idea of independence or of a republic; but exclusively in the circumstance that I was only the *commander of the army*; consequently that an exchange of trumpets with me could have only a *purely military*, and by no means that political significance, without which an exchange of trumpets between the Russian army of intervention, hurried hither *to save Austria*, and the heads of the provisional government of Hungary, bent on the *destruction of Austria*, would have been wholly inconceivable. This being evident to him,

Kossuth, further, could not possibly have overlooked, that the Russians, from the moment in which I took *the power of the provisional government*, could no longer negotiate with me, any more than with himself or Sze-mére; and that if they nevertheless should do so, it would most probably be not with the dictator of Hungary, but again only with the *commander of the troops*, and that therefore the benefits of any negotiation (*in spe*) would *not* extend *beyond the camp of the army*.

Consequently, the idea that *I* had now to conclude a peace with Russia, saving the political existence of Hungary and guaranteeing its future- — although Kossuth did not hesitate to render me responsible for the realisation of this idea before God, the nation, and history — had really no higher practical value than perhaps the state-creating idea expressed by Kossuth in the first intoxication of independence (I hope not in full earnest?), completely to clear the Banat of the Serbians and Raizens, to colonise the depopulated tracts of land with Honvéd battalions, and to make the success of this liberal enterprise more speedily possible by simultaneously introducing bigamy.

So that from negotiations between the Russian commander and myself, even if such had already been in progress, Kossuth could not expect any thing for the state of Hungary; nor, as in fact no such negotiations had been commenced, for the troops united under my personal command.

Kossuth might take my assertion, that hitherto no such negotiations had been commenced with the Russian commander, as a pretext for reproaching me that I distorted the facts; and he might at the same time establish the counter-assertion, that sending General Pol-

tenberg to the Russian camp (with the Gyapjú letter of the minister Szemere and Count Batthyányi to the Russian commander) was in itself the commencement of a negotiation. But Kossuth, in order to venture this assertion, must openly ignore the fact that, for the opening of negotiations of any kind whatever, an inclination *on one side is by no means sufficient*. And if Kossuth had delayed his departure from the fortress of Arad only half an hour longer, he might have modified his much-promising farewell proclamation before it went to the printer, without coming into the least conflict with his conviction; for scarcely had he left the fortress when General Poltenberg, returning from the Russian camp, arrived at the head-quarters in Alt-Arad, and handed me the following letter addressed to me:

"MONSIEUR LE GENERAL,

" J'ai fait parvenir à la connaissance de Monsieur le Maréchal Prince de Varsovie l'arrivée du Baron Poltenberg comme parlementaire à mon corps d'armée. Son Altesse me charge de vous informer, Monsieur, que la destination de son armée est uniquement de combattre; et que si vous désirez traiter de votre soumission à votre souverain légitime, il faut que vous vous adressiez au commandant-en-chef de l'armée autrichienne, qui probablement a les pleins-pouvoirs nécessaires à cet effet.

" Recevez, Monsieur le Général, l'assurance de ma parfaite considération.

(Signed) " LE COMTE THEODORE RUDIGER.

, 28 Juillet „

"Ártaná, h -> - 1849."

y Août

When, in spite of this, many besides Kossuth indulged the suspicion that I was thinking only of the salvation of the army, not of the country's, and openly shewed by this suspicion their belief in the possibility of saving only the troops under my command; they thereby proved merely their incapacity to judge correctly of the situation in which those forces were placed after the fatal defeat of Dembinski's army, according to the report of Count Guy on.

The error of those who still thought the salvation of the army possible by negotiating, might have originated in the idea, that, supported by the fortress of Arad, I should have been able to make such an impression on both hostile armies as to force from them humane and honourable terms of capitulation.

The army under my command might certainly be supported by the fortress of Arad, in its rear. The protection of the latter would also first of all have been indispensable; for the Russian main army threatened from the north, the Austrian from the south.

The consequent pressing necessity of protecting the rear of the army might indeed be quite simply met by stationing it around the fortress. By disposing it in this way, the army would at all events have been unassailable in its rear. A commanding position, by which the enemy should be forced to offer honourable terms of capitulation, happens, however, to demand besides the state of being unassailable in the rear, the securing likewise of the front by the natural or artificial impediments of the ground, and this to such a degree that a hostile attack would be possible only under very disadvantageous circumstances. But even this condition was still attainable: the army had merely to draw back within the

outworks of the fortress (if there was space enough), and here — safe from attack in the rear, covered in front by the ramparts of the outworks — the army, forthwith unmolested, might sing *miserere* after *miserere*, that one or other of the hostile commanders would take pity on it, and (though he should not exactly be pressed to concede honourable terms of capitulation) at least attack it speedily, that it might not finally be driven to the fatal necessity of completely abandoning its commanding position, although supported by the fortress of Arad, *without striking a blow*; of course only — to deliver up its arms for the most necessary sustenance during its captivity, and thereby escape certain starvation.

After the report relative to the fate of Dembinski's army arrived, I was convinced that the army under my command had only to choose between the forcible or voluntary surrender of its arms (in either case unconditionally), and the breaking through into the Turkish territory, which was certainly still possible.

In the latter (and out of Hungary generally) neither I, nor the army, so long as *I* commanded it, had any thing to seek: for this was a *national* army; and I — myself a Hungarian — felt, as its commander, the obligation to prevent it from taking a step by which it would have denied the Hungarian national character.

Or was it self-delusion, when I believed that the true, inalienable greatness of the nation rested —

On the inmost aversion of the Hungarian to leave his fatherland, even when death from the hand of the executioner awaited him for it at home:

On the sublime courage displayed by the Hungarian in battling with his adverse fate, and — if this avails not — in knowing how to endure unsubdued:

On the manly resignation with which the Hungarian, voluntarily, and with a calm, steadfast gaze, advances to meet what is unavoidable, when perceived to be such.

Was this belief a vain delusion?

By it I was resolved not even to think of the still possible breaking through into the Turkish territory, much less to prefer a *voluntary* to a forcible surrender of arms.

But the honour of receiving our arms immediately from our hands, I could not possibly, after the intervention of Russia, now adjudge to the Austrians.

The Austrians, in my opinion, had forfeited all claim to this honour long ago, — at the moment when they were no longer able to sustain their courage — broken by the April campaign — through their own self-reliance, but only through the hope of Russia's near and saving aid.

Moreover, a resolution on my part to lay down our arms before the Austrians (so long as I had a free choice in the matter) would have been a denial of that principle, to which the army and myself personally were pledged. Not as if I had perceived in Russia a guarantee of the constitutional-monarchical form of government of Hungary: but because I reckoned that the Austrian government was much less such a guarantee; because I, besides, knew of no fact from which I could have concluded that the violent overthrow of the constitution of Hungary sanctioned by King Ferdinand V. had originated with Russia, and not with Austria.

And in fact the voluntary laying down of our arms, resolved upon by me (certainly on my own responsibility before God, the nation, and history), could — so long as

I commanded the army — have taken place before the Austrians only in one of two cases; either if they had conquered us without the aid of the Russians, or if the army under my command had expressly wished that this act of surrender should be performed before the Austrians — not before the Russians.

