

S A R A J E V O

A STUDY IN THE ORIGINS OF THE GREAT WAR

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TO
MY WIFE
AS A MEMORY OF
FOUR JUGOSLAV JOURNEYS
TOGETHER
(1912, 1913, 1920, 1925.)

SARAJEVO

(A SERB FOLKSONG)

Sarajevo, whence comes thy gloom?
Tell me, has fire consumed thee?
Or has the flood engulfed thy streets?
Or has the plague laid hold on thee?

Softly Sarajevo gives answer:
" Had fire consumed me so sore,
My shining courts would rise again.
Had the fierce flood engulfed my streets,
My markets would be cleansed and fresh.
But plague has laid her murderous hand,
Her murderous hand on young and old,
And those I love has torn apart."

PREFACE

MUCH has been written on the immediate origins of the Great War and the complicated diplomatic conflict which preceded actual hostilities; but till very recently the Balkan aspect of the question has not received the attention which it deserves. The two most authoritative surveys in English — Mr. Headlam-Morley's *The History of Twelve Days* (1915) and Sir Charles Oman's *The Outbreak of the War* (1918) — are now both out of date, owing to the subsequent publication of the German and Austrian diplomatic documents, and of much supplementary material of a less official character. Thus there is great need of a book summarising all the latest evidence on a question which is of burning importance in the Europe of to-day.

The original German theory, which made of Britain and of Sir Edward Grey the villains of the piece, has long since been exploded, and, for the time at least, abandoned even in Germany itself: nor is it ever likely to convince any person who, with open mind, reads that statesman's newly published memoirs. The attack was then transferred to Russia, and the alleged methods by which a general mobilisation was carried out behind the back of the Tsar were treated as responsible for the final catastrophe. The superficiality of this argument was from the first apparent to all save the wilfully blind, and was finally demonstrated by the critical study of General Dobrorolski and other publications. The most recent tendency has been to shift the main responsibility on to the shoulders of Serbia; and it therefore becomes all the more necessary to place the Serbian side of the problem in the forefront of discussion, instead of treating

it as a mere accessory to general diplomatic history and thereby missing the true significance of events.

The present volume, then, is an attempt to subject much new and hitherto undigested material to a critical and detailed analysis, and to place in their proper European perspective both the Austro-Serbian quarrel and the crime of Sarajevo which resulted from it. I found myself almost involuntarily driven to the attempt, while engaged upon a larger work which traces the Yugoslav national movement from its origins to the achievement of unity and independence. It soon became obvious that to treat the crisis of 1914 in that detail which alone could ensure fairness and make it comprehensible would utterly destroy the proportions of the proposed book, and I therefore decided to detach it from the main narrative and present it to the public in a form which would leave freer play to the argument. During a long visit to Yugoslavia last spring I was able to obtain much additional information from first-hand sources, and especially from the survivors of the revolutionary movement inside the Dual Monarchy, whose spontaneous nature has been too often overlooked.

It is hardly too much to assert that one prime cause of the disaster which befell Europe was the failure of her leading statesmen to estimate truly the forces at work in what was called the " Eastern " or " Balkan " Question. Without any accurate diagnosis there could obviously be no hope of applying an effective remedy; and hence the measures adopted between 1908 and 1914 at best only postponed, and at worst actually aggravated, the malady. One fact which emerges from the following narrative is the superficial outlook of all the Powers towards a problem so full of explosive elements as the Southern Slav; and this may perhaps serve as a reminder that similar national problems subsist in an acute and unsolved form, even in post-war Europe, and deserve close and constant attention.

In this connection I desire to make quite clear the motives which prompted me to undertake this work. After seven years of confusion and recrimination Europe at last seems to be moving slowly in the direction of peace and conciliation; and there is a tendency in some quarters to regard the question of responsibility either as a mere irritant which should now be relegated to the background and replaced by the motto "Forget and forgive," or as an insidious excuse for re-opening problems which the war has solved. Both these views seem to me fundamentally false. The question of war guilt is likely to, and ought to, occupy some measure of the attention of all who wish to see the European Commonwealth placed on a sounder and safer basis; for it provides the main clues by which we may judge and compare the merits of the old system and the new. An honest investigation of the causes of the war, however severe the verdict to which it may lead, cannot properly be regarded as a vindictive act towards our former enemies; and I for one am perfectly prepared to cooperate with German no less than Allied students of the problem, with a view to the elucidation of the truth. The stronger our condemnation of the old forces and the old *regime*, the keener should be our desire to establish a common basis of outlook and of action with the new.

A considerable portion of the present volume had already been completed when the publication of an amazing article by Mr. Ljuba Jovanovic aroused acute controversy at home and abroad, and led to a determined attempt to saddle Serbia with the main responsibility for the outbreak of the Great War. In chapter vi. I have tried to reduce this incident to its true-proportions, and an appendix to the same chapter contains a summary of subsequent developments. The silence of Mr. PaSic and his Government — due apparently to intricate motives of internal party politics and to a singular indifference

to moral considerations — reflects great discredit upon them, and has gravely injured the reputation of their country abroad, but none the less it cannot affect the main issues involved.

I owe a special debt of gratitude to Mr. Headlam-Morley, who allowed me to read the advanced proofs of the complete edition of *British Diplomatic Documents* relating to the outbreak of the war, which he has prepared for publication and which is due to appear shortly. I was thus enabled to add valuable points of detail to my narrative, and above all to assure myself that nothing really material to the issue had been withheld by the British Government in August 1914. Much has been written for and against Lord Grey's policy, but even to this day he has never received full credit for the publication of the frankest and fullest White Paper ever published in our history. The moral effect of that publication was simply incalculable, both at home and abroad; and the publication of the German, Austrian, and Russian documents, and the British Government's decision last December to entrust Mr. Gooch and Mr. Temperley with a similar task, were, it seems to me, merely the logical consequence of Lord Grey's initiative in August 1914 and of its decisive influence upon world opinion.

R. W. SETON-WATSON.

15 November, 1925.

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SERBO-CROAT ORTHOGRAPHY.

c =ts in the English	" lots "	nj =gn in the Italian	" degno "
c=ch	„ "church"	s = sh in the English	"show"
c =t	„ " tune "	vj =zvi	„ " view "
gj =j	„ " June "	z = j in the French	" jour "
j =y	„ " yet "	dz = j in the English	" jungle "
lj = gl in the Italian	" meglio "	[All other letters as in	English.]

ABBREVIATIONS.

- D.D.* = *Die Deutschen Dokumente* (German post-war collection of diplomatic documents, 4 vols., Berlin 1920).
D.A. = *Diplomatische Aktenstücke* (Austrian post-war ditto, 3 vols. Vitnan 1919).

SARAJEVO

CHAPTER I

THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CONFLICT

THE murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife at Sarajevo was merely the spark that fired the powder magazine of Europe. But the Southern Slav Question, of which it was a symptom, was one of the most burning of pre-war problems, and may take rank with Franco-German, Anglo-German, and Austro-Russian rivalry as a fundamental cause of the Great War. Though overlooked by Western opinion till very recently, it was far from being a new problem. Indeed, its origin and explanation are to be sought as far back as the Turkish conquest of Serbia and Hungary, which arrested the political development and the culture of the Southern Slavs, and was followed by the long struggle of Habsburg Imperialism to eject the infidel invaders from its dominions, to win back South-Eastern Europe for Christendom, and at the same time to establish German Habsburg hegemony over the Balkan Peninsula.

In the nineteenth century the rivalry of Austria and Russia came to play an almost dominant part in the foreign relations of the Southern Slavs. But it must be remembered that in the preceding century and a half Austria had had an easy lead, and might, but for wasted opportunities, have solved the problem in her own favour before Russia became a really serious rival.

The creation of the " Military Frontiers " in the late sixteenth century — territory organised on a special military tenure along the old river frontier against Turkey — gave rise to a race of hereditary fighters of Serb and Croat race, trained in a tradition of dynastic loyalty,

pinning their faith to Vienna as the predestined liberator of their kinsmen under Turkish yoke, and, indeed, often forming the spearhead of the Austrian fighting machine. Then, again, at the close of the seventeenth century (1690) we find the Serbian Patriarch, with many thousands of Serbian families, withdrawing into Habsburg territory, and forming at Karlovci and Novi Sad, on the middle Danube north of Belgrade, what were for over a century the only real centres of Serbian culture. The Serbian element in Sylvania and South Hungary was still further strengthened in the early eighteenth century as part of the scheme of colonisation which followed the final ejection of the Turks.

The victories of Prince Eugene represent the high-water mark of Austrian prestige in the Balkans, and from 1718 to 1739 the northern portion of the modern Serbia (including the Sumadija, afterwards the real kernel of national resistance to the Turks) was in Austrian possession. But the disastrous war of 1737-9 ended in its restoration to Turkey, and fifty years later the war of 1787-92, undertaken jointly with Russia, and crowned for a time with Laudon's conquest of Belgrade, again ended in failure and an unexpected rally of Turkish power. On each of these two occasions Austria had been valiantly supported by the native Serbs, who found themselves exposed to Turkish vengeance when their protectors withdrew. Henceforward they relied more upon their own strength than upon foreign aid. Yet, none the less, Kara George, the first hero of Serbian independence, began with an appeal to Vienna — though Francis was too absorbed in the European struggle against Napoleon to give much heed to an obscure handful of illiterate Balkan peasants.

From Austria the Serbs turned to Russia, with whom, remote as she was, they were bound by the two powerful ties of Slav kinship and Orthodox religion. Throughout the nineteenth century the movements of Panslav

solidarity gained in strength, on the one hand serving to stimulate Russian opinion in favour of the oppressed Balkan Slavs, and on the other hand providing a basis for Imperialistic aims, and only too often exploited by those whose real objective was Constantinople and the Straits.

Meanwhile the growth of national feeling in Europe transforms the relations between Austria and the Southern Slavs, a majority of whom are actually living on Habsburg territory even before the occupation of Bosnia. Serbia starts from very modest beginnings as a vassal peasant state, but with each new generation tends more and more to become a centre of national culture, and also a point of attraction for her kinsmen under alien rule. And thus it is not really surprising to find Serbs from the Banat, and also from Bosnia and Dalmatia and Montenegro, playing quite a notable part in the political and intellectual life of the new principality, while, on the other hand, Serbs from the principality intervened very actively in the racial war of 1848 on behalf of the Croats and Serbs of Croatia and the Banat against Hungary.

One of the main factors in Jugoslav history has been the rival influence of Byzantium and Rome, of Orthodoxy and Catholicism, in the formation of the national character. In each case political influence has been superimposed, thanks on the one hand to the alliance of Habsburg and ultramontanism, and on the other hand to the privileged position of Hellenism in the Eastern Church under Turkish rule. The religious issue which thus arose has long since died — for certain ecclesiastical jealousies of to-day cannot properly be described as a religious issue — but it has perpetuated a very profound difference in outlook and mentality that is only too fertile in misunderstanding. For a whole century past it is possible to observe a swing of the pendulum between two poles — close and cordial co-operation between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, as exemplified by the attitude of the famous Ban Jelacic and the Patriarch Rajacic in 1848,

or still more by the figure of the great Catholic Bishop Strossmayer, the protagonist of unity and concord among all branches of the Jugoslavs; and, again, fierce mutual recrimination on a basis of clerical and anti-clerical feeling, skillfully fanned by Magyar national and Habsburg ultramontane interests.

While, then, Serbian independence grew, the Illyrian idea, first kindled by Napoleon's brief experiment in state-building, took root in Croatia, and was restated after the revolution of 1848 in its more modern Jugoslav form. And amid political disunion and stagnation the reforms of Vuk Karadzic and other brilliant scholars laid well and soundly the foundations of that absolute linguistic unity between Serb and Croat which was the natural forerunner to political unity some generations later.

In 1848 Jelacic, though a devoted supporter of the House of Habsburg against Magyar national expansion, had corresponded with Peter II, the poet-prince of Montenegro, and ardently promoted Serbo-Croat co-operation; but, thanks to imperial ingratitude, his career ended in disillusionment and eclipse. In the 'sixties the idea of political unity awakened an echo in the ambitious mind of Prince Michael of Serbia, who even in 1859 ^{na}d already discussed with emissaries of Kossuth and Alexander Cuza plans for a Danubian Confederation. In 1866 he concluded an alliance with Prince Nicholas of Montenegro by which the latter undertook to abdicate if Michael should succeed in uniting all the Southern Slav lands, and in 1867 he reached an agreement with the Bulgarian revolutionary committee at Bucarest, proclaiming the Serbs and Bulgars to be kindred peoples, called by Providence to live together under one direction and one flag, and adopting for future use the alternate names of Serbo-Bulgars and Bulgaro-Serbs. There was to be a single Prince, a single legislature, cabinet, and coinage, and an independent Patriarchate for the two.

A little later the revolutionary delegates favoured the

idea of calling the new state " the Southern Slav Empire." This was followed by an alliance with Greece, and negotiations were also being carried on with Roumania when the assassination of Michael removed the soul of the whole movement. His calculation had followed very daring lines; for he believed that the whole peninsula would rise at his signal, that Serbia was stronger and Turkey weaker than was generally supposed, that Russia by her diplomatic action would prevent the intervention of any of the Powers, and that it would be possible to checkmate Austria by encouraging Hungary, with whom Michael had many personal ties. At his death the whole design collapsed, Serb and Bulgár fell rapidly apart, and the skilful and deliberate tactics of the Porte in creating a separate Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870, widened the breach, and ranged the Balkan Slavs more and more in two rival camps.

Meanwhile the Yugoslav idea met with a no less serious set-back in Habsburg territory. Prussia's victory forced Austria to come to terms with the Magyars, and the bargain was sealed by the *Ausgleich*, or Dual System, at the expense of the lesser nationalities. Within certain limits Croatia's autonomy was respected, but, so far from Zagreb being consulted, the terms of the new settlement were, in effect, dictated from Budapest, and only submitted *pro forma* to a carefully " packed " Croatian Diet, after the bargain between Budapest and Vienna had already made of them an accomplished fact.

During the 'seventies Austro-Hungarian policy was increasingly successful in checking intercourse between the Yugoslavs of the Monarchy and those outside its bounds. Meanwhile the newly constituted "Party of Right," resting upon a narrow Catholic clerical basis, aimed at the reunion of Dalmatia with Croatia-Slavonia in the so-called Triune Kingdom, within whose bounds it attected to deny the very existence of Serbia. This Pan-Croat ideal was favoured in Vienna as a convenient rival

to Pan-Serbism, with its centre in Belgrade; but its natural effect was to drive the Serbs of Slavonia and South Hungary into the arms of Budapest.

It was not, however, till the great Eastern crisis of 1875-8 that Austria-Hungary became irrevocably involved in a real conflict of principle with Serbia. The insurrection of the two purely Yugoslav provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina against Turkish misrule was naturally greeted with enthusiasm by their kinsmen in the free principalities of Serbia and Montenegro, who became involved in war with Turkey in their defence. Beaten in 1876, and forced to accept an armistice, they resumed hostilities once more after the intervention of Russia, and spent their blood and treasure freely for the cause of union, to which the insurgent leaders stood equally pledged. But, though Serbia and Montenegro received certain extensions of territory, they were thwarted in their main aim, and had to look on in impotent fury, while the diplomatists of Europe, assembled at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, gave to Austria-Hungary a mandate for the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It is important to bear in mind that Russia at an early stage in the Eastern crisis lost faith in the Serbs, and transferred her patronage to the Bulgarians, thus arousing in the minds of the latter, by the stillborn settlement of San Stefano, exaggerated hopes and ambitions which have warped the whole subsequent development of the Balkans. In order to retain the friendship of Austria-Hungary, and, at a later stage, in order to secure her neutrality during the Russo-Turkish conflict, Tsar Alexander II — first at his meeting with Francis Joseph at Reichstadt in July 1876, and then by a military convention at Budapest in January 1877 — definitely sanctioned an Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia.

As the tide of Panslav feeling rose in the war, and, above all, when the Russian armies crossed the Balkans

and dictated the Peace of San Stefano at the very gates of Constantinople, the Tsar's Government repented their concessions, and in April, 1878, sent General Ignatiev to Vienna with a secret offer of Bosnia to Austria-Hungary in return for an endorsement of the remainder of the San Stefano settlement. But Andrassy, with the two previous pledges in his pocket, and with Britain threatening Russia with war, was not in the least disposed to yield; and at the Congress of Berlin Russia had to give way to a combination of Austria-Hungary and Britain, with Bismarck posing as "honest broker," but really affording Andrassy a support which was to smooth the path for the future Dual Alliance.

Russia, then, not only threw over the Serbs and endorsed the occupation, but secretly undertook to raise no objections if Austria-Hungary should find it necessary "to occupy the Sandjak definitely like the rest."¹ Moreover, the Russian delegates, Gorchakov and Shuvalov, told the Serb statesman Ristic that he must come to terms with Andrassy, and that beyond Pirot and Vranja Serbia could hope for nothing. It is highly interesting to note that Ristic, hitherto the soul of the Russophile party, but henceforth driven perforce to a revision of policy, tried to convince Shuvalov that one day Russia would have a great settlement with Austria, and that at the moment of liquidation Serbia would be of more value than Bulgaria. * But all that he could get in reply was the remark of the Russian Under-Secretary, Jomini, that "in fifteen years at most the situation will be such that Russia will have to reckon up with Austria. That will be your consolation" — and very cold comfort this must have been at the time.

In a word, two Serbian provinces had been added to the Habsburg dominions, which now held nearly twice as many Jugoslavs as lived outside them. Contact

¹ Fournier, *Wie wir zu Bosnien kamen*, p. 74.

² Vladan Gjorgjevic, *La Serbie et le Congrès de Berlin*.

between Serbia and Montenegro was rendered more difficult by the introduction of Austro-Hungarian garrisons in the Sandjak. The presence of those garrisons seemed to be symbolic of Austria-Hungary's designs upon Macedonia and Salonica. Worst of all, Russia had definitely abandoned Serbia as an Austrian sphere of influence and was concentrating her own efforts upon Bulgaria.

The twenty-five years that followed the Berlin settlement are the most disheartening in Yugoslav history, but, though they supply the key to many of the discontents of the present day, the barest summary must suffice for my present purpose.

Serbia, under the rule of the brilliant but unprincipled and utterly unstable Milan Obrenovic, became the vassal of Austria-Hungary by a secret political treaty concluded in 1881 (and lasting till 1895), and at the same time, thanks to her geographical isolation, fell into an economic dependence, which was only accentuated by Austro-Hungarian control over railway development in the Balkans. At home Milan instituted a *regime* of arbitrary and spasmodic government, rendered worse by open favouritism in the army and the administration. The result was an internecine party feud which weakened the country.

Milan's main excursion into foreign policy was his unhappy onslaught upon Bulgaria in 1885. Obsessed by the idea of a Balkan Balance of Power, he was eager to recover his lost prestige, and looked upon Prince Alexander and his untried army as an easy prey. His ill-considered and dog-in-the-manger action resulted in immediate disaster, but, worse still, it created a gulf between Serb and Bulgár that was speedily to widen. Milan was saved from the worst consequences of his folly by Austria-Hungary's threat of armed intervention against the Bulgars if they carried their success too far. Bismarck, who had a well-merited contempt for Milan,

tried to dissuade Kálnoky, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, from committing himself too far. But Kálnoky's reply is most illuminating.¹ He explains that his action was not taken for the sake of Serbia or of Milan, but on account of its effect upon the " brothers " of the Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia. In other words, he was conscious of the growing interaction between the different branches of the Southern Slavs on either side of the frontier, and saw that what affected the one group could no longer be indifferent to the other.

Bismarck remonstrated and hinted prophetically that, the stronger Serbia became, the greater would be her powers of attraction upon the Southern Slavs of Austria-Hungary. " But Kálnoky, as he once told his Minister in Belgrade, did " not count on Serbia adhering to us for love; she will have to do so from fear and owing to material interests, and these I consider as far more reliable motives than the changing feelings of such half-wild peoples."* This phrase gives us the key to Austria-Hungary's failure during the next thirty years. Her only real solution rested upon force, and led logically to the progressive alienation of Southern Slav sentiment.

Milan's abdication in 1889 did not lead to any essential change of *regime*, for his son, King Alexander, warped by education and surroundings, perpetuated the personal scandals of his father's Court, and, worse still, his unconstitutional and arbitrary tendencies. All this and fierce party dissensions kept Serbia in a fever till, in 1903, she was rid of her impossible King and Queen by a brutal assassination which set a precedent for military interference in politics.

Meanwhile, the same period had been one of stagnation and repression in Croatia. Count Khuen Héderváry, who ruled as Ban from 1883 to 1903 as the exponent of Budapest policy, may in his own way be regarded

¹ *Die Grosse Politik*, v., pp. 28, 32.

² *Ibid.*, p. 38.

³ Corti, *Alexander von Battenberg*, p. 235.

as one of the most effectively corrupt satraps of a subject province of whom the nineteenth century can boast. His method was to play off Croat and Serb against each other, to " pack " the Diet and muzzle the Press, and to close every avenue of public life to men of independent views and keen national feeling; so that the Croats do not exaggerate when they denounce Khuen as the corrupter of a whole generation. It was only towards the turn of the century that a new generation began to arise, both among Croats and Serbs, which had received its education abroad, and especially at Prague, where the ethical and political teachings of Professor Masaryk exercised a remarkable influence over the progressive youth of all Slav countries.

At the same time Bosnia-Herzegovina was under the control of the Joint Ministry of Finance in Vienna, whose chief from 1882 to 1903 was another brilliant Magyar, Benjamin Kállay. Under him Bosnia acquired roads, railways, ordered administration, and growing material prosperity; but nothing was done to win the soul of the people, and very little to solve the two vital problems of illiteracy and the feudal land-tenure. His virtual proscription of the Serb name, and the attempt to create an artificial " Bosnian " nationality, was, of course, foredoomed to failure. But it was part of the general system of water-tight compartments in which the different sections of the Southern Slavs were kept. Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Dalmatia, Croatia, the Voivodina, the Slovene lands, Fiume, each developed on lines of its own, and everything was done that could be done to discourage intercourse between the different units.

As between the Habsburg lands and Serbia, this was ensured especially by the establishment of an extraordinarily ramified system of espionage, civil and military, with Bosnia as its centre, so comprehensive as to make it very nearly impossible for subjects of the Serbian

kingdom to travel in Bosnia. The first signs of reviving solidarity came in 1903, when Khuen's rigorous suppression of rioting in Zagreb and other Croatian towns led to demonstrations of protest throughout Dalmatia and Istria. Thirty Croat deputies of those two provinces resolved to lay their kinsmen's grievances before the Emperor, and his refusal of an audience played a material part in alienating Croat sympathies from the Crown.

It is a curious coincidence that, just as the year 1868 witnessed a set-back in both Serbia and Croatia, so the year 1903 marks a parallel revival in national consciousness in all the chief Yugoslav countries. In Serbia the removal of the Obrenovic dynasty, however revolting the circumstances under which it was accomplished, leads to a very general improvement — more constitutional government, less corruption, financial stabilisation, and a corresponding revival of economic life. In Croatia Khuen falls, and there is the beginning of a movement here and along the Dalmatian coast which leads to renewed co-operation between Serb and Croat, and in 1905 to the Resolution of Fiume and to the formation of the Serbo-Croat Coalition, which remains the backbone of national resistance to Hungary right on till the final upheaval of the Great War. In Bosnia, again, the death of Kállay in 1903 ends an era, and under his successor Burián some progress was made towards autonomy in Church and School, and the demand for self-government became yearly more insistent. Lastly, in Macedonia the desperate insurrection of 1903, though it ended in failure, led the Powers to insist upon a scheme of reform which, while checking the worst forms of outrage, actually accentuated the unrest, and braced all the rival races for the supreme effort to expel the Turk and substitute a new hegemony in place of the old.

This series of transformations in the political field Rurally reacted upon Austria-Hungary's Balkan policy,

and in this her relations with Serbia became more and more the keystone.

It is of some importance, in view of what happened in 1914 after Sarajevo, to consider the attitude of Vienna towards the assassination of King Alexander. The details of the plot had been worked out by some of the conspirators at the Café Imperial, on the Ringstrasse, in Vienna; and one of Kállay's principal subordinates in the Bosnian Ministry, Thallóczy, had been in close touch with them. What was on foot had been well known both to the Austro-Hungarian and to the Russian Government for at least a fortnight beforehand, and neither had lifted a hand to prevent it.¹ It is, of course, only fair to add that no one had foreseen the brutal details of the crime, which were due to panic after the lights of the Palace had been cut off; but it is also obvious that they must all have reckoned with bloodshed and probably murder as a virtual certainty. On the day after the assassination, the official organ of the Ballplatz, the *Fremdenblatt*, published an article regretting the murder, but affirming " that it mattered little who reigned in Serbia, provided he were on good terms with Austria-Hungary." This view was confirmed by Count Goluchowski to the French Ambassador; and, while King Edward insisted on the withdrawal of the British Minister from Belgrade for three years, and the Tsar greeted the new King Peter in pointedly frigid terms, Francis Joseph, the *doyen* of European dynasties, sent a long and relatively cordial telegram, assuring Peter of " support and friendship " in the task of restoring internal order.»

The fact is that Austria-Hungary calculated that the

¹ This was confirmed to me in 1908 by a prominent member of the Austrian Cabinet of the day. According to Bogicevió (*Kriegsursachen*, p. 15), Herr Müller, then chief of the Ballplatz Press bureau, was also in constant touch with the conspirators through Prince Peter's cousin, Nenadovid.

² Herr von Wegerer in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage* (June 19-25), among other serious inaccuracies, asserts the contrary.

Karagjorgjevic dynasty was not likely to quarrel with Vienna, and less likely to lean upon Russia, as Alexander had done before the catastrophe. But this calculation was false in two directions. Peter, both by personal inclination and thanks to the circumstances under which he came to the throne, played a much more negative rôle than Alexander, and could not shape policy, which fell under the control of the Russophil Radicals. Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, instead of setting herself to conciliate the new *regime*, antagonised it by an economic policy resting upon high agrarian tariffs.

The Radicals had from the very first opposed Austria-Hungary, and King Milan as her tool; and Svetozar Markovié, the inspirer of their programme, had proclaimed in very explicit language the view that "the liberation and union of all Southern Slavs can only be attained through the destruction of Austria-Hungary," and that its existence and that of Serbia are incompatible.¹ Now that they had definite control of Serbia's destinies, their leader, Mr. Pasic, appears to have drawn up a secret programme, whose six points were as follows: (1) League with Montenegro; (2) Agreement with Bulgaria as to Macedonia; (3) Serbo-Bulgar Customs Union; (4) Economic emancipation from Austria-Hungary; (5) Furtherance of the Southern Slav movement inside Austria-Hungary; and (6) Propaganda to discredit it abroad.²

In 1905 a first step was taken in this direction by the conclusion of a Customs Alliance with Bulgaria. But this was stillborn from the first, since Austria-Hungary was determined to prevent at all costs a step which would have soon brought the two Slav neighbours closer together. She imposed her veto, and, when Serbia

¹ Skerlic, *Svetozar Markovié*, . 108.

² This was made public by Mr. Balugdiic, then private secretary to the King, and to-day Yugoslav Minister in Berlin. See Mandl, *Die Habsburger und die Serbische Frage* p. 62. a source which must be used with very great caution, since Mandl has for over fifteen years led a campaign of extreme violence against Serbia

demurred, peremptorily broke off the negotiations then in course for a new Austro-Serbian commercial treaty, and closed her frontier to Serbian livestock and other imports. To yield was made still more impossible by Austria-Hungary's further demand that Serbia should order the guns and other munitions which she required at the Skoda works in Austria rather than with Creuzot-Schneider, or elsewhere in the West.

The result was the famous "Pig War," in which Serbia, shut off from her economic outlet to the north, had to search desperately for new markets — a task in which she was surprisingly successful. But this prolonged economic struggle had important political effects. It brought home to the meanest intelligence the intolerable handicap of Serbia's geographical position — shut off from the sea, and dependent for her trade and prosperity upon the whim of her great neighbour to the north. It hit the pocket of every peasant, and gave him a double incentive to hostility against the "Svaba"¹ — the economic and the national combined.

While, then, Serbia was passing through this ordeal, and making under King Peter a rapid revival alike in the political, the intellectual, and the economic sphere, in Austria-Hungary home and foreign policy became more and more intertwined. Magyar racial policy towards Croatia and the other non-Magyar nationalities, the parallel tariff policy advocated by Magyar agrarian interests, and the narrow outlook of the high military authorities of the Monarchy towards Italy and the Balkans, all reacted upon the foreign relations of the Ballplatz with Serbia, and, as time passed, with Roumania also.

In the spring of 1907 the short-lived *entente* between the Hungarian and Serbo-Croat Coalitions ended in open rupture, and a determined attempt was made from

¹ The "Swabian" — the Serb's nickname for the German, whom he knows best through the Swabian colonists of the Banat.

Budapest, through its successive nominees as Ban, or Governor, of Croatia, to split the new-found concord between Croat and Serb, and to reduce Croatia to its old subservience. But Baron Rauch, despite all his official apparatus, failed to secure a single seat for his creatures at the general election of 1908, even under the very narrow franchise which then prevailed; and so he proceeded to govern without Parliament by an elaborate system of administrative pressure, Press persecution, and espionage. At this stage home and foreign policy again joined hands — on the one hand Magyar intolerance of Croat national aspirations, on the other the designs of the Ballplatz against Serbia in connection with the impending annexation of Bosnia.

From 1897 to 1906 Austria-Hungary and Russia had worked fairly harmoniously together in Balkan questions, thanks in no small measure to the easy-going attitude of Count Goluchowski. But the Russo-Japanese War diverted Russia's attention from the Near to the Far East, and, by rendering her temporarily unfit for military action on a grand scale, created a situation which the Central Powers could not refrain from exploiting — Germany by her action against France in the Moroccan affair, Austria-Hungary by renewed activity in the Balkans.

With the appointment of Baron Aehrenthal as Goluchowski's successor (1906) the coolness between Vienna and Petersburg grew rapidly, and was, ere long, accentuated by a personal rivalry between Aehrenthal and the Russian Foreign Minister Izvolsky, who was angry at not receiving any previous notice of the project announced in January 1908 for a railway through the Sandjak of Novipazar, to link the Bosnian railway system with Salonica. To this day it is not clear whether Aehrenthal was really in earnest with this project, or Wierely used it as a means for breaking with Russia. Certain it is that such a railway could never hope to be

a commercial proposition, and that the Austro-Hungarian General Staff was utterly opposed to it, of course realising that the strategic line of advance to Salonica or the Aegean lay up the Morava valley, through the heart of Serbia, and not through the wild and trackless mountains of the Sandjak.

The growing unrest in Bosnia took the significant form of a demand for the grant of parliamentary institutions by the Turkish suzerain — a skilful tactical means of loosening and challenging the authority of the occupying Power¹; and when the Young Turk Revolution came in the summer of 1908, Aehrenthal not unnaturally felt that it was high time to regulate the position of the two provinces, and that the Revolution provided him with an admirable excuse and opportunity for creating an accomplished fact, before Russia had recovered her full strength.

It was at this point that Russian Imperialistic aims played into Aehrenthal's hands; for Izvolsky was eagerly working to secure free passage for Russian warships through the Straits, and on 2 July, 1908, offered to Aehrenthal, in return for this, to endorse the annexation, not only of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but of the Sandjak as well. Aehrenthal, in his reply, agreed, subject to Roumania and Bulgaria, as Black Sea Powers, acquiring the same right, and subject also to a guarantee of the safety of Constantinople against naval attack.² On 15 September a meeting took place between the two statesmen at Count Berchtold's castle of Buchlau, at which Aehrenthal told Izvolsky of the impending annexation, though without indicating the exact date. Aehrenthal renounced the Sandjak, and also those clauses of the Treaty of Berlin which restricted Montenegro's freedom of action, while Izvolsky pledged Russia not to

¹ Friedjung, *Zeitalter des Imperialismus*, vol. II., p. 205. In a footnote Dr. Friedjung goes out of his way to criticise me for not referring to this incident in my book, *The Southern Slav Question* (1911).

² 27 August, 1908. Friedjung, *op. cit.*, p. 224,

occupy Constantinople. But Izvolsky, when he went on to Paris and London, found the Western Powers entirely disinclined for any concession on the question of the Straits, and thus found himself without any *quid pro quo* when, in October 1908, the annexation of Bosnia and the independence of Bulgaria were simultaneously proclaimed.¹ He could not pretend that he had had no warning, for Aehrenthal had given formal notice on 30 September; but his own *amour propre* was touched, and to Berchtold, then Ambassador in St. Petersburg, he insisted that the method adopted by Aehrenthal was an *acte brutale*, contrary to ordinary diplomatic practice. But, of course, the root of the matter lay in the fact that a severe blow had been deliberately dealt at the prestige of Russia among the Balkan Slavs. In the six months of crisis that followed, Izvolsky, it must be admitted, tried to ignore a whole series of very explicit commitments entered into by Russia on the Bosnian Question in the seventies and eighties,³ and now once more, less formally, with Aehrenthal, and set himself to enlist the Entente, Serbia and Turkey against Austria-Hungary's action. The contention of the Western Powers that

¹ Aehrenthal himself once boasted to Dr. Kanner of having deceived Izvolsky at Buchlau by telling him of the annexation, but giving him no inkling that it was imminent. (See Kanner, *Kaiserliche Katastrophenpolitik*, p. 82.) On the other hand, it seems clear that Izvolsky was disingenuous when he assured Sir Edward Grey that he had not "given his consent in advance to what Austria had done about Bosnia." (Grey, *Twenty-five Years*, vol. i., p. 183.) He certainly had not agreed to a definite date for the annexation, but he almost certainly agreed to it in principle, as part of a bargain involving the Straits. If, however, Baron Schoen, who talked with Izvolsky at Berchtesgaden on 26 September, has correctly reported this conversation, then Izvolsky must have even known of the *imminence* of annexation; for Schoen quotes him as saying that Aehrenthal's intention was to raise the whole question at the Delegations, which were due to meet as early as 8 October. Cf. Brandenburg, *Von Bismarck zum Weltkrieg*, pp. 272-6.

² Berchtold's report to Aehrenthal on his conversation with Izvolsky on 30 October, 1908, is quoted by Friedjung, *Zeitalter des Imperialismus*, p. 22g te. He also gives extracts from Aehrenthal's two letters to Izvolsky, of 1 and 30 September (pp. 231-2). These help to explain Izvolsky's annoyance, or in the first Aehrenthal says, "Je ne suis pas encore à même de vous donner s informations sur la date précise à laquelle nous procéderons à l'annexion de ces provinces."

³ 1881 and 1884. See Fournier, *Wie Wir eu Bosnien Kamen*, p. 83 and Pribram, *Austrian Foreign Policy*, p.20.

an international Treaty cannot be subjected to one-sided revision without undermining the public law of Europe, was unanswerable in theory, but was greatly weakened in practice by these very commitments of Russia, and hence denounced by the Central Powers with some plausibility as hypocritical.

Serbia, on her side, confronted by the brutal fact of annexation, was encouraged by Russia's attitude in a resistance which would otherwise have seemed mere madness even to the maddest of patriots. She had lived thirty years in the fond illusion that the occupation of the two provinces in 1878 was not necessarily more than a passing phase, and now saw the erection of a permanent obstacle alike to her national and her economic expansion. Excitement reached fever-heat; the Press, and even responsible statesmen, indulged in wild language against Austria-Hungary; and Crown Prince George was mouthpiece of a very vocal war party, until the scandal of his demented attack upon his valet put him under eclipse and led to a change in the succession.

The tension between Vienna and Belgrade was still further increased by the sinister methods employed by Aehrenthal and his subordinates to justify Austro-Hungarian action. In the summer of 1908 wholesale arrests were made in Croatia on charges of treasonable Pan-Serb propaganda; and in March 1909, while the international crisis was at its very height, a Treason Trial was opened against fifty-three Serbs of the Monarchy at Zagreb, which lasted seven months, and developed into one of the worst travesties of justice since Judge Jeffries. Its object was to show that the leaders of the foremost Croat and Serb parties of the Monarchy were in correspondence with, and in the pay of, the Serbian Government, and that drastic action had to be taken in order to check the movement.

As a further proof, the well-known Austrian historian, Dr. Friedjung, was supplied by the Ballplatz with a

large number of documents implicating many of the Serbo-Croat Coalition leaders, and the first of his articles based upon them appeared in the *Neue Freie Presse* at a moment when war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia seemed to be unavoidable. If war had come, these men were to have been arrested, and probably shot, and the truth might never have come to light. As it was, the crisis passed, and they brought a libel action against Friedjung, which, after long delays, came up before a Viennese jury, and led to the amazing revelation that the "documents" supplied by the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office were impudent forgeries, intended to compromise the movement for Serbo-Croat unity.¹

Even more sensational was the sequel. In a speech before the Austrian Delegation in February 1910, professor Masaryk (now President of Czechoslovakia) was able to produce evidence which showed that the documents were manufactured inside the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade. It transpired that the alleged minutes of the revolutionary society, "Slovenski Jug," had been forged upon huge sheets of paper (97 by 34 centimetres in size), so that they could be conveniently photographed afterwards, and that the forgers were so clumsy as to use a reception form in place of a transmission form for a telegram which they were forging. Another hardly less interesting document produced by Masaryk was a sheet of paper on which someone had been practising the signature of Mr. Davidovic, a former Serbian Minister of Education.² On the strength of all this Masaryk denounced the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade, Count Forgách, as another "Azev,"³ while Aehrenthal sat shamed and

¹ For a detailed account of these trials and their sequel, see my *Southern Slav Question*, chaps. x., xi., xii.

² In 1919 and 1924 Yugoslav Premier, and to-day leader of the Opposition bloc.

³ A reference to the notorious Russian *agent provocateur* who betrayed the police to the revolutionaries and the revolutionaries to the police, until a just fate came him.

silent before him. Yet nothing was done to punish Forgách, and, after a short interval as Minister at Dresden, he was transferred to the Ballplatz, where he became the right-hand man of Aehrenthal and his successor Berchtold in the conduct of the Monarchy's Balkan policy.

The attempt to destroy Serbo-Croat unity in Croatia had failed miserably, Austro-Hungarian policy towards Serbia had been badly discredited before the whole world as a result of these revelations, and a strong impetus had been given to the national movement among the Southern Slavs, who looked increasingly towards Serbia as their champion.

Meanwhile, the international crisis had been settled by Russia's surrender. Aehrenthal's whole action rested upon the calculation that Russia could not fight a great war so soon after the conflict with Japan, and here he judged rightly. But he was not allowed to win the laurels of a new Austrian Bismarck, as some were fain to call him; for the final solution of the crisis came through Germany's intervention in Petersburg, and William II's theatrical pose as the deliverer "in shining armour." This phrase, which stung no less than his other allusions to "Nibelung loyalty" and to Austria-Hungary as "brilliant second on the duelling field," revealed to the world the double fact that Austria-Hungary was becoming more and more the vassal of Berlin, and that the Central Powers were bent on eliminating Russian influence from the Balkan Peninsula. There is even reason to believe that the final decision of Francis Joseph and his nephew in favour of peace was due to their fear of falling under German control in the event of war.¹

¹ William II had visited Francis Ferdinand at Eckartsau in November 1908, and had won him for a scheme by which German garrisons would hold Galicia and Bohemia, and keep Russia in check, while Austria-Hungary invaded Serbia. But Francis Joseph's comment was, "I can see the Germans coming in, but I don't see how we are to get them out again afterwards." See H. W. Steed, "The Quintessence of Austria," (*Edinburgh Review*, October 1915).

It must, however, be added that Germany, so far from prompting Aehrenthal's action, had not been consulted at all. While Aehrenthal had, on 27 August, made formal overtures to Russia, which led to the Buchlau meeting, his first communication to Bülow in Berlin was ten days after that event (26 September), and included the highly misleading statement that he had already come to terms with Russia. Aehrenthal's hand was forced by Ferdinand of Bulgaria at the last moment, but he, in his turn, dragged Germany in his train. William II was furious with Austria-Hungary, spoke of the "intolerable way" in which it had "duped" him, and denounced "Aehrenthal's appalling stupidity"¹. But all this was carefully concealed from the outer world, and Vienna had the full support of Berlin throughout the crisis. Then, as on later occasions, one of Germany's main motives was the fear of loosening her only sure alliance, if she withheld her backing from an Austrian quarrel, and of thus finding herself isolated, if a new crisis should arise in Europe over a matter which was of primary interest to herself, but only of secondary interest to Austria-Hungary.

Aehrenthal had risked war, but, when his main object was attained, he no longer advocated extreme measures, and he, of course, had to reckon with the pacific (or, above all, passive) attitude of Francis Joseph. On the other hand, Baron Conrad von Hötzendorf, Chief of the General Staff, holding that the Monarchy's future lay in the Balkans, strongly urged that the right moment had come for a reckoning with Serbia, and that war with Italy might safely be risked, either as a preliminary or as a corollary. But Aehrenthal radically disagreed, and Francis Joseph would not hear of anything save a defensive war with Italy; and it was, above all, consideration for Italy that led Aehrenthal to evacuate the ^andjak, rather than give her any title to compensation

¹ See Brandenburg, *op. cit.*, pp. 274, 276.

in the Balkans under Clause VII of the Triple Alliance. » Though the evacuation was sound from the tactical standpoint, yet politically it was a blunder, as it made it possible for Serbia and Montenegro to join frontiers barely three years later in the war against Turkey.

Russia's surrender brought with it the humiliation of Serbia, who had to accept the new situation in Bosnia and declare publicly that it in no way affected her rights, and that she would abandon all opposition and change her policy towards Austria-Hungary. Needless to say, Serbian public opinion bitterly resented this renunciation, and henceforward took a keener interest than ever in their kinsmen across the frontier, the internal situation in Croatia and Bosnia providing a perpetual irritant. One result was the foundation of the Narodna Odbrana (Society of National Defence), of which it will be necessary to speak in a later chapter.²

In a word, the Bosnian crisis converted the Southern Slav Question and the relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia into an international problem of the first rank, and this rank it was to retain through a whole series of crises in 1912 and 1913, till it at last served as the spark which lit the world war. It also greatly accentuated the grouping of the Great Powers into two hostile and fairly balanced camps. The personal rivalry of Aehrenthal and Izvolsky gave added force to the competition of Austria-Hungary and Russia in South-Eastern Europe.

Aehrenthal's stiff and unconciliatory attitude was not approved by the more enlightened Austrians, and in November 1909 Dr. Baernreither — who was known to enjoy the confidence of the Heir-Apparent, and who soon afterwards played the part of mediator behind the scenes of the Friedjung Trial — had a friendly meeting in Vienna

¹ Fourth Agreement, 28 June, 1902, see Pribram, *Geheimverträge Oesterreich-Ungarns*, p. 94.

² See pp. 118 and 138.

with the Serbian Premier, DA. Milovanovic. The conditions laid down by the latter for a real Austro-Serbian *entente* were four: a new economic policy on the part of the Monarchy; free transit through her territory for Serbian armaments; the introduction of land reform and a more Serbophil administration in Bosnia; and consent to Serbia's territorial expansion in Macedonia.¹ But Aehrenthal remained impervious to Baernreither's arguments in favour of such a basis, and the whole matter was dropped.

¹ Dr. Baernreither in *Deutsche Revue*, January 1922, *cit.* Wendel, *op. cit.*, p. 41-2.

CHAPTER II

THE BALKAN WARS

IN 1909 and 1910 there seemed to be a slight lull, but the rival activities of Vienna and St. Petersburg were illustrated by an attempt at Russo-Italian *rapprochement*, by a secret Russo-Bulgarian Treaty in December 1909, and by Vienna's encouragement to Prince Nicholas of Montenegro to assume the Royal title, thereby reaffirming the rivalry of the two remaining Serb dynasties of Karagjorgjevic and Petrovic. And all the time the unrest produced by Young Turk Chauvinism and misrule among the Christian subjects of the Porte, and especially the troubles in Albania, made it clear that an explosion might come at any moment and in almost any part of the Peninsula. Everywhere lawlessness and megalomania joined hands: such a situation was a logical outcome of that political and social disintegration which had now reached its final stage in what was left of Turkey's European provinces, and which in its earlier stages had been mainly responsible for the unsatisfactory development of Serbia and the Southern Slavs.

In 1910, it should be added, Austria-Hungary did take one real step towards conciliation, by establishing a Diet in Bosnia, but the device adopted of placing the three religions in distinct water-tight compartments for election purposes, aroused much antagonism, while the creation of yet another artificial Diet merely underlined still further the divided state of the Jugoslavs. Meanwhile Austria-Hungary's alienation of Serbia on the one side and the policy of Turkification favoured by the new *regime* in Constantinople on the other, naturally

strengthened the tendencies in favour of a Balkan League, and Italy's adventure in Tripoli in 1911 only served to hasten the pace.

In Vienna, Conrad as Chief of Staff urged war upon Italy while she was at a disadvantage, setting before himself the domination of Serbia and the Balkans as his ultimate goal. But though Francis Ferdinand shared his suspicions of Italy and gave eager support to his plans of military reorganisation, Francis Joseph and Aehrenthal would hear nothing of such a "highwayman policy" and insisted upon peace. Conrad was therefore dismissed in 1911, to the indignation of Francis Ferdinand, who treated it as a personal affront.¹ In February 1912 Aehrenthal died and was succeeded by Count Berchtold, a man whose mediocre intelligence was aggravated by indolence and aristocratic prejudice, and whose anti-Slav outlook made him more than ever dependent upon Berlin, though by no means free from suspicions of his ally.

It was a moment of very great activity in the Balkans. The original idea of a Balkan League including a Turkey amenable to Russian influence, proved unrealisable, and in its place there took shape a League of the four Christian states directed against Turkey. While the Greco-Bulgarian agreement was due to the initiative of Mr. Venizelos and probably owed its attainment to Mr. Bouchier, the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement was leached very largely under the influence of Russia, and especially its Minister in Belgrade, Mr. Hartwig. It is important to note that Serbia made a condition of her adherence the promise of Bulgarian military support on her Northern frontier in the event of Austria-Hungary's intervention — obviously in the calculation that then Russia would also become involved and make Serbian resistance possible. It is more than doubtful whether Bulgaria intended to carry out this pledge, and it has

¹ Margutti, *Vom Alten Kaiser*, p. 392.

even been alleged that King Ferdinand betrayed it to Vienna. In any case it reflects the profound distrust and hostility which had grown up between Belgrade and Vienna in recent years.

The Balkan League came not a moment too soon, for in the summer of 1912 real anarchy spread through Albania and Macedonia, the rival komitadji bands and the agents of the Committee of Union and Progress were more active than ever, and when Berchtold put forward a tentative scheme of Turkish reform and opened discussions with the other Powers, the four Christian states, who had suffered from a series of nominal paper reforms for two generations past, decided to precipitate events and declared war upon Turkey early in October. That the Powers, having failed to stop them, adopted a passive attitude during the early stages of the war, was due to the almost universal assumption in official and especially in military circles, that the Turks would be victorious, and that the refractory Balkan States would soon be only too glad to accept a settlement dictated from the outside.

But the unexpected happened. The Balkan Allies gained rapid and overwhelming successes, and by the end of November, Turkish rule in Europe was limited to the Tchataldja and Gallipoli lines and to the three fortresses of Adrianople, Janina and Skutari. The Serbs in particular had not only avenged Kosovo and five centuries of thraldom by their victory at Kumanovo, but had linked up with Montenegro and reached the Adriatic at Medua and Durazzo. The Ballplatz, to its anger and concern, saw the situation suddenly transformed to its disadvantage, both without and within — without, by the downfall of Turkey, the shifting of the balance of power in the Peninsula, the recovery of self-confidence by Serbia; within, owing to the decisive repercussion of these events among the Jugoslavs of the Monarchy.

For by an irony of fate the Serbian victories came at a moment when the quarrel between Hungary and Croatia had culminated in the suspension of the ancient Croatian Constitution by arbitrary decree from Budapest, the appointment of a Dictator in Zagreb, and a thoroughly oppressive *regime*. The contrast was altogether too crude. The whole Southern Slav provinces of Austria-Hungary were swept off their feet with enthusiasm for the Balkan allies, there were demonstrations in every town, the collections for the Balkan Red Cross reached astonishing figures for so poor a country, many of the young men succeeded in evading the frontier guards and volunteering for the Serbian army. "In the Balkan sun," said a leading Croat cleric on a public platform, "we see the dawn of our day"; while a Catholic Bishop, on the news of Kumanovo, recited the *Nunc Dimittis*. On the other hand, even before the great events of the Balkan War, the Hungarian flag had been burnt in more than one town of Dalmatia, Croatia and Bosnia as a protest against the Cuvaj dictatorship; the boys of the gymnasia went out on political strike, and acts of political terrorism became a new feature of the movement.

The opening of the Bosnian Diet in 1910 had already been marred by an attempt on the life of the Governor, General Varesanin, by a Serb student who then at once shot himself. The story of the General's contemptuous spurning of the corpse with his foot, as Zerajic still lay where he fell upon the bridge of Sarajevo, spread on all sides and appears to have done more than anything else to breed successors to Zerajic among the youth of Bosnia. It may have been entirely untrue, but it was universally believed. And now in June 1912, came a determined attempt on Cuvaj's life, the murderer killing the Croatian Secretary for Education and a policeman before he was captured. Then in November a third student fired ineffectively on Cuvaj's windows and committed suicide.

This state of tension among the Jugoslavs of the Monarchy was intensified tenfold by the action of the Ballplatz. After a short period of hesitation and complete latitude to the population, it ordered restrictive measures in the South, the leading municipalities of Dalmatia were dissolved, there were frequent confiscations of the Press, police espionage was extended still farther, and above all, Austria-Hungary mobilised and concentrated troops in Bosnia and Dalmatia. Typical of this whole outlook was the notorious Prochaska affair. Prochaska was Austro-Hungarian Consul in Prizren, and having been specially active against the Serbs, found himself isolated from his own Government when they occupied the town early in November. For many days afterwards the Press of Vienna and Budapest rang with sensational stories as to the brutal ill-treatment meted out to Prochaska by Serbian officers; and as the Press campaign was encouraged by the Press Bureau and the Ministry of War, most people in Vienna, from the throne to the fiacre-driver and the concierge believed the story of his castration, and were roused to fierce indignation against the barbarous Serbs.¹ In point of fact, this story was a deliberate invention. When the crisis was over, Prochaska assured his friends that nothing whatever had happened to him, but that he had had instructions to "make an incident." Moreover, the Ballplatz deliberately allowed the campaign to continue long after it knew the story of ill-treatment

¹ Miss Durham, as part of her violent campaign of defamation of everything Serb ("Serbian vermin" was her elegant phrase during an address at which I was present last December), has fastened especially upon the Prochaska affair, and I am therefore reluctantly forced to refer to repulsive details. She was in Montenegro at the time of the incident, and claims that certain Serbian officers, recently arrived from Prizren, boasted openly to her of having subjected him to very disgusting indignities. While they thereby proved themselves to be a disgrace to their uniform, it is no less certain that they were deliberately "pulling the leg" of Miss Durham. For there was not a word of truth in their story. Shortly before the war the late Count Francis Lützow (the historian) repeated to me, the confidential account which Prochaska himself had given to a mutual friend in the Consular service, and the gist of it is my statement in the text.

to be utterly false.¹ The reason for this was that the irresolute Berchtold had very nearly come down on the side of war, and wanted an excuse for picking a quarrel.

The war party was exceedingly strong. The War Minister, Auffenberg, and the ex-Chief of Staff, Conrad had very nearly won the ear of Francis Ferdinand, who was now Inspector-General of the Army, and Conrad, drew up a memorandum advocating the re-occupation of the Sand jak and the expulsion of the Serbs from Albania — which would of course have involved a campaign for the conquest of Serbia itself. They were even ready to risk Russian intervention. What seems to have held back Berchtold and Francis Joseph from war was the attitude of Germany and, to a lesser degree, of Italy. On 23 November, Francis Ferdinand met William II at Springe, and is alleged to have advocated action against Serbia, but William insisted on the need of peace with Russia:¹ and in renewing the Triple Alliance on 5 December, Bethmann Hollweg, on the Emperor's instructions, made it clear " that Germany would only join in a conflict if her partner were the victim of aggression."² As Sazonov on his side declined to back the Serbian claim to an Adriatic outlet and told Hartwig flatly that Russia would not wage war for Durazzo,⁴ there was still some room for moderate counsels: and the joint pressure of Germany, Italy and

¹ This is expressly admitted by Baron Szilassy, who was a high official in the Ballplatz at that very time, but who was also an honest man who could not approve the methods of his chief and colleagues. See his *Der Untergang der Donau-Monarchie*, p. 230.

As early as 21 November the *Neue Freie Presse* printed a wire from Prochaska, stating that he was well and unharmed. On 26 November the Consul Edl, sent officially from Vienna for the purpose, was allowed to meet Prochaska at Skoplje and convinced himself of the truth. Yet it was not till 17 December (in other words till Vienna had definitely postponed the idea of war on Serbia and therefore no longer needed this incident as a stimulus to public opinion) that the Ballplatz published an official communiqué, to the effect that the tory of Prochaska's imprisonment or ill-treatment was " entirely without oundation." Cf. Sosnosky, *Die Balkanpolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns*, ii., pp. 293-5, 354.

² Pribram, *Austrian Foreign Policy*, p. 41; but see *infra*, pp. 53-4.

³ Gooch, *Modern Europe*, p. 507.

⁴ *ibid.*, p. 507.

Britain won Berchtold's reluctant consent¹ to a Conference of Ambassadors in London for the settlement of the Albanian and kindred disputes.

Yet, though the immediate danger of war had thus been averted, the reappointment of Conrad as Chief of Staff on 12 December showed that the war party was still very strong in Vienna. If we may trust his own account of his previous interview with Francis Ferdinand,* the latter must have regarded war as still virtually certain: and Conrad, knowing that Francis Joseph also regarded the situation as "extremely dangerous for Austria-Hungary,"⁸ returned to the charge on 30 December, with a memorandum urging war. His view was that this was inevitable sooner or later, and that every further delay made the position worse for Austria-Hungary. He recognised frankly that "the union of the Southern Slavs is one of those nation-moving phenomena which cannot be denied or artificially prevented," and that the only question was whether that Union was to be achieved inside the Monarchy at Serbia's expense, or under Serbia at the Monarchy's expense.⁴ But while Conrad was at least frank and downright in his ideas and intentions, there was among leading statesmen a complete lack of

¹ Pribram, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

² Conrad, *Aus Meiner Dienstzeit*, vol. ii., p. 378.

³ *ibid.*, p. 389.

⁴ *ibid.*, p. 380. This coincides almost exactly with the view which I myself advocated to the best of my ability in a series of books and articles on the eve of war. In *The Southern Slav Question* (1911), I wrote: "The movement in favour of Croato-Serb unity has many obstacles to surmount. . . . But as surely as Germany and Italy have won their liberty and unity, so surely will it be won by the Croato-Serb race. The real problem is the manner of its achievement: and here we are at once faced by two alternatives. Unity can be obtained either inside or outside the Habsburg Monarchy, either by the latter's aid and under its auspices, or in defiance of its opposition. ..." (p. 336.) "Upon Austria's choice of alternative depends the future of the Habsburg Monarchy." (P. 344.)

Unfortunately though our diagnosis was the same, our remedies were radically different. I still cherish the belief — it may be a mere illusion — that real statesmanship might have reconciled Austria and the Yugoslavs, and having in 1911 dedicated my book "to that Austrian statesman who shall possess the genius and the courage necessary to solve the Southern Slav Question," I repeated this dedication in the German edition (1913), adding the words "at the twelfth hour." The remedy advocated by Field-Marshal Conrad, on the other hand, was not conciliation, but sheer force, and that was from the first foredoomed to failure.

goodwill. Berchtold in particular was not merely less sincere than Conrad, but more negative and far less energetic. His own peculiar temperament, the old Emperor's pacific and negative mood, and above all, the fear that Germany might not support her ally in a war of aggression, were the real deterrents; but the Foreign Minister and his all-powerful subordinates Forgách, Macchio, Kanya, and others, remained steadily hostile to Serbia, and only waited for a safer way of taking the plunge which they too regarded as necessary. One indication of this is Berchtold's contemptuous rejection of the overtures made by the Serbian Premier, Mr. Pasic, through the mediation of Professor Masaryk in the winter of 1912. Pasic was willing to come to Vienna and discuss a political and commercial agreement which would facilitate Serbian exports to the Adriatic and in return place the work of West Balkan reconstruction and development in the hands of Austro-Hungarian firms. But Berchtold treated Masaryk with lordly contempt, and actually left the overture unanswered.¹

In the first half of 1913 the Conference of Ambassadors in London exercised a restraining influence upon Austria-Hungary and preserved peace. By ordering an international naval blockade of the Montenegrin coast, in order to enforce the demand for a Serbo-Montenegrin evacuation of Skutari, the Powers robbed Austria-Hungary for the moment of an excuse for military action; and the mission of Prince Gottfried Hohenlohe to the Tsar on the express initiative of Francis Joseph, helped to produce a slight *detente*. According to Szilassy² the

¹ This again is confirmed by Szilassy, *Untergang der Donau-Monarchie*, p. 231. Herr Kanner (*Kaiserliche Katastrophenpolitik*, p. 112), tells us that Masaryk informed him of these facts at the time and that he made enquiries through a friend of Berchtold, Count Arthur Bylandt. When asked, Berchtold told the latter that " he had enquired about Masaryk and learnt that he was a poor devil, who probably wanted to ' make a commission,' " and " we are not there to help people to commissions." This anecdote tells us more of Berchtold's Mentality and political capacity than many volumes. And this was the man whose hands foreign policy rested.

² *p. cit.*, p. 236.

Tsar said to Hohenlohe, " If you really want war, you'll get it. But then both your Emperor and I will stagger on our thrones."¹

That Berlin also saw the dangers of the Balkan situation and, as in 1909, resented its ally's policy, is shown very clearly in the correspondence of Kiderlen-Wächter, who in September, 1912, wrote to the Chancellor: " What I stress most, is that we should not merely learn afterwards what Vienna is planning, but *beforehand*. Otherwise Vienna will involve us overnight in a Balkan adventure."¹

Demobilisation was secured, but the war-mongers set themselves to attain their aims against Serbia by the more indirect method of encouraging the dissensions inside the Balkan League and in particular setting Serbia and Bulgaria by the ears. Serbia's double aim in the war had been the liberation of her kinsmen under Turkish rule, and her own economic emancipation by means of free access to the sea; and the second half of this programme was now destroyed by the veto of Austria-Hungary. It should be unnecessary to add that Serbia had no right whatever to Skutari or any of the Albanian coast, but that as her natural outlets through Bosnia and Dalmatia were in Austria's hands, she was tempted to cast covetous eyes upon what lay farther to the South. This veto left the Vardar valley as Serbia's only possible alternative outlet, and a claim to the Vardar brought her automatically into conflict with Bulgarian national aspirations in Macedonia. Thus it is not too much to say that Austria-Hungary's Balkan policy made the second Balkan war inevitable; and indeed this was one, though not the only, motive of her support to Albania.

¹ Bogicevic (*Kriegsursachen*, Appendix X) prints the text of Francis Joseph's letter to Nicholas II (February 1913). In it he expresses " great sorrow " that Austria-Hungary's Balkan policy should be " regarded ironically in Russia," and insists " that it would be a sin against our sacred mission," not to realise the " grave dangers of disagreement between our Empires."

² Kiderlen-Wächter, *Nachlass*, ii., p. 187.

Russia, who under the secret Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of Alliance had been appointed arbiter in cases of dispute, strained every nerve to effect a peaceful compromise between the two Balkan allies, but national Chauvinism was already running very high on both sides, and here again Austria-Hungary, through her able and active Minister in Sofia, Count Tarnowski, did all she could to render Russian efforts ineffective. Even the Tsar's appeal to the Slav feelings of the Kings of Bulgaria and Serbia fell upon deaf ears, and the joint *démarche* of the Powers at Sofia and Belgrade in favour of demobilisation was also disregarded. Nothing did so much to stiffen the Bulgarian attitude as the speech delivered by the Hungarian Premier, Count Stephen Tisza, on 19 June, emphasising the right of the Balkan States to settle differences in their own way — even by war — and stating that Austria-Hungary could not allow any other Power to acquire special prerogatives in the Peninsula — in other words an open rebuff to Russia and an encouragement of Bulgaria to adventurous courses. Tarnowski's influence with King Ferdinand completely triumphed over that of his Russian colleague. Some indication of Vienna's intentions during this critical week may be gathered from a conversation with Berchtold which Conrad records in his *Memoirs*¹ (21 June). In reply to the Chief of Staff's enquiry, the Foreign Minister declares quite explicitly that Austria-Hungary will make war on Serbia if Bulgaria is beaten by the latter (in other words, in a war which Vienna and Sofia were jointly plotting). It is true that when Conrad asks whether they will remain in Serbia, Berchtold at once becomes vague, stating that Francis Joseph evades an answer to the question, while Francis Ferdinand wont hear of annexation (in other words, it had been *der* discussion).

The result was the famous Bulgarian night attack

¹ Conrad, *Aus Meiner Dienstzeit*, iii., p. 353.

upon the Serbs and Greeks on 29 June, 1913, which inaugurated the second Balkan War. But once more Austria-Hungary had gravely miscalculated; the Serbs and Greeks were not caught napping, and much more than held their own, while Roumania, who had given Sofia a fair warning of her probable attitude, joined the Allies and invaded Bulgaria from the north. If the war brought disaster upon Bulgaria, it was also very serious for Austria-Hungary, for Serbia had not merely increased her military laurels and prestige, doubled her territory and established direct contact with Montenegro, but had won to her side Roumania — till then linked with the Dual Monarchy by a secret alliance and military convention and regarded as a safe adjunct to the Triple Alliance; while the Jugoslavs of the Monarchy, still suffering from the dictatorship in Croatia and parallel repression in Bosnia and Dalmatia, now openly began to look upon Serbia as their future Piedmont.

Berchtold again drew near to the war party, and already, on 3 July — when the official Press of Vienna was still acclaiming imaginary Bulgár victories — intimated to his allies in Berlin and Rome that Austria-Hungary could not tolerate further aggrandisement of Serbia, "since this would not only mean a considerable moral and material support of a traditionally hostile neighbour, but also would result in a noticeable increase of the Pan-serb idea and propaganda."¹ Against this view the Italian Foreign Minister, San Giuliano, strongly protested, on the ground that there was no real danger to Austria-Hungary. Half-jestingly he said to the Ambassador Mérey, "We'll hold you back by the tails of your coat if necessary."²

¹ Pribram, *Geheimverträge Oesterreich-Ungarns*, pp. 301-2.

² According to Bogicevic (*Kriegsursachen*, p. 76), San Giuliano used the phrase "pericolosissima avventura."

¹ In the attitude of the Italian Government on this occasion may be found the key to Berchtold's treatment of Italy during the critical weeks of July 1914. See *infra*, pp. 234, 236, 241.

Still more decisive was the attitude of Germany, which in the summer of 1913 was quite definitely opposed to war. Berchtold, on 3 July, tried to convince Tschirschky that Austria-Hungary would be forced to intervene against Serbia in the event of a Bulgarian defeat, and that she could under no circumstances allow Monastir to remain in Serbian hands. He tried to justify this attitude by depicting the dangers inherent in the Southern Slav Question if Serbia should become a Balkan Piedmont, he hinted that even Trieste would be threatened, and he begged Germany to realise the dilemma (*Zwangslage*) in which Austria-Hungary found herself. But Berlin's reply to Tschirschky minimised "the danger of a Great Serbia" and ordered him "to calm down Vienna, hold it back from hasty action and ensure our being kept regularly informed as to its intentions, and no decisions being made without previously hearing our view." He was also informed that William II regarded Berchtold's attitude on Monastir as "a grave blunder."¹

There is no difficulty in discovering the underlying motives. William II was anxious to help his brother-in-law, King Constantine, and thus extend German prestige in Greece. He was genuinely concerned at the loosening of Roumanian relations to the Triple Alliance and opposed to anything which might force her into the arms of the Entente: and here his friendship for King Charles and the Hohenzollern dynasty played its part. On the other hand he both disliked and distrusted King Ferdinand of Bulgaria — feelings shared even more vehemently by the Archduke Francis Ferdinand.² Lastly William II was by no means anti-Serb until the murder of his friend produced a violent outburst of feeling.

¹ The two telegrams were published by Count Montgelas in the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* on 7 March, 1920, and are quoted in his book *Leitfaden zur Kriegsschuldfrage*, pp. 61-3.

² He had actually refused to cross the Channel in the same ship when they attended King Edward's funeral in 1910.

Tisza's memorandum to Francis Joseph after the murder¹ stresses the need for overcoming the prejudices of William II *in favour* of Serbia; and it is not sufficiently well known that Germany had a very active and Serbophil Consul-General in Belgrade, and was during the eighteen months previous to the Great War busily extending her markets in Serbia at the expense of Austro-Hungarian merchants, whose prospects were injured by the political friction between Vienna and Belgrade. William II in particular more than once made it clear to Vienna that he could not understand its persistent refusal to allow the Serbs a harbour on the Adriatic.

Austria-Hungary did not at once desist from her design, and as late as 9 August⁸ — the day before the Treaty of Bucarest was signed — notified Berlin and Rome of her intention of attacking Serbia, arguing that such action could be defined as defensive. But San Giuliano and Giolitti, in conjunction with Germany, took the line that the *casus foederis* of the Triple Alliance would not apply, and made it clear to Vienna that they would not give their backing. Finding herself thus in complete isolation, Austria-Hungary had no alternative save to draw back and leave the Bucarest settlement untouched. What finally turned the scale in favour of peace was the awful scandal of Colonel Redl, the Austrian Staff officer who was now discovered to have been the spy of Russia for the last fourteen years, yet was allowed to commit suicide and carry half his secrets to the grave. This incident seems to have had an overwhelming effect upon Francis Joseph, whose intellectual powers, never very high, were now noticeably failing. It also not unnaturally filled Francis Ferdinand with fury, and rendered him

¹ *Diplomatische Aktenstücke*, (henceforth referred to as *D.A.*) i., No. 2.

² See Giolitti's speech on 5 December, 1914, in the Italian Parliament (*Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 401). Montgelas *op. cit.*, p. 64) argues that Giolitti is mistaken in the month, and that this really took place in July. Giolitti in his *Memoirs*, however, adheres to the date of August.

distrustful of the General Staff and its chief, and caused corresponding uncertainty and discouragement in all the higher ranks of the Army.¹

The Emperor William's bestowal of a Field-Marshal's baton on King Constantine and his public telegram of cordial good wishes to King Charles on the signature of peace, gave such offence at Vienna that Francis Ferdinand and the Austro-Hungarian military delegates abandoned their visit to the German manoeuvres in August. This did not affect the personal relations of Conrad with Moltke, who assured his colleague that though "as so often, diplomacy has thrown a stone across the path of the soldiers," he himself adhered to terms of closest alliance. But though the Archduke was induced to attend the Leipzig celebrations in the following month, it is not too much to speak of a temporary coolness between Vienna and Berlin, which it required a special effort during the winter to remove,² and which is still reflected in Berchtold's distrustful attitude towards Germany at the time of the tragedy of Sarajevo.³

The Treaty of Bucarest seemed for the moment to have stabilised the situation and averted war; but there was the gravest uncertainty throughout Europe, and in Austria-Hungary that summer there seemed to be a smell of the charnel-house in the air.⁴

In the winter of 1913-14 Austria-Hungary again twice tried to pick quarrels with Serbia, first in regard to the Albanian frontier, where the Serbs were in the wrong, but where the ultimatum was made as unpalatable as possible to them, and second in regard to the shares held by Austro-Hungarian subjects in the Orient Railway.

¹ Auffenberg, *Aus Oesterreichs Höhe und Niedergang*, p. 241.

² Brandenburg, *Von Bismarck zum Weltkrieg*, p. 386.

³ It is even possible that the unofficial visit of Francis Ferdinand and his wife England in November 1913 was stimulated by this passing friction.

⁴ This drastic but extremely apposite phrase was coined by Mr. Steed, then on the point of leaving Vienna after eleven eventful years as correspondent of *The Times*.

There can be no doubt that Conrad Was more convinced than ever of the necessity for war, and that Berchtold was already converted to his view and merely looking in his indolent way for a safe pretext. This is made clear from Conrad's voluminous Memoirs which, like a gold-mine, contain occasional priceless fragments of ore scattered through the dull mass. Conrad, it should be added, was perfectly logical from the very first. In 1906, on appointment as Chief of Staff, he argued that the Monarchy's future lay in the Balkans; that this involved the seizure of Serbia and Montenegro, to prevent their exercising attraction on the other Southern Slavs; that a preliminary step towards this was the defeat of Italy, then still a relatively weak military power; and that Russian intervention was not as yet to be feared.¹ Serbia offered the very economic advantages which a country like Austria-Hungary required, and its annexation was positively a condition of life or death for Austria-Hungary.² Two favourable opportunities had already been wasted, Russian intervention could no longer be ruled out, there was a real danger of losing Roumania, Serbia though exhausted was far stronger than before, and the internal situation of the Monarchy was increasingly unstable.

In February 1914, then, Conrad wrote to his German colleague, General Moltke, expressing his belief in an imminent catastrophe, insisting that France and Russia were not yet ready, and exclaiming, " Why are we waiting? "³ On May 12 he met Moltke at Karlsbad and ended by securing the latter's admission that " any postponement (*jedes Zuwarten*) means a diminution of our chances."⁴ On 16 March again, he discussed with the German Ambassador Tschirschky the Russian danger and the advisability of a preventive war, but met with the answer that both Francis Ferdinand and William II

¹ Conrad, *Aus Meiner Dienstzeit*, iii., p. 755.

² *ibid.*, iii., p. 406.

³ *ibid.*, iii., pp. 601, 605. " *Warum warten Wir?* "

⁴ *ibid.*, iii., p. 670.

would oppose it and would only consent to war if placed before a *fait accompli*.¹ and in June Conrad records his impression that both German and Austro-Hungarian policy was "lacking in clear will or firm directive," though it was full of forebodings of approaching danger. To Berchtold a few days earlier he had argued that the balance of forces would alter more and more to Austria-Hungary's disadvantage the longer the decision was postponed.²

After the tragedy of Sarajevo he summed up his view of the prospects as follows: in 1909 it would have been a game with open cards, in 1913 it would still have been a game with chances, in 1914 it had become a game of *va banque*, * though in his view there was no alternative.⁴ In this connection it is interesting to note that in 1913 Conrad sent one of his officers to discuss the situation with Mr. Steed. When the latter expressed grave doubts as to the wisdom of a policy of armed aggression against Serbia, he was told that Conrad regarded this as quite inevitable, and that at the worst Austria-Hungary would perish gloriously (*glorreich untergehen*).

It should be added that in the autumn of 1913 Conrad twice talked with William II, and seems to have at least partially infected him with his ideas. On 8 September William asked him why it had not come to war in 1909: "I did not hold back your soldiers: I declared that Germany would stand entirely on your side." But Conrad quite accurately assigned the blame to the London Conference of Ambassadors, which had exercised a restraining influence.' On 18 October, at the Leipzig

¹ *ibid.*, iii., p. 597.

² 12 March, *ibid.*, iii., p. 616.

³ *ibid.*, iv., p. 72.

³ *ibid.*, iv., p. 18. An instructive comment upon Conrad's policy will be found in the valuable memoirs of the German General von Cramon, *Unser Österreichisch-ungarische Bundesgenosse im Weltkriege*, p. 52. Conrad's various Memoranda, he writes, reveal him "as a mixture between a German-Austrian Liberal of the 'seventies and a Federalist of the colour of Francis Ferdinand, put in any case as the most determined enemy of the Dualist form of the state, in which he saw the greatest danger to the Monarchy."

⁴ *ibid.*, III, p. 43.

Centenary celebrations, William went 'further, declaring Serbia's measure to be full, and approving energetic action. " I'll go with you," he told Conrad. " The other Powers are not ready and will do nothing against us. In a few days you must be in Belgrade. I was always for peace, but that has its limits. I have read and know much about war and know what it means, but at last there comes a situation in which a Great Power can't look on any longer, but *must* draw the sword."¹

That Conrad's misgivings were abundantly shared by the supreme authorities of the Dual Monarchy is shown by the Memorandum on foreign policy which was being prepared in the spring of 1914 at the Ballplatz for the purpose of winning Germany to an actively anti-Serb policy and the attachment of Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance. * In its earliest draft it does take into consideration the possibility of coming to terms with Serbia — mainly, it is true, because of the reaction of the Serbian question upon Roumania, which is in 1914 the main preoccupation of both German and Austro-Hungarian policy. But Berchtold eliminates this and revises the draft in accordance with the assumption that Serbia cannot be reconciled.

This is fully in keeping with Berchtold's attitude in the autumn of 1913. Conrad, in his third volume, prints in full the minutes of a meeting of the Joint Council of Ministers held on 3 October, 1913:³ and from them we learn that on the very day before Mr. Pasic had made renewed overtures to Austria-Hungary, expressing the desire for friendly relations "for decades to come."⁴

¹ *ibid.*, iii, p. 470. ² See *infra.*, p. 161. ³ Conrad, *op. cit.*, iii., p. 729.

⁴ Mr. Bogicević, then Serbian Charge d'Affaires at Berlin, claims (*Kriegsursachen*, p. 69) to have learned direct both from Pasic and from Jagow that during the peace negotiations at Bucarest in August 1913, King Charles and Mr. Maiorescu more than once urged Serbia to improve her relations with Austria-Hungary. Evidently Pasic took this advice to heart. If the same writer is to be trusted, this overture of Pasic to Vienna is not unconnected with the warning addressed in the same August by Jagow to the Serbs as to Austria-Hungary's intended military action (*ibid.*, p. 73.)

How little response there was to Pasic's advance is shown by the remarks of the Austrian Premier, Count Stürgkh, who declared: "A reckoning with Serbia and her humiliation is a condition of the Monarchy's existence. If this can't happen to-day, it must in any case be thoroughly prepared."¹ In his audience with Francis Joseph on 2 October, Conrad talks of the impending visit of Pasic to Vienna, and even he, after years of "Delenda Carthago," allows himself to entertain the possibility of "binding agreements with Serbia."²

But Pasic was a second time rebuffed and never came to Vienna. This incident deserves to be specially stressed, for it is the final justification for Serbia falling more and more under Russian influence. This lay in the nature of things. On the one hand stood Austria-Hungary consolidating her hold upon Bosnia, keenly resenting Serbian protests, enforcing Serbia's public humiliation before Europe, employing forgery and espionage to discredit the Yugoslav movement and repressing Croatian liberties at home, and again, blocking Serbia's economic outlet, mobilising against her at the height of her struggle with Turkey and encouraging discord between her and her allies. On the other hand stood Russia, where public opinion sympathised hardly less intensely with the Balkan Slavs and their war of liberation, than it had a generation earlier in the Eastern crisis of 1876 — with the result that the Tsar was chosen as arbiter and his Government strained every effort to secure a peaceful solution of the dispute between the allies, and when those efforts failed, served as the sole effective deterrent to forcible intervention on the part of Austria-Hungary. It was thus hardly surprising that the Pasic Government should have been Russophil and eager to show its gratitude towards its saviour.

Yet though Russia actively sympathised with Serbia, and though to prevent Serbia's overthrow had become

¹ Conrad, *op. cit.*, iii., p. 731.

² *ibid.*, iii., p. 456.

an obvious matter of Russian prestige — recognised as such by every Chancellery in Europe as part of the unhappy pre-war situation — Russia had none the less made quite clear to Serbia her desire to avoid a Great War; though of course there were Russians in high places, and notably Mr. Izvolsky, the Ambassador in Paris, who regarded it as sooner or later inevitable, and therefore not unnaturally desired that it should take place at the most favourable moment for Russia.

Mr. Bogicevic,¹ who was Serbian Charge d'Affaires in Berlin shortly before the war, quotes Mr. Pasic as remarking to his Greek colleague, Mr. Politis, at the conclusion of the Peace Conference in Bucarest (10 August, 1913): " The first round is won; now we must prepare the second against Austria."* Considering that both statesmen must have been well aware how narrowly an Austro-Hungarian assault upon Serbia had been averted in the preceding weeks, it is difficult to find fault with the remark, if it was actually made. More compromising are the phrases which Pasic is alleged to have used to Bogicevic himself during a cure at Karlsbad some weeks later:» " Already in the first Balkan War I could have let it come to an European war, in order to acquire Bosnia and Herzegovina: but as I feared that we should then be forced to make large concessions to Bulgaria in Macedonia, I wanted first of all to secure the possession of Macedonia for Serbia, and only then to proceed to the acquisition of Bosnia/' This is the true atmosphere of Balkan megalomania and calculating intrigue, but it shows that he was not planning any immediate aggression. That he had at the back of his mind the dream of Bosnia as one day united with Serbia, it would be

¹This writer must be read with considerable caution. Brought up at the Theresianum in Vienna, and having hardly ever lived in his own country, he acquired an essentially German outlook and, belonging to the Obrenovic faction, owed his diplomatic post solely to his family's personal relations with Milovanovic. His book contains some first-hand material, but it suppresses all criticism of Austria-Hungary and treats Russia as the villain throughout.

² *Kriegsursachen*, p. 65.

³ *ibid.*, p. 65.

absurd to deny; for that was a dream which was common to almost every Serb on either side of the Austro-Serbian frontier.

Much more important are the terms of Pasic's conversation with the Tsar on 20 January, 1914,¹ when he and the Crown Prince had gone to thank Russia for her support, and if possible to win the hand of a Russian Grand Duchess. The Tsar met their thanks by the simple phrase that Russia had only done her Slav duty. But Pasic, in his exposé of Serbian policy, lays the main stress upon the need for Balkan peace and the avoidance of all fresh complications. Serbia, he rightly maintained, required peace in order to recover and to prepare anew for the defence of Serbian interests against the dangers threatening from Austria, Turkey and Bulgaria. If on the other hand Pasic had come to despair of any arrangement with Vienna after the failure of his two overtures in December 1912 and October 1913, and in view of the events which we have already summarised, it is surely very hard to blame him for such an attitude.

But if Serbia had come to regard a life-and-death struggle as well-nigh inevitable after so many indications of Vienna's hostility, it is only natural that the same opinion should have been entertained in many Russian circles. No one will accuse the Tsar of wishing war, especially in the precarious internal state of Russia herself, nor was the Foreign Minister, Mr. Sazonov, of an adventurous disposition. But both had pronounced and genuine Slavophil sympathies and inevitably allowed them to intertwine with the old Russian desire for access to the Mediterranean. The aim which Izvolsky had failed to achieve at the time of the Bosnian Annexation Crisis was constantly present to the minds of Russian statesmen, and their military and naval discussions with

¹ Pasic's report is reproduced in *Deutschland Schuldig?* (*German White Book*, 9 9), appendix xxvi., pp. 130-6; or in Bogiöevic, *Kriegsursachen*, appendix iii. PP. 170-80.

representatives of the Entente were not unconnected with it. Already, at his visit to Balmoral in September 1912, Sazonov had discussed with Sir Edward Grey and King George the possibilities of an European War.¹ He did not inform Britain of Russia's share in producing the secret Serbo-Bulgarian Convention of the previous spring, which was the germ of the Balkan League, but he did intimate it to M. Poincaré, who showed a certain alarm and feared aggressive aims.» But though these aims obviously ran counter to Austro-Hungarian policy as then conceived by Berchtold and his subordinates, it cannot reasonably be maintained that their point was directed against the Dual Monarchy.³ The secret clause which committed Bulgaria in the event of an attack from the north was simply part of a design intended to secure immunity during the projected campaign against Turkey; and it was obvious from the first that Bulgaria would never have consented to share in a Serbian war of aggression against Austria-Hungary, even if the Serbs should be so mad as to undertake one. Moreover, Russia's control of Balkan events was very much more apparent than real, and indeed almost from the first the Balkan states took the bit between their teeth. The secret treaty prescribed the Tsar as umpire both regarding the date for beginning the war with Turkey and regarding future frontier disputes among the allies. The dramatic manner in which the latter provision was repudiated in June 1913 has overshadowed the fact that the other provision was equally disregarded, that Sazonov was intensely annoyed at the allies' onslaught upon Turkey and would have liked to hold them back. His Minister in Belgrade, Hartwig, who is generally regarded as the *Spiritus movens* behind the scenes, and who undoubtedly enjoyed great

¹ Report of Sazonov to Tsar (undated) in *Le Livre Noir* (ed. René Marchand), ii., pp. 345-59. This book contains the Russian diplomatic documents from 1910 to 1914, as published by the Bolshevik Government.