After I had received the document of resignation of the provisional government, and moreover the official report that Kossuth had already decamped, I drew up a letter to Count Rüdiger, which in substance contained the following points:

The announcement that the provisional government of Hungary had resigned, and transferred to me the supreme power;

The declaration, containing my reasons, that I was ready unconditionally to lay down our arms;

An appeal to the magnanimity and love of justice of the Czar, in behalf of the general interests of the nation, and in particular of those officers of the army who had formerly been in the Austrian service — with the exception of my own person;

The express condition, that the act of surrender should take place only before Russian troops;

The line of march of the army for the 12th, 13th, and 14th of August (Világos, Boros-Jenő, and Béei), communicated in order that Count Rüdiger might move with his troops between us and the Austrians, so as to separate us from the latter;

Finally, the remark, that in case this manoeuvre should be frustrated by the Austrians, I should retire, repelling the attacks of the latter, on the specified route towards Gross-Wardein, for the purpose of arriving within reach of the Russian army.

The draught of this letter I communicated forthwith, in all its contents, to those generals and superior staff-officers of the army, who, being at that moment off duty, had in the meantime been summoned to the head-quarters to hold a military council; and called upon the assembly plainly to declare, after having deliberated, whether they, in the name of the army, agreed or not with the forwarding of this letter, and with the consequences of this step. In the latter case, the assembly had immediately to come to a positive decision, to the execution of which I pledged myself beforehand. I did not support my proposal by a single word. I even avoided availing myself of the influence of my personal presence upon the consultation. Immediately after I had communicated to the assembly the contents of the letter, and had addressed to it the above-mentioned invitation, I left the council-chamber.

My proposal was nevertheless determined on, and I was informed of the fact by two delegates of the assembly.

After the expiration of the time up to which Kosuth had reserved to himself the dignity of governor (as already said, this was an hour of the evening — if I mistake not, 8 o'clock of the 11th of August), three trumpets left the head-quarters of Alt-Arad for the purpose of forwarding my letter to Count Rüdiger.

From the simple description of the manner in which my proposal for an unconditional surrender to the Russians was resolved upon by the military council, the reader might be inclined to conclude that I had not, after all, been originally in good earnest about the laying down of our arms in general, as well as in particular about the performance of this act before Russian troops;

since I pledged myself beforehand to the military council, unasked and without any reservation, to execute any of its possible resolutions, even if by them my proposal should be partially or even wholly set aside, without previously being sure of my object, without having done the least to assure myself of it, without having made use of so many means lying near at hand — as, preliminary agitations, a precautionary sifting of the members of the military council, presiding myself in the council — without employing one of these and similar means, which surely would have been calculated to guarantee the reception of my proposal.

Certainly in the camp of the army under my command no kind of agitation for the laying down of our arms took place, at least I knew nothing of it, unless it was that perhaps Kossuth, Szemere, and Count Batthyányi's evident prepossession in favour of the groundless idea of concluding a peace with Russia, or the efforts made by these men for the realisation of this idea, or, after all, even Kossuth's farewell proclamation, might have operated as an indirect agitation for the surrender of arms, although the effect of this could hardly have been considerable, because the credit of these men with the army was not great; — certainly the military council was composed of, or, more correctly, by chance contained not a few select persons, but, without choice, the generals and higher staff-officers of the army who happened to be off duty just then; and even individuals who no longer belonged to the army under my command, or had never belonged to it, were allowed to take part in the consultation, if only they seemed to be entitled to it by their rank; — certainly I renounced the presidency, nay even my personal presence at the con-

sultation about the proposal made by me. But the non-employment of all these and similar means, ought, if well considered, to furnish an irrefragable proof how much I was in earnest about the laying down of our arms in general, and in particular about the performance of this act before Russian troops exclusively, before the decision of the military council. For, in my opinion, agitations for the laying down of our arms would have served only to demoralise the troops, to render them unfit for repelling, if eventually necessary, Austrian attacks, and, on the contrary, fitter to disperse themselves; — further, in my opinion, with the decision of a military council composed of a few chosen persons, as well as in general with such a decision taken under the predominating influence of my personal participation in the council, only a *decision* would have been obtained, but its *carrying out* would, with all that, have been doubtful.

That the laying down of our arms should not only be decided on, but that it should also be executed, the military council must be numerous, and formed at hazard, without choice, not a picked one; I must give full liberty of debate on my proposal; I ought even not to embarrass it by my personal presence; least of all ought I to lower myself by delusive agitations, even if I had possessed the moral capacity, which was not the case.

Only thus could I succeed in keeping together the army until the last moment; only thus could I render the military council almost as inaccessible to the suspicion that I wished the laying down of arms in general, or at least the performance of this act before the Russians, for *my personal* interest, as I myself had remained

inaccessible to every thought of saving my person from the consequences of my acts. Only thus could the receiving of my motion by the military council be at the same time a guarantee for its execution; for only in bringing it forward neither by means of agitations, nor under the predominating influence of my personal participation in the deliberation, could I rely, in the execution of this determination, upon the voluntary co-operation of all those who had taken part in the decisive debate; but among them were the bravest generals and staff-officers of the army,- — men without whose heroic renunciation of any attempt to save their lives, the surrender of arms would never have been possible.

My assertion, that these men had completely renounced the preservation of their lives, when they resolved upon the act of surrendering before the Russians, might certainly be vigorously attacked from different sides and with different views.

This assertion, however, is founded on the facts, that I not only did not conceal from the military council — before I left it to it to decide upon my motion — the contents of the above-communicated indirect answer of the Russian commander to the diplomatic efforts of the ministers Szemere and Count Batthyányi; but, on the contrary, plainly warned it not to expect any results whatever from my appeal to the magnanimity and love of justice of the Czar, as well as generally, in forming their resolution, not to set out from the illusion, that there was still a prospect for us of the possibility of preservation from Austrian courts-martial under Russian protection. And in consequence of this warning, as well as of the answer of the Russian commander, which left not even the hope that Russia could reserve to itself

the part of mediator between Austria and Hungary, my proposal would certainly have been rejected, and at the same time the breaking through into the Turkish territory would have been resolved upon, if the members of the military council had not set less value on their own lives than on the speedy deliverance of their fellow-citizens from the miseries of a hopeless war. The supposition that the military council had declared its accordance with my letter to Count Rüdiger only because it had indulged the hope that the Russians would save us from the Austrian courts-martial, would consequently be quite untenable; would be in fact nothing else than intentionally to create a suspicion.

The military council approved of my letter being sent to the Russian commander, because every single member of the council strongly felt that *the* decision of the moment was, whether, in the last issue, the highest honour which one enemy can give to another enemy should fall to the lot of the Russian or the Austrian *general*; and because not a single member of the council overlooked the circumstance that the *Austrian* general, Baron Haynau, had rendered himself unworthy of this highest honour by the first of his doings in Hungary — the well-known executions at Presburg.