² Stieve, *Izvol'sky und der Weltkrieg*, p. 91.

³ This is Stieve's contention (*ibid.*, p. 86).

personal prestige and influence at Belgrade, was so little initiated into the plot as to be able to report to St. Petersburg late in July that Serbia was decidedly disinclined for warlike plans of any kind.¹ As late as 1 October — a week before war broke out — he assured his Entente colleagues that Pasic was entirely pacific,² and during the war he wrote home in alarm, lest Russia's " historical ideals " might be threatened by the League's advance upon Constantinople.

On the other hand Sazonov undoubtedly gave encouragement to the Serbs. On 27 December, 1912, he appears to have told the Serbian Minister, Mr. Popovic, that they must be satisfied with what they might get and " regard it only as an instalment, since the future belonged " to them.³ Again in April 1913 he bade them work for the future, as they would eventually " get much territory from Austria."⁴ The Paris despatches of Izvolsky to Sazonov⁵ also show that during the Balkan War the former was working steadily to commit the French Government to military action in the event of Austria-Hungary intervening against Serbia. But there is no evidence whatever that Russia contemplated a war of aggression, and it is sufficiently notorious that quite apart from internal unrest, she was so little ready for war that the General Staff reckoned with the necessity of abandoning Warsaw and the whole Polish salient. When the Great War actually came, it was only Germany's tremendous concentration of effort against Belgium that enabled Russia to alter her plan and attempt the invasion of East Prussia. This has obscured the utter unpreparedness of Russia in the summer of 1914. Those who maintain that Russia intended to make war

¹ Siebert, *Diplom. Aktenstücke*, p. 529.

² *French Yellow Book (Affaires Balcaniques)*, i., p. 69, No. 116. Telegram reproduced in appendix v. of Bogicević, *Kriegsursachen*, p. 128. *ibid.*, appendix vii. To this Popović naively replied, " We would gladly give Monastir to Bulgaria, if we could get Bosnia and other Austrian lands." *See Le Livre Noir*, i., pp. 321-72.

in the following autumn, and so was only forestalled by a few months, argue in flagrant defiance of well established and fundamental military facts.

The most, then, that can be said is that Izvolsky, influenced in part by personal pique against Vienna, but above all by his temperamental reading of the European situation, had come to regard war as inevitable and was absorbed in diplomatic preparations for it. But though influential, he was far from all-powerful at St. Petersburg, and even friends and colleagues were ready to discount his colossal vanity. On the very eve of the tragedy there is evidence from Bucarest of Sazonov's pacific intentions, and his confidences to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador as late as 26 July, 1914, reveal him as anything but aggressive, even when roused.¹ It seems, however, to be well established that Izvolsky used the expression " C'est la guerre."

It may, however, be said that in the spring of 1914, despite certain signs of relaxed tension such as the Anglo-German negotiations, the general situation in Europe was one of very great uncertainty and was at the mercy of any untoward event. Austro-Russian rivalry in particular was as acute as ever, not merely in the Balkans, but also in Galicia and the Ukraine, where Uniate and Orthodox propaganda was exploited by both sides for political ends and gave rise to sensational treason trials, and where legions were being organised for the coming war. So far as Austria-Hungary was concerned, her prestige had been seriously impaired by Berchtold's clumsy handling of the Balkan situation. The successive rebuffs of 1912 and 1913 were in everyone's recollection, and now as spring turned to summer there came the Russo-Roumanian *rapprochement*, the humiliating failure of the Wied *regime* in Albania, the Serbo-Montenegrin negotiations for union and the danger that the two Serb states might ere long find a genuine

¹ See *infra.*, p. 269.

excuse for intervention in Albania. Berchtold was therefore searching anxiously for some means of rehabilitating himself before public opinion. In the words of the ablest German post-war critic of diplomatic history, Vienna's "attitude towards Balkan questions and the whole Southern Slav problem" was one of "perplexity and planlessness," and her statesmen were "permanently possessed by the fear that further failures in foreign policy might completely dislocate the internal structure of the Monarchy."¹

Inside Serbia itself the situation was also strained; two closely balanced factions were struggling for power, a revision of the constitution was imminent, and the PaSic Cabinet was hard put to it to maintain its majority at the impending general elections. The problem of administering the newly acquired provinces was entirely unsolved and causing great disquietude, in view of the Bulgarophil sympathies of large sections of the population. In a word, Serbia was absorbed in her own troubles and not in a position to risk fresh adventure. That some of the wilder and more ambitious spirits in the army had not yet had their fill of fighting is as certain as that the pothouses and cafés of the Balkan Peninsula, as also of Hungary and some parts of Austria, were frequented by megalomaniacs whose political phantasy was boundless and who reflected the general atmosphere of unsettlement, but who did not after all control their respective Governments.

Far more serious, however, than this loud-mouthed beer-patriotism was the fact that in the Jugoslav provinces of the Dual Monarchy the entire younger generation under the age of twenty-five, and especially the youths finishing their gymnasium and starting a University career, were infected by revolutionary ideas, utterly

¹ Brandenburg, *Von Bismarck zum Weltkriege*, p. 387. His criticism of Aehrenthal and Berchtold, based on official German documents not yet published, is very instructive.

impatient of the mild and opportunist tactics of their political leaders, going their own way and leaning more and more towards "propaganda of the deed." Before the war little or nothing of this movement was known in the West, while more than one post-war writer, misled by motives of race or party, has placed it in an entirely false perspective and thereby produced a very distorted picture of the events leading to the Sarajevo outrage and the outbreak of the Great War. Hence no apology is needed for treating this subject in somewhat greater detail.

CHAPTER III

THE JUGOSLAV REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

THE Austro-Serbian conflict is only too often treated as a diplomatic struggle between the Governments of Vienna, Budapest, and Belgrade; and the Bosnian problem in particular is presented as a question of international law or of European balance of power, to be decided according to the interests of the Great Powers rather than the wishes of the native population. Yet the really essential facts, the facts which are linked with the tragedy of 1914 as cause and effect, are, firstly, that in the two decades preceding the Congress of Berlin the hopes of the entire Serbian race were centred upon Bosnia-Herzegovina, that Serbia and Montenegro, having fought in vain for its delivery, regarded its occupation by Austria-Hungary as downright robbery and declined to accept it as a finally accomplished fact; and, secondly, that the mass of the Bosnian population itself struggled valiantly for union with the two Serb principalities, resisted foreign occupation by force of arms, and, though reduced to subjection, remained sullenly unreconciled. That Austria-Hungary did much for the material welfare and ordered development of the two provinces is simply not open to question; but nothing that she did could win the hearts of her new subjects, and those who, since the turn of the century, celebrated the success of her colonising efforts either wrote in ignorance or were living in a fools' paradise.

How deep-rooted was the sentiment for Bosnia in every Serbian heart had long been known to all who had ears to hear, and is nowhere expounded more clearly

than in the confidential reports addressed to Vienna between 1868 and 1874 by Benjamin Kállay, Austria-Hungary's first diplomatic agent in Belgrade. During the years following the murder of Prince Michael we find him repeatedly impressing upon Count Beust that the one sure way of allaying Serbian suspicions of the Dual Monarchy is to prove that it has no design of occupying the Slav provinces of Turkey.¹ On the other hand, he makes it clear that "Bosnia is the centre round which all the wishes and hopes of Serbian statesmen turn" and that "the idea of its possession is the fundamental principle of all Serbian aims." And "as the Serbs count upon the future possession of Bosnia, and this is a fact which cannot be altered," Kállay suggests that much the most advantageous plan would be if they came to "hope its realisation" from Austria-Hungary.

Within a short space of years, however, Kállay himself was contributing very materially towards Austria-Hungary's adoption of an entirely different policy towards Serbia and Bosnia; and it is notorious that as Joint Finance Minister from 1882 to 1903 he became her most noted instrument in holding down the latter province.

If, then, we are to understand the events of 1914, we must realise, not only the resentment aroused throughout the native population by Austria's Balkan policy since the 'seventies, but also the fact that, especially in Bosnia, revolutionary feeling was no novelty, but had simmered for years. The insurrection of 1875, which precluded the Russo-Turkish War and the long Eastern Crisis, was only the last and most successful of a series of risings which Turkish misrule had provoked during the previous hundred years. In two districts in particular the revolutionary tradition lingered — in Southern Herzegovina,

¹ See, e.g., autograph letter of Kállay to Beust, 22 June, 1868, and his official Reports, No. 64 of 5 October, 1868, No. 68 of 29 October, 1868, No. 60 of 17 March, 1870, No. 3 of 25 January, 1871. *Vienna Staatsarchiv*, Belgrade (1868-75).

and in the Krajna, or north-western portion of Bosnia, sometimes loosely described as " Turkish Croatia." The former cherished the memory of two abortive risings against Austria in the KrivoSije, just across the Dalmatian border, in 1868 and 1881; while in the latter a curious legend grew up around the person of " Petar Mrkonjic/' the name assumed by Prince Peter Karagjorgjevió,¹ when he fought in the ranks of the Bosnian insurgents in 1875.

It is obvious, however, that during the generation following the occupation of Bosnia nothing occurred to kindle these memories into flame. Under King Milan, Serbia's prestige had sunk to zero, Croatia vegetated under the corrupting rule of Khuen, while in Bosnia itself Kállay did all in his power to maintain the confessional lines of cleavage, and so keep Orthodox, Catholic, and Moslem in disunion and political impotence. There was as yet no political life, no Diet, very few schools, and virtually no newspapers. Isolated, backward, and inexperienced, the leaders could not see beyond the petty concessions of Church autonomy which Kállay offered piecemeal to them.

But with the year 1903 there came a sudden change. Fresh breezes seemed to spring up on all sides — in Croatia, in Dalmatia, in Serbia — and soon began to scatter the mists of isolation which had so long hung over Bosnia. In Croatia especially a new generation of Croats and Serbs, educated in Prague, Vienna, and Graz, impatiently rejected alike the opportunism of the old Magyarophil Unionist Party and the unpractical super-patriotism of Ante Starcevic and his Pan-Croats. The framers of the Resolution of Fiume proved that the co-operation of Serb and Croat was a highly practical political ideal, and, indeed, the sole line of advance which offered serious Prospects of success.

The advantages of unity after almost a generation of

¹ The future King Peter.

discord were soon obvious even to the narrowest intelligence, and were demonstrated to the masses by the strenuous and short-sighted efforts of Budapest and Vienna to force Croat and Serb apart once more. Here, as in most cases, ill-will and persecution produced the contrary effect, and the Croato-Serb Coalition survived all the rude shocks of the Rauch *regime*, the Annexation crisis, the Zagreb and Friedjung trials, and even the Cuvaj dictatorship. But in the course of time opportunist tendencies grew stronger within its ranks. It had come to realise on what precarious foundations the national cause rested, so long as the administrative and judicial system of Croatia, its franchise and Press laws, were controlled by the nominees of Budapest. The "Realist" doctrine, which many of its leaders had imbibed in Prague from Masaryk and Drtina, also pointed in the direction of "small work," on slow and unsensational lines, as a preparation for that final trial of strength for which the times were not yet ripe. Thus a wise resolve not to imperil by rash action the gains of recent years, combined with a noticeable slackening of national endurance — in other words, a blend of statesmanship and personal caution or indolence — was steadily urging the Coalition leaders towards a compromise with Budapest, at the very period when the stirring events of the two Balkan Wars seemed to be vindicating Serbia's right to pose as the Southern Slav Piedmont, and when the official policy of Vienna and Budapest showed itself increasingly hostile towards her.

It is in this period of violent ferment that an entirely new movement makes itself felt among the rising generation, no longer confined to the small intellectual class of Croatia and Southern Hungary, in whose hands political leadership had hitherto been mainly concentrated, but recruited more and more from the masses in every Jugoslav province. This process had been hastened by the foundation of secondary schools, with

Serbo-Croat as the language of instruction, and by the consequent growth of what was virtually an intellectual proletariat, especially in Dalmatia and Bosnia.

So kaleidoscopic and uncertain was the political situation throughout the Southern Slav provinces that the young men were inevitably tempted to dabble in coffee-house politics and street demonstrations at an age when they should have been absorbed in their studies and their sport. One of the first consequences of the conflict between Zagreb and Budapest in 1907 was that the great majority of the Croat and Serb youth at Zagreb University migrated to Prague, already the most flourishing of West Slavonic Universities. Here they founded an organ of their own, *Hrvatski Djak* (*The Croat Student*), and extended still further that intellectual contact between Yugoslav and Czech which an earlier generation had established, and which has grown even more intimate since the war. Most of the emigrants returned in the following year, but the number of Croats and Serbs normally studying in Prague, Graz, and Vienna grew steadily. Among them the Bosnian annexation caused keen excitement, and the intervention of Masaryk in the Zagreb treason affair and his exposure of the Friedjung forgeries won him the lively sympathy of the academic youth.

In 1910 the Croats and Serbs at Vienna University decided to publish an organ of their own, and henceforth tended to go more and more their own ways, regarding the *Hrvatski Djak* as too colourless, and the political leaders, with but few exceptions, as mere timid tacticians. It is highly significant that *Z or a* (*Dawn*) — which was published in both alphabets in order to emphasise the absolute equality of Croat and Serb — fell almost from the first under the influence of a group of Bosnian students, who already favoured much more radical Methods than those advocated by their kinsmen elsewhere. The Bosnian Press was still in its infancy, but

two groups of youthful fanatics had already founded the *Otatbina* in Banjaluka and the *Narod* in Mostar, and their respective editors, Petar Kocic and Risto Radulovic, both gifted with considerable journalistic and literary talent, preached nationalist doctrine in a new and purer form. The aim which in one sense or another all these groups had set before them was the political and cultural unity of all Jugoslavs in a single nation.

How this was actually to be attained was much less clearly understood, and a whole series of alternative methods was advocated by this or that group. But there was a growing feeling that the Habsburg Monarchy was an obstacle rather than an aid, and that far the best hope lay in those European complications which most Jugoslavs, with their lively imagination, regarded as sooner or later inevitable, and for which they were therefore resolved to prepare themselves, as offering them a supreme opportunity such as might never recur. In a word, every nuance from " evolution " to " revolution " was represented in their ranks.

It is, however, specially important to remember that all these groups, virtually without exception, took their stand on a strongly Yugoslav basis, insisting on the absolute equality, or indeed identity, of Serb and Croat, and, as time went on, of Slovene also, and firmly rejecting all idea either of Serb or of Croat predominance, such as was desired by official Belgrade on the one hand or by the Croat clericals on the other. As we shall see, this idea was, and, indeed, still is, unsympathetic to the dominant Radical clique in Serbia, and is one proof among many that these youthful revolutionaries never possessed the backing of official circles.

While, then, the Prague group was mainly abstract and literary in its aims, and *Zora*, in Vienna, proceeded to expound more radical doctrine, the movement assumed its most advanced forms in Sarajevo and Zagreb. In

the summer of 1910 the annexation of Bosnia was consummated by the proclamation of the new Constitution and the solemn opening of the Diet by General Varesanin in the name of the Emperor. A young disciple of Kocic, Bogdan Zerajic, a Serb from Nevesinje, in Southern Herzegovina, resolved to mar the ceremony, and to voice before Europe the dissatisfaction of his compatriots by an attempt to assassinate the Governor on one of the bridges of Sarajevo. Varesanin escaped uninjured and Zerajic committed suicide before he could be seized. No accomplices were discovered, and, indeed, it seems certain that his was the spontaneous act of an overwrought fanatic, brooding over the wrongs of his nation, as interpreted in the extremist Press. But his example struck the imagination of the Bosnian and Croatian youth, and was a rallying-point for " Mlada Bosna " — " Young Bosnia " — which was never an actual organisation, but something far more than that, since it soon comprised the vast majority of youths born in the two provinces since the late 'eighties.

A practical proof of how the poison was working, but one which remained virtually unknown till after the catastrophe was over, was an anonymous pamphlet entitled *The Death of a Hero (Smrt Jednog Heroja)*, and devoted to the glorification of Zerajic.¹ This was the work of another disciple of Kocic, Vladimir Gacinovic, born in 1890 as the son of a Herzegovinian Orthodox priest, and himself at first intended for the priesthood. During the Annexation crisis he had fled to Serbia, with the intention of serving as a volunteer against Austria-Hungary if it should come to war. He thus naturally enough came into contact with Komit adj is and others who favoured "direct action," and when, in 1912, he went from Belgrade to Vienna University, he was already infected with the ideas of Herzen and Krapotkin, and

¹ It was Vienna to Belgrade, and there printed by the extremist newspaper *Pijemont*.

left the greatest extremists of the *Zora* 'group far behind.

It was in Vienna that he wrote his pamphlet on Zerajic, which, by its strange perverted idealism and high-faluting . style, gives a clear insight into the revolutionary movement which is now commencing) He complains that Serbian public opinion does not pay due attention to " those who are coming " (" *oni koji dolaze* "). " Their aim/' he tells us, " is in the first place to kindle revolution in the minds and thoughts of young Serbs, so that they may be saved from the disastrous influence of anti-national ideas and prepare for the breaking of bonds and for the laying of healthy foundations for the shining national life that is to come." ^x

After quoting the example of Orsini* and the Russian Terrorists, he gives a brief sketch of Zerajic, whom he describes as " foreordained for a high national conception and prepared as a national offering," amid the " resignation and apathy " of his age. " In such moments of calm, after a great national failure " (he means Austria-Hungary's successful annexation of Bosnia), " there comes upon the stage a man of action, of strength, of life and virtue, a type such as opens an epoch, proclaims ideas, and enlivens suffering and spellbound hearts."* " The Serb revolutionary, if he wants to win, must be an artist and a conspirator, must have talent for strength and suffering, must be a martyr and a plotter, a man of Western manners and a *hajduk*, who will shout and wage war for the unfortunate and downtrodden. Revolution never comes from despair, as is mistakenly thought, but out of revolutionary thought, which grows in national enthusiasm."⁴ He quotes Zerajic's own phrase, "I leave it to Serbdom to avenge me," and he concludes the pamphlet with the appeal: " Young Serbs, you who

¹ *Spomenica Vladimira Gacinovica* (Sarajevo, 1921), p. 41. On pp. 41-51 is printed the greater part of the original pamphlet, under the heading „ Bogdan Zerajic.”

² Author of the bomb outrage on Napoleon III.

³ *ibid.*, p. 48.

⁴ *ibid.*, p. 47.

are rising from the ruins and foulness of to-day, will you produce such men? It seems as though this sums up the whole Serbian problem, political, moral, and cultural."¹

This pamphlet hardly circulated outside student circles, but it was just among them that its influence was so profound and decisive. Besides, events were a daily incentive in the same direction. The Croatian elections of December 1911 and the high-handed methods of Cuvaj, first as Ban, then as Dictator, caused high tension throughout the Yugoslav provinces, and led to street demonstrations, in which the students took an active part. Early in 1912 there was bloodshed in front of the University at Zagreb, and on 21 February the first joint demonstration of students of all three faiths — Orthodox, Catholic, and Moslem — in Sarajevo ended by the police firing on the crowd and killing Salim Agié, a young Moslem.

On 8 June, 1912, another young Bosnian student, Luka Jukic, made an unsuccessful attempt upon the life of Cuvaj in the streets of Zagreb, killing in the process the Chief of the Croatian Department of Education and one of the policemen who tried to arrest him. Though this outrage was followed by numerous arrests of students, the exasperated feeling which prevailed is shown by the fact that 270 Yugoslav students in Prague signed with their own names a letter of open menace and defiance to the Dictator. The scattered student groups at the various Universities had already begun to organise themselves, the " Serbo-Croat Nationalist-Radical Youth " being formed at Vienna in December 1911. Now a whole series of new student organs began to appear - — *Val* in Zagreb, to replace the all too anaemic *Hrvatski Djak*; *Prepared* in Ljubljana; *N ovi Srbin* at Sombor

¹ *ibid.*, p. 51.

This fact was brought out at the trial of the assassins, several of whom admitted the influence of the pamphlet upon their minds. Cf. " Jugoslovenstvo sarajevskih Atentatora," by P. Süjeptevic (*Nova Europa*, 1 June, 1925, p. 501).

and Pancevo; *Srpska Omladina* in Sarajevo; *Ujedinjenje* at Split.¹

In all these groups feeling, of course, varied according to temperament. Even the most moderate among them went considerably beyond the most advanced of the political leaders, and all were firmly convinced of an impending crisis in European affairs, upon whose issue the fate of their own nation would depend. But, though probably a great majority already looked upon Zerajic and Jukic as national heroes, there still were a tiny handful who actually dabbled in terrorist plans. In August 1913 a young Croat student named Dojcic, who had come all the way from America for the purpose, inflicted a severe, though not dangerous, wound upon the new Ban, Baron Skerlec; and in March 1914 another Croat, Jakob Sefer, was caught red-handed at the Zagreb Opera, when waiting to shoot Skerlec in company with the Archduke Leopold Salvator.

By this time not merely the University students, but the middle school youth in most Yugoslav towns of Austria-Hungary, were thoroughly infected by revolutionary ideas. They continually took part in street demonstrations against the Cuvaj *regime* and the Budapest Government, and disciplinary methods or the expulsion of individual pupils sometimes led to sympathetic strikes in neighbouring schools. The unrest in the schools was deliberately fanned by young agitators from the Universities, who went secretly from town to town and encouraged the formation of student societies or clubs. When the Balkan War broke out, and the whole South blazed with enthusiasm for the cause of Serbia and her allies, some of the wilder spirits swam across the Drina to Serbia or slunk by night over the

¹ In 1914 three more began their brief existence: *Zastava* at Split (Spalato), edited by Oskar Tartaglia, the present Mayor; *Vihor* at Zagreb, and a more ambitious monthly review entitled *Jugoslavia* at Prague, with whom one of the moving spirits was Ljuba Leontic" (since the war founder of a widespread patriotic Yugoslav organisation on semi-Fascist lines, known as the "Orjuna").

Montenegrin frontier, and joined the irregular volunteer bands which served as outposts for the Serbian Army as it invaded Macedonia. It was thus that the first real contact was established between the ringleaders of the Bosnian movement and the most reckless elements in Serbia. This was still further promoted by the policy of the Austro-Hungarian authorities; for in a good many cases youths who were expelled from all Bosnian gymnasia, and expressly disqualified from entering any school in Austria or Hungary, had no choice left but to renounce all further education or to throw themselves on the mercy of their free kinsmen in Serbia.

This overcharged atmosphere was admirably suited to such a born agitator as Vladimir Gacinovic, who left Vienna in the winter of 1912 in order to fight as a Montenegrin volunteer before Skutari, and then resumed his sociological studies at Lausanne University, but remained in close contact with many of his contemporaries and juniors at home. Indeed, to quote one of his most intimate associates, " he held the half of revolutionary Bosnia in his hands; almost all the younger priests and teachers were with him." By his pamphlet, and by his articles in *Zora* and *Srpska Omladina*, he had hypnotised the younger generation. His high moral phrases, leading to the same strangely immoral conclusions as the writings of Savinkov¹ and similar Russian terrorists, kindled raw youth to action. " The young men must prepare themselves for sacrifices," was his message from the very outset; and the best sacrifice consisted in taking the same risks as Zerajic.

It is not generally known that in Lausanne Gacinovic was in close relations with the Russian revolutionaries, and, among others, with Trotsky, who even wrote a

of that strangest of Russian books, *The Pale Horse*, by " Ropshin " (Savinkov, the murderer of Plehve and the Grand Duke Serge), which opens with a meeting of a Nihilists, reading St. Gospel together, as a preparation for the murder of governor!

³ Spomenica, p.32.

preface to a selection of his French articles.¹ From some of these men he learnt the art of bomb-making, and began plotting outrages. In January 1913 he invited certain young Bosnians — among them two Moslems, Mehmed-basic and Mustafa Golubic — to meet him at Toulouse, and here he provided them with weapons and poison, for the purpose of attempting the life of General Potiorek, the Governor of Bosnia, and forestalling their own capture by suicide. But the youthful conspirators' nerve failed them; fearing a Customs examination on their return across the Austrian frontier, they threw the weapons out of the carriage window, and nothing further came of this design.

None the less, they and others of their contemporaries continued to dream of terrorist action, and remained in continual correspondence with Gacinovié. But, while most of the semi-secret societies which they had formed never got far beyond the theory of revolution, there was formed, mainly at his instance, a secret terrorist group, or "Kruzok," in more than one of the Bosnian towns, and notably in Sarajevo, where his friend Danilo Ilic, a young schoolmaster, who had also served for a time as a Komitadji in Macedonia, was the link between many who were otherwise completely unknown to each other.

The extent to which discipline had been undermined among the youth of Bosnia is very clearly shown by a series of confidential memoranda drawn up immediately before and after the tragedy by high officials in the Joint Finance Ministry in Vienna and kindly placed at my disposal by one of them since the war. Incidentally, these documents throw light upon the jealousy and lack of co-ordination between the *Landesregierung* in Sarajevo

¹ A Croat edition of these was published in Vienna in 1922, under the title of *Sarajevski Atentat* (Bibliotéka Svétlost, édition Slave) and contains the preface by "L. T." Trotsky, however, disapproved of Gacinovié's views as too exclusively nationalist.

² This account is based on verbal statement made to me by some of Gaéinovié's intimates, now living in Sarajevo.

and its nominal superior, the Finance Ministry in Vienna — a circumstance which, as will transpire later, was, more than anything else, responsible for the success of the murder plot against the Archduke.¹

It appears that in the course of 1913 a secret organisation called the " Serbo-Croat Nationalist Youth " (" Srpsko-Hrvatska Nacionalisticka Omladina ") was formed in Sarajevo. It had no office or statutes, but took as its model a similar society in Belgrade called " National Unity " (" Narodno Jedinstvo "), with which Gaćinovic had formerly been in relations. Its aim was to win the rising generation for the idea of throwing off the Habsburg yoke and achieving Yugoslav Unity under Serbia; and its efforts were concentrated above all upon pupils in the various teachers' training colleges. Sub-sections existed in Tuzla, Mostar, Trebinje, and Banjaluka, but the centre of the whole movement was in Zagreb, where it was intended to hold, on 16 July, 1914, a sort of congress of delegates from all the training colleges in the various Yugoslav provinces, and to lay plans for future agitation.¹

Specially active as wandering prophets of revolution were the Slovene student Endlicher and a budding school-teacher named Laza Gjukie. These and others set themselves deliberately to undermine discipline in the secondary schools, and the conditions in the gymnasia of Mostar and Tuzla were typical of the result. In the former a number of senior students " by their provocative behaviour towards the teachers, kept the school in a ferment," and organised insubordination in every class, until it ended in open insults and disturbances

¹ See pp. 106-7;

² Report No. 5544 of Dr. N. Mandic, Vice-Governor (*LandeschefStellvertreter*) of Bosnia, addressed to the *Zentralstelle für den defensiven Kundschaftsdienst* (Headquarters for Counter-espionage), then situated in Zagreb. Through the "ourtesy of friends in Zagreb, I was able to obtain this document from the archives of the Zagreb police. The document asserts that the Sarajevo group numbers about 100 members, and gives the names of six ringleaders, of whom only one, Laza Gjukic, is known to us from nationalist sources.

and led to a formal enquiry. From the minutes of the teaching staff at Tuzla it appears that here several of the older pupils publicly insulted their professors in class, and even assaulted one of them; that demonstrations and disturbances were frequent; and that a pupil of the seventh class during religious instruction spat in the face of the Orthodox catechist, simply because he belonged to the moderate Serb party which at that time supported the Bosnian Government.¹ In these and other cases disciplinary measures seem to have completely failed, to an extent which is well-nigh inconceivable to Western minds. But the fact that this failure was frankly admitted on all sides illustrates better than anything else how untenable not merely political, but even social conditions in Bosnia had become on the eve of the catastrophe. The remedy actually adopted by the Ministry was, on 30 June, 1913, to close the Mostar Gymnasium for a whole year. But here the cure was almost worse than the disease, for the youths thus set * at liberty were either admitted to other schools, and carried the infection with them (this was the case at Tuzla), or swelled the ranks of revolutionary hotheads who were already to be found in every town in the South.²

The slightest incident brought these youths into the street. In Sarajevo there were protests before the Italian Consulate in connection with the Italo-Slovene quarrel at Trieste; or, again, German shop-inscriptions in the town were systematically damaged or besmirched,

¹ See Report 968 of 16 July, 1914 (" *betreffend Mittelschulen, Sanirung der Zustände an denselben* ") — Regierungsrat Cerovic to Minister Bilinski.

² A very valuable testimony to the gravity of this movement will be found in a pamphlet of Count Berchtold's confidential secretary, Count Alexander Hoyos (who was sent on so decisive a mission to Berlin on 4 July, 1914) — *Der deutsch-englische Gegensatz und sein Einfluss auf die Balkanpolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns*, p. 74. " All who knew the country " (i.e. Bosnia) " had the impression that an explosion was near at hand. Especially in the schools Panserb propaganda had created such chaotic conditions that a regular continuance of instruction scarcely seemed possible. The Bosnian Government declared most urgently that severe measures must be taken to check the Serbian agitation, if a catastrophe was to be avoided."

as a protest against Germanisation. In Mostar there was a demonstration against a German theatrical company, in Tuzla against the Austrian national anthem and the person of the Emperor. Amid this atmosphere of constant excitement and agitation the most fantastic rumours circulated, and were rendered plausible by events in the Balkans, by the Austrian mobilisation and military movements, and by the series of attempted assassinations inaugurated by Zerajic — five in four years. One consequence, which it is important to emphasise, was that there was such constant talk about " Attentats " and outrages in all circles, alike official and non-official, that at last it ceased to be taken as seriously as it deserved. This is one of those general assertions which is hardly susceptible of exact proof, because it rests on personal experience and recollections, but which will certainly not be challenged by anyone who had lived even for a month or two in that atmosphere. It is a point of detail which bears very materially upon the question of possible precautions or warnings.

During the winter of 1913-14 the " Kruzoci " already mentioned continued their work, and began deliberately to plan a fresh outrage. The stricter methods introduced by General Potiorek as Governor of Bosnia naturally rendered him specially obnoxious; but he was well protected and not easily reached. Early in 1914 Danilo Ilic set himself to collect youths ready for some desperate outrage, but neither he nor his accomplices appear to have had a clear idea as to where or against whom they were to act. At this moment the forthcoming visit of the Heir Apparent to Bosnia was announced in the Press, and Ilic's friend Pusara cut the announcement out of a local newspaper, gummed it on a postcard, and posted it without further comment to Vaso Cabrinovic, a young Bosnian who had been expelled two years before for Socialist tendencies, and was now working as a typesetter in the State Printing Press at Belgrade. Cabrinovic

showed it to another young Bosnian, Gavrilo Princip, who was finishing his studies in great poverty at a Belgrade gymnasium. The incident proves — as was subsequently admitted at the trial — that their heads were already full of terrorist ideas, and that the barest prompting from their friends at home was needed to set them in motion. (It also proves, incidentally, that the initiative came from Bosnia, not from Serbia.)

While, then, they were winning a third youth, Graben, for their plans, and obtaining arms from Ciganovic — himself a Bosnian refugee — and from Tankosic" — leader of the Komit adj i band in which Princip had unsuccessfully tried to enlist — Ilic* continued his preparations in Sarajevo quite independently of them, and armed three other youths, Cvetko Popović, Vaso Cubrilović, and Muhamed Mehmedbasic, none of whom had any connection with Serbia. Thus when the Archduke came to Sarajevo, these three, the three youths from Serbia, and Pusara himself, were all waiting, armed with revolvers or bombs, at different points along the route. Each group knew that there were others on the watch, but did not know who or where they were, Ilić himself being the sole connecting-link.

The initiative lay, not with those who so recklessly provided arms to three of them in Belgrade, but with Ilić and Pusara in Sarajevo, and above all with Gaóinović in Lausanne. Moreover, it appears that even the inner ring was not in full agreement, that Ilić at the last moment took alarm and wanted to draw back, that Princip insisted upon Gaóinović being consulted afresh, and that only then were the final preparations continued.¹ It appears also that some of the group, and the Slovene student Endlicher, were also in touch with Italian anarchists in Trieste, and hoped to obtain bombs from them, though nothing actually came of this. It may be

¹ Most of the above details I learnt in conversations last summer in Sarajevo and elsewhere with the survivors from the various groups of conspirators.

taken as certain that a few ringleaders among the Yugoslav students in Graz and Vienna knew something of what was brewing; and it is now known that in at least one of the Dalmatian towns some youths had resolved to shoot the Archduke if he passed through their district, and that they possessed the necessary weapons.

On this whole question of initiative there will be a good deal more to say in the chapter devoted to responsibility for the crime of Sarajevo.¹

The survey of events thus briefly attempted in the three introductory chapters must surely lead to the conclusion that between 1912 and 1914 war was on a razor's edge; that in most capitals there existed groups or individuals recklessly bent upon precipitating events; and that, while each weighed anxiously the reasons for and against action, some stroke of fate might utterly disturb the precarious balance. The present chapter will have demonstrated that the real initiative in the Southern Slav Question was rapidly passing from the hands of statesmen and politicians alike into those of raw and hare-brained youths who stuck at nothing, and whom not even the direst consequences could deter. Thus all the materials needed to produce an explosion had long since been accumulated, and, while the actual spark which lit the powder magazine was struck in Sarajevo, there were many other points at which the conflagration might equally well have broken out.

¹ A word as to Gacinovic's fate. After the outbreak of war he served as a volunteer with the French fleet in the Adriatic, then, being invalided, went with Pero Slijepcevic to America to recruit volunteers for the Serbian army and collect funds for the families of "traitors" who had suffered from Austrian reprisals. He died in Switzerland in 1917 at the age of twenty-seven. See *Spomenica*, pp. 93-106.

CHAPTER IV

THE ARCHDUKE FRANCIS FERDINAND

THE events recorded in the previous chapter make it abundantly clear that long before June 1914 a fundamental issue had arisen between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, the product of the same nationalistic currents which had already transformed the face of Germany and Italy. It is obvious that so foul a crime as that of Sarajevo greatly aggravated the quarrel, and hence the dangers to European peace, but it did not in any way create it. Nothing could have arrested the movement save a change of policy by Austria-Hungary towards her own discontented Jugoslav subjects.

Throughout this critical period the personality of the heir-apparent, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, exercised a marked influence upon men and events, and therefore deserves special consideration before we pass to a detailed study of the Sarajevo crime and its consequences.

It may safely be affirmed that in the second decade of our century Francis Ferdinand was the most singular figure of any of the reigning dynasties of Europe. In the words of Count Czernin, who enjoyed his friendship and confidence, " he was unbalanced in everything: he did nothing like other people." Yet he was a man of very considerable intellectual powers and wide interests. In glaring contrast to his uncle, he had a keen artistic sense and was a famous collector of antiques. A brilliant shot, he carried the usual royal mania for sport to the length of wholesale massacre, yet he was passionately devoted to the more peaceful pursuit of gardening, and the grounds of Konopistë were justly famous for their

roses. He cared very little for popularity and certainly never attained it, but he was an excellent judge of character,* and despite his overbearing and hasty temper, was far more tolerant of frank speech and well-grounded criticism than might have been expected. On one occasion the representatives of a minor nationality, when summoned by him to a secret audience,² were very outspoken in their criticism of the situation, and while expressing their devotion to his person, warned him that among their people belief in the dynasty was being steadily undermined. The Archduke, so far from taking offence, expressed his surprise that there was any trace of loyalty left! Being a man of very strong feelings and prejudices, he was equally emphatic in praise and blame, and often gave mortal offence when another in his place would simply have remained silent. He could be winning and gracious on occasions, but he could also be brutal and callous to the last degree, and this showed itself in his lack of consideration for the servants and employees on his estates. Another unlovely side to his character was his extreme meanness in all money matters and his constant habit of driving a hard bargain with persons who were scarcely in a position to resist. There can be little doubt that he was encouraged in this by the desire to provide for his children a fortune independent of any action on the part of his successor to the throne; and it is a cruel irony of fate that they should have been deprived after all of the estate of Konopistě by a decision of the Czechoslovak Parliament³ which it is hard to reconcile either with the spirit of the Peace Treaties or with the principles of international law.

Francis Ferdinand cared little for society and made

¹ Auffenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 188. He it was who "discovered" both Conrad Aehrenthal. His verdict on soldiers or politicians, unless they happened to be Jews, was generally extremely sound.

² Two of them recounted the details to me in strict confidence soon afterwards.

³ The decision was made on 5 August, 1921, and was carried out so ruthlessly that the children of the late Archduke were not even allowed to remove some of his Personal effects from the castle of Konopiste.

few friends, but those whom he admitted to the inner ring were whole-heartedly his. His natural reserve was not untinged by a certain bitterness, due in part to the neglect and affronts from which he suffered as a young man, when he was not expected to live very long, but above all to the situation produced by his marriage, which indeed, as time passed, tended to accentuate still further the main points of his character, both good and bad. His decision to marry the Countess Sophie Chotek, of an ancient but impoverished Bohemian family, could not fail to be unwelcome to the Emperor, and was a source of permanent estrangement between the two. By the rest of the Imperial family it was openly resented, and the constant intrigues of the Archduchesses,¹ the Court Chamberlain² and other high officials against any change of etiquette or precedence in favour of his Consort, were continually rousing Francis Ferdinand to fury, and often led him to absent himself from ceremonies at the Hofburg. For the rest he was a faithful and devoted husband and father, and his domestic happiness was increased by a common standard of strictest attachment to the Catholic Church. This coloured his whole outlook upon men: for instance, he disliked officers who were lax in their observance or, still worse, free thinking, and Conrad records how the Archduke took him violently to task for his failure to attend Mass on a Sunday during manœuvres.³ On the other hand, he was not so narrow as the Duchess, and showed great friendliness towards prominent Slovak or German Lutherans and the Roumanian Orthodox clergy. He attacked the *Los von Rom* movement because he rightly recognised that it

¹ Specially hostile were the Archduke Frederick and his wife, who had been planning a marriage between Francis Ferdinand and her own daughter, when suddenly she found his affections to be centred upon one of her ladies-in-waiting, the Countess Chotek.

² Prince Montenuovo's attitude was influenced by the fact that he himself was a grandson of Marie Louise (daughter of the Emperor Francis and second wife of Napoleon) through her morganatic marriage with Count Neipperg.

³ Conrad, *Aus Meiner Dienstzeit*, iii., p. 436: " I know your religious views but if I go to Church, you have to go too."

was in the first instance a political, anti-dynastic and separatist movement, and religious only in quite a secondary sense. His disapproval of Free Thought gave an added point to his dislike of the Jews, on whom he sometimes expressed himself with even more than his usual vigour and indiscretion.

With the old Emperor his relations were definitely bad, in the first instance because they were temperamentally so different. Francis Joseph typified the House of Lorraine, while his nephew showed more Habsburg qualities, transmuted by the Bourbon blood which he inherited from his maternal grandfather, the notorious King " Bomba " of the Two Sicilies. But the jealousy that subsisted between the Emperor and his heir was above all due to a fundamental divergence of political aims and outlook. Francis Joseph had throughout life favoured half-measures and discouraged the emergence of masterful personalities, while Francis Ferdinand believed in energetic measures and welcomed strong men (so long of course as they were loyal to himself). Francis Joseph was wedded to the Dual System as it had developed since 1867. It was a typical product of his love of compromise, and regarding himself (with Deák) as its chief creator, he was exceedingly jealous of any suggestion of its reform and had honestly come to believe that he alone possessed the political experience needed to control so complicated a machine. Francis Ferdinand, on the contrary, was fully alive to the many fatal flaws in the Dual System and made no concealment of his desire for its drastic revision. He does not appear to have ever committed himself to the exact details of such a revision, but he is known to have given the problem a great deal of thought and to have invited and examined a whole series of proposals drafted by such recognised authorities on international or constitutional law as Lammasch, Tezner, Steinacker and Zolger. It is quite true that his autocratic leanings ran counter to a proper

understanding of constitutional questions, but he and his advisers found common ground in the view that the Dual System was a cul-de-sac, that its gravest defect was the lack of any constitutional machinery for revision when necessary, and that a forcible exit being well-nigh inevitable, the main problem was to discover that which would cause the least disturbance.¹ He undoubtedly inclined to the idea of remodelling the Dual Monarchy into a number of separate national states, linked together by a strong central Parliament and unified ministries for the conduct of certain common affairs.

In all these schemes the foremost obstacle in his path was the position of Hungary, and it is sufficiently notorious that he looked upon the Magyars with a violent antipathy, as endangering not merely the dynasty, but the very existence of the Dual Monarchy itself, by their insane policy towards all the nationalities which bordered with them. So strong were his feelings that in receiving a small Slovak deputation he once said of the Magyars, " It was bad taste on their part ever to come to Europe." * In one way or another the power of the ruling oligarchy in Hungary had to be broken. The new sovereign on his accession would at once be confronted by that provision of the Hungarian Constitution» which obliges him

¹ Perhaps the most serious of all the various drafts was that prepared by Colonel Brosch, till 1911 the Chief of the Archduke's *Militärkanzlei*, a soldier of quite unusual breadth of vision and understanding, who had established intimate personal relations with the leaders of most of the lesser nationalities, and to the last enjoyed his master's confidence. I have seen a letter of his addressed to one of these leaders shortly after the murder, in which he says that after an event which has shattered all his hopes for the future there is nothing left for him but to take his place at the head of his regiment and die fighting in the war which was on the point of breaking out. In actual fact he courted death, and fell in August 1914 during the Galician campaign. Incidentally his letter, coming from one inside the innermost ring of knowledge, may serve as indirect confirmation of the " will to war " in Vienna. This draft has been published in full in the *Neues Wiener Journal* of 30 December, 1923, and 1 January, 1924. According to Count Polzer-Hoditz, a former private secretary of the late Archduke, it was afterwards very materially altered by Professor Lammasch and others. (See interview in *Pester Lloyd* of 5 January, 1924.)

² " *Es war eine Geschmacklosigkeit von den Herren, dass sie überhaupt nach Europa gekommen sind.*" This I learnt from members of the deputation, personal friends of my own.

³ Art. iii. of 1790-1. See *Corpus Juris Hungarici*, vol. v., p. 150, or *Ungarische Verfassungsgesetze*, (ed. Steinbach), p. 7.

to take his Coronation oath within a period of six months, and this Francis Ferdinand was firmly resolved not to do, until that constitution could be brought into line with the requirements of the Monarchy as a whole. But even he hesitated at the idea of open repudiation, and was glad to find a pretext for delay in the undoubted fact that the Austrian and Hungarian versions of the compromise of 1867 conflicted in certain important particulars which must be cleared up before an oath could reasonably be exacted. The most striking example of this related to a Southern Slav problem, for in the one document Dalmatia is assumed to belong to Austria (which was of course its actual *de facto* position), while in the other it is implied to be an integral part of the Triune Kingdom and therefore of the Crown of St. Stephen.¹

Francis Ferdinand was not the man to shirk awkward facts. He realised that his political aims could only be attained through the overthrow of the Dual System, and that this must involve him in conflict with the ruling caste in Hungary. It was this which led him to seek allies among the non-Magyar nationalities, and he advocated the introduction of universal suffrage in Hungary, not of course because he believed in democratic principles, but simply because it was an instrument for placing the Magyars in a minority and securing national justice all round, and he calculated that the other races would gladly purchase this by an endorsement of his plans for constitutional reform. It would thus be possible to superimpose upon the existing Parliaments of Vienna and Budapest a central parliament and executive for the whole Monarchy, perhaps simply by fusing the Delegations and converting them from deliberative to legislative bodies. The Archduke boldly reckoned

¹ See the Austrian Law of 21 December, 1867, §8, and the Hungarian Art. xxx, 01 1868 (compromise between Hungary and Croatia), which refers throughout and "Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia" as one of the two contracting parties, and in 65§. expressly insists upon "the reincorporation of Dalmatia."

with the impossibility of effecting such far-reaching reforms by normal means, and within the limit of six months prescribed for the Coronation, and was therefore prepared to announce his intentions by a manifesto on accession, which would have been virtually equivalent to a *coup d'etat* and have given rise to a constitutional crisis of the first magnitude.¹ It should be added that Colonel Brosch had worked out to the smallest details a plan to ensure order in all parts of the Monarchy in the critical days following the public proclamation of his intentions. He calculated, probably with reason, that if proper precautions were taken, Hungary would remain helpless and impassive, and this belief he based to a large extent upon the precedent of March 1906, when non-Magyar troops were massed round the Parliament buildings by an unconstitutional government and a Colonel of Militia read the decree of dissolution, without a single serious act of resistance from the country at large.

In foreign policy the Archduke also held pronounced views, and indeed his projects of internal reform were very largely prompted by his desire to strengthen the international status and prestige of the Monarchy. His Este and Bourbon blood, combined with the ultramontane views of himself and his wife and his detestation of Freemasonry and Radicalism, rendered him suspicious of Italy who, a sure instinct told him, would range herself against Austria-Hungary at the moment of supreme crisis in Europe. These doubts lay at the root of his interest in the Navy and the problem of Adriatic defence, which again has its obvious connections with the Southern Slav Question. It was inevitable that Germany should bulk largest in his survey of Europe, but the idea of Austria-Hungary's dependence upon her northern ally was distasteful to him, alike from the political and the

¹ A most valuable summary of the considerations which weighed with the Archduke is contained in an essay of the late Professor Lammasch, in the Volume entitled *Heinrich Lammasch*, pp. 77-95 (Vienna, 1922).

dynastic standpoint. Viewed in the abstract, what would have pleased him most would have been a revival of the League of the Three Emperors, as a guarantee of conservative development in Central and Eastern Europe and a bulwark against revolutionary ideas: and Count Czernin has pointed out that the Balkan rivalry between Vienna and St. Petersburg caused him genuine anxiety.¹ Hence it is probably a mistake to credit him with bellicose tendencies, though undoubtedly there were times when his overbearing and explosive nature led him to regard war as probable. To Conrad he was generally ready to listen, both because of his zeal and military efficiency and because they found common ground in their distrust of Italy; yet both Conrad himself and Auffenberg, who stood in his favour till the winter of 1912, represent him as hardly less reluctant to engage upon war than the old Emperor himself, and Count Czernin maintains that he was by no means as anti-Serb as he has been depicted. This is confirmed by Dr. Danev, to whom Francis Ferdinand, during an audience granted to him as Bulgarian Premier at Budapest during the first Balkan war, assumed the whole credit for averting Austria-Hungary's intervention against Serbia.⁴

Of special interest is Conrad's testimony,^{fi} On the repeated opportunities I had of discussing with the Archduke the need for decisive action against Serbia, I could never be quite clear whether the Archduke in his inmost heart had decided on warlike action. He dealt with all matters bearing on it, discussed concrete preparations for war with an interest which suggested that he

¹ Interesting confirmation of this is provided by a conversation with the German Military Attaché in Vienna, Count Kageneck, in which the Archduke summed up his political confession of faith in the phrase, " Alliance of the Three Emperors, with adhesion of England where possible " (mit tunlichstem Anschluss Englands). This is quoted from Kageneck's unpublished report, by Montgelas, *Leitfaden zur Kriegsschuldfrage*, p. 54.

² *In the World War*, p. 51.

³ cf. Auffenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 231; Conrad, *op. cit.*, iii, pp. 353, 597.

⁴ Interview of Danev in *Trgovinski Vjestnik*, reproduced by *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* of 9 July, 1914. See Friedjung, *Zeitalter des Imperialismus*, ii., p. 269.

had its execution in view, but yet seemed to me in his heart to have no real liking for it." And here he adds his impression that Francis Ferdinand was influenced against war from the German side and especially from the Emperor William.¹ Again, Count Kageneck, the German Military Attaché, in a report to Berlin, quotes the Archduke as describing war with Russia as " positively a monstrosity " *überhaupt ein Unding*) and declaring that he saw no reason for war with Serbia. * During the same critical period a letter of the Archduke to his brother-in-law, Duke Albrecht of Württemberg, was communicated by the latter to Bethmann Hollweg early in February and by him to Moltke; in it was a strong expression of feeling against war with Serbia, since at the very best Austria-Hungary would only acquire untrustworthy subjects and " a heap of plum trees." Moltke replied that this coincided with previous remarks of the Archduke, and that the Chancellor's chief task would be "to prevent Austrian follies so far as possible — not a pleasant or an easy task! "

Interesting confirmation of Francis Ferdinand's attitude can be found in a conversation between Berchtold, Czernin and Conrad on 10 October, 1913, recorded by the latter in his memoirs.« On this occasion the military Cato urged a policy of action against Serbia and reaffirmed the view that he had preached for years, that " the Southern Slav and Panserb Question " were fundamental for the Monarchy. " But here in Austria," objected Czernin, " one must reckon with Emperor and Heir Apparent. They are not for war, and least of all the Heir Apparent; he holds stubbornly to peace."

¹ Conrad, *op. cit.*, ii., p. 413.

² Kageneck's reports of 17 December, 1912, and 26 February, 1913, *cit.*, Brandenburg, *Von Bismarck zum Weltkrieg*, p. 372.

³ Quoted from imprinted documents in the German Foreign Office, by Count Max Montgelas in his *Leitfaden zur Kriegsschuldfrage*, p. 52. Moltke's phrase throws some light on his correspondence with Conrad in 1914, quoted *supra*, p. 52.

⁴ *op. cit.*, hi., pp. 463-4.

During the same winter Baron Szilassy, before proceeding to his post at Athens, had an audience with Francis Ferdinand and found him "every bit as pacific as his Imperial uncle" and anxious for an understanding with Russia. He blamed Tisza's nationalist policy for the friction with Serbia and Roumania.^x

Of the Archduke's friendly attitude towards the Croats there can be no matter of doubt, and it would seem probable that he looked upon them both as an asset in the struggle against Hungary, and also among the Yugoslavs as a counterweight to Belgrade. The fact that the Croats were Catholics told much in their favour with the Archduke and his clerical advisers, who saw in them a weapon for the reconquest of the Balkans from Orthodoxy. He rightly resented the short-sighted policy which was steadily alienating Croat sentiment from the Habsburgs, and on at least two occasions he made violent protests to the Emperor against the Cuvaj *régime*, but without any effect. His real aim was to bring about Yugoslav unity under the Habsburg sceptre — an aim which in certain circumstances might have placed Serbia and even the Karagjorgjevic dynasty in the same relation to Vienna as that of Bavaria and the Wittelsbach towards Berlin. This project has come to be known as "Triallism," but in the Archduke's eyes it was only part of a wider whole. For, as Czernin assures us, he also entertained the possibility of ceding Transylvania to Roumania, but then admitting united Roumania as a vassal state within the bounds of the Monarchy. This idea was actually discussed between Czernin and Nicholas Filipescu, the Conservative patriot statesman, who — perhaps all too logically — regarded it as the sole alternative to an ultimate life and death conflict between Roumania and Austria-Hungary.² Once more, it is obvious that neither idea could have been realised until the obstinate Resistance

¹ *Der Untergang der Donau-Monarchie*, p. 259.

² *In the World War*, p. 80: Conrad, *op. cit.*, iii., p. 783.'

of Hungary had been overcome: for the effect would inevitably have been to diminish the relative importance of the Magyars in the aggrandised Habsburg state.

A further very vital factor in the Archduke's character was the growth of the sinister disease which was sapping his strength and which found vent in occasional fits of ungovernable rage, bordering for the time being upon insanity. The symptoms were most marked at shooting parties, when the Archduke fired at everything within range, and was an object of general terror. On one occasion, brilliant marksman though he was, he shot a beater; and the Austrian aristocracy were already beginning to be chary of their invitations to him.¹ According to a story repeated to Professor "Masaryk by members of his party in the neighbourhood of Konopistě, the Archduke's lawyer, when summoned on some legal business, was shown into a large unfurnished room, and found him sitting on the floor and playing with his children. " The Archduke motioned to him to sit likewise on the floor, and on seeing him hesitate, flew into a violent passion, abused him roundly and drove him from the castle."» Another story which reached me from the same source came from the Czech railway officials who had charge of the Imperial train. The Archduke had visited the German Emperor in Potsdam and some incident must have occurred to arouse his displeasure: for after the train had started southwards, he drew his sword and in his fury hacked at the upholstery of his compartment.

It is not quite certain whether the Archduke realised the full gravity of his symptoms, but he undoubtedly felt his health to be deteriorating, and burned with impatience and anger as he saw his uncle ageing in

¹ During his visit to England in 1913 his reckless shooting and the frantic manner in which he abused his loaders made a strong impression upon a member of the British Royal family and led him to inquire (in complete ignorance of the facts) whether there was not a strain of madness in the Archduke.

² H. W. Steed, *Through Thirty Years*, i., p. 367.

impotent negation, and the short time probably available for himself slipping away from him, while such vast and vital tasks were still untouched. It is certain that the Duchess knew the full truth: not long before the end she had discussed settlements with the family lawyer and had told an intimate friend that her husband might be seized with madness or paralysis at almost any time. Though the secret was jealously guarded, some of these facts could not fail to become known. They amply explain the nervousness of the Imperial family, who knew that another bronchial attack might at any time prove fatal to the old Emperor,¹ and saw the prospect of the throne being occupied, at a period of latent European crisis, by a man of autocratic leanings, committed to a vast programme of political adventure, yet liable at any moment to lose all balance and control, and influenced by an ambitious wife who might in the interests of her children persuade him to change the succession and throw " Habsburg House Law " to the winds. Disturbing possibilities were presented by the fact that the law of succession differed in Hungary and Austria, that the Magyar nationalists had an obvious motive for widening the gulf, and that no legal or constitutional means existed for preventing the Archduke's succession, whatever might be the state of his health.²

Though the full facts remained a jealously-guarded secret, the precarious state of the Archduke's health, his conflict of opinion with the Emperor and his intention of introducing drastic changes on succeeding to the throne, gradually became known to wide circles, and took shape in rumours of the most contradictory kind. Thus, though unable to influence the political development, the figure

¹ Even in the winter of 1910 Dr. Neusser had assured Colonel Brosch, the Archduke's confidant, that the Emperor could only live one or at most two years longer, and that his physical condition was one of " from to-day till to-morrow." See *Heinrich Lammasch*, p. 81.

² His granduncle Ferdinand I had reigned from 1835 to 1848, though notoriously weak-minded, epileptic and unfit for the throne.

of the Archduke loomed very large in the life of the state and gave an added tinge of uncertainty to a situation almost equally unstable at home and abroad.

The Treaty of Bucarest (10 August, 1913) seemed for the moment to have stabilised the new Balkan situation and averted the danger of a general conflict. But, as we have seen, it was only rendered possible by serious disagreements inside the Triple Alliance. A passing coolness between Vienna and Berlin was the result, but the vital necessity for seeing eye to eye was obvious to both parties as each fresh incident occurred to show how easily a conflagration might be produced. Vienna's aggressive attitude towards Belgrade in the matter of Albania, the acute friction between Russia and Germany caused by the Liman von Sanders Mission, the announcement of a Serbo-Greek alliance, the visits of the Serbian Crown Prince to St. Petersburg and of the Tsar to Roumania, the Serbo-Montenegrin negotiations, the dispute between Greece and Turkey — each of these caused nervousness in many quarters. It was thus natural enough that those at the head of affairs in Germany and Austria-Hungary should wish to meet and discuss future policy in a world whose balance had undoubtedly been upset by the Balkan Wars. Accordingly we find visits of William II to Francis Joseph in Vienna and to Francis Ferdinand at his Adriatic castle of Miramar in March, and again to the Archduke's Bohemian home in June.

It is generally admitted that on each occasion Balkan questions figured largely in the discussion, and that the main preoccupation of Francis Joseph and his advisers was not so much Serbia as Roumania. On 23, March, 1914, there were conversations between William[^]-Francis Joseph and Berchtold, and from the report of the German Ambassador, Herr von Tschirschky, to Berlin — based on what the Emperor William told him the same day¹ —

¹ This report was published in *Deutsche Politik* of 11 June, 1920, and is reprinted in an appendix of Montgelas, *Leitfaden zur Kriegsschuldfrage*, p. 189.

we learn that the two latter expressed great alarm about Roumania, treating her as "already virtually lost for the Triple Alliance." William was more optimistic, argued that Roumania was bound to side with the Central Powers "against the supremacy of Slav Russia/" and that Berlin was now to be regarded as the link between Bucarest and Vienna. Russian armaments he refused to regard as a warlike menace, and explained them on the one hand by French insistence and on the other by the highly interesting theory that Russia was better informed than either Vienna or Berlin about the sad state of Turkey and so felt bound to be prepared for the worst. A little later William talked with Count Tisza, who impressed him greatly as a man "of firm will and clear ideas." They too began by a discussion of the Roumanian question, the Emperor showing his joy at Tisza's negotiations with the Roumanian leaders in Transylvania and assuring him that on this Bucarest, did not ask for "action on a grand scale, but merely concessions on minor points." Tisza on his side spoke of the union of Serbia and Montenegro as the most important Balkan event, and assuming it to be unavoidable, argued that Austria-Hungary's main interest was to keep Serbia away from the Adriatic and hence that the union might be tolerated in return for the cession of the Montenegrin coast to Albania.

At Miramar a few days later William repeated the gist of these conversations to Francis Ferdinand, who emphasised the need for attaching both Roumania and Greece, and if possible Turkey also, to the Triple Alliance. » The Archduke criticised very strongly Berchtold's attitude to Bucarest, who could still be reconciled if only Vienna treated it with "frank loyalty," and above all, if proper treatment were meted out to the Roumanians of Hungary.² William's appeal to the Archduke to trust

¹ See report of Herr von Treutler (Minister attached to the Emperor) to Berlin, published by *Montgelas, ibid., p. 191.*

² This coincides exactly with the view put forward by the Austro-Hungarian

Tisza led to a frank discussion of the internal politics of the Monarchy, and when William insisted on the need for a " Germanic orientation " and for " washing the heads of the Czechs," Francis Ferdinand concurred. The Slavs, he remarked, were getting " too aggressive and impertinent."

During this same period Count Czernin, at the Bucarest Legation, was sending periodical warnings to Vienna as to the danger of losing Roumania altogether. Careful investigations had led him to regard opinion both among the general public and in the army as increasingly hostile to Austria-Hungary,¹ and a *détente* between the two countries did not strike him as possible unless a Magyar-Roumanian agreement could be reached in Hungary, and unless in foreign policy some satisfaction could be found for Bulgarian claims. This again was only possible at Serbia's expense — in other words, through war. But war, he reminded Berchtold, need not necessarily involve the annexation of Serbia by the Monarchy, with the unwelcome accompaniment of augmenting still further its Slav population. An alternative would be to " reduce Serbia to a minimum " by assigning portions of her territory to Bulgaria, Greece and Albania.» Resorting to the stump orator's argument of " don't put him under the pump," Czernin at once disclaimed any idea of war upon Serbia " to-day or to-morrow," but merely affirmed Austria-Hungary's intention of hampering Serbia's digestion of her new Macedonian territories, where she might be kept busy for years to come.

Military Attaché in Bucharest, Colonel Hranilovic, who went so far as to maintain that the Roumanian Government " made a condition of future friendship " the solution of the Roumanian Question in Transylvania. See e.g. his report to Conrad (29 June, 1914)» quoted in the latter's *Aus Meiner Dienstzeit*, iii., p. 553.

¹ His two reports of 11 March and 2 April, 1914, are reproduced in full by Conrad, *Aus Meiner Dienstzeit*, iii., pp. 781-9 (appendix x.), and 663-8.

² This suggestion of Czernin may have been the germ of Berchtold's proposal at the Crown Council of 19 July, 1914; see *infra*, p. 200.

But Czernin's report naturally concentrates its attention upon Roumania and upon the anxious and increasingly equivocal position of King Charles. As he points out, no one in Roumania, save the King himself, the Premier, Mr. Ion Bratianu, and the Conservative leader, Mr. Maiorescu, had any knowledge of the secret treaty that had so long attached the country to the Triple Alliance, and more than one Roumanian Minister abroad imagined himself to be free to work for closer relations with the Entente. The King was no longer " unconditional master in his own country," and felt " that an open confession of Austrophil policy " might involve him in serious conflict with Roumanian sentiment.

Some weeks later Czernin dealt with the problem in further detail, and challenged the view put forward by Berchtold, as a result of his meeting with the German Emperor, that the mediation of Berlin in Bucarest would suffice to restore the old relations between Austria-Hungary and Roumania. He then went on to warn Berchtold against the double blunder of ignoring the growing strength of public opinion in Roumania and of assuming that the King was still the only decisive factor in foreign policy. In the previous December, King Charles had himself told Czernin that " as things stood at the moment, Roumania in a war could not go with the Monarchy."¹ Save for a tiny Austrophil clique at Court, Czernin added, all those in authority were already reckoning upon an Austro-Russian war, and calculated on waiting until " with a million soldiers they could deal the death-blow to the defeated side and so secure either Transylvania or Bessarabia for themselves."¹ He was able to reinforce his argument by a reference to two recent incidents — the failure of Tisza's negotiations with the Transylvanians, which stimulated afresh the feeling^a against the Monarchy in Bucarest, and the bomb

¹ Conrad, *op. cit.*, iii., p. 634.

² *ibid.*, p. 635.

outrage of Debreczen,¹ which was an ominous sign that terrorism was spreading from the Jugoslavs to the Roumanians.

These various reports make it clear that both Vienna and Berlin were extremely anxious at the gradual evolution of Roumanian policy in a sense inimical to the Triple Alliance; that while William II reckoned on his personal influence with Charles of Hohenzollern to redress the balance, his allies fully realised his optimism to be misplaced; that the project of making public the terms of the secret alliance would only have led to its prompt repudiation by the country and thus fatally compromised the King; and that if Roumanian military aid could not be relied upon in a war with Russia, the whole strategic plans of the Central Powers would require modification, and the problem of Transylvania's unfortified frontier would become acute. In his annual report for 1913 Conrad treated Roumania as virtually lost, and assumed that the next crisis would be evoked by the desire of Serbia *and Roumania* to unite with their co-nationals in the Dual Monarchy.² Tisza, for his part, in a memorandum addressed to Francis Joseph on 15 March, 1914,⁸ was equally emphatic as to the Roumanian danger and the urgent need for a clear understanding with Germany on Balkan problems. "The conquest of Transylvania," he wrote, "always remains the greatest bait," hence the essential point in a "politique de longue main" was to win over Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance by a promise of future compensations in Macedonia. It should then be possible to detach Roumania and Greece from Serbia and reconcile them

¹ The Magyar Government had in 1912 erected an artificial Magyar Uniata Bishopric at Hajdúdorog, for the deliberate purpose of Magyarising the Roumanian Uniates. In March 1914 the Vicar-General of the new diocese was killed by an infernal machine sent by post, and several of his priests were seriously wounded.

² *ibid.*, iii., p. 761.

³ The text is published by Bishop Fraknói in his *Die ungarische Regierung und die Entstehung des Weltkrieges*, and also by Professor S. B. Fay in *Papers of Count Tisza* (American Historical Review for January 1924).

with Bulgaria. There must be no rash action, but also no "passive expectation," for there was no time to be lost if Bulgaria in her isolation was to be saved from throwing herself into the arms of Russia. "Austria-Hungary's task," he adds, "is difficult in itself: of success there can be no question, unless we have the full assurance that we are understood, appreciated and supported by Germany."

It was while such grave questions of foreign policy were under consideration that William II paid a fresh visit to Francis Ferdinand at Konopistě (12-14 June).¹ Once more the discussions centred round the Roumanian problem, though they opened on the existing friction between Greece and Turkey. Both Emperor and Archduke agreed that the settlement of Bucarest must be upheld, and that King Charles should be sounded as to future policy. The conversation then turned to home politics, and Francis Ferdinand, "speaking still more bluntly and with exceedingly drastic expressions of his dislike," declared that Hungary was being maintained in quite mediaeval conditions by a tiny oligarchy, and that every Magyar was working against Austria and the Monarchy as a whole. When William began to praise Tisza, the Archduke retorted that he was really dictator in Hungary and would like to be the same in Vienna, that he was working for a separate Hungarian Army, and that if foreign policy went wrong a large measure of blame attached to Tisza for his ill-treatment of the Roumanians of Hungary. He followed up this outburst by making the Emperor promise to instruct Tschirschky to urge upon Tisza, whenever they met, the need for concessions to the Roumanians.

This is all that has transpired about the Konopistě

¹ See report of Herr von Treutler to Berlin, 14 June, 1914, published in *Deutsche Politik* of 14 May, 1920, and reprinted in Montgelas, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-4. It recounts two conversations, at the first of which Treutler was present, while the second is based on what William II repeated to him the following day. Hence, interesting as it is, it may be presumed not to be complete.

conversations, but early in 1916 Mr. Steed gave publicity¹ to a highly sensational story purporting to reveal the innermost secret of the meeting. His anonymous informant asserted that William II then laid before his host a grandiose scheme for transforming the map of Europe. By it a new Kingdom of Poland, stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, would become the heritage of Francis Ferdinand's eldest son, while his second son would become King of Bohemia, Hungary, Croatia and Serbia, leaving German Austria, with an Adriatic outlet at Trieste, to enter the German Empire, under the Archduke Charles as King. The three groups would be linked together by a customs union and military conventions, and would control the Balkans and the Middle East. In short, we are asked to believe that Francis Ferdinand, in return for the promise of "vaster realms elsewhere, acquiesced in the practical absorption of the hereditary Habsburg provinces into the German Empire." Such an idea conflicts with all that is known of the Archduke's character — his intense belief in Habsburg greatness, his jealousy of undue dependence upon Germany. Still more does it conflict with the solemn oath of renunciation which he had sworn at his marriage and which his strict religious views made him regard as absolutely irrevocable. Moreover these feelings, which were well known to all his intimates, were reinforced by a genuine affection for his nephew the young Archduke Charles, whose rights he was determined to respect. In a word, the story only becomes credible on the assumption that illness had deprived Francis Ferdinand of all balance and that William was aware of the fact. But in that case William's sanity might also be doubted, since such a project obviously could not be carried out

¹"The Pact of Konopisht " (*Nineteenth Century*, 1916). At the time no clue was given as to the source, but in *Through Thirty Years* (i., p. 396) it is ascribed to a Polish aristocrat formerly on terms of intimacy with Francis Ferdinand and claiming to have learnt the story from Vatican sources, through the Nunciature in Vienna. Mr. Steed is careful to describe it as "an interesting hypothesis; it was and could be nothing more."

by a man already stricken with a mortal disease. It may be that the concluding volumes of the German diplomatic documents or the forthcoming memoirs of the Archduke's secretary, Count Polzer-Hoditz, will throw some light upon the mystery; but in the meantime there is absolutely no evidence which would justify our accepting the story as authentic.

On the very eve of the war I learned from a sure source that the day after the murder in Sarajevo the Archduke's desks at home were searched for certain documents; and if there were any truth in the legend of "the Pact of Konopisht," such action would not be surprising. But a much simpler explanation is the desire of the Imperial family to obtain a clue to the Archduke's plans of political reconstruction, and still more the names of his secret advisers and confidants. As a matter of fact, nothing compromising was found, and it is only now that the essential documents are about to be given to the world.

Other legends also have gathered round the Konopistë meeting, and it has been alleged that confidential information as to what passed there reached the Russian General Staff, was transmitted by it to Belgrade, and prompted the conspirators of the "Black Hand" to instigate the Archduke's murder. This is obviously pure fantasy, for even if such highly confidential information could have leaked through to the Russians, it could hardly have reached St. Petersburg more than a week before the murder, which allows no time whatever for the necessary plans. Moreover, it is known that the future assassins had already crossed over from Serbia to Bosnia at least a fortnight before the Konopistë meeting, and were by that time no longer amenable to control from the "Black Hand" or from anywhere

All that can be said, then, is that the journalistic Pouring⁵³ about the "Roses of Konopistë" gave wide

publicity and encouraged wild speculation. The knowledge that the changed situation in Eastern Europe must be under discussion led to the assumption that Francis Ferdinand had propounded a scheme for Serbia's overthrow, and that William II had promised Germany's support. Though unsupported by any evidence,¹ this is at least credible, and it was actually believed in many quarters. The fact that the Archduke left for Bosnia only a week later seemed to lend colour to the view, and the manoeuvres which he conducted there were generally regarded as a rehearsal for the coming war with Serbia.

¹ For indirect evidence to the contrary, see *infra*, p. 183.

CHAPTER V

THE MURDER OF THE ARCHDUKE

THE Archduke Francis Ferdinand attended the Bosnian manoeuvres as Inspector-General of the Army, and from the outset gave to his visit a strictly military character. But his headquarters were at the little health resort of Ilidze, some four miles from Sarajevo, and here he was joined by the Duchess of Hohenberg. Before returning home it was decided that they should pay an official visit to Sarajevo, and the day selected for this was Vidovdan, or St. Vitus's Day. This anniversary is specially dear to the Serbian race, for it commemorates the memorable battle of Kosovo, which in 1389 rang the death-knell of the Serbian mediaeval Empire, and round which a whole cycle of legend and ballad poetry has gathered. After more than five centuries this defeat had been wiped out by Serbia's victory at Kumanovo in 1912, but in 1913 the acute tension which produced the Second Balkan War had prevented any proper celebration of the day. Thus in 1914 the Serbs were for the first time in a position to celebrate it in peace and seeming security, and their kinsmen across the frontier needed no prompting in order to share in their rejoicings. It was thus peculiarly unfortunate that this day, of all days, should have been deliberately selected for the visit of one who personified a foreign domination and was not unnaturally regarded as the most formidable obstacle to Serbian national expansion. It was resented by the vast majority of Jugoslavs on both sides of the frontier as a provocation and a challenge, and this feeling must be taken into account in any estimate of what followed.

On the morning, then, of Sunday 28 June, the Archduke and the Duchess were proceeding to the Town Hall of Sarajevo, when a bomb was thrown at their car, and falling in the roadway behind it, exploded and wounded some of the spectators and an officer in the car that followed. The Archduke entered the Town Hall in a towering passion, and before the Mayor could address him, called out, " Mr. Mayor, I come here on a visit and I get bombs thrown at me. It is- outrageous. Now you may speak." After the speeches and presentations the Archduke asked Potiorek whether they should continue their drive, or whether there were likely to be more bombs. The Governor and the Chief of Police expressed the conviction that nothing more could happen, and that the only alternatives were to go to the Konak * (only a few hundred yards across the river) or to avoid the main streets altogether and drive straight to the Museum. On this the Archduke declared his intention of first visiting the military hospital to enquire after the wounded Colonel von Merizii, and then going on to the Museum. When Count Harrach tried to dissuade him, Potiorek testily exclaimed: " Do you think that Sarajevo is full of assassins? " The Duchess having announced her intention of accompanying her husband, the pair entered a new car, with General Potiorek inside and Count Harrach standing on the footboard.

The front car, containing the Chief of Police, drove along the Appel-Quai, but at the Latin Bridge diverged to the right into a narrow street leading to the main thoroughfare of the town. The driver of the second car, in which the Archduke was seated, was a military chauffeur who did not know Sarajevo, and therefore naturally followed suit. But Potiorek at once made him pull up, and he was slowly backing on to the embankment, when shots were fired at very close range by a young man on the pavement. This was Gavrilo Princip, one

¹ The Governor's official residence.

of the seven assassins whom we saw to have been armed for an attempt on the Archduke's life. Orders were promptly given to drive back to the Konak, which was reached within a couple of minutes. But even by that time the Duchess was already dead, and the Archduke, wounded in the jugular vein, was unconscious when he was lifted from the car, and expired within a quarter of an hour, before either doctor or priest could be summoned to his aid. His last murmured words, overheard by Harrach, had been " Sophie, live for our children! "

It appears that Princip fired first at the Archduke and then, seeing that his shot had gone home, turned his revolver upon Potiorek. At this moment the Duchess, realising that something had happened, rose in her seat to shelter her husband, while simultaneously someone in the crowd tried to seize the assassin's arm, with the result that his aim was spoilt and the next shot fatally wounded the Duchess in the body.

Before we turn to discuss the antecedents and motives of the assassins and the responsibility of the crime, a brief reference must be made to the incidents of the funeral — incidents only less sensational and perplexing than the tragedy of Sarajevo itself. The bodies were transported to the Dalmatian coast and thence by sea to Trieste, and reached Vienna at ten o'clock on the night of 2 July. The cortège was met at the station by the new Heir-Apparent, the Archduke Charles, and the whole officers' corps of the Vienna garrison, and solemnly escorted to the Chapel of the Hofburg. Already there was much comment at the choice of so late an hour and the deliberate avoidance of daylight, and it became known that the young Archduke by going to the station had broken through the arrangements prescribed at Court, and that the Chamberlain, Prince Montenuovo, had originally intended that the body of the Duchess should be sent direct to its last resting-place, while only

the Archduke's should be admitted to the Hofburg. This was too much for the old Emperor, and the two coffins, which were of different size and ornamentation, were placed together in the chapel, but on different levels; and as if this distinction were not enough, the full insignia of the Archduke were placed on his coffin, while on that of the Duchess were a pair of white gloves and a black fan — a pointed reminder of her former inferior position as lady-in-waiting. No wreaths were sent either by the Emperor or by members of the Imperial family, and until the foreign Ambassadors brought tributes from their sovereigns, those sent by the Hohenberg children and by Countess Lónyay (the former Crown Princess) stood quite alone.

The funeral service was attended by the Emperor and conducted by the Cardinal-Archbishop, but the chapel was tiny, and no opportunity whatever was offered to the general public to pay their last respects to the Heir-Apparent. The coffins were left all the afternoon in the closed chapel, and not till after dusk did the funeral procession again leave the palace. This time, by way of protest against such extraordinary procedure, over a hundred members of the highest Austrian and Hungarian aristocracy,¹ in gala uniform, but on foot, forced their way unannounced into the procession at a given point on the route, and accompanied it as far as the station. The train left at eleven o'clock, reaching the little country station of Pöchlarn about one in the morning. It was as though every conceivable effort had been made to inconvenience those desirous of attending the last ceremony, and to keep the public utterly at arms' length. Feeling was intense against Prince Montenuovo, as master of ceremonies, and it was widely asserted that he, as a morganatic offshoot of the House of Habsburg, was wreaking a petty vengeance upon the woman who,

¹ Such families as Liechtenstein, Schwarzenberg, Lobkowitz, Fürstenberg, Windischgrätz, Hohenlohe, Thurn und Taxis, Széchenyi, Zichy, Hoyos, Kinsky, Ledochowski, Sternberg.

but for the hand of an assassin, might perhaps one day have ceased to be morgantic and attained the rank of Empress. Yet Francis Joseph, before leaving for Ischl on 7 July, went out of his way to address an autograph letter to Prince Montenuovo, thanking him for his faithful services and the care which he had always taken to act "in accordance with his Majesty's intentions."

To the plain man all this seemed to partake of studied insult to the memory of the dead, while military circles resented it as "a fanatical attempt to eliminate the dead Archduke as speedily as possible from the sphere of his former activity, and if this could be attained, from the memory of his contemporaries."¹ Added force was given to this view by the marked manner in which foreign royalties were discouraged from attending the funeral² — a step which was explained by the fear of further outrages, but was really intended by Berchtold to prevent a personal exchange of views between the Emperor and other sovereigns, such as would almost certainly have made for peace in Europe.

As though the very elements had conspired to mark the unusual tragedy of the occasion, one of the most terrific thunderstorms of recent years burst over the Danube at the very moment when the cortège was about to leave Pöchlarn. Torrential rain threw everything into confusion, the coffins were hastily carried into the tiny waiting-room, and everyone crowded pell-mell after them. The heavens were giving their warning of the wrath to come. At last the storm abated, and in the first summer dawn the victims of Sarajevo were borne across the Danube and up the hilly road to Artstetten, where Francis Ferdinand had built his memorial chapel

¹ These are the words of the former War Minister, General Auffenberg, (*Vesterreichs Höhe und Niedergang*, p. 255).

² Auffenberg quotes "one of our most tried diplomatists" as describing this as "a huge blunder or a sign that war was already being planned" (*ibid.*).

because the wife of his choice was too low-born to rest in the stifling Habsburg vaults of the Capuchine Church in Vienna.

The Archduke's decision to visit Bosnia was taken as early as September 1913,¹ and was made by him in his capacity as Inspector-General of the Army, in consultation with the military chiefs.² It would seem only natural that he should at least have invited the opinion of Dr. von Bilinski, the Joint Finance Minister, within whose competence the two annexed provinces lay. But in point of fact the latter was altogether ignored, and first learned of the proposed visit from the Governor, General Potiorek, who notified the Archduke's desire that it should follow exclusively military lines. Bilinski recounts in his memoirs that about this time anonymous letters, threatening murder and revolution, were being fairly frequently received both by the Ministers and by the Archduke, and that he himself, while not taking very seriously persons who advertised their intentions beforehand, thought it to be none the less advisable to discuss precautionary measures. He therefore instructed Sarajevo to sound the local authorities* as to their views on such a visit — with the result that practically all of them declined responsibility for the consequences. These reports were duly transmitted to Vienna and to the Court, but brought down upon Sarajevo a sharp reprimand: the responsibility of the civil authorities, they were told, was neither desired nor needed.⁴

The result was actually to strengthen the Archduke in

¹ Conrad, *A us Meiner Dienstzeit*, ii., p. 445. Francis Ferdinand told Conrad himself on 16 September, and on 29 September Potiorek informed Conrad of the Archduke's intention to go as *Heir-Apparent* and to take his wife with him.

² On 8 July, 1914, Count Tisza, speaking in the Hungarian Parliament, affirmed that no official notification of the journey was made either to the Joint Finance Ministry, or to the Austrian and Hungarian Governments.

³ *Bezirkshauptmannschaften*.

⁴ R. Wiener, in *Der Tag* of (?) August, 1923, quoted by Albert Mousset in *Gazette de Lausanne*, 7 July, 1924.

his resolve to visit Bosnia, not merely because he was exceedingly headstrong and resented anything that might seem a reflection upon his personal courage, but also because he regarded Bilinski with dislike and suspicion, as a close confidant of the Emperor and as the chief exponent of a more moderate *regime* in Bosnia, as against the more drastic methods favoured by Potiorek and the military chiefs. Bilinski was therefore pointedly ignored in all the arrangements of the visit.¹ So far was this carried that a printed programme of the visit was circulated to all the Ministries, but *not* to the Joint Ministry of Finance! During the visit a state ball was given at Ilidze (the health resort outside Sarajevo, at which the Archduke and his wife stayed), but by the express orders of Francis Ferdinand himself no invitations were issued to any officials of the Finance Ministry² — an affront so amazing and so subversive of prestige and discipline as to suggest that its author contemplated in the near future some drastic transference of authority in Bosnia, as part of his general design for a " Great Austrian " state. Moreover, the details regarding the journey of the Duchess and her official reception at Sarajevo were not referred to Bilinski as Minister, and he

¹ In a telegram of 3 July, 1914, Bilinski reminds Potiorek that they were drawn up " exclusively from the point of view " and " exclusively between the Archduke and the Landeschef." See Gooss, *Das Wiener Kabinett und die Entstehung des Weltkrieges*, p. 47.

² I have had in my hands this official programme, which was of course strictly confidential (*Reservat*) and of which only 50 copies were printed. The list of recipients includes the Emperor, all the chief military factors, the Joint Ministries of Foreign Affairs and War, *but not of Finance* (Bosnia), both Premiers, both Ministers of Commerce, but only the Austrian Minister of the Interior (because the Archduke went by Dalmatia, without touching the territory of the Crown of St. Stephen), the police in Vienna and Trieste, the *Statthaltereien* in Vienna, Trieste and Zara, and even the *Bezirkshauptmann* in Metkovic. It will be seen that the list is thought out to the smallest detail by some bureaucratic pedant. Moreover a separate programme was printed for the journey of the Duchess, who came direct by train through Croatia. In her case, therefore, the name of the Hungarian Minister of the Interior is added to the list of persons to be notified, but that of the Joint Minister of Finance is again missing. There can be no question that the omission was deliberate and that Bilinski in his telegram to Potiorek (see note 1 above) is telling the bare truth.

³This we have on the authority of Bilinski himself. See extract from his Memoirs (so far only published in Polish) in *Neue Freie Presse* of 28 June, 1924.

claims to have read them for the first time when he opened his paper on the fatal Sunday morning.¹ For this, it is true, there was a further explanation in the fact that for the first time on Habsburg territory royal honours were to be paid to the Duchess of Hohenberg, and that by eliminating the civil authorities from all say in the matter, Francis Ferdinand had found it easier to force the hand of the Emperor and win his passive consent to a precedent which but for the tragedy would have had important consequences at Court.