Of the prevalence of any other motive in the decision of the military council in favour of my proposal (to lay down our arms before Russian troops exclusively), I have heard nothing. The motives of *apolitical* nature, clearly and distinctly expressed in what precedes, which had determined *me* to make this proposal, could not possibly have led to its being received, because I had not communicated these motives either to a member of the council or to any one else, and because I have never

subsequently heard any expression, from which I could suppose that one of these motives had been referred to during the deliberation by any body.

On the contrary, it is my settled conviction that I should certainly have failed in my proposal to perform the laying down of our arms before Russian troops only, if Baron Haynau had known how — like many a one of his sub-commanders — to gain for himself the fame of a humane personal character, which does not sound dishonourably even in the mouth of an enemy.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

IMMEDIATELY after I had learnt from Count Guyon's report to Governor Kossuth the issue of the battle at Temesvár (consequently before daybreak of the 11th of August), orders to retreat without delay to the right bank of the river were issued to the first and seventh corps, which in consequence of the last dispositions were deployed on the left bank of the Maros. The first corps was charged with the eventual defence of the latter against the Austrian corps which, as is known, had pressed forward, on the preceding day, on the road to Temesvár nearly to Neu-Arad; while the third and seventh corps, together with the division of reserve, encamped in battle-array to the north and north-west of Alt-Arad, on the roads leading to Simánd and Pécska. This disposition originated from the news, on the one hand, that the vanguard of the Russian main army was already posted near Simánd, and on the

other, that a strong Austrian corps was approaching from Pécska.

This position of the army remained unchanged during the whole day, and without being attacked by the Austrians. The Russians, as it became afterwards evident, were not near enough to be able to attack us at Alt-Arad during the course of the 11th.

In the night between the 11th and 12th (after our trumpets had left the head-quarters with my letter, spoken of in the preceding chapter, to Count Rüdiger; and General Damjanics moreover, having previously been informed of the impending unconditional surrender of the army, had declared of his own accord, that as commander of the fortress of Arad he would follow the example of the army), the whole army commanded by me moved from the above-indicated position in and around Arad, on the road to "Világos, reached this point early in the morning of the 12th of August, and encamped near and before this place in battle-array, its front and outposts facing Arad.

Here the whole army remained stationary till late in the morning of the next day.

According to the last news, which I had received on the previous day when still in Arad, relative to the movements of the Russian main army, I necessarily supposed it possible, as intimated in my letter to Count Rüdiger, that I should be pursued by Austrian troops on the retreat from Arad towards Bécs.

This news was, that not the corps of the vanguard, but only Cossacks (the foremost advanced troops) had approached Simánd during the day (the 11th of August). And I knew already, from my experience of the use made of the Cossacks, obtained during the retreat from

Komorn to Arad, that the nearest considerable force of the Russians may with much probability be assumed to be still two, not seldom even three ordinary days' march from the point where the first divisions of Cossacks emerge alone.

Consequently, from the news, that in the course of the 11th the first divisions of Cossacks had been seen only at Simánd (four miles to the north of Arad), I conjectured that the main body of the Russian corps of the vanguard (the commander of this corps was Count Rüdiger, as General Pöltenberg had reported) could scarcely have crossed the river Körös at Nagy-Zerénd (from three to four miles north of Simánd). This conjecture seemed moreover to be confirmed by the circumstance, that Count Rüdiger — as his letter, which reached me through General Pöltenberg, shewed — on the 9th of August was still in Artánd; the distance from Artánd to Nagy-Zerénd being ten miles.

According to this conjecture, which, as I have just shewn, was not unfounded, I could not possibly expect that Count Rüdiger would arrive by daylight of the 12th with his corps between Világos and Arad, in order to separate me — as invited to do by my letter — from the Austrians, and thereby prevent any further conflict between the Austrian troops and those commanded by me. I could not expect this for the simple reason, that the distance from Nagy-Zerénd to the road which leads from Arad to Világos is six miles, and that it was an absolute impossibility for Count Rüdiger to pass over this distance with his corps before late in the evening of the 12th, even if he set out immediately after the receipt of my letter. On the contrary, the advance of an Austrian column from Arad towards Világos in the

course of the same day seemed certainly not impossible.

Count Rüdiger, however — what I could not foresee — thought it sufficient for separating us from the Austrians, to send only his foremost advanced troops from Simánd on the road from Világos to Arad. This was done *before* noon of the 12th of August; and immediately afterwards appeared the commander of these advanced Russian troops, accompanied by our trumpets, who were just returning to the head-quarters in Világos to inform me of this movement.

So long as I must still be prepared for an attack on the part of the Austrians, it was absolutely necessary — considering my very serious intention to oppose them with the greatest energy — to keep the decision of the Arad military council secret from the troops. This necessity had also been perceived by the council, which had pledged itself for this very reason to leave to me personally to fix the time *when* the real object of our retreat from Arad towards Béei should be communicated to the troops, as well as the act of the communication itself.

The time for informing the troops of the mournful fate which awaited them would certainly have been the moment when the report arrived from our outposts, that a hostile column, descending from the direction of Simánd, was approaching laterally the road from Világos to Arad. The commander of the Russian advanced troops, however, preceding his column, had arrived at the head-quarters at Világos before this report; and, prevented partly by his presence, partly by attending to some pressing military affairs which could not be deferred, I failed to repair to the camp immediately after

the receipt of this report from the outposts, and explain in person to the troops the real meaning of the flank-manceuvre of the Russian column. All the corps of the army, alarmed by the approach of this column, had got ready for battle. And now they received without any comment my simple order to abstain in future from all kinds of hostilities. The thought, that treason was going on, was obvious enough to be improved for agitations against my person, or perhaps only against further remaining together, by some declaimers, who would have preferred an aimless flight on their own account, to the fate of being made prisoners of war and its consequences. The result of this was, that I was surprised, late in the afternoon of the 12th, by a report, that mutiny threatened to break out in the camp.

Determined to prevent this, I immediately repaired to the camp: and the event shewed that this report was founded either on exaggeration, or that my personal appearance among the revolted troops must have been sufficient of itself to keep the army obedient to my orders till the laying down of arms was accomplished. For during my presence in the camp I confined myself merely to announcing to the separate army corps, that, perceiving the impossibility of conquering both hostile armies, I had resolved on our voluntary disarming before Russian troops; that I expected obedience, and engaged my life that it would be paid to me in future as it had hitherto; that the surrender was at discretion; that this step nevertheless, in the face of the sad position in which Hungary found itself for the moment, was a patriotic, not a disgraceful one, — one endangering our lives certainly; but that I, on whose head the vengeance of the enemy must chiefly alight, did not shrink from this

step; and that I was convinced, those who had hitherto followed me with manly courage into the battle, would not now desert me; the others, if dismayed, I should know how, with the assistance of their brave comrades, as formerly to drive into the battle, so now into becoming prisoners; to them — the discouraged — it was further declared, that — exclusively for the purpose of rendering impossible a disgraceful flight — on an understanding with me, the army had been completely surrounded by Russian troops; that this measure had no reference to the brave; they — the brave — I knew beforehand could never be regardless of the honourable duty 'of voluntarily maintaining military order in the army up to the last moment.