I have the authority of one of the highest officials of the Finance Ministry, who was continually consulted by Bilinski, for stating that both the minister himself and his subordinates were very much disturbed at the prospect of the Archduke's visit, because they had come to realise the extent to which the ground was undermined in Bosnia and the neighbouring provinces. Bilinski's annoyance was naturally increased by the knowledge that his own authority was being deliberately flouted. In conversation he consoled himself with the thought that the visit was a purely military one, and that the real danger was in the towns. If, then, he had been notified beforehand of the intended reception at Sarajevo, it is probable that he would have protested, but it also seems highly probable that a protest, even from such a quarter, would have been unavailing. The Archduke was a wilful man, and Potiorek, who enjoyed his full confidence, would have encouraged him to have his way.

All arrangements, then, were in the hands of Potiorek, and at his door must be laid the failure to provide adequate protection. According to Bilinski's own official information,² the authorities in the Bosnian capital actually only had 120 police at their disposal, and were "not at all equal to their task." Moreover, though 70,000 troops were concentrated within no great distance for purposes of the manœuvres, there was none the less

¹ *ibid.*

² See his telegram to Potiorek, 3 July (Gooss, *op. cit.*, p. 47).

no proper lining of the streets. In short, we can safely endorse the words of that tried servant of Francis Joseph, Baron Margutti, who declares that the inadequacy of the precautions " baffled every description."¹ The best proof of this is to compare them with those adopted on the very similar occasion of the Emperor's state visit to Sarajevo as recently as 1910. Every street along which he passed was lined with a double cordon of troops, the town swarmed with special police and detectives from headquarters in Vienna and Budapest, who tested the minutest details of the already elaborate system of espionage and control established by the Bosnian police. Strangers were not tolerated except after close enquiry, and hundreds of individuals in Sarajevo were forbidden to leave their houses during the Emperor's stay. The contrast between 1910 and 1914 amply justifies us in speaking of criminal negligence on the part of those Austro-Hungarian authorities with whom the care of the Archduke lay.

The most trenchant comment upon this neglect came from the German Ambassador, Herr von Tschirschky, who said to General Auffenberg, "If in some railway station an Archduke is stung by a fly, the Stationmaster might even have to pay for it with his post. But for the *battue* in the streets of Sarajevo not a hair of any man's head is touched!"²

Nor can Potiorek plead in excuse his failure to realise the gravity of the situation. For it was he who, as Governor of Bosnia, had over a year before introduced repressive measures against the Serbian population³ and

¹ *Vom Alten Kaiser*, p. 396. Margutti reflects the views of the inner ring of Court officials, Paar, Montenuovo, etc. One of the most responsible Austrian writers on the war, Hof rat Glaise-Horstenau, is equally frank in admitting "extraordinary carelessness and lack of precaution." (See *Neues Wiener Tagblatt*, 28 June, 1924).

² Auffenberg, *Aus Oestereichs Höhe und Niedergang*, p. 255.

³ In May 1913 he annulled the statutes of Serbian societies in Bosnia, put a stop to the activities of the Prosvjeta (a very active educational and publishing organisation), and closed the Radical club in Sarajevo.

had since then continued to urge the need for their extension and to denounce to Vienna the folly of Bilinski's more conciliatory policy. He was fully aware that Bosnia was seething with discontent which needed no stirring from the outside in order to boil over; that the choice of Bosnia for the scene of manoeuvres was widely regarded as a menace, or at least a warning to Serbia and still more that the choice of St. Vitus's Day for the Archduke's official visit would be especially resented as a direct challenge to the Serbian national idea. After a lapse of five centuries Kosovo had been avenged and could be celebrated freely for the first time since the liberation; and on that very day the representative of an alien dynasty seemed by his presence to be reaffirming the enslavement of provinces for whose delivery Serbia and Montenegro had twice gone to war in vain. There is little doubt that Potiorek regarded this sentimental factor as an added reason for the state visit, just as he and Conrad and the whole military hierarchy held a speedy reckoning with Serbia to be inevitable and desirable.

Potiorek's crowning fault was an arrogance that led him to keep all arrangements in his own hand, yet prevented him from listening to advice; and this involved him quite naturally in the paradox that while he preached to Vienna the dangers of the situation, he could not conceive that Bosnia could be so utterly out of his control as to produce a whole bevy of assassins on the streets of the capital. Thus he expressly assured Bilinski that the military measures taken by him were quite adequate for the Archduke's protection.¹

Meanwhile, it is obvious that the police, which on such occasions is bound to take its own precautions, also showed itself strangely remiss or inefficient. Indeed, not the least mysterious fact in the whole tragedy is that it should have been possible for so large a group of

¹ This also I have on the authority of one of Bilinski's highest officials.

conspirators to evade so permeating an influence as that of the Bosnian and Croatian police for so long a time. It is worth noting that only two days before the murder, the Croat clerical deputy, Persic, in the Croatian Sabor, denounced the growth of the police *regime* and asserted that in Croatia alone (of course under orders from Budapest and Vienna) 700,000 crowns had been set aside for police spies and informers. What followed showed the incompetence of the *regime*, but it also set many people wondering whether its failure could be entirely accidental, and whether there were not some hideous secret behind the murder.¹ Small wonder, then, if in the excited atmosphere of war many both at home and abroad should have rejected mere negligence as an adequate explanation of the crime, and if the theory of official complicity on the part of Vienna or Budapest gained considerable credence! Moreover, the ill-concealed relief, sometimes bordering upon delight, at the ill-fated couple's removal, which was displayed by more than one member of the Imperial family, by high court dignitaries and by many prominent figures in the political and journalistic world, seemed to lend plausibility to the theory, when it was publicly advanced early in the world-war. But nothing which even remotely deserves the name of evidence has ever been adduced in proof, and each of the many suspicious details is susceptible of a simpler and less sensational explanation. There seems to be little doubt that more than one attempt was made to dissuade Francis Ferdinand from the journey, and also that on the eve of departure he had strong presentiments of coming evil. In this connection

¹ Symptomatic of the fantastic legends that grew out of the murder is a long article by J. J. Bosdan in the *Boston Sunday Globe* (U.S.) of 21 March, 1915, asserting that the Archduke was a victim of the "Austro-German Palace conspirators," that the driver of the car was in the plot and deliberately turned into a side street in order to place him at the mercy of the assassins; that neither Princip nor Cabrinovid were the real murderers; that both victims wore silk-woven armour and were shot into the neck by expert marksmen who knew this fact!

it is worth quoting a remark, which he himself let fall after the reception at the Town Hall and which was overheard by Mr. Cokorilo, the local representative of *The Times*: " Now I understand why Tisza advised me to postpone my journey.¹ In point of fact, both a defiance of danger and a disregard of warnings on the part of royal personages belong to the commonplaces of history — from Caesar to Henri Quatre and Alexander Obrenovic. But in this case the main cause, apart from his own headstrong behaviour, was the conflict between the military and civil authority, which has already been described. It was a final and classic example, of the almost boundless " *Schlamperei* " (no English word can fully render the idea of incurably bungling and haphazard methods which this conveys) which characterised the old *regime* in Austria.

The rôle of the police in the whole affair is a matter which has rightly attracted considerable attention, and I therefore make no apology for citing here a somewhat miscellaneous assortment of facts which I was able to collect on the spot last summer.

For instance, the German Consul in Sarajevo received on 10 April, 1914, an anonymous letter, warning him that an attempt was being planned against William II,⁸ and as the latter had recently been at Vienna and Miramar and was soon to visit the Archduke Francis Ferdinand again at Konopistë, this was not to be rejected as fantastic, even though no proof was ever actually forthcoming. It certainly serves to explain the insistent messages sent by the Consul to Berlin after the murder — messages which we now know from the German official documents to have been the decisive factor in

¹ H. W. Steed, *Through Thirty Years*, i., p. 400.

² I remember discussing the whole affair more than once with Professor Masaryk in the early days of his exile, and this was the word which he found most adequate to describe the situation in Sarajevo.

³ This was told me by the detective who had to deal with the warning at the time, and who showed me his original notes.

preventing the Emperor from attending the funeral in Vienna.

The subordinate police officials seem to have been more nervous than their chiefs, and to-day claim to have advised against the selection of St. Vitus's Day (Vidovdan) for the visit, but to have been disregarded. They tell also of a mysterious individual who, ten days before the murder, called more than once at their office and insisted that he had an urgent warning to convey to their chief. He could not be induced to give his information to any subordinate, and having been twice refused an appointment, never came again.

During the week preceding the tragedy, a police order was issued that all pupils at secondary schools who were not actually domiciled in Sarajevo itself must at once return to their homes. But this order, which would have affected almost all the ringleaders, was not enforced. Then two days beforehand a detective at Ilidze telephoned to headquarters, warning them that he had recognised on the street young Cabrinovic, who, as we saw, had been expelled from Bosnia in 1912. The message actually reached Dr. Gerde, the Chief of Police, who replied, " Leave him alone " (*Nemojte da ga dir ate*). The explanation of this, however, is much simpler than might be supposed. Cabrinovic was the son of a notorious Austrian police confidant — a fact which is known to have had a decisive influence upon his own psychology. He bitterly resented his father's rôle and at one time thought of changing his name. He did not often speak of it, but to one of his intimates he admitted that the main motive of his terrorist activity was to wash himself free from the stain and in a sense to atone for his father. To the Chief of Police, on the contrary, the name of Cabrinovic was known in a very different connection, and he may perhaps be excused for assuming that the son of a spy was not very dangerous. That was just such a family as this which produced one of

the chief assassins shows to what extent the ground had been undermined among the youth of Bosnia.

That the son of a spy did after all enjoy certain facilities is shown by an incident, on the very day of the murder. Only ten minutes beforehand another official of the Bosnian police met young Cabrinovic on the Quai and asked him to legitimate himself, whereupon he produced a permit of the Viennese police.¹ How this was procured is not clear, and at first sight it might seem to strengthen the theory, put forward during the war, of official Austrian complicity in the crime. But this theory cannot possibly be upheld in the face of the indignant protest of every survivor from the band of conspirators. To them the suggestion that any of their number was in touch with the Austro-Hungarian authorities is as grotesque as it is insulting. The motive in every case was national fanaticism in its most unalloyed form. The conspirators asked, and received, not a penny from anyone, and the state of their finances is illustrated by the fact that Princip on the morning of the crime found it necessary to borrow from a friend the sum of one crown (*gd.*).

If the tragedy was very largely due to the incompetence of the authorities in Sarajevo, their conduct during the next forty-eight hours was even more astonishing. On the morning of 29 June, the riff-raff of the bazaar, supplemented by a handful of Croat clerical students, began to demonstrate before the leading Serb centres in the town, and as no steps were taken to disperse them, shouts and insults were soon followed by acts of violence, and from mere window-smashing the crowd passed to wholesale destruction and pillage. Thus the Serbian school, the Prosvjeta society, the offices of the two Serb newspapers, *Narod* and *Srpska Rijec*, the Hotel Europa and quite a

¹ This also I learnt from two officials of the Sarajevo police, who still remain under the present *régime*.

number of shops and private houses belonging to prominent Serbs, were systematically sacked, with the almost open connivance of the authorities. After the rioting had continued for some hours, General Potiorek proclaimed a state of siege, but though the damage was estimated at K.5,000,000 (£200,000), no attempt was made to bring the ringleaders to justice or to indemnify the victims. On the contrary, even the most reputable and conservative Serbs in the two provinces were held up to obloquy in the press of the Monarchy, and fantastic stories circulated about their alleged treason.¹ Similar excesses on a smaller scale occurred in most towns of Bosnia-Herzegovina. These incidents appear to have provoked a strong protest from the Joint Finance Minister, Dr. Bilinski, but the Governor's position remained unshaken, and neither he nor any of his subordinates was punished for their failure to maintain order. Indeed, Potiorek replied in quite unrepentant tones, denying any shortcomings on the part of police or gendarmerie, but admitting that "very abnormal conditions" prevailed in the two provinces and that "the ground was being undermined more and more from day to day," and insisting that the only remedies were to close the Bosnian Diet and to take up Serbia's challenge.² His firm tone was of course partly due to a knowledge that the military chiefs in Vienna were whole-heartedly on his side and favoured all his most drastic proposals.³ The Bosnian manoeuvres had been planned as a kind of rehearsal for military operations against Serbia, such

¹ For instance, in the *Pester Lloyd* of 30 June, Mr. Jefanovic, the wealthiest and weightiest of the Bosnian Serbs of pre-war times, was reported to have been arrested as he was trying to escape to Serbia, and was accused of "irredentist and anti-dynastic aspiration." In reality, he had just had his house, hotel, café, stables and warehouses sacked from top to bottom, and had hastily taken refuge in another part of the town. His special crime in Austrian eyes was that he was the father-in-law of Mr. Spalajkovic, then Serbian Minister in St. Petersburg.

² Potiorek to Bilinski, 6 July, in Conrad, *op. cit.*, iv, pp. 64-6.

³ Gooss, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-9.

as had already been contemplated in March 1909, November 1912, and June, August and November 1913, though on each occasion something occurred to prevent the action. Moreover, quite irrespectively of the Konopistë meeting, the Ballplatz had for some time past been endeavouring to convince the Wilhelmstrasse of the necessity for attaching Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance, bringing recalcitrant Roumania once more to heel, and thus achieving the isolation and eventual vassalage of Serbia. The Memorandum, originally drafted on more moderate lines by Baron Flotow in May, had already been revised in the above sense and passed by Berchtold on 24 June,¹ and thus represented the considered policy of Vienna and Budapest before the tragedy of Sarajevo occurred. That event provided the very pretext which had hitherto been lacking; and it is abundantly clear from the diplomatic documents that the first intention of Berchtold and the military party was to use this pretext for an immediate surprise attack upon Serbia which, it was calculated, would meet with no opposition from Europe, if carried out before public indignation had been allowed to cool. Owing mainly to Tisza's opposition this design was abandoned, and it was decided to order an inquiry at Sarajevo, the results of which might justify severe action against Serbia. For this purpose Herr von Wiesner, one of the higher officials in the Ballplatz, was sent to Bosnia to investigate the evidence already collected on the spot, and on 13 July he returned to Vienna, sending ahead of him a telegraphic report summarising the result.» He here records the general conviction of the Bosnian authorities that the Panserb propaganda conducted by various societies and nationalist organisations was known to and approved by the Serbian

¹ Printed as the first document in the post-war *Red Book* of the Austrian Republic (i.e. *D.A.*, i., No. i). See also Gooss, *Das Wiener Kabinett und dt Entstehung des Weltkrieges*, pp. 4-6, 13, 32-5. See *infra*, p. 161.

² *D.A.*, I, No. 17.

Government, but adds that the latter's complicity in the execution or preparation of the outrage and in procuring weapons is in no way proved or even to be imagined (*oder auch nur zu vermuten*). Indeed there are grounds (*Anhaltspunkte*) for regarding this as out of the question/ The admissions of the murderers themselves seemed to Wiesner to establish the complicity of Tankosic and Ciganovic, who supplied the weapons, and of the frontier police who smuggled the three youths across the Drina. But he is careful to remind his chiefs that though the bombs certainly came from the Serbian arsenal in Kragujevac, this proved nothing whatever, since large supplies had been issued to irregular komitadji bands during the recent Balkan wars and were therefore still easily available for daredevil enterprises. It is worth adding that he dismissed the charge of complicity against Milan Pribicevic as resting on a "regrettable misunderstanding of the police." This point has a certain importance because Pribicevic's brother, Svetozar, was one of the leaders of the Serbs in Croatia, and two other brothers the foremost victims of the Zagreb Treason Trial: and their enemies in Zagreb and Vienna were never tired of advancing charges which, if substantiated, would gravely compromise the whole Serbo-Croat Coalition, which formed the majority in Croatia.

In conclusion Wiesner advised restricting Vienna's demands to the punishment of certain specified individuals and to the adoption of more stringent measures on the Serbian frontier.

Wiesner's view was at once challenged by General Potiorek, who despite all that had happened had lost none of his influence in high quarters, and even with Francis Joseph himself. In the Governor's view it was simply incredible that the Serbian Government should have been entirely ignorant of what was on foot, and especially of the share of active officers in foreign propaganda, and he warned Vienna against the danger

a merely presenting demands which could be met by their promises without performance. He held it to be this " most sacred duty " to insist that it was " already to late " to permit any such " postponement of the decision " with Serbia. " The ground at home¹ is already so undermined that military operations would be rendered very difficult, and if the Panserb propaganda was given further time for action, he himself would decline to remain answerable for his military duties in Bosnia!² There can be little doubt that views so emphatically expressed strengthened the party in Vienna which favoured war. In any case Berchtold, finding Wiesner's report to be negative and even unfavourable, deliberately suppressed it and made no attempt to produce evidence until after the breach with Serbia was an accomplished fact.

At this stage it may be well to summarise what is essential in the bulky *dossier*³ submitted by Austria-Hungary, on 25 July, to the five other Great Powers of Europe and to the Porte in justification of its action against Serbia. The initial memorandum purports to give a survey of anti-Austrian activities in Serbia since the annexation of Bosnia in 1909, and from the first lays special stress upon the Narodna Odbrana, or Committee of National Defence, founded by General Jankovic and the ex-Ministers, Ljuba Jovanovic and Davidovic. As we shall see later, the authors of the memorandum fail to draw any distinction between this avowedly propagandist but perfectly respectable and open society and the very different organisation which came to be known as the " Black Hand " and which was terrorist in aim and of course highly secret. Indeed the very *raison d'être* of the latter lay in its protest against the wow-terrorist (and

¹ i.e. in Bosnia and Croatia.

² Letter of Potiorek to Conrad, 14 July (Conrad, *op. cit.*, iv., pp. 83-5).

³ *Austro-Hungarian Red Book* (1915), No. 19 (with eleven appendices),

in its own opinion absurdly mild) principles of the more important society.¹

The memorandum devotes considerable attention to the Serbian press and quotes extracts to show its undoubted hostility to the neighbouring Monarchy. It recounts the various outrages committed in Sarajevo and Zagreb since 1910 and ascribes them — quite erroneously and without any attempt at proof — to the direct prompting of the Belgrade Government, whom it also credits with directing the agitation in the middle schools of Croatia and Bosnia. It is scarcely necessary to add that this agitation was during the period in question even more Croat than Serb in character, and grew spontaneously out of the protests against the outrageous Cuvaj *regime* in Croatia.

The number of conspirators is as yet only given as six — Princip and Cabrinović, the actual murderers; Grabez, who accompanied them from Belgrade; Vaso Cubrilovic and Cvetko Popovic, two other young Bosnian Serbs; and finally, Mehmedbasic, a Moslem from Southern Herzegovina, who managed to escape to Serbia. The first three only had been in Belgrade, Cabrinovic as a type-setter, the other two leading a precarious existence as pupils of a gymnasium, frequenting doubtful company in shabby cafés and indulging in revolutionary talk among a small group of Bosnian emigrants. In these circumstances they made the acquaintance of a certain Milan Ciganovic, also a Bosnian Serb, who held a minor post on the railway and had belonged to a komitadji band in the recent Balkan Wars. To him they confided their desire to attempt the life of the Archduke, as a foremost enemy of the Serbian race, and from him they received

¹ Appendix v. of the memorandum gives in great detail the evidence of a certain Trifko Krstanović, one of the many notorious informers who lived by supplying both sides, and is therefore thoroughly unreliable. But in any case all that transpires from his evidence is that Krstanović belonged in 1908-9 to the band which Tankosic was organising for the event of war, and which would in that case probably have been employed for a raid into Bosnia. By his own admission he left Bosnia finally in December 1910,

four Browning revolvers and six hand-grenades, and a certain amount of instruction in their use. They were also given cyanide, that they might commit suicide if in danger of capture. These weapons Ciganovic procured from his fellow-conspirator, Voja Tankosic, who in the spring of 1909 had formed a komitadj i band of 140 members, had acquired considerable notoriety as a guerrilla chief in 1913, and had won the rank of major in the Serbian army. At his instance Ciganovic arranged for the three young men to be transported by "underground route " to the frontier, and then smuggled across the Drina river into Bosnia, by the connivance of certain frontier guards at Sabac and Loznica. This occurred on 28 May or the following day.

To this extent the memorandum is accurate. It is in error when it ascribes a share in the conspiracy to Major Milan Pribicevic¹ and Mr. Dacic, the director of the state printing-press. It is quite true that both were very active members of the Narodna Odbrana, but that is just why they had no connection with Tankosic and his group.² Even the memorandum, however, admits that neither of them were in Belgrade at the critical time when the three young desperadoes were armed and started on their mission.* At the subsequent trial Princip admitted having appealed to Milan Pribicevic to use his influence in respect of a bursary controlled by the Narodna Odbrana, but only met with a refusal.⁴ Cabrinovic also stated that he had applied for help to the secretary of the Odbrana, Major Vasic, and that the latter, finding a

¹ A Serb from Croatia who threw up his commission in the Austro-Hungarian army and entered the Serbian army. His brother Svetozar was one of the leading Serb deputies in the Serbo-Croat Coalition and was from 1923 to 1925 Minister of Education in the Pasid Cabinet. His other two brothers, Adam and Valerijan, were the two foremost victims of the Zagreb Treason Trial, in which a " Revolutionary Statute " ascribed to Milan's authorship served as an incriminating document. Not unnaturally Milan was a special bugbear to the Austro-Hungarian authorities, who also hoped through him to compromise Svetozar and his colleagues in the Coalition.

² See *infra*, pp. 138 and 147.

³ *Austro-Hungarian Rotbuch* (1915), No. 19, p. 78.

⁴ Pharos, *Process gegen die Attentäter von Sarajevo*, p. 8.

volume of Maupassant in his possession, took it away, saying that it was not for him, and supplied him with other more edifying literature and a little money.¹ This tiny incident illustrates the difference in mentality between the Narodna Odbrana and the terrorist group. That these young *émigres* should have applied to the former society is the most natural thing in the world, for it was known to be specially interested in Bosnia and in the fate of its *émigrés*.

That is probably hardly a mere accident that the memorandum only cites the names of six conspirators, three of whom had come from Serbia. In reality, proceedings were taken by the Sarajevo Court against twenty-five persons, all Bosnian subjects. Of these, sixteen were eventually sentenced and nine acquitted. The three chief criminals, Princip, Cabrinovic and Grabez, were condemned to twenty years' imprisonment, Austrian law not allowing the death sentence for persons under the age of twenty'; but Ilić, Veljko Cubrilovic and Jovanovic were actually executed.⁸ Of the remainder, one was sentenced to sixteen, one to ten, one to seven and two to three years' imprisonment. To have admitted before Europe that as many as twenty-five persons were implicated in the plot, would have been to stress the spontaneous character of the conspiracy and correspondingly to diminish the probable share of Serbia.

In effect, however, this is exactly what Austria did during the early months of 1915, though Europe was then far too absorbed in other things to realise the implications. A whole series of treason trials was instituted against the youth of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At Travnik

¹ *ibid.*, p. 5.

² All three were in an advanced stage of consumption and died during the war — Cabrinovic in the prison of Theresienstadt in January 1916, Grabez in February, and Princip early in 1918. Mitar Kerović, whose death sentence had been commuted to twenty years' imprisonment, also died in prison at Möllersdorf.

³ On 2 February, 1915.

Borivoje Jevtic ¹ was sentenced to three years, and six of his comrades to two years each. At Sarajevo ten other students were sentenced to one year each. At Tuzla Todor Ilic was sentenced to death (though afterwards reprieved), while six comrades received sentences of ten to sixteen years, and others again of "one to five years. Finally at Banjaluka 151 of the ringleaders of " Young Bosnia " were the victims of a monster trial, which ended in 98 convictions, the deputies, Vasilj Grdjic and Popovic and 14 others being sentenced to death, 52 others to terms of imprisonment varying from 10 to 20 years, and the remainder to terms varying from 8 to 2 years.² Needless to say, proceedings were only instituted against those who had in one way or another become marked men; the great mass were simply mobilised at the outbreak of war and used as " cannon fodder " for the Central Powers. But the large numbers involved in these trials, and the wholesale internments of Yugoslav patriots of all ages — nine-tenths of whom had never been in any contact whatever with Serbia — provide overwhelming proof of the spontaneous and universal character of the national movement among the Yugoslavs of the Monarchy, and in particular of the revolutionary tendencies in Bosnia.

One point seemed to be definitely established by the Memorandum — namely, that the hand-grenades came originally from the Serbian State Arsenal at Kragujevac. This again need cause no surprise, for it was notorious that large numbers of these had been distributed to the irregular bands employed by Serbia during the Balkan Wars. Thus there were still many available in private hands, and Tankosic, as the former chief of a band, can have had little or no difficulty in procuring some, without the authorities being any the wiser.

¹ Author of *Sarajevski Atentat* (1924).

² For details, see *Austro-Magyar Judicial Crimes* (1916).

The most serious charge in the memorandum — and one which has since been substantiated — is the implication of two officers of the Serbian Frontier Guards, at Sabac and Loznica, in smuggling the young men across to Bosnia. This was from the very first virtually unchallenged, and the details would very quickly have been established if the whole question had been referred to the Hague Tribunal, as the Belgrade Government suggested.

While investigations proceeded at Sarajevo behind a strict veil of official secrecy, there were growing polemics in the press of Vienna and Budapest on the one hand and of Belgrade on the other. In neither case would it be just to regard them as symptomatic of normal public opinion in the two countries, but their continuance had an irritating and inflammatory effect. One essential distinction must, however, be emphasised at the very outset. The Serbian press had always been violent, and often scurrilous; subject under the Obrenovic to unjust and illicit pressure, it had attained since the change of *regime* in 1903 a liberty which, in the absence of any law of libel, swiftly degenerated into licence, but which was generally tolerated as a safeguard against any possible return to the old system. No Government since 1903, however powerful in other respects, possessed the power to restrain the press, or had the courage to attempt a remedy by introducing a stringent press law; and to impose restrictive measures by ministerial decree would have been a violation of the Constitution. At the moment of the murder Serbia was absorbed by party feuds of a specially acute kind, and opponents of the Government took a positive delight in embarrassing it still further by provocative language, even in the delicate sphere of foreign politics.

In Vienna and in Budapest the position was entirely different. Not merely the official and semi-official organs, but the entire press, with very rare exceptions,

was amenable to the influence of the Ballplatz in matters of foreign policy, and could be mobilised, or muzzled, almost at a moment's notice, despite the existence in both Austria and Hungary of press laws drafted on approved European lines. Of this, such incidents as the Prochaska affair in the winter of 1912 provide eloquent proof. In a word, while the two Governments of the Dual Monarchy, and above all the Joint Ministry for Foreign Affairs, had most of the press in both capitals at its disposal, the press of Belgrade — save a few personal organs, which were not necessarily the most influential — was all the more uncontrollable because so many of its writers were inexperienced and unbalanced, and was often ready to defy the Government on the most trifling excuse. Undoubtedly one reason of the contrast was that among the two ruling races of the Monarchy journalism had become very largely a monopoly of the Jews, whose natural subservience to authority was supplemented by anti-Slav bias, whereas in Belgrade the journalistic trade, being poorly paid and still in its infancy, attracted a number of very second-rate individuals. Nor would it be fitting to overlook the rôle played in envenoming Austro-Serbian relations by a group of Jewish "revolver journalists" living at Zemun, the little frontier town facing Belgrade across the river, and unscrupulously feeding Vienna and Budapest with a never failing supply of scandalous gossip about Serbia. Moreover, among the Southern Slavs there has always been a class of "*Hochstapler*," highly intelligent but unprincipled to a degree, and possessed of a lively imagination which takes the form of feeding the credulous or spitefully-disposed foreigner with yarns of a highly sensational character. The all-pervading system of police espionage which the Austro-Hungarian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and War had organised throughout Bosnia and the other Southern Slav provinces provided these adventurers with great opportunities; and obscure

individuals like George Nastic, Vasic, Steinhardt and others came to play a really important rôle, thanks to the infinite gullibility of the authorities and their blind hatred of everything Serb. The virulent pamphlets of Leopold Mandl were accepted as gospel, not merely by historians of the calibre of Friedjung, but by all the chief statesmen of Central Europe.

In the fierce polemics which followed the murder, considerable excuses may be made for the Viennese clerical organs, to whose hopes and ambitions the removal of Francis Ferdinand dealt the deadliest of blows. But no such plea can be advanced for the Liberal Jewish press of both capitals, which had always hated and feared the Archduke, while the attitude of the official and semi-official organs was of course due to the direct initiative of *the Ballplatz* itself. Specially unrestrained, and hence specially worthy of notice, was the language of the *Pester Lloyd*, which on all matters of foreign policy had, ever since the 'sixties, been a recognised mouth-piece of the Hungarian Premier and of the Joint Foreign Minister of the day. Its first leader after the murder (29 June) roundly declared that " the threads of this bloody web are still not laid bare, but there is already certainty as to whither they lead. . . . Ten years ago they butchered their own King and Queen by night; they have now murdered the Austro-Hungarian heir in open daylight on the street. In technique and boldness there has in the interval been a notable improvement. Such are the cultural products which the world has to procure from this quarter." And again next day, Panserb crime has already been branded on the forehead. To render it harmless by pitiless extermination as the task of the future." (30 June.) As must have been foreseen, the first of these articles of course provoked reminders in the Belgrade press that the crime was due bosnian discontent and Austrian repression; and of this the *Pester Lloyd* replied on 1 July with over three

columns of violent comment, in which it was claimed that those who dared to speak of " the fable of oppression of their kinsmen " laid themselves open to the countercharge of " incitement to murder." Instead of regretting the excesses perpetrated against the Serbs of Bosnia, it simply treated Potiorek's proclamation of martial law as " a revelation of facts which the Belgrade gentry with their big talk can no longer juggle away." After these calculated outbursts it established a daily rubric entitled: " Serbian whitewash," or " From the Serbian Witches' Cauldron," and containing the most violent rejoinders to its own abuse. Finally, when the Serbian Press Bureau issued a statement regretting the crime and its effect upon relations between the two countries, the *Pester Lloyd* replied by declaring that a country where " assassination was the national gospel " and "regicide an article of exportation, had no right to be counted as part of the civilised world."

Under such provocation Belgrade was not slow to retort, and exaggerated the already grave anti-Serb excesses into a veritable "St. Bartholomew's Night." As an example of the lengths to which certain revolver journalists went, may be quoted the article of *Zvono* (16 July), which describes Principas the son of the former Crown Princess Stephanie, charged with avenging Rudolf's death upon his murderer, Francis Ferdinand! »

Matters were not improved by an interview in *Novoye Vremya*, in which the Serbian Minister in St. Petersburg, Mr. Spalajkovic, referred to Vienna's reprisals against the Bosnian Serbs.» The fact that the Minister had first become known by a pamphlet on Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia, and that his wife came of a prominent Bosnian family, made his intervention all the more indiscreet and

¹ *First Austro-Hungarian Red Book* (1915), No. 19, app. ix.

² An interesting commentary on this incident is to be found in Sazonov's frank reference to Spalajkovic" as *déséquilibré*. (Szápáry to Berchtold, 21 July 1914, *D.A.*, I, No. 45.)

highly incensed the Ballplatz. Almost equal offence was riven by an interview of Pasic himself in the *Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten*, which he soon found it advisable to deny in several particulars, and which Baron Giesl may have been right in regarding as really addressed to his own electors at home.

Perhaps the most singular contribution to this press feud was made by Mr. Horatio Bottomley, who on 11 July placarded London with the phrase, " To Hell with Serbia," and published an article in *John Bull* accusing the Serbian secret service of plotting the murder through its London Legation. The incriminating document — reproduced in facsimile — was a half-burnt cipher on the notepaper of the Legation, procured by *John Bull*, " never mind *how*," to use its own words. It decodes " into crude Spanish," and contains a promise of £2,000 " for the total elimination of Francis Ferdinand."¹ Now it so happens that this " crude Spanish " is really the dialect employed by the Jews of Salonica, and that the man who hawked this document round several London newspaper offices and was eventually accepted by the sensation-loving Mr. Bottomley was a Salonican Jew. This suggests some connection with the Committee of Union and Progress, which had centred in the Jewish Lodges of Salonica until the expulsion of the Turks eighteen months previously, and which was of course actively hostile to Serbia. Needless to say, no one in those days took *John Bull* seriously as a critical authority, but its " revelation " served to draw attention to sinister forces working below the surface and using the well-worn method of forgery to discredit Serbia.

A far graver event, also savouring almost of melodrama,

¹ The " Senor G." referred to in the " document " is obviously intended, by insinuation to mean Mr. Grujic, still Chargé d'Affaires in London at the date even (5 April, 1914). Those who know anything of Mr. Grujic will find this much grotesque to cause even a passing annoyance. Yet Miss Durham, in her addresses includes among countless other wild and unproved charges the insinuation that Mr. Grujic, as also Mr. Jovan M. Jovanović, was in the plot.

imparted further venom to the press feud. Various allegations had been put abroad from interested quarters as to the scarcely veiled glee displayed by Mr. Hartwig, the all-powerful Russian Minister in Belgrade, when the first news of the murder had reached him. His Austro-Hungarian colleague, Baron Giesl, returned on 10 July from an absence of some days, and Hartwig made a point of calling upon him that evening in order to contradict the story. But while he sat in the Minister's study explaining matters, he was suddenly overcome by heart failure and expired within a few minutes. Following upon the excitement of Sarajevo, this tragic incident gave rise to fresh rumours of the grossest kind; and it was even whispered that the champion of Slavdom had been poisoned by a cup of coffee by his bitterest rival! While the Belgrade Cabinet accorded a state funeral and a grave of honour to the dead Minister, "reckless and provocative language" continued to be used; and on the 13th there was a panic among the Austrians in Belgrade, Giesl going so far as to assure Pasic that a regular assault was being planned against the Legation. The one story was as preposterous as the other; but though nothing whatever happened, the rumour was taken seriously in Vienna and added to the general irritation against Serbia. Meanwhile there were periodical demonstrations before the Serbian Legation in Vienna, which had to be specially guarded.

¹ *The Times* leader of 16 July, 1914.

CHAPTER VI

THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CRIME

TURNING to the question of responsibility for the murder, we find that there are four possible channels of investigation. First and foremost stands the charge of complicity which public opinion in the neighbouring Monarchy levelled against the Serbian Government, and which underlay the formidable ultimatum of 23 July. On the other hand, the Serbian historian Professor Stanojevic, in his sensational pamphlet,¹ ascribes the outrage to three distinct groups — the nationalist students in Bosnia, the military conspirators in Belgrade, and certain unspecified " Austro-Hungarian politicians." The first and third of these groups he dismisses in a few phrases, hinting that the rôle of the former is well enough known already, and is in any case " a question of technical nature," while that of the latter is never likely to be fully known; and he then concentrates upon the " Black Hand," whose importance is thus exalted out of all proportion to the true facts.

I have already given my reasons for limiting the charge against Austria-Hungary to one of culpable negligence. Let me examine the other three possibilities.

It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the Serbian Government was in a position of very great embarrassment, in which foreign complications were specially unwelcome to it. Only four days before the murder (24 June) King Peter, incapacitated by ill-health, and appointed as Regent his son, Prince Alexander, till

¹ *Ubistvo Austriskog Prestolonaslednika Ferdinanda* (German ed., *Di Ermordung des Erzherzogs*, Frankfurt, 1923), p. 43.

then without direct political experience. On the same day the Pasic administration, which had already in April committed itself to elections for a " Great Skupstina " and a revision of the Constitution, had dissolved Parliament and embarked upon a desperate struggle with the Opposition parties. That the Government should have chosen the opening of an electoral campaign for sharing in a foreign murder plot which was likely to produce war is grotesquely improbable; but there are many other reasons for doubting official complicity. The country was exhausted by two wars; the finances, carefully husbanded by Mr. Pacu, were not equal to further strain. The Albanian campaign in the previous autumn had shown the reluctance of the peasant soldiers to return to the colours, and it was now the eve of harvest. The concordat with the Vatican had only just been signed, and delicate negotiations with Montenegro for Customs and military union, and perhaps even a dynastic arrangement, were still pending. The position in the new Macedonian territories was far from consolidated, the civil administration was notoriously bad there, and there was extreme friction between the civil and military authorities. How little the army chiefs anticipated war is best shown by the fact that the Voivode Putnik was taking a cure at Gleichenberg, in *Austria*, and was actually caught there by the outbreak of hostilities.

Far too little stress is usually laid upon the military unpreparedness of Serbia, yet this notorious fact must have weighed decisively with both the Government and the military chiefs at Belgrade. The two Balkan campaigns had strained the military machine to the uttermost. Only 120,000 rifles were available, and these were of six different types. The shortage of field guns¹ had to be made up for by old slow-firing guns, with black powder, or at best by the Krupp guns captured from the Turks in 1912. Of heavy artillery there was none at all.

¹ The best were Schneider-Canet 75mm. guns.

There was a serious shortage of every kind of ammunition, which at once became acute after the outbreak of war, and brought Serbia to the very verge of ruin, by November 1914. Before its dissolution in June the Isjkupstina had voted a new war-credit of 100,000,000 dinars, but, of course, nothing had as yet been supplied by the time that war actually broke out. The problem of the transport of war material from France to land-locked Serbia had always presented considerable difficulties, and was, of course, to be accentuated tenfold as soon as France herself became involved in war.

But hardly less serious than shortage of ammunition was the complete lack of equipment and war material of every kind. The Serbian Army was lacking in uniforms, in tents, in bandages, and the most elementary medical stores, and its stock of oxen and farm carts, which formed the backbone of its commissariat and transport departments, had been dangerously depleted.¹ In a word, the authorities had every possible motive for alarm and none whatever for a policy of adventure and assassination. It is too much to assert that a knowledge of the exhausted and unprepared state of the Serbian Army was one of the determining factors which weighed with the Austro-Hungarian General Staff and Foreign Office when the crisis came. The temptation to strike before the Serbs had time to rearm and recuperate was naturally very great.

Special reference should also be made to the Montenegrin question, which figured far more in the calculations of Vienna than is generally realised. One result of the Balkan Wars had been greatly to strengthen the movement for union between Serbia and Montenegro, now no longer separated from each other by Austrian or

¹ For a very matter-of-fact account of technical conditions see *Bitka na Jadrju* (*The Struggle round Jadar*, August 1914), by General Živko Pavlović, then Chief of Staff under the Voivode Putnik. This is vol. i. (623 pages) of the official Serbian military history of the war. See pp. 53-5 and *cursim*.

Turkish garrisons in the Sandjak. Save for a small Court clique, King Nicholas was universally distrusted, and his sons had forfeited all claim to be considered. Early in 1914 the Montenegrin statesman Mr. Miuèković began serious discussions with Mr. Pasic on the following basis: The two countries would remain nominally independent, each under its own dynasty, but there would be a union of finance, customs, and posts, uniformity in justice and administration, a fusion of the two armies, a joint General Staff, and a common orientation of foreign policy and diplomatic representation.¹ These negotiations became known both to Vienna and to Berlin, and caused the former such acute alarm that Count Szápáry, the Austro-Hungarian Minister in St. Petersburg, was instructed to inform Sazonov that in the event of union "Austria-Hungary would not remain a silent observer," since her Adriatic interests did not permit any change in the balance of power.⁸ Hartwig, on learning this, urged on Pasic the need for extreme caution in the matter, and early in July, at Sazonov's orders, advised the postponement of the negotiations, with a view to calming Vienna. This pacific advice deserves to be placed on record, as disproving Sazonov's warlike aims. Meanwhile it is abundantly clear that Vienna was highly nervous, looked upon the union as inevitable unless Serbia were speedily crushed,⁴ and thus gained an additional argument in favour of war.

Another quite material fact to be borne in mind in any apportionment of war-guilt is Berchtold's steady refusal

¹ See despatch of Hartwig to Sazonov, 7 April (N.S.), 1914, in Siebert, *Diplomatische Aktenstücke*, p. 629.

² Sazonov to Hartwig, 5 March, 1914, *ibid.*, p. 627. cf. *Kaiserliche Katastrophenpolitik*, p. 150, where Dr. Kanner describes a conversation between him (as editor of *Die Zeit*) in October 1913 with Montlong, head of the Ballplatz Press bureau. The latter, referring to the proposed union of Serbia and Montenegro, excitedly exclaimed: "That would be war I"

»Sazonov to Hartwig, 7 July (Siebert, *op. cit.*, p. 631).