After I had spoken to this effect to the troops, I returned again to the head-quarters; for from their behaviour towards me, I was already convinced that the danger of mutiny, even if it had been really on the point of breaking out before my ride into the camp, was now over.

In striking contradiction to the mutinous intrigues which, in consequence of the sudden cessation of hostilities against the Russians, had shewn themselves, though only for a little while, in the ranks of the army under my command, whole swarms of fugitives arrived towards evening of the 12th of August at Világos; among others also a detachment of several hundred men (mostly still unarmed recruits), of the presence of which on the right bank of the Maros I had not been at all informed. The leader of this detachment reported to me, that, having been alarmed by the rumour that the Austrians had already occupied Alt-Arad, he had intended about noon to start from Radna by Lippa for Lugos, when an

Austrian column suddenly approached on the left bank of the Maros towards Lippa; whereupon he not only gave up the intended march to Lugos, but immediately burnt down the bridge over the Maros between Radna and Lippa, and again drew back some distance towards Arad. He now really knew not whither he should turn. But among the fugitives, to whom, as to him and to his detachment, the road to Lugos was now interrupted by the Austrian column, the rumour of my march towards Világos soon spread, and that I had already concluded an advantageous peace with the Russians. This rumour determined him and the whole mass of the fugitives to save themselves at Világos.

What a blind belief the rumour that I had obtained an advantageous peace with the Russians must have found beyond the camp and the head-quarters of the army which I commanded, is evident, above all, from the remarkable circumstance, that among the fugitives who arrived at Világos in the course of the 12th of August were a great number of those officers (mostly from Dembinski's army) who had deserted in the beginning of August. They were people of an avowedly prudent character. They would certainly have avoided, at any cost, the proximity of the army under my command, if they had entertained the slightest suspicion that the said advantageous peace concluded with the Russian commander was mere fudge. But how could they, as well as many thousands besides, have any presentiment that the solution of all those oracles contained in Kossuth's farewell proclamation, equally enigmatical and much-promising, would be the unconditional surrender of arms? It must not be said, that they might have deduced it from the proclamation in which I in-

formed the citizens of Alt-Arad of the resignation of the provisional government, as well as of the junction of the highest civil and military power in my person. My proclamation was prose; Kossuth's, poetry. The public, to whom we both spoke, had no comprehension for the prose of the strict warrior; for the poetry of the great agitator, on the contrary, a high degree of susceptibility. The public must not, therefore, be blamed; it may at most be pitied, that the agitator was not a warrior, the warrior not an agitator; that consequently their routes must diverge.

It is scarcely necessary to mention, that of all who subsequently arrived at Világos merely with the intention of saving their own worthy persons under Russian protection — when they had learnt the " advantageous conditions for peace" — those only remained with the army, who, being subordinate soldiers, belonged to the ranks, and were obliged to give up all further attempts at flight.

In the category of those whom the absurd rumours had enticed to Világos must, however, *not* be included *those men* who, determined to share the fate of the army, had never left it since it was in Alt-Arad. These were, the ministers Csányi and General Aulich; the generals not belonging to the active contingent of the army, Kiss, Lahner, Knézich, Schweidel, Gáspár, Török, and Lenkey; and besides many members of the Diet. Of the latter, almost all — so far as I know — belonged to the peace-party.

On the previous day (the 11th of August) — as has been mentioned — and this before the resignation of the provisional government, I had communicated to the minister Csányi my determination to surrender at discretion.

Immediately after the retirement of the provisional government, however, and before the convocation of the decisive military council, a lengthened consultation took place between Csányi and myself upon the questions of an unconditional surrender, or a still further prosecution of the contest. Csányi endeavoured to maintain divers possibilities of new success on the battle-field, in order to gain me to a continuance of the struggle; and he did not give up his endeavours until after I had undisguisedly expressed my conviction that, in our present situation, without war-supplies, without money, with the support of the troops dependent exclusively on contributions — even if the possibility of new successful war-operations were admitted — on the one hand, the permanence of them must at all events be denied; and on the other hand, the *objection* to a combat, to be maintained, against the well-known Wallenstein maxim, in our *own* country, must be plainly seen. It was on this occasion also that Csányi declared, without being asked, that he was determined to remain with the army; for he felt there was no necessity to save his life, if he could no longer devote it to the service of the fatherland.

General Aulich, like the other generals, had been summoned to take part in the council of war in which the sending of my letter to Count Rüdiger was approved.

The above-mentioned members of the Diet, finally, had joined, as it appeared, properly the minister Csányi direct. Disquieted by the thought that they had taken this step perhaps in the vain expectation of finding in the Russian camp protection from the persecutions of Austria, I applied to Csányi, for the purpose of learning something certain on this point. This I did at Világos on the 12th of August. And Csányi assured

me, he had communicated to his companions, while still in Alt-Arad, that our surrender would be at discretion. Several of them thereupon were undecided whether they should remain or flee; the greater number, however, without hesitation declared that they were determined *not* to avoid the fate which awaited them in the fatherland; they only wished for the present to remain with the army, until the enemy should have disposed of their persons. The undecided, however, he had himself advised to flee; but he was sorry he had done so, — for they, very probably hurt thereby, now declared that they also would persevere, like himself and the others; though he feared that this victory of their sense of national honour over the instinct of self-preservation was not a lasting one, that their courage to die would not remain unshaken; and in his opinion all to whom there seemed at this moment to be a moral necessity voluntarily to face death for their belief in the justice of the cause of the fatherland — before they took the decisive step, ought to examine themselves conscientiously, lest their strength should desert them, when it might be necessary *not* to deny their belief in the face of sneering enemies, nay even at the place of execution. And those who felt themselves not fully adequate to this trial ought to recognise flight as their nearest patriotic duty; that the nation might not endure the disgrace of having to blush for the pusillanimity of those men on whom it once relied as on a rock.

Let the reader take into consideration with due earnestness the facts of the two conferences held at Arad between Csányi and myself, upon the necessity of an unconditional surrender, undeniable in a purely patriotic point of view, — the summoning of Aulich and

the other generals to the decisive military council, — Csányi's frank behaviour towards his companions; and he will be obliged unreservedly to assent to my assertion, that those ministers, those generals, and those members of the Diet, who of their own accord joined the army in Alt-Arad, can by no means be included in the category of those, who, as we have seen, enticed by the absurd rumour that I had concluded an advantageous peace with the Russians, suddenly emerged, late in the course of the 12th of August, at Világos, and speedily undeceived, just as suddenly disappeared again. The minister of finance, Duschek, whose participation in the contest of Hungary against Austria — as Kossuth himself assured me — was not a voluntary one, was at Lugos at the time of my arrival at Arad (on the 9th of August), for the purpose of setting the bank-note presses again to work. This, however, in consequence of the defeat of Dembinski's army at Temesvár, had become impracticable. The presses were therefore brought from Lugos to Arad. The order to do this was issued by Kossuth. The minister of finance consequently arrived in person at Arad on the 11th of August, but not till the provisional government had resigned. At least I do not remember to have spoken with him there before this time. I gave him an order, in the course of the following day (12th of August), immediately to convey to Világos the whole store of the public treasury in gold and silver, as well in bars as in coin, together with the still-existing state-notes; and — not convinced of his willingness to obey my orders — I appointed two officers by his side, with authority to oblige him to the punctual execution of my order, by employing even coercive measures, according to circum-

stances. Thus the money in the public treasury was at my disposal. I had it distributed among the army, that it might receive at least in part the pay which had been due to it for several weeks. The coin found remaining in the public treasury was unfortunately not sufficient to pay them in full. The bars of precious metals in store, however, I gave in charge to the minister of finance, and left him to choose between conveying them to the Russians or to the Austrians. He resolved upon the latter.