³ Conrad von Hötzendorf admits that union was only opposed by the dynasty and its subordinates, and was correspondingly disquieted. *Das Meiner Dienstzeit*, iii., p. 663.

to consider various attempts at mediation between Vienna and Belgrade during the two years previous to the Great War. The most notable of these was Pasic's offer, conveyed through Professor Masaryk during a visit to Belgrade in December 1912, to visit Vienna for the purpose of concluding a working arrangement, both political and commercial, between the two countries.¹ Berchtold, to whom Masaryk's motives in championing the Southern Slavs were a sealed book, assumed that he was seeking some personal advantage, and did not even deign to reply to the Serbian Premier.

On the other hand, it must always be remembered that the Serbian Government on three separate occasions in five years — during the Bosnian Annexation crisis, at the Friedjung Trial, and in its reply to the Ultimatum — offered to submit its dispute with Austria-Hungary to impartial investigation by the Hague Tribunal — a step which does not suggest a guilty conscience on its own part or even a desire to shield any of its own guilty subjects. It is sometimes argued that a reference to the Hague would simply have meant shelving the matter, but it is obvious that, even if the Entente had shown itself lukewarm, two such Powers as Austria-Hungary and Germany could have effectually enforced a thorough enquiry, and would have had the backing of public opinion throughout the world. The plain fact is, of course, that Austria-Hungary herself had a very guilty conscience in Southern Slav matters, and did not relish the prospect of the Friedjung forgeries or the internal conditions of Bosnia and Croatia being raised before M* international forum.

Meanwhile, though a whole series of considerations go to prove that the Serbian Government was far from wishing to provoke a fresh conflict, it was certainly

¹ See letter of Professor Masaryk to Prince Windischgrätz of 6 December, 1913 published by *Magyarország* of 25 July, 1924, and reproduced in *Prager Presse* of 26 July.

guilty of a grave blunder in not immediately forestalling Vienna's demands by instituting a searching enquiry of its own. This omission is only very partially explained by absorption in the electoral campaign. The complicity of Major Tankosic and Ciganovic" became known at a very early stage, and it would at least have been good tactics, if nothing else, to take some action against two notoriously suspect characters. Inaction was all the more inexcusable, in view of the frank warning administered by Herr von Zimmermann, the German Foreign Under-Secretary, to the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin as early as 30 June.¹ He emphasised the grave consequences of any failure of Serbia " to do her duty " by proceeding against suspect persons; in that case " one could not tell what would happen."* It is indeed impossible to deny Herr von Jagow's plea^s that the Belgrade Government, though giving official expression to its horror at the crime,⁴ took no serious steps either to search for its authors or to

¹ This was repeated by Zimmermann to Sir H. Rumbold, who reported it to London.

² Lerchenfeld to Munich, 2 July, *D.D.*, iv., Anhang iv., No. 1.

³ *Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieges*, p. 96.

⁴ On 1 July Mr. Pasió sent a circular to all Serbian Legations (*Serbian Blue Book*, No. 8) reminding them (in view of the attempt of the Austrian and Hungarian Press to destroy Serbia's " high moral reputation in Europe " and exploit against her " the act of a young and ill-balanced fanatic ") that " the outrage has been most severely condemned in all circles of society " as prejudicial to good relations with Austria-Hungary " at a moment when Serbia is doing all in her power to improve them." " It is absurd to think that Serbia could have directly or indirectly inspired acts of this kind. On the contrary, it was of the greatest interest to Serbia to prevent the perpetration of this outrage." The value of this announcement would, of course, be materially affected by the revelations of Mr. Jovanovic (see p. 153), if they were to be accepted at their face value.

Two further circulars were sent by Mr. Paâié to the Legations on 14 July (*Serbian Blue Book*, Nos. 20 and 21), the one drawing a distinction between the Austro-Hungarian and the Serbian Press, and emphasising the lack of censorship and Press control in Serbia, and the other denying the wild rumours circulating in Vienna as to imaginary attacks on Austro-Hungarian subjects in Belgrade.

All these circulars were, of course, for diplomatic use only. The only public announcement was a statement of the Serbian Press Bureau, issued on 30 June (see *D.D.*, i., No. 10, Griesinger to Bethmann Hollweg).

Herr Wendel refers (*Die Habsburger und die Südslawenfrage*, p. 60) to another circular of 10 July, in which the Serbian Government undertakes to bring before the courts any Serbian subjects mixed up in the murder, and to introduce legislation against the misuse of explosives. But of this there is no trace in the *Serbian Blue Book*.

check propagandist excess. Despite warnings of its Minister in Vienna, Mr. Jovan Jovanović,¹ it remained inactive for three weeks, and when at last, on 20 July, it presented at Berlin a Note formally inviting the German Government to use its good offices at the Ballplatz and affirming a desire to meet Austria's demands wherever possible.¹ It was already far too late to produce any effect either in Berlin or Vienna, and, in point of fact, merely brought down a severe snub from Jagow upon the head of the Chargé d'Affaires. The Note was unexceptional in tone, and concluded by promising compliance on every point save only where Serbia's "dignity and independence" might be threatened. Reading the ultimatum in the light of this document, one is instantly reminded of Berchtold's secretly expressed resolve to frame it in such a manner as would make acceptance impossible.» Moreover, unless the German Government had already identified itself with Berchtold's views, such a document would have provided ample ground for a peaceful settlement; for its terms could easily have been interpreted as committing Serbia to as stringent an enquiry as European opinion might desire. The only obscure point which it contains is the assertion that the Serbian Government had "at once declared its readiness to take legal proceedings" against any Serbian subject who might be implicated. It is quite true that *Samouprava*, the official Government organ, gave abstract expression to such a view when deploring the murder; and there is no evidence, either in the *Serbian Blue Book*

¹ See *Serbian Blue Book*, Nos. 23, 25, 31.

² *D.D.*, I., No. 86. The main portions of this Note, supplemented by other details not given in the Berlin copy, were also circulated to all Legations abroad (see *Serbian Blue Book*, No. 30). It is very strange that the version published in the *Serbian Blue Book* also contains the pledge to introduce "a more drastic law against the misuse of explosives," but that this does not occur in the Berlin version. Hermann Wendel (*Die Habsburger und die Südslawenfrage*, p. 60) quotes the former only, assigning to it the date of 10 July instead of 19 July — a very important discrepancy, due perhaps to a misprint.

³ See *infra*, p.p. 187, 194.

or elsewhere, of any official action having been taken from Belgrade in this sense.

In point of fact, this passive attitude was entirely in keeping with the character and political tactics of the Serbian Premier. Mr. Pasic has always preferred to wait upon events rather than commit himself to a definite line of action; and he has also always shown a truly Oriental indifference to public opinion both about himself and about his country. The repeated failure to make the most of Serbia's case before Europe, even when it most lent itself to favourable presentment and when its enemies were active in misstatement, must be ascribed in large part to this indifference. Of all the subsequent collections of diplomatic documents the *Serbian Blue Book* holds a record for paucity of material and inadequacy; though it is but fair to add that in preparing it for publication the Government was seriously handicapped by its precipitate withdrawal from Belgrade to Nis, many documents having perforce been left behind.¹

Energetic action by Mr. Pasic during the week or even fortnight following the murder would not, of course, have led the war party in Vienna to renounce its aims; but it would undoubtedly have deprived it of its tactical position, and increased the chances of friendly mediation from the outside. To this extent, then, the Pasic Cabinet must share the responsibility for what befell. It could no doubt plead absorption in an electoral campaign which threatened the whole future of the Radical party; but a true grasp of European realities should have shown that infinitely more was at stake. Yet Pasic remained passive, took no steps to put himself in the right at Vienna, and, on the other hand, allowed the reservists to be dismissed,

¹ It is only in the year 1925, since the completion of a new and adequate Foreign Office in Belgrade and the recovery of the documents removed during the Austrian occupation, that it has been possible to reorganise the Serbian archives on modern lines. When this process is complete, the Serbian Government will at last be able to fulfil its promise, and publish an adequate collection of documents on the origin of the war.

took no measures for the defence of Belgrade, and left the Commander-in-Chief, Voivode Putnik, to pursue his cure unwarned in an Austrian watering-place. All this doubtless serves to show that Pasic was not preparing for war, or even expecting it, till the very end; but it convicts him of great remissness and lack of judgment.

Pasic's passive attitude was shared by the officials of the Serbian Foreign Office. The British Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Crackanthorpe, reports on 2 July to London that "high words" passed between Mr. Grujic and the Austrian Counsellor, Herr von Storck, when the latter broached the idea of an investigation.¹ Much later, on 19 July, he himself discussed with Mr. Grujic *The Times's* suggestion that Serbia would do well to institute a Voluntary enquiry, and so forestall Vienna. But he was "met by the doctrinaire view that until the Sarajevo proceedings were published the Serbian Government "had no material on which such an enquiry could be based." He added that while an influential party in Vienna "wished to press Serbia to extremes," his Government "had certain knowledge that restraint would be exercised on Austria from Berlin,"* but unfortunately he gives no indication as to the source of his information. This disastrous miscalculation of the permanent officials combined with the political absorption of their chiefs, and a golden opportunity was wasted.

There was, however, a further reason for the Serbian Government's inaction at this critical time, namely, the rôle played by the "Black Hand." This secret society had been founded in 1911 by survivors of the group of officers which had assassinated King Alexander and Gheen Draga in 1903, and which had been broken up very largely by British diplomatic intervention. Its

¹ *Unprinted British Documents*, Crackanthorpe to Grey, 2 July.

² *Unprinted British Documents*, Crackanthorpe to Grey, 19 July.

⁴ This nickname was first given to it during a campaign launched in the Belgrade Press by an Austrian Jew named Konitzer, at the instance of the notorious Count Forgách, then Austro-Hungarian Minister.

real name was " Union or Death " (" Ujedinjenje ili Smrt "), and its adherents were drawn from those who frankly accepted murder and terrorism as the best propagandist weapons, and were not content with the more open and respectable methods of social and educational agitation for which the Narodna Odbrana (or Society of National Defence) had been founded in 1909, after the Bosnian crisis. It may be pointed out in passing — as a proof of the unreliability of the Austrian Secret Service — that both before and after the Sarajevo outrage Vienna completely failed to distinguish between the two organisations, though anyone at all closely acquainted with conditions at Belgrade knew them to be not merely distinct, but directly antagonistic to one another, and to be conducted by persons who were poles apart in outlook and policy.¹

The Narodna Odbrana was founded on the initiative of the dramatist Nusic, with the blessing of such tried statesmen as Milovanovic and Ljuba Stojanovic and the active co-operation of young idealists like Skerlic, Bozo Marković, and Marjanovic, and existed to combat illiteracy and encourage popular education, temperance, and hygiene, to establish village libraries, clubs, and lectures, and, above all, to spread information and interest regarding national questions in all sections of the Slav race. This brought it inevitably into conflict with the Austro-Hungarian authorities, but there was nothing secret or subversive in its programme or tactics, except in so far as all national movements are bound to be subversive in a mixed state.

Very different was the " Black Hand." It was founded in the first instance as a kind of protest against the

¹ This crass blunder is repeated by Alfred von Wegerer in his elaborate treatise " Der Anlass zum Weltkriege " (*Die Kriegsschuldfrage* for June 1925, p. 356). He treats the " Black Hand " as " in connection with " the Narodna Odbrana, though the two were notoriously at enmity. He also prints quite imaginary details regarding a secret section of *the latter* " for the execution of terrorist acts."

Government's refusal to authorise an active terrorist campaign in Macedonia, and its members were avowedly conspirators who ignored scruples and did not stick at crime. This tendency was increased by the melodramatic method of admission to membership; the candidate had to appear in a darkened room before a table draped in black, and take a high-sounding oath by the sun and earth, by God, honour, and life, while the symbol of the conspirators was a rude representation of a death's head, banner, dagger, bomb, and poison glass, surmounted by the motto " Union or Death."¹ The life and soul of this society was Dragutin Dimitrijevic, a man of good education and attractive personality, brave, energetic, and a fiery patriot, and possessing real powers of organisation, but entirely lacking in balance or common sense, and ruthless in his ambition. Personal vanity and a love of adventure also seem to have played their part, and he possessed sufficient magnetism and plausibility to rally round him some of the more unruly and reckless of the younger officers.

These were troublous times for Serbia, and quite a number of the group distinguished themselves in the two Balkan Wars, and came to play an increasing part in military circles. In 1913 Dimitrijevic himself, now a colonel, became head of the Intelligence Bureau of the General Staff, and all matters of espionage passed through his hands. How much the Government knew of the " Black Hand's " real organisation and aims it is very difficult to determine, but for every possible reason — -moral, political, and purely tactical — they looked upon it with disfavour and suspicion, and there was already acute friction between them early in 1913, because Dimitrijevic and his friends, being specially interested in

¹ For a full account of the " Black Hand " see S. Stanojevic, *Die Ermordung des Erzherzogs* (1923), pp. 46-56; H. Wendel, *Die Habsburgéi- und die Südslawen V^o924*; D. R. Lazarevic, *Die schwarze Hand* (Lausanne, 1917); and my own article, " Serbia's Choice," in the *New Europe* for 22 August, 1918; but above all, *Tajna Prevratna Organizacija* (the report of the Salonica Trial of 1917).

Bosnia, favoured concessions to Bulgaria. This friction developed after the Second War into a quarrel between the civil administration and the army commanders in Macedonia. The new officials appointed from Belgrade were quite unequal to an admittedly difficult task, and, as the Serbian Constitution was not at first extended to the new territories, there was a virtual interregnum in which all kinds of sharp practices were tolerated. The dispute sometimes assumed most petty forms, and early in 1914 a number of officers associated with the " Black Hand " demanded that a ministerial order giving precedence to the civil authorities should be rescinded.

By this time the Government was thoroughly alarmed by the aggressive tactics of the " Black Hand," and, though now seemingly near the end of its resources, made a last effort to reassert its authority. In the spring Protic, the masterful Minister of the Interior, seized the club premises of " Union or Death " — a step virtually equivalent to a declaration of war. He is said to have concentrated 3,000 gendarmes in Belgrade as a safeguard against possible action. Dimitrijevic on his side appears to have wished to accept the challenge and to attempt a sort of military *coup d'état*; and only the intervention of the Russian Minister, Mr. Hartwig, who induced the Government to withdraw the objectionable order, averted more serious trouble.¹ Protic's action, however, deserves special emphasis, as one of the many proofs that the Serbian authorities, so far from being in league with the terrorists, were in acute and open conflict with them. Not merely this, but " Apis " has been accused of planning a military revolt and the overthrow of the Pasic Cabinet, and, though this cannot be regarded as proved, there is nothing in the least improbable in it.²

¹ Stanojević, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

² Herr von Wegerer, in the article already quoted (*Kriegsschuldfrage*, June 1925), calmly ignores this and treats the " Black Hand " as " enjoying great prestige -with the Serbian Government at the outbreak of war! " Two such fundamental misconceptions deprive him of the right to be taken seriously on the whole question.

On the other hand, it is necessary to bear in mind that " Union or Death " had the support of many officers who were not terrorists, and that Dimitrijevic only revealed his real aims and secrets to a small inner ring of tried conspirators. It has been alleged¹ that as early as 1911 he had sent an emissary to Vienna with instructions to attempt the life of Francis Joseph or Francis Ferdinand but the individual selected was in a highly consumptive state, and was never heard of again by the plotters in Belgrade. Hence, though widely known for his love of intrigue and reckless patriotism, " Apis," as Dimitrijevic was popularly called, had not yet embarked upon terrorist action, save for the encouragement given to Komitadji bands during the Balkan campaigns; and this, of course, falls rather under the category of guerrilla warfare. It was among these band-leaders that " Apis " found his chief assistant, a certain Voja Tankosic, who as a young lieutenant had taken part in the murder plot of 1903. Tankosic was not a man of high ability, but an ideal instrument; for he could keep his own counsel, and behind a calm and even insignificant exterior hid a savage and ill-disciplined nature.«

His adventures in Macedonia had brought him a certain notoriety and attracted to him some of the wilder students in Belgrade. Among these were the two young Bosnians, Princip and Cabrinovic, who were already deeply infected by revolutionary doctrine, and whose abnormal state of health rendered them apt pupils in terrorism. Tankosic therefore provided them with weapons and trained them secretly in their use. In the meantime Dimitrijevic had received, through his secret intelligence, information which convinced him that Austria-Hungary was preparing for aggressive action against Serbia, and that the

¹ Ibid. p. 50. Unfortunately, Professor Stanojevid never adduces any proof for this and similar statements, so that we are left entirely in doubt as to the source.

² Stanojevic p. 52. This was confirmed to me from private information — among others, from persons who had served in his band and were far from sardng him as a heroic figure.

manceuvres in Bosnia were simply the rehearsal for an attack.

This gave him the idea of forestalling the enemy by a sensational act of terrorism. He can hardly have been so mad as to expect (though this has been seriously alleged) that its success would render Austria-Hungary incapable of action and avert war altogether. It is more probable that, like many Serbs, he regarded the Archduke as the soul of the war party and as specially hostile to the Southern Slavs, and calculated that his removal would create such confusion and discouragement as to increase Serbia's chances when war came.¹ In this mood he called a meeting of the inner committee of the " Black Hand " on 15 June and announced his intention of sending Tankosic's two pupils into Bosnia with the definite mission of removing the Archduke. It is a striking fact that even in such a ruthless company " Apis" and Tankosic should have found themselves in a minority of two, and that the opposition was so general that he had to promise to abandon the design. It is not quite clear whether he genuinely tried to undo the arrangements already made but found that it was already too late, or whether he simply disregarded his promise and took no steps to hold back the would-be assassins. Probably both theories are partially true, and in any case, as has been shown, it is practically certain that, short of forcibly detaining them in Serbia, even he could not have held back the young men from their purpose. According to Professor Stanojevic, Dimitrijevic regarded himself as " the chief organiser of the murder."² But, though there

¹ In this connection Professor Stanojevic states, again without giving any evidence, that as Chief of the Intelligence Bureau, Dimitrijevic had received confidential warning from the Russian General Staff, regarding an anti-Serbian design propounded by Francis Ferdinand and accepted by William II, at their meeting at Konopisté on 12 June. It is, however, obviously impossible that Dimitrijevic could have received any such information from any source whatever (least of all from St. Petersburg) before 15 June, which is given by Stanojević himself as the day *on* which Dimitrijevic called his committee and decided to launch the murder plot. See *supra*, p. 99

² *Die Ermordung*, p. 9.

is no doubt of his connection through Tankosic with two of the murderers, that is very far from proving that the main initiative rested upon him; and many who knew him hold that, however unscrupulous he may have been, he was much too intelligent to have nursed any such illusion. In any case it is clear that, in so far as he acted, he acted as an individual, against the wishes and without the knowledge even of the " Black Hand " itself!

The whole question is bound up with the sinister affair of the Salonica trial, whose detailed treatment belongs to another place. For the moment it will suffice to state that Colonel Dimitrijevic and other prominent officers were sentenced to death in the spring of 1917 on the charge of arranging an alleged attempt on the Prince Regent's life, and that when the friends of Serbia in the West, and, among others, the British War Office, urged the inexpediency of executions, and pled for a reprieve, they received the answer that in the case of Dimitrijevic at any rate this was impossible, since his responsibility for the Sarajevo murder had been established. It is obvious that such a reply was quite irrelevant; for to establish a man's guilt in one crime is no reason for condemning him on an entirely different count. But it was calculated that London or Paris would show less zeal on behalf of Dimitrijević if he was implicated in so grave an affair as Sarajevo, and in the interval Dimitrijevic and two others were put out of the way, and the Prince Regent was prevented by the most drastic pressure from exercising his prerogative of mercy. Whether such a document as Dimitrijevic's confession exists, and, if so, how it was extracted from him, must still be regarded as an open question; but, even if it does exist, it would merely prove that Dimitrijevic ascribed to himself the chief " credit " for the deed.

That his enemies were scarcely less unscrupulous than himself is shown by the fact that, while denouncing him the Allies as the prompter of Sarajevo, they represented

him to the Opposition parties as the chief promoter of a separate peace with Austria, and that, not very long after he had been removed, they were trying to discredit the Serbian Opposition leaders before Western opinion on a similar trumped-up charge.

Eighteen months later, in answer to an article of the present writer criticising the executions,¹ Mr. Protić, then acting Foreign Minister at Corfu, stated that there existed " a written document which of itself made Dimitrijević's pardon out of the question."² In 1922 Protic stated in his own newspaper³ that Dimitrijević had signed a paper accepting the whole responsibility for Sarajevo; but no such document has ever been made public. The Radical Government, having used the story to rid itself of its most dangerous opponents, had an interest in maintaining it long after the war, especially on the periodical occasions when an enquiry was demanded on behalf of the numerous officers implicated, more or less arbitrarily, in the Salonica affair. The story also provided useful capital for the rival military clique of the " White Hand," which had become the mainstay of the Radical party. It is quite clear that Professor Stanojević's pamphlet reflects this attitude, and that his facts and theories, being only a fragment of the whole truth, are a most misleading guide. He has thrown valuable new light upon an ugly corner of Serbian life, but his entire focus is wrong.

The real initiative for the crime came from within Bosnia itself, and one of the survivors from the original group of conspirators is in no way exaggerating when he declares that it was " not the work of an isolated individual in national exaltation, but of the entire youth of Bosnia."⁴ It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the great majority of the young men in Bosnia, and to a

¹ *New Europe*, No. 97 (22 August, 1918) — „Serbia's Choice.”

² *ibid.*, No. 102 (26 September, 1918) — "A Serbian Protest."

³ *Radikal* (Belgrade daily), No. 294 (1922).

⁴ Borivoje Jevtic, *Sarajevshi Ateniat* (Sarajevo, 1923).

lesser degree even in Croatia and Dalmatia, had — as a result of the process fully described in the three opening chapters — virtually repudiated the national leaders and their party tactics, and fallen under the spell of revolutionary and terrorist action. The outrage of Sarajevo was the sixth in less than four years. All six were the work of Serbs or Croats from within the Monarchy, while one had come all the way from America for the purpose.

No one who knew anything of conditions in the South could fail to realise that the atmosphere was surcharged with electricity, and that an explosion might occur at any moment. Personally, I am glad to remember that after four months spent in South-East Europe — from March to July 1913 — I gave such frank expression to my alarm in talking with my Viennese friends that one of them took me to Bilinski himself, and asked me to repeat my plea for a change of policy if a revolutionary outbreak were to be averted. In a word, the official world of Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Zagreb, and Sarajevo alike, and hundreds like myself besides, knew that the Archduke was courting danger by his visit.

But it is only since the war that the conspiracy has become known in all its ramifications. Groups of students had been formed in all the towns of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the moving spirits being, as a rule, youths who had contrived at one time or another to join some Komitadji band in the Balkan Wars. As has already been shown,¹ the real initiative lay with Vladimir Gacinovic in Lausanne and with a small group of his friends in Sarajevo, notably Danilo Ilic and Pusara. During the previous winter they had already decided upon terrorist action, but it was only in the spring, when the Archduke's visit was publicly announced, that they definitely fixed upon him as their victim. The Press cutting which Puäara sent to Cabrinovic in Belgrade was sufficient incentive to the latter and his comrades, Princip and

¹ Chapter iii.

Grabez. Their minds were already full of terrorist ideas, and it afterwards transpired during their trial that Princip in particular had often paid nocturnal visits to the grave of Zerajic at Sarajevo and vowed to avenge him by some similar outrage upon the Austrian oppressor. This admission led to a kind of open rivalry in court between the two assassins, Cabrinović claiming that he had tended the grave at an even earlier date, and had resolved to follow Zerajic's example, in the knowledge that he himself had not long to live.¹ It is hardly possible now to establish which of the two first reached such a resolve; but it may well have been Cabrinovic, who had the further motive of disassociating himself from his father, the spy, and clearing the honour of the family according to his own peculiar standard. One thing is quite certain — that all three youths were consumptive and neurasthenic, found it hard to make ends meet, and were ready for any devilry; and also that all were already contemplating some desperate act in their native Bosnia before ever Pusara's message reached them.

The method by which they secured weapons was really simple enough. Their chief helper, Milan Ciganović, was, like themselves, a Bosnian emigrant in Serbia, who had obtained a very subordinate post on the railway.* They first met him in a highly unpromising manner, being introduced to him in a café by a friendly waiter, and suspecting him of being one of the numerous Austrian agents who frequented Belgrade. It was not, however, difficult for him to win their confidence, for he had served during the Balkan War in the Komitadji band of Tankosic, in which Princip had tried to enlist, but had

¹ cf. Slijepčević (*Nova Evropa*, 1 June, 1925, p. 491).

² So subordinate that when Austria-Hungary cited his name as an accomplice, the Serbian authorities had the greatest difficulty in tracing his very existence. What Mr. Ljuba Jovanovic has to say on this point (*Krv Slovenstva*, English trans. in *Journal of B. I. I. A.*, p. 62) is treated by Herr von Wegerer [*Kriegsschuldfrage*, June 1925], as highly compromising to the Serbian Government, but in reality seems to corroborate the view that Mr. Pačić and his colleagues had never even heard of the man, much less used him as an accomplice.

been rejected as physically unfit. At the trial Princip denied having met Tankosic, and there was no motive in his lying, for he was glorying in, rather than shirking, the responsibility for his act. But it seems certain that Ciganovic brought at least one of the others into personal contact with Tankosic, and, in any case, it is admitted on all sides that it was from the latter that revolvers and hand-grenades were obtained. These weapons were comparatively easy to obtain in Serbia, as they had been widely distributed to the guerilla bands which accompanied the army into Macedonia in 1912.

That Tankosic told his own chief, Dimitrijevic, of the young men's intentions, and met with full approval, may be taken for granted; but all the evidence available goes to prove their claim that the entire initiative came from Bosnia. The most that can be said is that but for Major Tankosic they might not have been able to obtain bombs; but, after all, it was a "Browning" that did the mischief, and there were plenty of Brownings available without importing them from Serbia.

As we have already seen, there were seven armed men waiting for the Archduke at intervals along the embankment, the first group consisting of Cabrinovic, who threw the bomb, Princip, the actual assassin, and their friend Grabez; the second of Cvetko Popovic, Vaso Cubrilović, and Mehmedbasic; and in the third place Pusara, who had been watching for the Archduke elsewhere and only arrived in Sarajevo that morning. Behind them all stood Hie and Veljko Cubrilovic, who was eventually executed ^{wi}th him, while quite a number of other youths were more or less initiated in points of details. It was this that led no less a person than Archbishop Stadler of Sarajevo, soon after the crime, to declare that, quite apart from Princip, the Archduke could hardly have hoped to escape, since he would have had to run the gauntlet through "a regular avenue of assassins."

Yet the fact which stands out most strikingly from an

impartial survey of all the circumstances is the part played by the element of blind chance. Had the Archduke's car not been driven by a chauffeur ignorant of the town, it would have passed the point where Princip stood at a high rate of speed, and he would probably never even have tried to shoot. As it was, the driver, seeing the police car ahead of him turn into a narrow side-street, slacked down, followed it, and then, at General Potiorek's orders, had to back slowly, within perhaps twenty yards of Princip's revolver. But for this, it may be affirmed that the Archduke would either have escaped altogether or have fallen to one of the conspirators who had not been armed in Serbia. Certain it is that a large number of other youths were sworn to attempt his life, and that similar groups existed in Dalmatia and Croatia, eager to emulate their example.¹

At the subsequent trial numerous details were extracted from the prisoners illustrating very clearly their attitude towards official Serbia. For instance, their evidence shows that the real difficulty of smuggling weapons was not in Bosnia, but in Serbia. The explanation of this is that in Serbia, though so very few persons were in the secret, there was a constant danger of detection by the authorities, whereas in Bosnia Veljko Cubrilovic and Ilić not only had a number of student accomplices, but had also secured the help of several peasants — the brothers Kerovic, Milovic, and Stjepanovic — who knew them intimately, trusted them, and acted out of friendship and national enthusiasm, not for money, least of all for money from Serbia.» Moreover, that some of those on the Serbian side who helped Princip and his two friends to cross the Drina were quite unaware of the plot that was brewing is shown by another highly significant detail. Milovic,

¹ Since the war I have learnt of one place in Dalmatia where the Archduke was expected to spend the night on his way to Bosnia, and where several youths, entirely unconnected with any Bosnian organisation, at once resolved that he should not leave it alive. This is by no means an isolated instance.

² cf. article by Cubrilovic's third brother Branko, in *Nova Evropa* of 1 June, 1925.

the Prina fisherman who linked up the two " underground " systems, fled in a panic to Serbia after the murder, and appealed for help to Bozo Milanovic, president of the local section of the Narodna Odbrana in Sabac. But Milanovic received him roughly and refused to harbour him. " You never told me what you were at," he said. " Now you can go back and stand the racket." Miiović returned home, and was arrested and eventually imprisoned at Möllersdorf, where he died from neglect, following upon an operation rendered necessary by ill usage.¹

This little incident admirably illustrates the relative positions of the Narodna Odbrana and the " Black Hand," for it reveals the attitude of responsible members of the former towards an act of terrorism. At one point in the trial the Public Prosecutor pressed Princip for the names of persons in Serbia privy to his designs, and received the answer that " no one except Ciganovic and ourselves knew." " Did no one of the Narodna Odbrana know? " he was asked. " What about the major who gave you weapons?" (i.e. Tankosic). " Tankosic had nothing to do with the Narodna Odbrana," replied Princip. " He was on very bad terms with it. His share in the crime was his own personal affair, which has nothing in common with Serbia." This merely confirms what had long been known from other sources.»

In this connection it is important to lay stress upon the independent attitude and pronounced views of all the young men incriminated in the murder. Strongly as we are bound to condemn their action, we are equally bound to admit that from first to last they gloried in it, unhesitatingly accepted the consequences, and repudiated

¹ The above story was told by him at the time to his fellow-prisoner Vaso Cubrilovic (now Professor at one of the gymnasia of Sarajevo), who repeated it to me. See also P. Slijepevic, " Omladina i Sarajevski Atentat " (*Nova Evropa*, 21 June, 1925, p. 546).

² But which is carefully overlooked by the Ballplatz in 1914, and by Herr von Wegerer to-day.

all idea of external influence. This proud and self-conscious attitude never varied, even though some of them were cruelly mishandled in prison, and on more than one occasion were bespattered with mud by Tirolese soldiers as they entered the court-house. Almost without exception they affirmed their belief in Yugoslav Unity as the motive of their action — some, like Popovic, claiming to be equally Serb *and* Croat; others, like Vaso Cubrilovic, refusing to admit any distinction between the two; others, again, like Grabez, declaring that with all of them " national belief " had taken the place of religious conviction.¹

Princip himself, who, according to eye-witnesses of every shade of opinion, stood shoulders high above all the rest for determination and clearness of conception, provided two useful clues in the course of his evidence. Asked by the President of the Court whether he had said " that it was Serbia's moral duty, as the free portion of the Yugoslavs, to liberate the unfree Yugoslavs/" he replied, " *Yes, but not now, because now Serbia is exhausted*" (after the two wars). Asked by the Public Prosecutor how he could imagine, after the experience of 1908 and 1912, that Austria-Hungary would remain inactive in the face of such an outrage, he replied, " Because the whole affair was our entirely private undertaking, and not official, as the indictment says. Serbia had nothing *to* do with it, and *so* cannot be responsible for our deed." This statement, made some months after the outbreak of war, unquestionably represents the real mentality of the Bosnian youth. To them Serbia was Piedmont, upon whom their future hopes rested; but for that very reason they were eager to show their own prowess, to prove that the Yugoslavs of the Monarchy were worthy of their free kinsmen, holding that they " who would be free, themselves must strike the blow. "

¹ See Slijepcevic, " Jugoslovenstvo Sarajevskih Atentatora " (*Nova Evropa*, 1 June, 1925, pp. 489-502), consisting mainly of extracts from the stenographic reports of the trial.

Of Serbian official complicity the stenographic records of the trial do not reveal even the faintest trace.¹

It must be added that of all the various groups in Serbia the politicians were the very last to attract the sympathies of the new generation in Bosnia. The young men looked to the Serbian army leaders, to the Serbian peasant soldier, to the group of intellectuals at Belgrade who were working for Yugoslav Unity in the purely intellectual sphere (men like Skerlic, Cvijic, Bozo Markovic, and others), and, lastly, the wilder of them looked to the fanatics of the "Black Hand." But they realised even at that date that Serbian government circles, and notably Mr. Pasic and his immediate entourage, had no comprehension whatever for the Yugoslav ideal, and looked at everything from a narrow Serbian and Orthodox angle. This fact has grown steadily more apparent in the ten eventful years that followed the murder, and to-day it is no accident that the Pasic clique is still engaged in combating the Yugoslav idea, while the survivors of the Bosnian revolutionary movement, as confirmed Yugoslavs, find themselves, almost without exception, in the Opposition camp.

One last anecdote deserves to be quoted, as illustrating the standpoint of the conspirators. A few weeks before the murder the group in Sarajevo had decided to reveal their intentions to Nikola Stojanovic, one of the most active of the younger Bosnian Serb leaders,* but, on learning that he was on the point of visiting Belgrade, they at once changed their mind and kept the secret to themselves, fearing (and quite rightly) that he would

¹ The reports, as published during the war by Professor "Pharos" (an assumed name), are very incomplete, and often inaccurate; their author is ignorant of the very elements of the problem out of which the trial arose, and actually confuses the *Jugoslav* idea with a political party (p. 23). The *full reports* have ever been published, partly because the original was removed from Sarajevo to Lenna and has therefore not been available to the Yugoslavs since the war. A carbon copy has, however, recently been found in Sarajevo, and there is some hope that they may soon be published in their entirety. They obviously provide the best due now available for the motives of the conspirators. Afterwards a prominent member of the Yugoslav Committee abroad.

have warned the Serbian Government, and thus frustrated their plans.¹ To-day the unanimous view of " Young Bosnia " may be summed up in the phrase of Mr. Slijepcevic,² " The Youth (of Bosnia) worked without the Government (of Serbia), secretly from the Government, and against the Government."

Enough evidence has been accumulated above to show that the theory of direct complicity on the part of the Serbian Government is preposterous and untenable. It still remains to consider the highly important question whether the Serbian Government had any inkling of what was on foot, and could have prevented the crime by timely warning. In view of its acute conflict with the " Black Hand," it clearly could have learnt nothing from that quarter, still less have had any share in the plot. But there is reason to believe that Cabrinovic talked indiscreetly when still in Belgrade/ and that something came to the ears of the police.

In any case, the question has been raised afresh by an extraordinary article written on the tenth anniversary

¹ This I learnt both from Mr. Stojanović himself and from the survivors of the conspiracy.

² Secretary of the Prosvjeta Society, and an intimate of the leading revolutionaries, though not himself a terrorist.

³ *Omladina je radila bez Vlade, tajno od Vlade, i protiv Vlade (op. cit., Nova Evropa, p. 545).*

⁴ Jevtic, *op. cit.*, p. 30. Cabrinovic was the son of an Austrian police agent, and, when the Belgrade police wished to expel him because his papers were not in order, the Austro-Hungarian Consulate is alleged to have protested. This was stated in *Balkan* of 1 July, 1914, and reproduced in the Austrian Press without denial. On this basis a theory was evolved during the war that Cabrinovic and Princip had no connection with each other, and that the former was an Austrian *agent provocateur*, or even planning murder in the interests of Vienna. This theory, however, was finally exploded by Jevtić's pamphlet. The two youths carefully avoided each other on the eve of the murder, but simply as an additional precaution.

But the fact that Cabrinović's father was an Austrian agent is true, and serves as proof in quite another direction; for it shows that nationalist and revolutionary sentiments had struck deep root even in the most doubtful soil.

Potiorek, with a view to discrediting Bilinski, asserted in his first report to Vienna that Cabrinovic had been expelled from Bosnia, but returned there in 1913, thanks to Bilinski's intervention. The first half of this is true, but the second half appears to be a sheer invention, and is indignantly denied by Bilinski in his Memoirs.

of the war by Mr. Ljuba Jovanovic, then President of the Skupstina, and at the time of the murder Minister of Education in the Pasic Cabinet.¹ " I do not remember whether it was at the end of May or beginning of June," he tells us, " that one day Mr. Pasic said to us that certain persons (*neki*) were preparing to go to Sarajevo and murder Francis Ferdinand, who was about to go there and be solemnly received on St. Vitus's Day." He adds that the criminals belonged to a secretly organised group of Bosnian students in Belgrade, that the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Protic, with the approval of his colleagues, gave orders to the frontier authorities on the Drina to prevent the young men from crossing, but that the " authorities " (the inverted commas are his), being themselves in the plot, passed them over, and told Belgrade that it was too late. Later on he describes his alarm and horror on receiving by telephone the first news from Sarajevo: " *Though I knew what was being prepared there*, yet, as I held the receiver, it was as though someone had unexpectedly dealt me a heavy blow." The whole article is written in a careless, naïve, and reminiscent vein, and its author seems to be blissfully unaware how damning are his admissions, if they are to be taken literally — as we are surely entitled to do when a politician of real prominence writes on a subject which vitally concerns his country's honour and his own.

The reader is at once tempted to enquire whether Belgrade may not have taken steps to warn Vienna of the projected plot, in which case Serbia would be fully absolved from all blame; and it may be remembered that rumours of such a warning were circulated immediately after the murder.² It is indeed true that Mr. J. M. Jovanovic, the Serbian Minister in Vienna, who was too well informed not to be alarmed at the situation in the Southern provinces, went *on his own initiative* to Bilinski, in the

¹ *Krv Slovenstva* (*Blood of Slavdom*), Belgrade, 1924.

² It first occurs in an interview given by Mr. Spalajković to *Novoye Vremya* (June or 1 July). It was officially denied by the Ballplatz on 3 July.

first week of June, and urged upon him the inadvisability of the Archduke's visit to Sarajevo on Vidovdan, since it would inevitably be regarded by all Serbs on both sides of the frontier as an act of provocation. It has sometimes been asserted that Jovanovic on 18 June received official instructions from Pasic to convey a warning to the Ballplatz, but I have the most explicit assurances on the part of Mr. Jovanovic himself that no such instructions were ever received or acted upon.¹

There thus rests upon Belgrade the onus of proving either that the information at its disposal was much more vague than Mr. Ljuba Jovanovic would have us believe, or that it conveyed an adequate warning of the danger in some way of which no record has yet reached us. Yet, in spite of the lively controversy aroused alike in Central Europe, in Britain, and in America, Belgrade has allowed nearly nine months to pass without issuing any official statement of any kind. A *Blue Book* was promised in April, but nothing more has been heard of it.

The matter can hardly rest here. Public opinion in Europe and America is more interested than ever in the problem of responsibility for the Great War, and is entitled to demand a full and detailed explanation from Mr. Ljuba Jovanovic and from his chief Mr. Pasic.

¹ The statement first occurs in the late M. Ernest Denis' *La Grande Serbie* (1916) p. 277, and must have come to him from some Serbian official source. It is given in full detail in an article of the *Wiener Sonn und Montags-Zeitung* of 23 July, 1924, on the authority of Mr. George Josimović, who was secretary at the Serbian Legation in Vienna at the time of the murder. I am, however, assured by Mr. Josimovic himself that he never made any such statement, and that the facts contained in it are entirely false. There is good reason to believe that the article was written by the notorious Leopold Mandl, who for nearly two decades has led the official Austrian Press campaign against Serbia, and now continues it simultaneously in the *Reichspost*, the chief organ of the Christian Socialist Party in Vienna, and in *La Federation Balcanique*, a monthly Communist paper maintained in Vienna by the Russian Soviet Government!

² Bilinski himself, in his Memoirs, is silent as to any such warning. He also expressly denies having warned the Emperor against the Archduke's visit; "for I had no reason to interfere in this military journey." It is, of course, clear that Bilinski's mind, as he writes, is concentrated above all upon the conflict between military and civil to which we have already referred in the text. Baron Rummerskirch, then Master of the Archduke's household, has also denied that Bilinski ever came to him with such a story, and, though there is an obvious motive for such a denial, it is probably true.

Failing that, it will henceforth be necessary for the historian, while exposing the aggressive Balkan policy of the Ballplatz and emphasising the criminal negligence of the Austro-Hungarian authorities in Bosnia, to convict the Serbian Government of the crime known in private life as "compounding a felony" — in other words, of failure to give due warning of a danger rendered possible by the criminal connivance of their own officials, or even to punish those guilty of it.

The crime of Sarajevo is an indelible blot upon the movement for Yugoslav Unity. But, unless we are to lose all sense of proportion, we must assign the main guilt to Austria-Hungary, who, by a policy of repression at home and aggression abroad, had antagonised all sections of the Yugoslav race. Murder or no murder, the seething pot would have continued to boil until Austria-Hungary could evolve a policy compatible with Yugoslav interests, or, alternatively, until the Yugoslavs could shake off her yoke.

APPENDIX.

THE "REVELATIONS" OF MR. LJUBA JOVANOVIĆ.

MR. JOVANOVIĆ'S essay in *Krv Slovenstva [Blood of Slavdom]* passed almost unnoticed at the time, even in Yugoslavia; for it was hurriedly edited and poorly produced (by Mr. Ksjunjin, a Russian emigrant journalist in Belgrade). In England it first aroused attention early in December 1924, when Miss Edith Durham gave very full quotations from it in an address delivered before the British Institute of International Affairs, and then commented upon the incident with varying degrees of violence in *Foreign Affairs* (the late Mr. Morel's organ) for December 1924, in the *Contemporary Review* of January 1925, and in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*. The British institute of International Affairs was sufficiently impressed by the importance of the matter to reprint a complete translation of Mr. Jovanovic's article in the March number of its *Journal*, and this was also published by Mr. Leo Maxse in the April number of the *National Review*. Great prominence was also given to Mr. Jovanovic's admissions by Professor Sidney B. Fay (a recognised American authority on the question war guilt) in an address delivered by him before the annual Conference of the American Historical Association at Richmond (Va.) on 7 December, 1924, before an audience of several hundred historians from all Parts of America. He has since written two articles on the subject in *Current History* for October and November, 1925.

I had myself taken part in the discussion following both Miss Durham's and Professor Fay's addresses, and had from the first felt that the matter could not be left without full investigation. This became still clearer when *Die Kriegsschuldfrage* (the German monthly which exists for the purpose of thrusting Germany's responsibility on to other shoulders and thus preparing the way for treaty revision) placed Mr. Jovanovic in the forefront of its campaign, and proceeded to argue, month by month with growing energy, that his revelations render necessary a complete revision of the prevailing verdict as to war guilt. No reasonable person can blame the Germans for availing themselves to the full of such a weapon as Mr. Jovanovic's folly had placed in their hands; for the bearings of the incident upon the famous Covering Note to the Treaty of Versailles, and even upon the problem of reparations, are sufficiently obvious.

In face of such a campaign it was quite impossible for the friends of Serbia in this country to remain silent, and on 16 February I published a letter in the *Times*, expressing the hope that " Mr. Jovanović himself, and his chief, Mr. Pačić — now, as then, Serbian Premier — will issue a statement sufficiently clear to exculpate them and their colleagues from the charge now being levelled against them by their enemies in England and Germany, of foreknowledge of, and deliberate connivance at, the crime of Sarajevo. Having throughout the war been especially active in advocating the view of official Serbia's complete innocence, I feel all the more bound to give equal publicity to contrary statements when they come from so serious a quarter, and to emphasise the need for an explanation." I ended as follows: " Even if Mr. Jovanovic's statements should prove incapable of refutation, this would not in any way alter two fundamental facts: i. That a central aim of Austro-Hungarian policy in the years before the war was the isolation and overthrow of Serbia; and 2. That political discontent, of a semi-revolutionary kind, was widespread throughout the Southern Slav provinces of Austria-Hungary, as the result of Magyar racial policy, and quite irrespective of Serbia's action. But it is necessary to add that failure on the part of Belgrade to provide an adequate explanation would not merely affect our verdict on the events immediately preceding the war, but, above all, our attitude to the official Jugoslavia of to-day, whose destinies are controlled by the same party-leaders who were in power in June 1914."

Soon after this it was announced in the Belgrade Press, but not by the official Press Bureau, that the Yugoslav Government had decided to publish a new *Blue Book* on the origins of the war. In view of this I wrote a second letter to the *Times* some five weeks later, begging its readers to suspend judgment until these documents could appear. But eight months have passed, and nothing more has been heard of the *Blue Booh*; and it seems probable that the announcement was merely tactical, intended to appease the critics until the whole agitation should die down. Unfortunately the Yugoslav Government, instead of demonstrating its innocence by a detailed statement of the facts, shrouded itself in mystery. Worse still, the official organs of the Radical Party proceeded to exploit the incident for party ends. In 1924 Mr. Ljuba Jovanovic had led the more moderate and conciliatory wing of the Radicals, had at one moment been invited by the King to form a Cabinet, and seemed in a fair way towards superseding

the more intransigent Mr. Pasic as leader of the party. The publicity given abroad to his article provided an excuse for most violent attacks non him in the Belgrade Press, and by April he found himself completely insulated in his own party and in danger of political ostracism. He took the field at great length against his critics in a series of articles in *Novi Zivot*, but, while ranging over thirty years of Serbian history, he entirely evaded the real issue — namely, whether the Serbian Government had foreknowledge of the plot and failed to warn Vienna.

The plain fact is that his statements in the original article are so extremely explicit as to leave us only two alternatives. *Either* the Serbian Government of the day, having got wind of the plot and having genuinely tried to arrest the would-be criminals but having failed to do so, deliberately refrained from warning the Austro-Hungarian authorities, and thus became guilty of conniving at a crime which they certainly had not prompted. *Or* Mr. Jovanović, for reasons of his own, has misrepresented the true facts, and his former colleagues, for reasons of their own, have refrained from giving him the lie publicly.

The reader will find in chapters iii. and iv. of the present volume a considerable amount of evidence which it is scarcely possible to reconcile with the first alternative; and having, after repeated attempts, failed to extract any statement whatever from official Belgrade, I feel bound, in the interests of the truth, to state quite frankly my grounds for accepting the second alternative.

Mr. Ljuba Jovanovic, like his chief Mr. Pasic, is a politician of the old Balkan school, and has himself a revolutionary past. He is a native of Southern Dalmatia, and originally fled to Serbia after the abortive rising of 1881. He has ever since taken a quite natural and legitimate interest in the fate of young Serbs and Croats who came to Serbia for their studies, and, thanks to his origin, has often shown a fuller comprehension of the Yugoslav problem as a whole than many of his colleagues in the Radical party, whose vision did not extend much beyond the first narrow limits of modern Serbia. He is, however, one of those politicians who like to exaggerate their own importance, and in the post-war period, when it is the fashion for everyone to parade on the housetops sentiments which before the war he carefully concealed in the cellars, Mr. Jovanović seems anxious not to remain behindhand. I have the authority of one of the most distinguished Serbian writers and historians for the statement that on the day after the murder of King Alexander and Queen Draga in 1903 he himself met Mr. Jovanović in the streets of Belgrade, and in reply to his anxious enquiry for news was given to understand that he had known what was brewing for some time past. Now credulous writers like Miss Durham, with whom hostility to everything Serb has become a positive obsession will doubt accept this little anecdote as a proof positive that Mr Ljuba had Jovanovic was in the earlier plot also. But to anyone who knows anything of that sinister affair it is notorious that Mr Jovanovic had nothing whatever to do with it; and I trust that the reader will accept this assurance from me, (it is one of the very few statements in the book for which I do not give documentary evidence) without forcing me to enter upon a long digression.

I believe that Mr. Jovanovic was as ignorant of the plot 1914 as he

was of the plot of 1903, and that he suffers from a complaint which the Germans admirably describe as *Wichtigtuerei*. There are, however, other motives which serve to explain his famous article. Those acquainted with the present Yugoslav situation are well aware that since 1918 the Radical party has conducted a desperate struggle for the political control of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that for a number of reasons that control has been slowly slipping from its grasp. They are also aware that the younger generation in Bosnia (this only applies in a much lesser degree to the other Yugoslav provinces) regards the revolutionary movement of 1913-14 with feelings of admiration, and Princip and his fellow-assassins as national martyrs. If we put these two facts together we shall find the second explanation of Mr. Jovanovic's statements. He was making a bid for the support of the Bosnian youth by showing that the Belgrade Government had sympathised with the revolutionary movement, though it is quite notorious that it did not do so (see, e.g., p. 151). Incidentally, he probably hoped to strengthen his own position in the Radical party, as against those whose outlook is more narrowly identified with the old Serbian Kingdom.

It is necessary to allude to a third motive. The Sarajevo crime and the rôle of Colonel Dimitrijevió is inextricably entangled with the Salonica Trial of 1917, which resulted in the execution of Dimitrijevió and two other officers for an alleged plot to murder the Prince Regent at the Serbian front, the execution of Malobabic (formerly a victim of the Zagreb Treason Trial of 1909) as their accomplice, and the condemnation to twenty years of Mehmedbasic (the only one of the assassins of Sarajevo who succeeded in flying across the frontier) as a further accomplice. A somewhat mysterious rôle was also played at the trial by Milan Ciganovié, the railway official who supplied Princip and his friends with the revolvers, and who was now denounced as an informer by some of the accused officers. This is not the place to deal with the details of the Salonica affair; a special chapter will be devoted to it in the larger book which I am preparing on the origins of the Yugoslav state. But it is necessary for the reader to understand that Mr. Ljuba Jovanovic was one of the two statesmen who insisted upon the Salonica Trial being conducted to the bitter end, strongly opposed the reprieve of the prisoners, and exploited the incident to purge the army of numerous officers who were obnoxious to the Radical party. Ever since then the Salonica Trial has remained an unsolved problem in Serbian internal politics. Many opposition circles hold that a gross miscarriage of justice took place, and demands for a re-examination of the facts are made at intervals. In this question, then, Mr. Jovanovic is on the defensive, and this may have contributed towards his attitude, though it may suggest a tendency to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds.

The attitude of Mr. Paáic is somewhat different. As has already been explained in the text, he has always shown an astonishing indifference to public opinion, especially to foreign public opinion. Yet this is not sufficient to account for his silence on this occasion; for, as one of Jugoslavia's most enthusiastic friends recently wrote to me, " there would seem to be no other example in history of a Government which is accused of grave offences remaining obstinately silent for eleven years, despite all

appeals from friend and foe, and simply snapping its fingers at the opinion of the civilised world." But to-day, as ever, party politics are the decisive factor with Mr. Pašić. He disapproves Mr. Ljuba Jovanovic's statements, and utterly denies their accuracy — as I know from more than one of his own colleagues in office. But he seems more anxious to use the incident to isolate a dangerous competitor for the party leadership than to clear the honour of his country; and he is apparently reluctant to stand up before his countrymen and to produce the proofs (which I have reason to believe him to possess) that he, as leader of the nation in 1914, was ignorant, and even disapproved, of an underground movement which some admire as having led directly to national unity.

The more reputable and thoughtful sections of the nation, while recognising that pre-war conditions were a veritable breeding-ground for revolutionary acts, deplore the part played by assassination in the great movement for liberation and unity. But there are others who insist upon glorifying the assassins, and it is this section of opinion — naturally most vocal in Bosnia itself — which is responsible for the removal of the memorial shrine erected at the scene of the crime, and for the reinterment of the assassins themselves in a special grave of honour at Sarajevo. The latter incident is doubtless a matter of taste (the celebrations of Armistice Day in Western countries might well suggest a day of national atonement as more suitable than an annual celebration of the crime), but the former can only be described as an act of wanton indecency, which the authorities of the new State ought not to have tolerated. It is proper and necessary that this should be said frankly by the friends as well as the enemies of Serbia. It is also greatly to be regretted that the " Orjuna " — a patriotic organisation of semi-Fascist tendencies — should have associated itself with this policy of glorification, and should at present be agitating for a monument in honour of the criminals of Sarajevo. It is to be hoped that responsible statesmen in Yugoslavia will have the courage to make a stand against these immoral tendencies. It is one thing to preach the doctrine that misgovernment (especially if it be alien) inevitably breeds a contempt for law and a tendency to reprisals and outrages (this is one of the main lessons to be drawn from the present volume); it is quite another thing to condone, or even to glorify, those outrages when they occur.

CHAPTER VII

COUNT BERCHTOLD'S PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

" We [Austria-Hungary] shall have to place Serbia before the choice of political disarmament or military overthrow. In that case we must not let ourselves be restrained by the fact that Russia would make the destruction of the Serbian state a *casus belli*." — Berthold Molden, in *Drängende Fragen* (1913).¹

IN the preceding chapters an attempt has been made to summarise the conflict of political ideas which had steadily developed between Austria-Hungary and Serbia since the momentous year of 1903. Even before the outbreak of the Great War it was possible for the careful student to obtain a very clear idea of the issues involved and of the ultimate aims pursued by Vienna, Budapest and Belgrade, though it must be added that European diplomacy as a whole as yet regarded them in an all too superficial and conventional light. But since the war the decision of the revolutionary governments of Austria and Germany to make public their whole diplomatic *dossier* has provided us with overwhelming evidence on all the major points at issue. Indeed to-day the main difficulty which confronts us is that of sifting out of the mass such details as are really material, and what is most important of all, such as the average reader may hope to assimilate without a sense of being lost in an interminable labyrinth. In the following pages it will be my endeavour to piece together the salient facts in such a manner as to present a reasoned sequence of events and policy. In every case the fullest

¹ Herr Melden was for years leader-writer on the *Fremdenblatt*, the chief organ of the Ballplatz, and his pamphlet reflected official views. In 1917 he published *Alois Graf Aehrenthal*, a semi-official glorification of Austrian foreign policy since 1908. cf. Kanner, *Kaiserliche Katastrophenpolitik*, p. 177.

possible references will be appended, and the reader will thus be able, if he should so desire, to check point by point both statements of fact and the conclusions drawn from them.

Berchtold's Expose of Policy

A natural point of departure is provided by the long *exposé* of Austro-Hungarian policy in the Balkans which the Ballplatz had had in preparation since May 1914, for the information of the German Government and which, after revision by Count Berchtold himself, appears to have reached its final form on 24 June, only four days before the murder.¹ It is instructive to note that though the conflict with Serbia is of course recognised as the ultimate rock of offence, the foremost subject of discussion is the change in the attitude of Roumania to the Triple Alliance since the Treaty of Bucarest in the previous year. As is pointed out very clearly and accurately, the two Balkan Wars had resulted in the virtual elimination of Turkey from the Peninsula, the defeat of Bulgaria by a coalition of her four Christian neighbours, and the aggrandisement of Russophil Serbia, and following upon this a marked deviation (*bedeutsame Schwenkung*) in Roumanian foreign policy, due not merely to the Balkan upheaval, but also to the increasing resentment of public opinion at Magyar policy in Transylvania. The Memorandum complains that in defiance of Roumania's commitments towards the Triple Alliance, the Roumanian Foreign Minister has recently laid public emphasis on " the principle of the free hand " as the basis of Roumanian policy; while King Charles — himself the originator of these very commitments — had felt bound to warn Count Czernin¹ that, though

¹ The first draft was prepared in May by Baron Flotow, the second (which incorporated a good deal of the first) by Baron Matscheko. For details see Gooss, *Das Wiener Kabinett*, pp. 4-6, 13, 22-5.

²Then Austro-Hungarian Minister at Bucarest.

during his own lifetime he would do all in his power to prevent a Roumanian Army from entering the field against Austria-Hungary, he could not make policy alone against the public opinion of present-day Roumania, and further, that if Russia should attack the Monarchy, there could be no question of Roumanian support for the latter, in spite of the existing secret alliance.¹

A situation had thus grown up in which the political advantages formerly accruing from the alliance had actually been reversed; for in the event of an Eastern war it would now no longer be necessary for Russia to send troops against Roumania, while Austria-Hungary would no longer be quite sure of her Transylvanian frontier which, owing to the alliance, had been left unfortified. Assuming a frank discussion between Bucarest and Vienna to be essential, the Memorandum proceeds to consider the alternative methods of forcing Roumania to break definitely with the Triple Alliance or to renounce before the whole world the secrecy which had hitherto veiled the agreement binding her to the central group of powers. In this connection it is very rightly argued that while such an agreement could have but little value as a make-weight against the Entente unless it was known to, and accepted by, Roumanian public opinion, it was on the other hand most improbable that either the King or any possible Government which he might form could win over the country to so decided a step. " Hence a categorical ' *aut-aut* ' on the part of the Monarchy might lead to an open breach." Moreover, it was doubtful whether further concessions, such as a guarantee of Roumania's new frontier towards Bulgaria, or even a certain Austro-Serbian *rapprochement*, would really restore the old cordiality between Bucarest and Vienna, it being inferred that Hungary's attitude to the Roumanians of Transylvania was the real stumbling-block. Elsewhere we learn that Count Berchtold had

¹ See Memo, in *D.D. (Die Deutschen Dokumente)*, i., No. 14, p. 26; *D.A.*, i., No. 1.

urged Count Tisza to modify this attitude in view of its influence upon foreign policy¹ that it figured prominently in the discussion between Francis Ferdinand and William II at Konopistě, and that the latter was fully alive to its bearings upon the Balkan prospects of the Triple Alliance.² The Memorandum, however, unreservedly accepts the view that in any discussion with Bucarest no reference to the internal affairs of the Monarchy can be tolerated; in other words, it rules out *ab initio* the very topic which kept Roumanian opinion in a patriotic ferment, and was so largely responsible for the growth of a Serbo-Roumanian *rapprochement*.

ITS REVISION AFTER THE MURDER

It is significant that in the first draft of the memorandum the possibility of King Charles and his Government mediating between Belgrade and Vienna was seriously considered,³ but that Count Berchtold dismissed this as impracticable and ordered its excision from the draft prepared on 24 June. Serbia being regarded as irreconcilable and Roumania being henceforth ruled out as a reliable pivot for Austria-Hungary's Balkan policy⁴ it obviously followed that " other dispositions " were necessary in order to counter Russia's designs for a new and aggressive Balkan League.

The only alternative apparent to Berchtold's mind was an alliance with Bulgaria, which had for some time past been " seeking " a backing (*Anlehnung*)⁵ with the Triple Alliance. If Bulgaria and Turkey could be brought together and attached to the Central Powers, and if the future alliance with Bulgaria can be framed on such lines as not to injure Roumanian interests, then the tables will be completely turned against Russia, Serbia will

¹ Gooss, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

² cf. Tschirschky to Bethmann Hollweg. *D.D.* i., No. 4. (Marginal note of William II).

³ Gooss, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁴ *ibid.*, p. 19.

⁵ *D.D.*, i., p. 29.

change places with Bulgaria as the isolated state, and all the other Balkan countries will be attracted into the orbit of the Dual Monarchy, thus presenting a solid phalanx against Russian ambition. In contrast to this seductive picture of the future, the Memorandum dwelt upon the strenuous efforts of Russia and France " to break the military superiority of the two Empires by means of auxiliary troops from the Balkans "; Russia was depicted as irrevocably committed to aggressive Panslav aims, and renewed stress was laid upon the common interests of Austria-Hungary and Germany. In conclusion, Berlin was invited, not merely to express its views on the policy thus outlined, but to co-operate in such " timely and energetic " action as would forestall Russia in her designs. The contents of this Memorandum make it quite clear that in June 1914 Austria-Hungary was on the point of resuming that diplomatic action against Serbia which Italy's attitude in August 1913 and Serbia's surrender in the following winter had compelled her to postpone.

In the form summarised above, the Memorandum was actually ready for transmission to Berlin when the tragedy occurred. That event, not unnaturally, only served to confirm the Ballplatz in their outlook, and it was decided to leave the document unaltered, save for a brief postscript describing the murder as " indubitable proof " that the conflict between the Monarchy and Serbia was " unbridgeable/' and that despite an attitude of " goodwill and conciliation/' Austria-Hungary must reckon in future with Serbia's "obstinate, irreconcilable and aggressive enmity."¹ This was the view long held by Count Berchtold, and in it he was still further fortified by his permanent officials, notably Count Forgách and Baron Macchio, and by his Chef de Cabinet, Count Hoyos. As we have seen, there was little or no regret, either in Court or in official circles, for the two victims;

¹ *O.A.*, i., p. 16; Gooss, *op. cit.*, 24.

indeed it was felt that their removal solved many awkward problems, and not least of all, provided a very admirable pretext for drastic action. It is no longer in dispute that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of War were from the very first virtually unanimous in favour of an immediate attack upon Serbia. The Chief of the General Staff, Baron Conrad, was particularly urgent in advising war, arguing as he had more than once argued during the Archduke's lifetime, that each successive "lost opportunity" of settling accounts with Serbia — in 1909, in 1912 and in 1913 — had placed the Monarchy in a less favourable position, and that to draw back yet again might have fatal results for its prestige and safety. In a report drawn up at Count Berchtold's request on 2 July,¹ Conrad argued that action had been rendered still more urgent by Roumanian estrangement and its effect upon the general military situation. In his post-war Memoirs he tells us that he accepted the murder as "a declaration of war by Serbia," which "could only be answered by war."* At the Archduke's funeral he discussed the situation with General Auffenberg, treating war as certain and reckoning with Russian intervention as a risk to be run.³ Most of the military chiefs shared Conrad's views, and it was probably due to this pressure that Potiorek, so far from being removed from Bosnia, was retained in full favour and eventually given high command in the first campaign against Serbia.

COUNT TISZA'S MEMORANDUM TO FRANCIS JOSEPH

If any further proof were needed that Berchtold and the War party "intended to make the outrage in Sarajevo the occasion for a reckoning with Serbia," it may be gathered from the Memorandum addressed by Count

¹ Gooss, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

² *Aus Metter Dienstzeit*, iv., p. 18.

³ Auffenberg, *Aus Oesterreichs Höhe und Niedergang*, p. 262. In recording the conversation Auffenberg says that his own chief preoccupation was the state of the artillery.

Tisza to Francis Joseph on 1 July,¹ and quoting Berchtold in this sense. This Tisza condemned as " a fatal mistake." It is, moreover, clear that Berchtold's original aim was "a surprise attack upon Serbia without previous diplomatic action."* Tisza insisted on the need for " gentlemanlike " behaviour, but Berchtold on the contrary contended that this was " hardly fitting [*schwerlich angebracht*] when such important interests of state were at stake, and especially towards such a neighbour as Serbia"» — a phrase which throws a flood of light upon the mentality of the Ballplatz. The impulsive comment of William II — " towards murderers, after what has happened! Idiocy!" — is a perfectly natural and legitimate attitude for anyone who accepted Serbia's guilt; but Berchtold is not merely applying the all too widespread axiom that good faith need not be kept with savages — and we know that he refused to the Serbs the title of " a civilised nation " — but is proclaiming the Machiavellian right to reject all scruples wherever great diplomatic issues are concerned. It is a common trick of journalists to employ the word " Balkan " when describing devious methods of diplomacy; but it would seem that the palm should be awarded to the school of Aehrenthal and Berchtold.

OBSTACLES TO WARLIKE ACTION

The main explanation of Austria-Hungary's long delay in taking action against Serbia is to be found in the opposition which Berchtold encountered in high quarters. He himself was bent upon war at all costs, and in this view he was supported by all the military chiefs and by the Austrian Premier, Count Stürgkh, whose narrow bureaucratic mind, tinged by clerical influence, was already strongly prejudiced against Serbia, and who may have welcomed external complications as a means

¹ *D.A.*, i., No. 2, p. 16.

² *D.A.*, i., No. 8, p. 27.

² Berchtold repeated this to Tschirschky on 10 July, and complained of Tisza's obstruction. See *D.D.*, i., No. 29, p. 50.

of escaping from the constitutional deadlock which his feeble Government had produced in Austria, and to a lesser degree by the Joint Finance Minister, Ritter von Bilinski, who, owing to the special responsibility of his own Ministry for the tragedy of Sarajevo, was in a worse strategic position for resistance to plans which he was far too sober and acute to regard with anything save misgiving. But two factors of the very first importance were averse to war, and these were no other than the Emperor himself and the Hungarian Premier, Count Stephen Tisza. Francis Joseph was undoubtedly pacific by nature, and a close inside knowledge of the European situation reinforced a natural reluctance to end his reign in war and possible revolution, and a caution engendered by repeated failure in every military undertaking which he had sanctioned. But old age, if it urged him to caution, had also dulled his feelings, and, above all, lessened his powers of resistance. The proclamation which he addressed to the peoples of the Monarchy after the murder reveals his own moderating influence in the passage which declines to identify the Serbian race or its official representatives with a small group of assassins; though it is of course true that his advisers accepted such phrases, not so much from conviction as in the hope of lulling both Serbia and Europe into a sense of false security. The old Emperor had long detested his nephew and remained quite unmoved by his removal. Those nearest to him describe him as receiving the first news quite calmly, as yet another of the many tragic events in his family, and as not assuming any grave political consequences.¹ But his attitude was certainly one of extreme depression, and he informed the German Ambassador that " he saw the future very black." ² Speaking further of the sudden death of the

¹To this Baron Margutti bears convincing evidence (*Vom Altem Kaiser*, p. 395). quoting not only his own experience, but that of Count Paar, the Emperor's Aide-de-camp, and Baron Bolfras, the chief of his military Chancellery.

² Tschirschky to Bethmann Hollweg, 2 July, *D.D.*, i., No. it, p. 16,

Italian Chief of Staff, General Pollio, he remarked, " Everything is dying around me; it is too sad." In passing, it may be noted that Pollio's death was a very real blow to Austria-Hungary, owing to his personal intimacy with Conrad and Moltke.¹

In such a mood Berchtold and the soldiers calculated very soundly that the surest way of overcoming their sovereign's resistance would be to isolate him by winning over the Hungarian Premier to their side. Tisza was indeed a formidable opponent, full of resource and argument, and as strong action was out of the question without Hungary's consent, every effort was concentrated upon his conversion, Berchtold meanwhile drawing a shroud of silence over his intentions and justifying this to all enquirers by the need for awaiting a full investigation at Sarajevo.

Count Tisza's Attitude

Alone of all the statesmen of the Monarchy, Count Tisza showed statesmanship and foresight at this crisis, and a legend has grown up which credits him with opposition to war, and at the same time seeks to exculpate Hungary from all blame for the final catastrophe. It is therefore extremely important to examine Tisza's attitude in detail, and to make quite clear his original views and the manner in which the war party eventually won his support, thereby securing the adhesion of the Emperor also to their plans.

Tisza's original views upon the murder and the action which the Dual Monarchy should adopt were committed to paper by him, in a Memorandum to the Emperor-King, dated 1 July.» In this he opened by a direct challenge to Berchtold's project of a surprise attack on Serbia, and he adduced various reasons for regarding

¹ His successor, General Cadorna, was friendly to the Entente.

² *O.A.*, i., No. 2, pp. 16-18; Gooss, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-64.

such a policy as " a fatal mistake " for which he could not accept responsibility.

In the first place there were no adequate proofs of Serbian complicity, and Austria-Hungary would therefore appear before the world as a disturber of the peace and " would start a great war under the most unfavourable circumstances." Secondly, it was a bad moment for warlike action, since Roumania was " as good as lost " for the Central Powers, without any compensation; while Bulgaria, the only Balkan State on whose support they could reckon, was exhausted and isolated after the two Balkan wars. Tisza's next argument makes it impossible for even the most wilful critic to credit him with pacifist motives. " As things stand in the Balkans, the last thing that would trouble me would be to find a suitable *casus belli*. When once the moment for striking has come, one can create (*aufrollen*) a case for war out of various questions. But first of all a diplomatic constellation must be created, such as shall make the balance of power less unfavourable to us." What is so interesting in this attitude is not its author's own entire cynicism as the fact that knowing Francis Joseph as he did, he should have thought it suited to his master's mentality. The true policy, he goes on to argue, must be to win Bulgaria definitely for the Triple Alliance, in such a manner as would not offend Roumania and might even leave the door open for an agreement with Greece. If Germany cannot win back the Roumanians, she must not object to Austria-Hungary securing the Bulgarians. Besides, further delay might easily have the effect of forcing Bulgaria into the arms of a new Balkan League, which would pay for her support against Austria-Hungary by territorial concessions in Macedonia; while to secure Bulgaria would be " the sole possibility " of winning back Roumania, who has always been afraid of her southern neighbour. In conclusion, Count Tisza, writing at a moment when the Emperor William was

still expected in Vienna for the Archduke's funeral, urges the need for "combating his prejudice in favour of Serbia by means of the recent horrible events." The whole tenor of the document shows that Tisza is not opposed to war on principle, but only to rash action without the necessary diplomatic preparations.

It need cause no surprise that the pressure for a Bulgarian alliance should come mainly from Budapest, for it was Magyar policy towards the Roumanians of Transylvania, as expounded especially by Count Tisza, that was mainly responsible for the reorientation of Roumania in a Serbophil and Russophil sense, which the Ballplatz viewed with such growing concern. We have already seen that Magyar-Roumanian relations had figured prominently in the discussions at Konopistě on 12 June between William II and Francis Ferdinand, both of whom agreed¹ in condemning Tisza's intransigence. William's *marginalia* on a despatch of Tschirschky shows that he both realised and resented the possible effects of Tisza's "internal policy upon the foreign policy of the Triple Alliance."²

COUNT BERCHTOLD AND BERLIN

It was from the first clear to Berchtold and those who shared his views that Tisza's weighty objections to a war policy could only really be overcome if the Ballplatz could obtain assurances of unreserved support from Berlin. In this lay the key to the whole situation, for had Berlin's attitude been lukewarm or discouraging, more peaceful counsels would necessarily have prevailed. Berchtold, then, set himself to ascertain that attitude by direct inquiry, the more so as Tschirschky, in his first conversation with Berchtold after the murder had, according to his own account,» "used every occasion for

¹ According to information supplied by Berchtold to Tschirschky. (See the latter's despatch of 17 June to Bethmann Hollweg. *D.D., i.*, No. 4, p. 6.)

² *Ubid.*, p. 6.

³*D.D., i.*, No. 8, p. 11.

warning, calmly but very emphatically and seriously, against over-hasty action," and had added a reminder that Austria-Hungary was bound to consider the position of her Allies and of Europe generally, as well as the probable attitude of Italy and Roumania in a fresh Balkan crisis. But this moderate language, when reported to Berlin, drew down upon the Ambassador the indignation of the Emperor William,¹ and a consequent " reproof " from the Wilhelmstrasse for such " luke-warm " advice.' This appears to have had a magic effect upon Tschirschky, for already on 2 July we find him assuring Berchtold that in his own view " only energetic action " would be of any use, and that Germany would always give her backing to Austria-Hungary in Balkan questions.»

To this Berchtold significantly replied that despite Berlin's frequent assurances to that effect, he had not always found its support " in practice/' and consequently did not know how far he could count upon it now — doubtless a reference to Germany's attitude towards the Balkan coalition against Bulgaria a year earlier. Tschirschky did not challenge this, but again, speaking entirely for himself, ascribed the German attitude to a feeling that in Vienna " there was much talk of ideas, but never a clear-cut plan of action," such as Berlin regarded as an essential condition of its support. Even now, he added, to make war on Serbia without first

¹ *ibid.*, " Who authorised him to this? That is very stupid! No business of his but solely Austria's affair what she thinks of doing in the matter. Afterwards, if things go wrong, it will be said that Germany did not want to! Tschirschky will kindly stop such nonsense! There must be a settling up (*aufgeräumt*) with the Serbs and that *soon* too! "

² Despatch of Szögyény to Berchtold (8 July, No. 243), quoted by Gooss (*op. cit.*, p. 40) but *not* included in *O.A.*, i., which is really less complete than *D.D.* This fact doubtless explains why Professor Fay, in his " Origins of the War " (*American Historical Review*, July 1920, p. 632, note 55), says that no such reprimand appears in any of the documents. As Gooss put together the Austrian post-war *Red Book*, there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of the document quoted by him elsewhere, though it would be interesting to learn his motive for omission. It can hardly have been consideration for Berlin's feelings, in view of many other documents included.

³ *Tagesbericht* of Berchtold, 3 July (*U.A.*, i., No. 3, pp. 10-20).

making sure of Roumania and Italy, seemed to him a "very questionable affair." In his audience with Francis Joseph, however, Tschirschky emphasised Germany's solidarity with her ally "as soon as it is a question of defending one of her life interests," and added that "it is for Austria to decide when and where such -an interest lies."¹

Prince Lichnowsky, in his evidence before the Reichstag Committee in 1919, confirms the view that this change in Tschirschky's attitude "must have resulted from instructions higher up." » He further described Tschirschky, whom he had known for years, as a "conscientious" and "even rather pedantic" type of official, "who would certainly never have adopted a truculent attitude of his own initiative or have placed himself out of agreement with superior authority."*

Tschirschky's progressively bellicose attitude is illustrated from a Ballplatz report of 4 July, which quotes very strong expressions on his part to an unnamed official personage, "obviously with the intention that they should be repeated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."² His assertions that Austria-Hungary would have Germany's backing against Serbia "through thick and thin," and that the sooner she took action the better, were duly sent up for the consumption of Francis Joseph and Tisza. On the same day, however, Count Szögyény reports from Berlin a conversation with the Foreign Under-Secretary, Herr von Zimmermann, who urged "great caution" and the avoidance of "humiliating demands" to Serbia.

Such conversations were hardly calculated to dispel the doubt in Berchtold's mind, and he cannot be blamed

¹ Tschirschky to Bethmann Hollweg, *D.D.*, i., No. n.

² *Official German Documents* (Carnegie Endowment), vol. i., p. 34.

³ It should, however, be pointed out that Lichnowsky, in his famous Memorandum (*Meine Londoner Mission*) states that "in the spring of 1914 one of my secretaries, returning from Vienna, where he had been on leave, told me that Herr von Tschirschky had assured him that war was imminent."

⁴ Gooss, *op. cit.*, p. 40, note.

⁵ *D.A. i.*, No. 5.

for deciding upon direct enquiry at the fountain-head. In consequence of wild reports from consular agents in Sarajevo and Semlin, to the effect that a whole bevy of fresh assassins were being sent to Vienna — reports which Berchtold of course took care to repeat to Tschirschky as trustworthy¹ — William II was induced by his Chancellor to renounce his attendance at the Archduke's funeral.² It was therefore natural that Francis Joseph, having lost the opportunity of a personal discussion, should, while acknowledging his ally's condolence, express at the same time his own views upon the general situation. The Emperor's autograph letter³ was entrusted to Count Alexander Hoyos, Berchtold's *Chef de Cabinet* and confidant, who reached Berlin with it on 4 July. Its main tendency was to represent the murder as a direct result of Panslav agitation and of a well organised plot whose threads reached to Belgrade. For even if Serbian complicity could not be established, Belgrade's policy of national unity "furthers such crimes." The danger of the situation was increased by Roumania's estrangement, even "so old a friend" as King Lharles, whose "loyalty and good intentions" he found it hard to doubt, being no longer reliable, and having twice in recent months warned Vienna that in view of Roumanian public opinion he could no longer fulfil his treaty engagements in the event of a general war. The policy advocated by Francis Joseph in face of such a situation was the formation of a new Balkan League under the patronage of the Triple Alliance, and of course as a direct counter to a similar design on the part of Russia. Stated more fully, it must be the aim of Austria-Hungary to isolate and weaken Serbia, to win over and strengthen Bulgaria, to detach Roumania from Serbia and reconcile her with Bulgaria, and if possible to help Greece back to good relations with Bulgaria and Turkey by an exchange of

¹ *D.A.*, i., No. 3.

² *D.D.*, i., Nos. 6a and 6b.

³ *D.-A.*, i., No. i; *D.D.*, i., No. 13.

territory. Such a League, he argued in conclusion, would ensure peace to the Balkans, but " will only be possible if Serbia, which at present forms the pivot of Panslav policy, is eliminated as a political factor in the Balkans.¹

It was of the first importance that this document, and the accompanying Memorandum of policy which we have summarised above, should be placed in the Emperor William's hands before he left for his Norwegian cruise on 6 July; and the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Berlin, Count Szögyény-Maroch, was urgently instructed not only to make sure of this but also to communicate them to the Chancellor in time for him to have a proper discussion with the Emperor before leaving.* On 6 July, then, Szögyény fulfilled his commission at a private luncheon with the Emperor, and the German and Austrian diplomatic documents provide a sufficient record of what passed.

The essential fact to remember about the Hoyos Mission is that it is quite meaningless, unless its aim was

¹ In the original draft this phrase ran as follows: " But this will only be possible if Serbia, which at present is the pivot of Panslav policy, ceases to be counted as a political factor in the Balkans. You, too, after the recent fearful events in Bosnia, will be convinced that *there can no longer be any thought of reconciling the conflict which separates us from Serbia*, and that the peace policy of all European Monarchs will be threatened as long as this centre (*Herd*) of criminal agitation in Belgrade survives *unpunished*." These phrases were toned down at the very last moment (indeed after the document had been sent off to Berlin), as the result of an insistent telegram from Count Tisza. Nothing illustrates better the original divergence of view between Berchtold and Tisza. It is also important to note the motive given by Tisza for the change: "in order not to frighten off Berlin " (*urn Berlin nicht kopfscheu zu machen*), in other words, on purely tactical grounds. See Gooss, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

Professor Fay appears to have overlooked this, for he writes (*Papers of Count Tisza*, in *American Historical Review* for January, 1924, p. 314) that Tisza was " not informed of the royal [*sic*] letter till after it was despatched to Potsdam; when he finally saw them [*sic*] he disapproved of their wording and tone." This is misleading, as suggesting that he had no concern with the document as presented, whereas he secured important modifications. Professor Fay has evidently relied upon Bishop Fraknoi (*Die Ungarische Regierung und die Entstehung des Weltkrieges*, p. 16) who, referring to Tisza's protest against Berchtold's phrasing of the memorandum, writes: " But Berchtold did not wait for the arrival of the Hungarian answer. When Tisza sent off his despatch, the memorandum was already in the hands of William II." Fraknoi's first sentence is accurate, but his second is gravely inaccurate, and he overlooks the fact that what William II received was Berchtold's document *as amended by Tisza*.

² *D.A.*, i., No. 4; Gooss, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

to secure German help against *Russia*. For with little Serbia, so long as she stood alone, Austria-Hungary could obviously cope unaided.

WILLIAM II AND VIENNA

According to Szögyény's report the Emperor read the letter attentively, at first merely remarking that he had foreseen serious action against Serbia, but that as European complications must be expected, he would like to consult the Chancellor before giving any definite answer. After lunch, however, he was more expansive, and authorised the Ambassador to inform Francis Joseph that "in this case also" (*auch in diesem Falle*) — a phrase to which the German critics have tried hard to give an ambiguous turn, but which, though not a model for diplomatic stylists, is perfectly clear from the context—Vienna could reckon on Germany's full support. He had no doubt that the Chancellor would "fully agree" with him, especially as regards action against Serbia. There must, however, be no delay, since Russia was certain to be hostile, but was "as yet by no means ready for war." If, then, Austria-Hungary "really thought warlike action necessary, he [William] would regret it if we [Austria-Hungary] left unused a moment so favourable for us as the present." In conclusion he promised to influence King Charles of Roumania, and to comply with Austria-Hungary's wishes regarding Bulgaria, though an alliance with that country was "not at all sympathetic to him," and though he had "not the slightest confidence in King Ferdinand or any of his advisers."¹

Later in the day the Emperor received Bethmann Hollweg and Zimmermann² at Potsdam, and according to the Chancellor's own account, expressed his sense of

¹ Szögyény to Berchtold, 5 July, *D.A., i.*, No. 6.

² As deputy for Jagow, who only returned from his honeymoon the following morning. (*Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieges*, p. 97.)

the gravity of the situation in Austria-Hungary as a result of Panserb propaganda. He also reaffirmed the view that it was not Germany's business to give advice to Vienna, but that she must assure Francis Joseph of German support in such a crisis, while endeavouring to prevent the dispute from assuming an international character. With these views Bethmann Hollweg found himself in full agreement.¹

In a second telegram² Szögyény reports his conversation with Bethmann Hollweg and Zimmermann on the following morning. The Chancellor, already acting on the Emperor's instructions, defined Germany's attitude to the Serbian problem. Recognising the dangers arising from Russia's Balkan plans, Germany was ready to promote " the formal adhesion of Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance," so long as a form was found compatible with German obligations to Roumania. The German Minister in Sofia was therefore being instructed forthwith to associate himself with any overtures of his Austro-Hungarian colleague to the Bulgarian Government; while the German Minister in Bucarest was to " speak quite openly " with King Charles regarding the intended negotiations in Sofia and to insist that the advice so often tendered by him in favour of an Austro-Serb *rapprochement* had been rendered invalid by the tragedy of Sarajevo. Szögyény adds that in further conversation he had elicited the fact (*festgestellt*) that both Chancellor and Emperor regard immediate action " as the most radical and best solution " of the Balkan troubles; that in their view the present juncture was more favourable than any later; and that neither Italy nor Roumania should be informed beforehand.³ German

¹ *Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege*, i., p. 135.