Besides the minister of finance, the staff-officers of hussars, Colonel Zambelli and Lieut.-Colonel Markovich also, as I know, declared themselves in favour of surrender to the *Austrians*. This, however, I only learned accidentally, in consequence of a violent discussion, which took place at Világos on the 12th of August, between these two staff-officers and some of their comrades. I saw myself, however, obliged thereby to inform them, in the presence of the generals and staff-officers of the army, that I expected the resolution of the military council of Arad to be respected as the last unchangeable decision upon the fate of the army; that since the moment when my letter to Count Rüdiger left the head-quarters at Alt-Arad, I considered the execution of this determination to be the army's honourable duty; I had consequently to prevent the subsequent discussion of the question, whether with the Russians or with the Austrians there was more prospect of escaping with a whole skin, as incompatible with the honour of the army; that to this end I proposed to them to leave the army instantly, and surrender themselves to the nearest Austrian outposts; that I called upon them the more decidedly to do this, as it was quite impossible for

me to hold out to them the least prospect, except of a not brutal treatment on the part of the Russians, whereby those expectations could be compensated which they seemed to attach to the performance of the act of surrendering before the Austrians. They preferred, however, to remain with the army, and not again to discuss the questionable expediency of executing the laying down of our arms before the Austrians.

In the just-mentioned last assembly of the generals and staff-officers of the army I had purposely undisguisedly repeated my conviction, that the most we might expect from the Russians was a less brutal treatment than from the Austrians, but nothing else, namely, no kind of protection from the vengeance of Austria, — for the purpose of preventing the optimist self-delusions, in which a part of the officers in the army — it is true, in consequence of a quite peculiar inducement thereto — began to indulge already on the 12th of August at Világos.

This inducement was furnished by an invitation of Count Rüdiger, which reached me on the same day, to inform him of the most urgent requests of the army, as he was ready to intercede with his chief to gain attention for them; and the conjectures of some of the officers relative to the bearing of this invitation mounted so high as to assume that there was now a possibility of forthwith passing over into the Russian service.

Several subaltern officers even requested to be advanced to a higher rank before the laying down of arms, because, as they thought, this higher rank in our army would secure to them a proportionately higher one in the Russian army. I represented to them, how unworthy it was to think of entering into the Russian

army, in the face of the loss of the cause of the fatherland being just the direct consequence of the Russian intervention. They seemed, however, not so much affected by my representations relative to the unworthiness of their request, as, on the contrary, to be inconsolable that I so decidedly refused them the latter. And, in fact, they and their sympathisers did not allow themselves to be at all disturbed by the severe censure, which, agreeing with me, the bravest generals and staff-officers of the army expressed at every opportunity about their thinking on Russian service. Based on the thesis, certainly indisputable, that "one may ask any thing," and without caring about thereby losing the esteem of his companions in arms, many a one persisted, that the request to permit those who wished to enter Russian service should be comprehended in the specification of the army's requests which was to be delivered to Count Rüdiger.

I did not consider that the philanthropic offer of Count Rüdiger to obtain attention from his chief to the most urgent requests of our army was insincere: any hope of a favourable result from his efforts, I must, however, unfortunately renounce; for the Russian commander-in-chief, in his answer to the diplomatic letter of Szemere and Count Batthyányi (see Chapter xxxii.), had not at all left me in the dark as to the extent of his task respecting us; and to attend to even the most natural wishes of the army under my command would not be a warlike but a political act — lay therefore beyond the limits which, according to the assertion of the Russian general himself, were prescribed to him.

Consequently, on the 12th of August at Világos, our future, in spite of this philanthropic offer on the part

of the Russian officer, appeared to me not less comfortable than on the previous day at Arad; and in fact I had continually to remind myself of the duty, unmistakable if viewed from the point of national honour, of maintaining the discipline of the army till the last moment of its existence; that I might not be overcome by the anxious apprehension, that the delivery of my own person to save the lives of my subordinates might nevertheless hardly suffice, and be induced forthwith to admonish all the generals and superior staff-officers of the army to take to flight. In the case of some of them — those, namely, who in the fall of Hungary happened not to have to lament that of their country — I thought, however, that I ought not to abstain from this invitation: I ventured it — but in vain! To the thought of forestalling the forcible separation from his friends and companions in arms, for the sake of his own safety, no one of them all was accessible.

The forcible separation, however, was near at hand, and urged us — my friends and comrades as well as myself — on the evening preceding the accomplishment of the fate we had chosen for ourselves, to the solemn exchange of a last encouraging "God be with thee!"

In the night between the 12th and 13th of August the chief of the general staff of Count Rüdiger appeared in the head-quarters at Világos, for the purpose of arranging with me, where the act of surrender was to take place on the following day. The result of this conference was as follows:

The voluntary disarming of the army under my command should be made at Szöllös — at the point of junction of the roads from Kis-Jenő by Zaránd and from Világos by Uj-Pankota to Boros-Jenő — on the

ground between the southern outskirts of Szollös and the Mühlen canal, crossing the road from Világos.

The corps of Count Rüdiger, very early on the 13th of August, approaching from Kis-Jenő, should enclose the above-designated ground on the east, north, and west, occupying with a part of its troops the brook Csiger, between Moroda and Szollös, as well as the latter place, and establishing its main body between Zaránd and Szollös, with its front towards the east.

The army under my command, on the contrary, in order to afford the Russian corps the time necessary for taking up the indicated positions, should not start from Világos for Szollös till late in the forenoon of the 13th of August, followed by the column of the Russian cavalry corps standing between Világos and Arad. This column would finally have to occupy the Mühlen canal also, as soon as the last Hungarian troops had crossed it.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

ON the 13th of August 1849, between ten and eleven o'clock in the forenoon, their last encampment was left by the shattered remains of those troops whose victories had certainly preserved Hungary from the disgrace of having failed in a proper answer to the "Olmütz octroyed," but at the same time had enabled Louis Kossuth to give a turn to *the just contest for the law* by which he — depriving the nation of its just right — could only gain for himself the thanks of the Austrian government, never those of his fatherland.

In company with some officers of the army, whom their duty did not confine close to the troops, I pushed forward towards Szöllös.

Not far from Uj-Pankota we met a Russian trumpet, who was charged, in the name of his chief, Count Rüdiger, to ask from me a definite verbal declaration, that it was my sincere determination unconditionally to lay down our arms at the place appointed.

I unhesitatingly made the desired declaration; and in order fully to convince the trumpet of my sincerity, I requested him immediately to conduct me to his chief.

This the trumpet agreed to, and remained close by me while we (my companions and myself) pursued our ride to the Mühlen canal before Szöllös. Here the trumpet left us, in order, first of all, to carry my answer to his chief; while we awaited his return on the bridge over the canal, and meanwhile could convince ourselves that the disposition of the hostile troops had really been carried out as agreed upon. The open ground enabled us to perceive, in the east, a hostile column on the right bank of the brook Csiger between Moroda and Szöllös. The latter place lies to the north of the canal bridge; from the outskirts glittered the Russian helmets, and in the west, leaning to the left on Zaránd, to the right on the Mühlen canal, was deployed the main body of the enemy's force. In this direction the trumpet turned from the high road, after he had left us by the canal bridge. He soon returned, and told me that Count Rüdiger was waiting for me in front of his troops.

Followed by my companions, I immediately proceeded to the place which had been pointed out. As

we drew near to the hostile position, we perceived in front of it an isolated group of horsemen; and the next moment, one of them detaching himself from the party singly approached us.

My companions now stopped; I advanced alone up to the rider, saluted him, and gave my name; for supposed that I now stood before the commander of the Russian corps, General Count Rüdiger. And such was indeed the case. Count Rüdiger seemed filled with the noble desire of alleviating as much as possible the depression of my present situation; for his first words to me contained the frank assurance that he fully appreciated the motive which had induced us voluntarily to abandon the prosecution of the war; and in confirmation of this he offered me his right hand. An audible, involuntary exclamation of my companions betrayed how agreeably they were surprised at this proof of esteem from the victor to the now unfortunate leader of the vanquished. This exclamation also betrayed, perhaps, the sudden revival of hope in the heart of many a one of my companions, — a hope which it seemed, however, impossible for the man to fulfil by whom it had — with the purest intention, I am convinced — been for a moment revived, and afterwards nourished.

Taking the respectful demeanour of the hostile leader towards me for the emanation of a certain reverence, not perhaps for my person, but for the greatness of our misfortune, I delivered to Count Rüdiger, together with a list of our requests, the names also of those members of the provisional Government and of the Diet who had voluntarily attached themselves to the army, and who had requested me to obtain, if possible, for them at least permission to remain with the army during

its captivity, until the fate of each of them had been decided.

The very modest request of these resigned men could now scarcely be disregarded; but Count Rüdiger not only guaranteed to them, as to all who surrendered, the undisturbed possession of the property they had with them, but consented that all generals and officers should retain their arms. For the remaining requests, which he had not the power to grant, he promised to use all his influence with his chief.

In anticipation, I felt myself called upon to assure Count Rüdiger of the most hearty thanks of my companions in misfortune.

The inquiry on my part, whether I had to await special orders to march up the army under my command, and the answer, by which the arranging of the plan for our self-disarming was left to my own discretion, formed the remainder of the only conversation which took place, *previous* to the completion of the surrender, between Count Rüdiger and myself.

Meanwhile the *tête* of the Hungarian army was leisurely approaching the Mühlen canal. The narrow carriage-road of the bridge easily caused stoppages in defiling over it; and to prevent this, I immediately returned with my companions to the bridge, and ordered the army to form *en masse* in two lines on the ground between the Mühlen canal and the village of Szbllos — the front towards the Russian main army at Zaránd. The first line was formed by the third and seventh corps; the second line by the Arad division of reserve and the first corps; in the space between the lines were collected all the batteries; the train of the army was behind the second line.

The oppressive sultriness of the atmosphere — the sky unclouded and not a breath of air stirring — unusually retarded the march of the troops. Besides, they had nothing more to lose.

As the last division of the army crossed the bridge, the sun was just setting.

And in the twilight of the 13th of August, 1849, General Count Rüdiger, the commander of a Russian army corps, inspected the Hungarian troops under my command. But the cavalry was dismounted, and had their swords hung on the pommels of their saddles; the muskets of the infantry were piled in pyramids; the artillery was drawn close together and unmanned; the flags and standards — lay there unprotected before the disarmed ranks.

CHAPTER XXXV.

IN the night between the 13th and 14th of August 1849, I was escorted from the Russian camp at Zaránd to Kis-Jenő, and on the morning of the 14th likewise all the other participators in the laying down of arms.

At nightfall of the 14th I had to leave Kis-Jenő under the charge of a Russian staff-officer, to be conveyed in a carriage to Gross-Wardein, the head-quarters of the Russian army. The doctor, whose assistance I still needed, and three or four of my most-closely attached officers, were allowed to accompany me. The other generals, officers, and civil notabilities who were prisoners, received notice, in the course of the 14th of August, by means of a placard, to be prepared next

morning likewise to set out for Gross-Wardein. As I subsequently learned, on the 15th they began the march from Kis-Jenö towards Gross-Wardein, but were led back from the station of Nagy-Szalonta to Sarkad (eight miles to the south-west of Gross-Wardein), and I accordingly in vain expected a re-union with them in Gross-Wardein.

The resolution, however, which I had definitively formed at Arad in the night between the 10th and 11th of August, to give the impulse to a speedy unbloody termination of the hopeless war, I had executed to its last consequences. Letters written by myself were already on their way to the commanders of the fortresses which were still occupied by Hungarian troops, as well as to the leaders of divers Hungarian corps and detachments isolated in the district of operations of the Russian army. The latter, in my letters, I distinctly called upon to follow my example: with regard to the former, I confined myself, as far as I recollect, to the simple communication of facts; and this from the twofold reason, that I could not overlook either the absolute situation of the commander of a fortress threatened by the enemy, nor the possibility of a not unconditional surrender being eventually offered to him.

The confidence of the troops once commanded by me had mostly been concentrated in those men, who, thoroughly understanding my mode of thought and action, had remained inaccessible to the suspicion, that in the unconditional laying down of our arms generally, or at least in the performance of this act before the Russians, I had had regard to the safety of my own person. Those, on the contrary, who had felt themselves perhaps moved to render me suspected of this in-

tention had probably so little renown with the troops, or one so extremely unfavourable, that an attempt by them at rendering me suspected must have been unsuccessful.

Therein lies the solution of the enigma, how — in spite of my scrupulously avoiding any delusive pretensions to prospects of safety, nay even simultaneously disavowing all such illusions — I could succeed in performing the act of surrender, without discipline being in any way considerably disturbed in the ranks of the army.

And had it pleased the victorious alliance, in consideration of the circumstances:

That I — although not agreeing with the "Debreczin act of independence" — had nevertheless fought under its asgis against the "Olmütz octroyed," for the carrying out of which such immense efforts had been made;

That I further — although perceiving from the first that the protraction of the combat against the allied armies was hopeless — nevertheless, by summoning up all the moral and physical forces I could command, assisted to continue the war until at last Kossuth himself officially declared that all hope of Hungary's carrying on the defence of the country any longer with a prospect of success was at an end;

That I finally — although in consequence of the laying down of our arms some Russians and Austrians had their lives prolonged — had really determined upon and performed this act neither from love of those Russians and Austrians, nor from repenting of my acts;

If, I say, in consideration of these obvious circumstances, it had pleased the victorious alliance not to

overlook, that *I*, of all the actors in the laying down of our arms, was certainly the most unworthy of its clemency, and if it consequently had allowed me to fall, it would most probably the more certainly have spared *me* the posthumous fame of having betrayed my fatherland, or at least my companions, and *itself* the slander of having succeeded in subduing Hungary only by the aid of my treachery; since, so far as I know, neither *it* nor *I* have to fear the disclosure of any fact from which it could be proved that *it* had bartered its pardon for the surrender, or *I* the surrender for my pardon.

However, on the first day of my involuntary arrival at Gross-Wardein (the 15th of August), the Russian commander-in-chief ordered me to be brought before him; and although he received me with vehement reproaches about the obstinacy of my resistance, and plainly declared to me at first that besides my own life I had forfeited that also of my comrades, — he nevertheless suddenly went on to a consideration of the voluntariness of our act of surrender; and concluded finally by a promise of interceding for pardon for me alone, though unsought for by me either directly or indirectly.

And hardly had eight days elapsed when an officer in the suite of the Russian commander-in-chief announced to me, in the name of the latter, that I had been pardoned by his majesty the Czar; further, that his majesty the Czar had intrusted his eldest son, the Grand Duke, heir to the throne, with the mission to obtain for me likewise the pardon of his majesty the Emperor of Austria; and that should this be refused me, I was to be taken to Russia, in virtue of the order of his majesty the Czar. At the same time this officer

demanded my sword from me, and intimated that it was the wish of his serene highness Prince Paszkiewicz that I should immediately lay aside the Honvéd uniform, and dress as a civilian.

A few days after this occurrence the following documents were handed to me by the Austrian major, Norbert von Andrassy, adjutant to the person of Baron Haynau.

" Chief Command of the Royal Imperial Army in Hungary.

No. 186.

Secret.

" His Majesty, my most gracious emperor and sovereign, with the hereditary clemency of his most high person, has deigned to pardon you.

" You are, however, not allowed to reside in Hungary, but in another crown-land, and in the first instance Carinthia is assigned for your abode, whither you have to repair without delay under the conduct of the royal imperial Major von Andrassy.

" There is no objection to your taking with you your family and effects.

(Signed) " HAYNAU, Master of the Ordnance.

"Head-quarters, Arad, Aug. 26, 1849.

"M. ARTHUR VON GÖRGEI."

" M. Arthur von Görgei and his lady are obliged to travel in company with the adjutant of the person of his Excellency the commanding Master of the Ordnance Baron Haynau, the right honourable Major Norbert

von Andrassy, as far as the place which he shall fix for both.

(Signed)" COUNT STEPHEN SZIRMAY,

Royal Imperial Lieut.-Colonel, and substitute of his Excellency the Royal Imperial Commissary-in-chief Francis Count von Zichy.

" *Gross-Wedein, Aug. 27, 1849.*"

The latter document was issued by the commissariat representing the Austrian government in the headquarters of the Russian army.

And Major von Andrassy conducted me without more ado from Gross-Wardein by Crakow and Vienna to Klagenfurt.*

While still in Gross-Wardein I had a foretaste of the injurious effect of all these things on my reputation. Already, in consequence of my separation from the rest of the prisoners, the rumour was spread, that I was about to be received into the Russian army as a general; and the circumstance that such a rumour found belief sufficiently proved of itself in what haste the public opinion had been to impress on the act of surrender the stamp of treason.

The facts which soon afterwards, nay almost simultaneously, became publicly known, namely, that the

* Major von Andrassy during the whole time of his escort-ser vice — which, as I can very well conceive, was any thing but agreeable — behaved towards me in a most chivalrous manner. After our arrival at Klagenfurt, he had moreover the kindness to commend me to the protection of Captain von Kurzendorfer, at that time commander of the place; a man — I speak from my own experience — distinguished by the most humane disposition, and at the same time having the rare courage boldly to prove this by his conduct to the unfortunate, without respect of persons, even in opposition to public opinion.

Emperor of Russia retained to himself the decision about *my* fate exclusively, and ordered, on the contrary, all the other prisoners to be unreservedly delivered up to Austria, sufficed to complete the justification of the condemnatory judgment which had been passed upon me.

In addition to this, the Russians, on the occasion of our surrender, it was said, had again got into their hands a subordinate individual who had deserted to us. This man (while the army under my command was stationed between Miskolcz and Tokaj), as leader of a Russian patrol of cavalry, being sent from the Gyöngyös high road towards the passage of the Theiss between Poroszló and Tiszafüred, at that time in our possession, had executed his determination of passing over to the enemy (into our ranks), abandoning his men. The detached commander of our column at Tiszafüred hereupon, on his own authority, had the deserter immediately escorted from Tiszafüred to Arad, as he wished to serve under Field-marshal Lieut. Bern. Nevertheless, instead of arriving at the Bem army, he happened to come into the camp of that which I commanded, and, through our surrender, before a Russian council of war.

Although the first knowledge I had of the existence of this individual was during my captivity, from a Russian staff-officer, who communicated to me the doings and destiny of the delinquent, as a topic of the day; nevertheless public opinion accused me of the intentional delivery of this Pole (in the " Pole" lies the point) to Russia, and welcomed therein an evident proof that I had shunned the use of no means to obtain pardon from the Czar.

Consequently it was to be foreseen, that the sum

of eleven hundred gold half-imperials,* which I had received from Prince Paszkiewicz, would figure in the general judgment about me wholly as the reward for delivering up this Pole, if not even as the price of blood for the treason committed against the fatherland, or at least against my comrades.

However, although originally by no means a despiser of the public opinion in Hungary, I had nevertheless,

* At the surrender, all the ready-money I possessed amounted to about fifty ducats in gold, and perhaps 2,000 florins in Kossuth notes.)* After the latter had been taken from me in the Russian head-quarters by order of the Austrian commissariat of the country, I was forced to sell my horses at any price, and immediately dismiss my servants. Prince Paszkiewicz, accidentally informed of this in the first days of my captivity, had the sum of 300 gold half-imperials placed at my disposal; and on the evening preceding my involuntary departure from Gross-Wardein the Prince in person handed to me a sum of 500 pieces of the same coin, when he had learned that my removal to Klagenfurt was not to take place at the expense of the state, and that the possibility of prolonging my existence was in no way secured to me, even for the immediate future.

Both sums, it is true, were offered to me as loans for an indefinite period, with the unmistakable intention of not wounding my feelings. My expectation, however, that the reaction of my revolutionary activity on my person would free me for ever from further care about support, having been disappointed by my unforeseen pardon, I was now unfortunately in the condition of being forced to accept with thanks what was called a loan, in spite of my apprehension of not being able again to repay it.

I have above stated the total sum received from Prince Paszkiewicz to amount to 1,100 gold half-imperials, because, besides the 800 pieces, I had also received 300 to be distributed among the Hungarian officers who had been transported to Gross-Wardein, in part together with me, in part in the course of the next following days. These officers were thereby to be enabled to procure for themselves civilian attire, as they were to lay aside the Honveád uniform immediately after their arrival at Gross-Wardein.

The ducat = about 9s. 6d.; the florin = 2. — *Trans.*

before the 13th of August 1849, ceased to respect it unreservedly — thanks to its numerous aberrations during the time, though but short, of our acquaintance.

And in fact it was the sorrowful future of Hungary and of my companions, not that of my public honour, which grieved me.

The future of *Hungary* was considered as lost after the surrender, even by *those* patriots who during the combat between Hungary and Austria had sided with the latter — but not in the field.*

The future of a great part of my *companions* evidently fluctuated between prison and death.

Csányi was brought a day or two later than myself to Gross-Wardein, in the strictest custody. He had with him in coin a part of the fortune of his ward, and earnestly requested a meeting with me, intending to forward this money through me to its owner. It was too late. A meeting was refused us. On the 14th of August 1849, at Kis-Jenő, I had taken leave for ever (without having a presentiment of it) of Csányi, as well as of all my companions, with the exception of a few.

The other civilian notabilities, who had joined in the act of surrender, were treated, as I heard, at first less severely. I even spoke to some of them in Gross-Wardein. They were for the present sent to their homes by means of compulsory passports.

The hussars and Honvéds, from sergeant-major downwards (those also who had formerly been in the

* Whether these patriots had formerly entertained hopes, and of what kind, relative to the salvation of the fatherland, I know not. It may easily be conceived, that *before* the surrender I had no opportunity of coming in contact with any of them.

Austrian service), received an amnesty soon after the surrender of arms.

The generals and officers, however, were kept in custody. Baron Haynau had reserved to himself for a more suitable time the decision of their fate. I could not possibly be deceived as to the horrid meaning of this reservation.

So long as the unfortunate men, like myself, were detained prisoners by the Russians, I still hoped indeed to induce Prince Paszkiewicz to use his influence, of which he seemed too prodigal towards me, rather in favour of my companions. I proceeded on the supposition that the Russian commander-in-chief had come to the determination to interfere only for *my* safety, in consequence of the erroneous opinion that our surrender was to be considered as the necessary consequence of my *absolute* will. To convince Prince Paszkiewicz of the contrary was, therefore, the nearest object of my endeavours. I duly rendered prominent the spontaneousness of the assent of my comrades to the laying down of our arms, their co-operation in the accomplishment of this act, as well as the impossibility of executing it without their assent and co-operation; and moreover declared to the Russian commander-in-chief, that I did not in general value the pardon which he designed for me, and least of all if it should be the unchangeable fate of my companions to be delivered up to Baron Haynau.

However plainly Prince Paszkiewicz's decided inclination towards generosity was proved by the humane treatment which my comrades and myself enjoyed in the Russian camp, his answer nevertheless was always confined to the comfortless assurance that it was im-

possible for him to attend to my representations and prayers. And when the delivery of the prisoners to an Austrian escort had taken place — although I knew perfectly well in how noble a manner Prince Paszkiewicz had directly solicited the pardon of the Emperor of Austria for my companions — I could not but the more certainly despair of their preservation, as in the mean time the influence of some things which had happened seemed in itself to be sufficient to endanger in the highest degree the life of these unfortunate men.

General Damjanics, commander of the fortress of Arad, immediately after the laying down of our arms, had informed Count Rüdiger of his determination to surrender this fortress only to Russian troops. The Russian general Buturlin, charged to open negotiations with the fortress, and provided for this purpose with a letter from me to General Damjanics, went consequently on the 15th of August to Alt-Arad, and obtained a capitulation, in which the garrison of Alt-Arad engaged to evacuate the place on the 17th of August in the afternoon, at discretion, but only before Russian troops; and General Buturlin, on his part, guaranteed the non-presence of Austrian troops at the act of surrender. The fortress had, however, been blockaded on the left bank of the Maros by an Austrian corps, under Field-marshal Lieut. Schlick, who, before it commenced negotiating with the Russians, had summoned it to surrender, but had received a decided negative answer. When Baron Haynau, therefore, was informed of the treaty for capitulation, which had been concluded immediately after between the garrison and General Buturlin, he issued an order to Count Schlick, the execution of which must place the Russian general

in the fatal alternative of either not keeping his word to the garrison of Arad (for the non-presence of Austrian troops at the act of surrender), or of opposing in a hostile manner his troops to those under Count Schlick. Count Rüdiger — early informed of Haynau's order, and perceiving that General Buturlin would be obliged, in virtue of his treaty, to prevent the execution of this order even by armed force, and that consequently a conflict between the Austrian and Russian troops would be unavoidable — despatched without delay an officer to the Austrian head-quarters at Temesvár, for the purpose of inducing Baron Haynau to revoke his order to Count Schlick. The deputy of Count Rüdiger found Baron Haynau obstinate in a high degree; and only the impressive representation of the Russian officer, that through this order the existence of Austria, scarcely saved, would again be called in question, at the last moment succeeded in obtaining its revocation. Count Rüdiger had beforehand charged his deputy at once to convey Baron Haynau's counter-order to Count Schlick. The latter — on the one hand, firmly resolved, from well understanding the interests of his Monarch, not to obey Haynau's order; on the other hand, believing the Baron capable of punishing his inevitable disobedience in the most inconsiderate manner — in the Russian officer, hastening back from Temesvár to Arad with Haynau's counter-order, hailed the saviour of his life.

The news of these occurrences, rapidly spread through the camp of the Russian army, gave rise to remarks upon Baron Haynau's personal character which appeared by no means to spring from feelings of esteem. Haynau's proclamation at Temesvár on the 18th of August 1849, by which the Russian army felt itself sorely

wounded, had the effect of exposing not only the person of the Austrian commander-in-chief, but likewise his army, to these remarks.

The Russian officers, who, following the noble example of their generals, from the day of the surrender had endeavoured to alleviate as much as possible the captivity of my companions in war, in their excitement against the Austrians now went so far as remarkably to distinguish the Hungarian prisoners, sometimes in the presence of Austrian officers, nay even to treat the latter with undisguised disrespect before the former. It soon came to encounters between separate individuals of the allied armies; and rumour, which reports every thing in a fabulous manner, developed from this by degrees the certainty of a war being already about to break out between Austria and Russia, in which Hungary was of course not to espouse the side of Austria. However, the circumstance that the prisoners were delivered up at Sarkat to an Austrian detachment deprived the nascent rumours of more than a merely ephemeral existence; and only the facts, on which these rumours were based, endured and *operated afterwards*, and this presumptively to the unavoidable destruction of these unfortunate men; for all that I had hitherto learnt relative to the character of Baron Haynau increased my apprehension that he would scarcely fail, in deciding upon the fate of my companions, to make these defenceless Hungarians pay for all the mortification caused, especially to his self-love, by armed Russians.

And so long as *my* pardon was valid only in Russia, *not in Austria also*, he could indulge his impulse to do so the more heedlessly, as even the most copious use of the *jus gladii* committed to him could more natu-

rally be represented as a state necessity to free united Austria.

But from the moment when the Emperor of Austria was also pleased to pardon *me*, the rule of *the jus gladii* over those who had been under my command against Austria must, according to my conviction, have ceased to be necessary to the state of Austria.

THE END.