² Szögyény to Berchtold, 6 July, *D.A.*, i., No. 7.

³ cf. pp. -i3.i — 5. It will be seen that Jagow, who was absent at this time, took quite a different view, and insisted that Italy must be " squared." This was because he understood the Italian situation. The military cannot have been consulted on this point, for when later on it became clear that Italy would not support her two allies, they showed great concern on strategic lines.

controversialists have attempted to discredit Szögyény's testimony as that of an old man whose powers were failing, but on this occasion at any rate its complete accuracy can be tested by reference to Bethmann Hollweg's own summary of the conversation in a telegram to Tschirschky.¹ In this document too we find for the first time precisely stated the official German view — so often to be reaffirmed during the critical fortnight that followed, and avowed by German statesmen in their post-war memoirs¹ — that " his Majesty [which here of course means Germany] could naturally take up no attitude towards the questions at issue between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, since they lay outside his competence/" but that Francis Joseph might rely upon His Majesty standing " loyally at Austria-Hungary's side "*" in accordance with his duty as an ally and his old friendship.

In any attempt to estimate William II's own responsibility for war, his *marginalia* upon official documents must inevitably play a foremost part. First published in selection by Karl Kautsky, they may be studied without any partisan comment, throughout the diplomatic publications of the German Government,⁴ and their perusal soon recalls the fact that the *marginalia*, however hurriedly they may have been scribbled down, were treated in the Wilhelmstrasse with all the attention and respect due to state documents of the first order. Two examples of this will suffice. On 19 June, 1914, the German Minister in Athens telegraphed certain details concerning Roumania's mediation in the Turco-Greek dispute, and the Emperor made comments in the margin.

¹ 6 July, *D.D.*, i., No. 15. Moreover, it so happens that Tschirschky, wiring in Berlin on 7 July, makes a point of stating that the above despatches of Szögyény (presumably shown to him by Berchtold) " correspond entirely " to Bethmann Hollweg's wire to himself, *D.D.*, i., No. 18.

² Bethmann Hollweg, *op. cit.*, p. 135; and Jagow, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

³ It should be added that at this point the words, " under all circumstances " had been inserted in the original draft, but were struck out by Bethmann Hollweg. *D. D.*, i. p. 33, note.

⁴ *Der Grosse Politik*, 21 vols., and *Die Deutschen Dokumente*, 4 vols.

These were at once sent to Prince Waldburg in Bucarest, with instructions to communicate them to King Charles.¹ Again, on 23 July, the day of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, Lichnowsky sent an important telegram to Berlin, on which the Emperor commented with copious violence.¹ These comments were at once wired back by Jagow to Lichnowsky as information and warning.

The light which they throw upon the arrogant, impatient and essentially underbred character of William II is very welcome, but what they show above all else is the extent to which he dominated and, it may almost be said, terrorised his Ministers and subordinates. "Donkey," he writes when Berchtold tries to convince Russia of his unaggressive tendencies.³ "A fool yourself, Mr. Sazonov," he solemnly writes when his Ambassador in St. Petersburg records an unguarded remark of Sazonov about Tisza.« "The little thief must always gobble up his share," he says of King Victor Emmanuel.* "The proud Slavs!" is his comment on Belgrade's dismay at the Note's severity. "Just tread firmly on the ruffians' feet! "" But his severest comments are reserved for his Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, when he dares to suggest certain measures relating to the fleet and is reminded that "a civilian Chancellor " does not understand such things.⁷ His notes on this occasion in particular make it quite clear that he realised that the ultimatum must inevitably lead to universal war, but that he would not for a moment brook an independent policy on the part of Bethmann Hollweg or the Wilhelmstrasse.

BERLIN'S ENCOURAGEMENT OF VIENNA

It is scarcely possible to exaggerate the decisive influence of Berlin's attitude upon Austria-Hungary's

¹*D.D.*, i., No. 41.

²*ibid.*, No. 121.

³*ibid.*, No. 155.

⁴*ibid.*, No. 120.

⁵*ibid.*, No. 168.

⁶*ibid.*, No. 159.

⁷25 July, Bethmann Hollweg to William. *D.D.*, i., No. 182.

" will to war," for, when reiterated as it was with every shade of emphasis, it was interpreted, and must have been intended, as *carte blanche* for drastic action against Serbia.¹ It is of course simply incredible that German official circles should not have foreseen from the very first that such action might easily lead to a Russo-German, and so to a general European war, and indeed we find Count Hoyos reporting from Berlin that the German Government favoured " immediate action " against Serbia, " *although it clearly recognised that a world war might arise from this.*"¹

Even more conclusive in this direction is the report sent by the Bavarian Chargé d'Affaires to Munich on 18 July.» In this he communicates (quite accurately, as the event was to prove) the salient features of the projected Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia, *as revealed to him by Zimmermann*, and then makes the following comment: " That Serbia cannot accept demands so incompatible with her dignity as an independent state, is obvious (*liegt auf der Hand*). The consequences would therefore be war." " Berlin," he adds, had at once " declared itself satisfied with whatever action Vienna might decide upon, even at the risk of war with Russia." It is quite true that when Hoyos talked big at Berlin

¹ On this point see Jagow, *op. cit.*, p. 103. He argues that there could be no question of *carte blanche* to Vienna " because I repeatedly told the Austrian Ambassador that we wanted to be informed of the steps which might be decided upon in Vienna." But though Tschirschky (as is shown on p. 192) carried out this order to the letter, yet Berlin deliberately refrained from any attempt to hold Vienna back, and hence we *are* fully entitled to speak of Germany giving *carte blanche*.

Again Jagow argues that " it is a very different thing if, recognising certain steps as necessary in principle, I also suggest the *modus procedendi* and so take over the responsibility for this, or if I wish to be made acquainted beforehand with the character of these steps and to retain in some degree the control for myself. We wanted the latter, not the former." Surely this strengthens, not diminishes, Germany's blame. Altogether Jagow's book betrays a curious mentality; it is fairly frank, but several of his premises seem to me to lead to conclusions diametrically opposite to those which he draws. He does not admit — and it looks as though he really did not see — that Berlin's negative attitude was a direct encouragement to Vienna, and led Berchtold to put forward extravagant demands.

² Gooss, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

³ *D.D.*, iv., Anhang iv., No. 2, pp. 126-7,

about the need for "a complete partition of Serbia "¹ Tschirschky was still sufficiently restive to extract from both Berchtold and Tisza a disclaimer of such drastic intentions, and to transmit this to Berlin, But despite such a revelation of mentality in Berchtold's immediate *entourage*, Berlin does not until a much later date² — and then only owing to anxiety as to Italy's action — make any attempt to extract from Vienna a clear definition of intentions which were bound to affect the peace of Europe, and indeed so far from urging Vienna to greater moderation, is on the contrary found repeatedly criticising Vienna for its slowness and inaction.

It has sometimes been claimed that the statesmen of Berlin could not be expected to foresee the consequences of giving a free hand to their ally. Such a claim could at best absolve them from direct criminal connivance, at the expense of their political sanity. But fortunately we have much weightier evidence than that of Hoyos for the assertion that they did foresee those consequences. For the *White Book* issued by the German Government shortly after the outbreak of war contains a reasoned statement of its motives which is quite conclusive.

" Austria," we read, " was bound to say to herself that it would be compatible, neither with the dignity nor the self-preservation of the Monarchy, to look on any longer inactive at what was going on across the frontier. The Imperial and Royal Government informed us of this view and asked our opinion. *With all our heart* we were able to give our ally our agreement with her estimate of the situation and to assure her that an action which she held necessary, in order to end the movement in Serbia against the existence of the Monarchy, would meet with our approval. In this we were well aware that possible warlike action of Austria-Hungary

¹ Despatch of Tschirschky to the Wilhelmstrasse to conversation between himself, Berchtold, Stiirgh and Tisza, at which Hoyos reported on his mission. *D.D.*, i., No. 18; also *ibid.* No. 61 (17 July)

² See *infra*, p. 198.

against Serbia might bring Russia into the field and thus involve us in a war according to our treaty obligations. But recognising the vital interests at stake for Austria-Hungary, we could neither advise our ally to yield more than was compatible with her dignity, nor refuse her our support at so grave a moment."¹ And later it adds, " *We therefore left Austria a completely free hand* in her action against Serbia, while taking no part in the preparations."

Realising, then, according to their own showing, that their ally might involve them in war with Russia, and having been for years obsessed by the further European consequences which such a war might involve, it would have shown the last degree of criminal levity if William II, before leaving for his northern cruise on 6 July, had not consulted carefully with his political and military advisers. It is doubtless this assumption which accounts for the persistent belief in a Crown Council held on 5 July at Potsdam, and attended not only by the leading German statesmen and the military and naval chiefs, but also by the Archduke Frederick, Berchtold, and Conrad von Hötzendorf. It has by now been conclusively established that no such Council ever met, and that the three Austrians did not visit Berlin, is absolutely certain.³ But this

¹ *Deutsches Weissbuch*, pp. 3-4. Herr von Jagow in his post-war Memoirs [*Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieges*, pp. 99-100] quotes this very passage as exculpatory; I, on the other hand, quote it as incriminating. The reader must judge.

² The only concrete evidence in favour of a formal Crown Council having been held is to be found in the Memoirs of Mi. Morgenthau, American Ambassador at Constantinople [*Secrets of the Bosphorus*, p. 54], who tells how his German colleague Baron Wangenheim, in August 1914, gave him an account of the meeting, and claimed to have been present himself. It seems probable that Wangenheim, who was vain, arrogant and impulsive, was exaggerating in order to impress Morgenthau, and that the Potsdam discussions were of a much less formal nature. Prince Lichnowsky's famous Memorandum (*Meine Lond mer Mission*, 1912-14) has also been quoted as a proof of a Crown Council, but his phrase, " the decisive consultation (*entscheidende Besprechung*) at Potsdam on 5 July " is ambiguous and does not necessarily prove more than the view expressed in the text. (It incidentally proves that Lichnowsky himself was not there, though Wangenheim asserted that all the chief Ambassadors attended) This view coincides with that of Sir Charles Oman, in his *Outbreak of the War*, pp. 16-17, who quotes Sir Horace Rumbold, British Charge d'Affaires at Berlin at the time, and Sir Maurice de Bunsen, in the same sense.

fact so triumphantly proclaimed by German apologists does not in the slightest degree serve to exculpate Germany from the responsibility for provoking war. On the contrary, from a memorandum prepared in 1917 inside the German Foreign Office for the use of the Under-Secretary, Zimmermann,¹ and also from the reminiscences of Admiral von Tirpitz himself,² we learn that on 5 July the Emperor William summoned to Potsdam the War Minister, Falkenhayn, representatives of the General Staff, the chief of the Military Cabinet, Admiral von Capelle (in Tirpitz's absence), and Captain Zenker for the Admiralty Staff, and that as a result of their discussion " it was decided for all events to take preparatory measures for a war. Orders were then issued in this

¹ Written by Baron von dem Bussche; first published by Karl Kautsky; *Wie der Weltkrieg entstand*, p. 49, afterwards published as appendix viii. in *D.D.*, iv., p. 171.

² Tirpitz, *Erinnerungen*, p. 209; Kautsky, *Wie der Weltkrieg entstand*, p. 50. Tirpitz himself was in Switzerland till 27 July (see his evidence in *Official German Documents*, Carnegie Endowment, vol. i., p. 73).

In the evidence given before the German Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry by General von Falkenhayn, then War Minister, and Count Waldersee, Acting C.G.S., it is admitted that Falkenhayn himself and Generals von Plessen, von Lyncker and von Bertrab were received by the Emperor at Potsdam on the afternoon of 5 July, but it is denied that military preparations were made " before the ultimatum to Serbia " (*ibid.*, p. 64). Even Falkenhayn, however, says that William, after reading to him portions of Francis Joseph's letter and memorandum (see p. 173), pointed out "the very serious consequences " which might arise from Austro-Hungarian action, and then asked " whether the army was ready for all contingencies "; while Waldersee states that Bertrab was ordered to inform the C.G.S., Count Moltke, that the Emperor had promised Francis Joseph " to stand by him in his difficulties with Serbia " (*ibid.*, p. 65). Admiral Behncke gave evidence that the Emperor on the same day saw and warned him of possible complications, and that he and Admiral von Capelle then decided "*that no measures were to be taken that could occasion any uneasiness* " [author's italics — R. W. S. W.], and that " only immaterial preparations " [italics in original] should be made, to meet the possibility of war (*ibid.*, p. 66). These and other statements are also appended to the preface of *D.D.*, i., pp. xiii.-xvi. All these assurances are intended to prove that Germany made no preparations whatever for war till after the ultimatum was presented on 23 July. Their value is, however, virtually destroyed by two documents in the official German collection, viz. (1), *D.D.*, i., No. 74, report of Waldersee to Jagow, 17 July, ending, " I remain here ready to spring (*sprungbereit*); we are ready at the General Staff, and for the moment there is nothing for us to order (*veranlassen*) "; (2) *D.D.*, i., No. 80. Wire of Count Wedel (Minister in attendance on the Norwegian cruise) to Jagow, 19 July, conveying the Emperor's desire that the directors of the Hamburg-America and North German Lloyd shipping lines (Ballin and von Plettenberg) should be warned of the impending ultimatum, " in strict confidence," through the Minister in Hamburg.

In point of fact, the German military machine was already *schlagfertig* at very short notice. The evidence for financial and commercial preparations for war belongs elsewhere.

sense." According to Tirpitz, these measures were of such a kind as should not " attract political attention " or " special expense." In other words, Germany saw where her ally's action might lead, did nothing to hold her back, and at once began quietly to prepare for the worst.

If any proof were still needed that Berlin's attitude towards the conflict was the determining factor at Vienna, it is provided by Field-Marshal Conrad's own account of his audience with Francis Joseph on 5 July.¹ The former at once proceeded to argue that war with Serbia was now inevitable, and met the Emperor's objection that this would produce a Russian attack, by a reference to Germany's backing (*Rückendeckung*). At this Francis Joseph, in doubtful tones, asked, " Are you *sure* of Germany? " and informed him that the German Emperor when asked by Francis Ferdinand at Konopiëtë for a pledge of " unreserved " support, had given an evasive answer. It was to clear up this point, he added, that a Note * had been despatched to Berlin on the previous day. " If the answer is that Germany is on our side," asked Conrad, " shall we then make war on Serbia? " " In that case, yes," replied the Emperor. The sequel shows that Francis Joseph, like Berchtold,² had his doubts of Germany; but it is abundantly clear that even he, though pacific by age and inclination, had made up his mind for war, and that all depended upon Berlin's reply.«

In this connection it is of some importance to consider any further available evidence regarding Francis Joseph's attitude to war. In an audience accorded to the Ambassador in Constantinople, Marquis Pallavicini, in the course of June 1914, the Emperor appears to have said that " he saw in a war the only possibility of escape

¹ *Aus Meiner Dienstzeit*, iv., p. 36.

² See p. 173.

³ See p. 171.

⁴ Incidentally this militates against the theory of the famous " Pact of Konopistë " referred to on p. 98.

from the present situation."¹ On the eve of actual war, Field-Marshal Conrad, coming from an audience, describes Francis Joseph as "deeply embittered and indignant at the action of Austria-Hungary's enemies, but well aware of what was at stake, yet convinced of the inevitable nature of the step so ruthlessly provoked by Serbia." "If the Monarchy must go down," he said to Conrad, "it shall at least go down decently." This was probably the real man when his pride was touched. Conrad was a good psychologist, and an anecdote which he tells us in his memoirs shows that he understood the Emperor. During a triangular conversation between Berchtold, Conrad and Czernin, on 10 October, 1913, the latter insisted that neither the Emperor nor the Heir-Apparent were for war, but especially the second whom, with his intimate personal knowledge, he evidently regarded as not open to suasion. Conrad did not challenge this, but simply commented: "In the long run the Emperor can be brought round."²

On the other hand, the testimony of - Frau Schrott, the Emperor's faithful Egeria for many years before his death, may be quoted on this point for what it is worth. She contended that he had told her, not once but repeatedly, that he was not at all in agreement with the ultimatum, and only let it be sent to please Germany.« This is presumably a feminine overstatement of the fact that the certainty of Germany's backing was what overcame his opposition to warlike action. Many people, however, will doubtless prefer to believe that if age had not already impaired his full faculties, he would never have allowed it to come to war, and that his high opinion of the more than mediocre Berchtold was an obvious sign of decay.⁵

¹ See report of Military Attaché in Constantinople, dated 20 July, 1914, to Conrad, quoted by the latter, *op. cit.*, IV., p. 107.

² *Wenigstens anständig zugrundegehen*, *op. cit.*, iv., p. 162.

³ *Man kann schliesslich den Kaiser dazubringen*, see *op. cit.*, iii., p. 464.

⁴ Margutti, *Vom Altem Kaiser*, p. 394.

⁵ cf. Szilassy on his last audience (*Untergang der Donau-Monarchie*, p. 259).

THE JOINT COUNCIL OF 7 JULY

Meanwhile the effect of Berlin's attitude upon Vienna was immediate. Count Berchtold summoned a Joint Council of Ministers on 7 July to discuss the whole position in the light of the information brought back by Hoyos. Those present were the three Joint Ministers, Berchtold (Foreign Affairs), Bilinski (Finance), and Krobotin (War), the two Premiers Stürgkh and Tisza, and Hoyos as secretary, and at times Baron Conrad as Chief of the General Staff, and Admiral von Kailer as representing the Navy. The minutes, as published by the Austrian Republican Government in 1919,¹ give a very clear summary of what occurred. Berchtold presided, and went straight to the point by defining the issue as "whether the time had come to make Serbia permanently innocuous by an exhibition of force" (*Krafläusserung*). As this involved diplomatic preparations, he had consulted Germany, with most satisfactory results, both Emperor and Chancellor having "most emphatically" promised the "unreserved support of Germany . . . in the event of warlike complications with Serbia." He himself agreed with Berlin that it was better not to inform Italy or Roumania beforehand, but to act at once, and to await possible claims of compensation from them. Again, the danger of a war with Russia must be faced, but in view of Russia's far-sighted designs of a Balkan coalition against the Monarchy it seemed to him more logical to forestall this by "a timely settlement with Serbia," since delay would place Austria-Hungary in a more and more unfavourable situation.

In the discussion that followed all save one unreservedly endorsed Berchtold's policy, Bilinski treating war with Serbia as sooner or later inevitable, since only force could bring her to reason, Krobotin arguing

¹ *D.A.*, i., No. 8, pp. 25-38; Gooss, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-60.

² *D.A.*, I., p. 31-2.

that after two lost opportunities¹ the loss of a third would be fatal to the Monarchy's prestige in the South»; while Stürgkh insisted that this was the right psychological moment for war, and put forward the additional argument that Germany's attitude towards Austria-Hungary would be unfavourably influenced by a policy of hesitation and weakness.»

Tisza alone remains unconvinced, though even he begins by admitting that war now seems to him more probable than it had seemed immediately after the murder. Though the actual tactics of aggression favoured by the others are not indicated in the minutes, it is clear from Tisza's line of argument that the discussion centred round the idea of a " surprise attack on Serbia, without previous diplomatic action."² This idea Tisza strongly repudiated, on the ground that it would injure Austria-Hungary before Europe, and would unite the whole Balkans, excepting exhausted Bulgaria, against her. Austria-Hungary, he contended, must first of all put conditions to Serbia " *severe but not impossible of fulfilment* "; their acceptance would mean " a striking diplomatic victory for Austria-Hungary," while, in the event of their rejection, he too would favour war. But even in that case he insisted that the aim of war must be " the diminution, but not the complete annihilation, of Serbia," for the double reason that Russia would not surfer this without engaging upon a life-and-death struggle, and that he himself, as Hungarian Premier, could not permit such annexations of territory as would increase the Slavonic element in the Dual Monarchy.

Eventually it was unanimously agreed that an early decision should be taken, while Tisza carried his point, that mobilisation should not be ordered till after Serbia had rejected concrete demands and an ultimatum. All except Tisza agreed that " a purely diplomatic success,

¹ i.e. 1909 and 1912.

² *ibid.*, pp. 32-3.

³ *ibid.*, p. 30.

⁴ " As seems to be intended, and was, to his regret, discussed in Berlin also by Count Hoyos." — *ibid.*, p. 27.

even if it should end with a striking humiliation of Serbia, would be worthless, and *hence that such far-reaching demands must be put to Serbia as would create a prospect of rejection (die eine Ablehnung voraussehen Hessen)*, so as to prepare the way for a radical solution by military intervention." Tisza, as a concession, consented that the conditions should be " very severe," but " not such as to reveal Austria-Hungary's intention of making them unacceptable," since in that case there would be no legal basis for a declaration of war. When the discussion was resumed in the afternoon various military problems were raised, and " the relation of forces (*Kraftverhältnisse*) and the probable course of a European war " were debated at some length.¹ In conclusion, Berchtold pointed out that " though there was still a divergence " between the views of Tisza and of all the others, yet they were nearer than before, and that Tisza's proposals " would in all probability " lead to that " warlike reckoning with Serbia " which they regarded as necessary.²

It is quite clear that this Council was the decisive moment, so far as Austria-Hungary is concerned, and that the subsequent delay in acting was solely due to the need for completing Tisza's still very partial conversion. When once a surprise attack had been abandoned at Tisza's instance, there was, of course, a further motive for delay in the need for collecting incriminating material at Sarajevo; but in Berchtold's case this was a purely tactical motive, intended to keep Europe quiet, and, in point of fact, as we shall see, the negative result of the enquiry would have seriously embarrassed any Minister less bent upon war than Berchtold.

On the day before the Council, Count Tisza had issued an inspired statement in the *Budapesti Hirlap* to the effect that there was no ground for fearing war, that no concrete proofs of Serbia's guilt had as yet been found, and that therefore the result of investigations into the

¹ *ibid.*, p. 36,

²*ibid.*, p. 38.

crime must be awaited. On the day following the Council he answered interpellations in the Hungarian Parliament with unusual reserve, protesting against the assumption that the situation in Bosnia was undermined, condemning the anti-Serb excesses, but insisting that the enquiry was still being conducted. The holding of a Crown Council was officially explained by the need for discussing the internal situation in Bosnia. The semi-official *Pester Lloyd*, however, wrote of "the projected diplomatic *demarche* at Belgrade," and, while affirming that it would not take a form "which could offend the *amour propre* or dignity of Serbia," added significantly that it expected the Government of Belgrade "to exterminate this nest of rats," since otherwise good relations with Vienna would be impossible.

Meanwhile, though the minutes of the Joint Council show that a severe diplomatic "humiliation" of Serbia was the minimum aim, care was taken by the Ballplatz Press Bureau to spread abroad an exactly contrary impression. For instance, on 9 July the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* published an obviously inspired statement that any step which might be taken at Belgrade "will not imply any interference with the sovereign rights of Serbia," and that as "nothing will be exacted which could be interpreted as *affront or humiliation*," Belgrade may be expected to comply with all demands.

THE GRADUAL CONVERSION OF TISZA

In the week that followed the Council concentrated efforts were made upon Tisza from all sides, and in particular by Berchtold and the German Ambassador. Tisza himself had lost no time in submitting to the Emperor-King a second memorandum¹ in which he elaborated the views upheld by him at the Council. Its main tenor was that "*despite the highly satisfactory*

¹ 8 July, *D.A.*, i., No. 12, pp. 41-6.

news from Berlin " he could not approve an armed attack such as would " in all human probability " provoke Russian intervention and " consequently the world war," and in which Roumanian neutrality (" despite all optimism in Berlin ") would be highly doubtful. An infinitely preferable course would be to create a new political constellation in the Balkans by " a logical and active policy "; and this, he contended, would meet the views of Conrad and the General Staff, who held that the race of armaments would " in the next few years " work out to the disadvantage of Austria-Hungary.¹ Tisza would readily bear responsibility for war if the Monarchy's " just demands " were rejected, but held that Serbia must be " given the possibility of avoiding war, though, of course, by way of a severe diplomatic defeat." These demands should be couched in concrete form, and " in measured, not threatening, tone "; for such tactics might hold back both Russia and Roumania, lead to British pressure upon the Entente, and give free rein to the Tsar's fear of anarchic and anti-dynastic tendencies. Moreover, an assurance that the Monarchy " will not annihilate, much less annex, Serbia," was necessary, in order to prevent complications with Italy, to assure British sympathy, and to enable Russia to remain a spectator. Austria-Hungary should rest content with a strong rebuff (*Knickung*) to Serbian arrogance, but should then take prompt and energetic steps to win over Bulgaria and the other Balkan States.

It was only natural that Tisza should look at the whole question from a Magyar angle, and should thus be influenced not only by the same ingrained fear of Russia and distaste for new Slav fellow-citizens as had weighed with his father in the 'seventies, but also by anxiety regarding Roumania's attitude. It is to be remembered that the negotiations conducted by Tisza himself with

¹ *Eher zu unseren Ungunsten.* D.A., i., p. 42; Conrad, *Aus Meiner Dienstzeit*, iv., p. 55.

the Roumanian leaders in Transylvania had only very recently broken down; and we now know that the whole Roumanian problem, in its internal and external bearings, was at this time a foremost preoccupation both of Berlin and Vienna, and had been fully discussed by Francis Ferdinand and William at Konopistë, and by Conrad and Moltke at Karlsbad.¹ Tisza, according to Conrad, was convinced that Roumania would invade Transylvania in the event of an Austro-Russian war.

Meanwhile Berchtold was in consultation with Tschirschky, who drew the conclusion that Tisza was "the retarding element," and to whom Berchtold confided his intention of urging upon the Emperor that the demands addressed to Serbia should in any case be "so framed that their acceptance should seem out of the question."⁴ The result of their talk was a special memorandum of Berchtold to Tisza, in which he reported William II's urgent instructions to Tschirschky to inform Vienna "that Berlin expects action by the Monarchy against Serbia, and that it would not be understood in Germany if we let the opportunity afforded us pass by without striking a blow."* Tschirschky had also reported Berlin's conviction that its urgent representations in Bucarest had removed all danger of Roumanian intervention. "From the Ambassador's further remarks," added Berchtold, "I could see that for us to bargain with Serbia would be regarded in Germany as a confession of weakness, which could not but react on our position in the Triple Alliance and upon Germany's future policy." Information of such consequence (*Tragweite*) would, he hoped in conclusion, "be of influence" on Tisza's "final decisions."

On 9 July Berchtold had an audience with Francis Joseph at Ischl, the gist of which he repeated to Tschirschky next day. The Emperor, he said, had been very

¹ cf. Conrad, *op. cit.* iii., p. 668.

²Tschirschky to Berlin, 8 July, *D.D.*, i., No. 19.

³*D.A.*, i., No. 10.

calm, expressed his gratitude towards William II and his Government, and agreed with their view that " a decision must now be come to "¹; he felt that "perhaps the conflict could be bridged over," but, on the whole, inclined towards " concrete demands to Serbia."² Commenting upon this to Tschirschky, Berchtold admitted the advantage of this method, since it would avoid putting Austria-Hungary in the wrong, and would make it easier for Roumania, and also for Britain, to remain neutral. He then invited Berlin's opinion as to the form which the demands to Serbia should take, and insisted that the time-limit for Belgrade's reply must be made as short as possible, since even forty-eight hours would enable Belgrade to take advice from St. Petersburg.³ He added that Serbia's full compliance would be a solution " most unsympathetic to him, and he is considering what demands could be put such as would make an acceptance entirely impossible for Serbia."

The incident is of capital importance for the whole question of responsibility; for Berchtold's readiness on this occasion to accept Berlin's advice and leading — due perhaps to Tisza's discouraging attitude — represents an unique opportunity for pacific action. But Berlin, so far from using this to the full, or taking any exception to Berchtold's bellicose intentions, as reported by the Ambassador, replies with an explicit refusal to express any view whatever, on the ground that " this is Austria's affair."⁴ The sole advice offered is that material illustrating the general tendencies of Panserb agitation should be collected and published just before the transmission to Belgrade of " the demands or ultimatum." The fact

¹ Tschirschky to Berlin, 10 July; *D.D., i.*, No. 29. William's marginal note upon this runs thus: " As His Majesty's *pro memoria* is about a fortnight old, this is lasting a long time " — a further confirmation of William's impatience.

² *ibid.*, No. 29, p. 50. Here William comments: „*Aber sehr! und unzweideutig I.*„

³ *ibid.*, p. 50. Here William comments: " Hartwig is dead! " — in other words, he quite approved.

⁴ Jagow to Tschirschky, 11 July; *D.D., L*, No. 31.

that Jagow treats an " ultimatum " as one of Vienna's two alternatives is significant in itself, and must have served to encourage Berchtold.

When Tschirschky brought this reply to the Ballplatz, Berchtold endorsed Jagow's view as to the need for a general exposure of Serbian policy, and added his own conviction that " very rapid action " was now necessary — a phrase which, when transmitted to Berlin, was twice underlined by the Emperor William on his official copy.¹ It is highly important to note that Berchtold on this occasion (13 July) intimated that he hoped to reach an agreement next day with Tisza,¹ to submit the Note drafted by them to Francis Joseph at Ischl on the 15 July, and to deliver it at Belgrade before President Poincaré left Paris for his official visit to the Tsar. In short, ten days before the actual delivery of the Note to Serbia, Berlin is officially informed of Vienna's intended procedure, yet adheres consistently to its earlier policy of pressing for action rather than holding back.

Further proof that Berlin, though ignorant of the Note's actual text, knew at least six or seven days beforehand all the more salient points which it was to contain, is provided by the Bavarian Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, who on 18 July transmitted to Munich a perfectly accurate summary of these points, as supplied to him by the Under-Secretary Zimmermann.» This despatch shows that the Wilhelmstrasse was kept fully posted by Tschirschky, and also that Jagow was quibbling in a highly disingenuous way when, a week later, he tried to allay Italian annoyance at receiving no previous warning

¹ Tschirschky to Berlin, 13 July; *D.D.*, i., No. 40.

² M. Poincaré in his book *Les Origines de la Guerre*, p. 195, refers to a telegram received by Count Szécsen in Paris as early as 11 July {and deciphered at the *Quai d'Orsay during the war*) which, if authentic, would show " complete agreement " to have been *already* reached between Germany and Austria-Hungary regarding " the situation arising from the murder and all possible consequences." This telegram is not included in the post-war *Austrian Red Book (D.A.)*.

³ cf. p. 179; *D.D.*, iv., Anhang iv., No. 2.

by affirming that Germany also had seen nothing beforehand. It is from Schoen also that we learn that Berlin intended to cite the absence of the Emperor, War Minister, and Chief of General Staff, as conclusive proof that "Germany was just as much surprised by Austria's action as the other Powers."¹

On 14 July Tisza duly visited Berchtold, and called upon the German Ambassador afterwards; and until Tisza's own papers are given to the world, we are dependent upon Tschirschky's report to Berlin for a knowledge of what passed.² Tisza's language was franker than ever. Hitherto, he declared, he had always been the one to advocate caution, "but every day was strengthening his conviction that the Monarchy must come to an energetic decision, in order to prove its vitality and put an end to the intolerable conditions in the South-East." The language of the Serbian Press and of Serbian diplomacy was quite insufferable. "It was hard for me to decide in favour of advising war, but I am now firmly convinced of its necessity, and shall stand with all my strength for the greatness of the Monarchy."³ Complete agreement, he added, had now been reached among all the leading factors, and Francis Joseph had been much influenced in his decision by "Germany's unconditional attitude on the side of the Monarchy." To those who would fain argue that Berlin did not foresee the full consequence of granting a free hand to Vienna it maybe urged that phrases so explicit as these, addressed by the Ambassador to headquarters, would (unless they had coincided with the official view) unquestionably have drawn down upon his head a reprimand still more severe than that already administered.

Tisza then intimated that the Note to Serbia would

¹ *ibid.*, p. 128.

² Tschirschky to Bethmann Hollweg, 14 July; *D.D.*, L, No. 49.

³ Further confirmation is to be found in a telegram of Szogyény to Berchtold, 16 July, summarising Tschirschky's report on Tisza, "who has now abandoned all his original objections, and is quite in agreement with energetic action. *D.A.*, i., No. 23, p. 60.

be given its final form on the following Sunday (19 July), but that it had been decided not to deliver it until Poincaré had left St. Petersburg. (William IPs comment on this is, " What a pity! ") Then, unless Serbia's acceptance is unconditional, Austria-Hungary will at once mobilise. The Note will, however, he added, be " drawn up in such a way that its acceptance is virtually excluded," (" *so gut wie ausgeschlossen* ").¹ On leaving, Tisza said to Tschirschky, " We'll now together look the future calmly and firmly in the face " — a phrase which drew from William the characteristic comment, " A man after all! "

It has sometimes been contended that Berchtold delayed action from the very praiseworthy motive of accumulating full judicial evidence against Serbia. But the minutes of the Joint Council show that in reality this was due solely to the desire to make quite sure of German support and to Tisza's opposition until there could no longer be any doubt on this essential point. As we have seen/ Wiesner's report from Sarajevo tended to exculpate rather than convict Serbia, and, therefore, was simply laid aside by Berchtold and not allowed to deflect him from his policy of war.

Berchtold and Tisza in Agreement

On the same day Tschirschky was summoned by Berchtold, who informed him how a general agreement had been reached regarding the terms of the Note, and how Tisza " had even imparted a stiffening in various

¹ See *supra*, p. 187. It is also interesting to note that the German Ambassador in Constantinople, Baron Wangenheim, confidentially told his Italian colleague, Marquis Garroni, on 15 July, that the ultimatum would be so drafted as to render war inevitable. This fact was made public by Signor Barzilai, then a member of the Italian Cabinet, in his speech of 26 September, 1915, at Naples.

In this connection we may note that on 23 July the Bulgarian Minister in Petrograd informed Sofia that Prince Hohenlohe (Austro-Hungarian Military Attaché) had just stated that the Vienna Cabinet would that afternoon present a very sharp Note in Belgrade, " in which there are entirely unacceptable points for Serbia." See *Bulgarian Diplomatic Documents*, i., No. 201.

² *Na doch mal ein Mann.*

³ *Supra*, p. 117.

points."¹ Berchtold explained that it was technically impossible to have the Note ready by the 16th or 18th; that its text had to be finally approved by a Joint Council of Ministers on the 19th and sanctioned by the Emperor on the 21st; but that he could vouch ("*er stehe ein* ") for that consent, and that the Note would therefore be delivered at Belgrade on the 25th [*sic*]. Both he and Tisza, he added, wished Berlin to realise that the sole reason for delay was Poincaré's impending visit to St. Petersburg, it being considered unwise to let the first news reach that capital while the Tsar and Sazonov were under the influence of such " agitators "«as Poincaré and Izvolsky. Berlin might rest assured that there would be "no hesitation or indecision " in Vienna.

This telegram of Tschirschky affords invaluable evidence in two directions. In the first place, it proves even more conclusively than that of the same day that Berlin knew beforehand Vienna's whole plan of campaign against Belgrade, knew also that Berchtold's aim was to prevent a peaceful issue by impossible demands, yet, having weighed the consequence in Europe, did nothing to stay her ally's hands. In the second place, it explodes the theory which Magyar controversialists have sought to construct — that Tisza and his Government were opposed to war, and hence that Hungary, having no share in the responsibility, has been unjustly treated at the peace settlement. The documents already quoted show quite conclusively that Tisza, though reluctant to commit his country to a rash adventure, was only too ready to embark upon war when once the full backing of Germany had been secured. Meanwhile the whole Hungarian Press, official and unofficial, was full of provocative articles against Serbia, which, as we shall see, were answered day by day by the gutter journals

¹ *Sogar in manche Punkte eine Verschärfung hineingebracht.* — Tschirschky to Betbmann Hollweg, 14 July; *D.D.*, i., No. 50.

² *Hetzer* — Berchtold to Szögyény (15 July); *D.A.*, i., No. 21.

of Belgrade, thus envenoming public opinion in both countries. The semi-official *Pester Lloyd* made a practice of publishing elaborate extracts, under the heading " From the Serbian Witches' Cauldron " from periodicals whose existence it had hitherto quite properly ignored, and some of which were entirely without any significance.

On 16 July, in answer to a lengthy interpellation of the clerical deputy Szmrecsányi on Panserb propaganda, Tisza delivered a speech in the Hungarian Parliament in which he declared that " the affair with Serbia must under all circumstances be cleared up," but declined as yet to say how. " The Government," he said, " is not of opinion that this clarification must necessarily lead to warlike complications. . . . War is a very sad *ultima ratio*, to which one must not resort until all other possible solutions have been exhausted, but for which naturally every nation and every state must be capable and willing, if it wishes to remain a nation and a state." There was an ominous ring about this which reminded many observers of a speech which he had delivered only a year before in the same place, vindicating the right of every Balkan nation (and so, in that instance, of Bulgaria) to resort to the sword as a last arbitrament — a speech which had materially contributed to provoking the second Balkan War.

It is worth adding that in Berlin considerable regret was expressed " that Tisza, by his statement in Parliament, has somewhat raised the veil."¹ The Wilhelmstrasse had fully approved the secrecy upheld in Vienna and regarded the leave of absence granted to the military chiefs as " skilful."²

What may fairly be said to have clinched matters in Vienna was the autograph letter addressed by William II

¹ This is reported by Herr von Schoen to the Munich Government on 18 July; *D.D., hr.*, Anhang iv., No. 2.

² *ibid.*, p. 126.

to Francis Joseph on 14 July from the island of Bornholm,¹ conveying in the most solemn terms — fortified by a reference to his grandfather's policy of friendship — a pledge of German support " in hours of gravity. ² He expressly declined " to take up any attitude to the question at issue " between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, but the categorical phrases in which he endorses the need of checking " Pan-Slav agitation " in the Balkans show him to mean that, on the contrary, he left it to Vienna to decide what action was necessary, and renounced all ideas of exercising restraint upon it. Referring to the Ballplatz memorandum on Balkan policy, he announced Germany's readiness to combat the formation of a new Balkan League under Russian patronage, to promote Bulgaria's adhesion to the Triple Alliance, and to warn Roumania against continued intimacy with Serbia. Such language could not fail to fortify the Ballplatz in its warlike designs, and was well calculated to remove the last hesitation of Francis Joseph himself.

REASONS FOR POSTPONEMENT

During the five days that followed Tschirschky's conversation with Tisza and Berchtold, Vienna shrouded itself in complete silence, while pushing on its secret preparations. In this connection it is interesting to note that already, on 12 July, Jagow had instructed Tschirschky to warn Berchtold that " Russia and Serbia have confidential information that Austria-Hungary is strengthening her garrisons on the Serbian and Russian frontiers."³ The source is not given, but it obviously comes from the German Military Intelligence. No comment is added, but the natural inference is that Berlin wishes Vienna to cover up her tracks more carefully, not to refrain from military preparations.

¹ *D.A.*, I, No. 18.

² *In den Stunden des Ernstes.*

³ *D.D.*, i., No. 37.

During this interval we find the first and only sign of nervousness on the part of Berlin in another telegram of Jagow to Tschirschky (17 July).¹ Both Berchtold and Tisza have disavowed Hoyos's plan of partition,¹ he reminds the Ambassador, but they have not given any further clue to "their territorial claims." Vienna's plans might, of course, be modified by the course of events, but it must "already have formed a general picture of the aims to be followed." Tschirschky, then, is to ask for Berchtold's views regarding "Serbia's future *shape*" (*Gestaltung*), but must "avoid the impression of wishing to block Austrian action or to prescribe certain bounds or aims. It would merely be of value to us to be in some degree informed as to whither the way may lead."* Jagow himself supplies the key to his belated anxiety by saying that a knowledge of the intended treatment of Serbia would have a decisive effect upon the attitude of Italy and of Britain.¹ How much this was on his mind is shown by yet another message of the following day (18 July), in which, prompted by his own close knowledge of Italy and her statesmen, he warns Berchtold "to be under no illusion," but to realise that "an attack of Austria-Hungary on Serbia will not only be resented, but perhaps directly opposed, by Italy."⁶ He suggests tentatively that to involve Italy at Valona might be Austria-Hungary's best way of easing the Serbian situation; but in any case he regards "a timely understanding between Vienna and Rome as urgently necessary."⁷ This step of Jagow was paralysed by the obstinacy of Berchtold, who was quite uncompromising in the matter of Valona/ and refused to admit the very

¹ *D.D.*, i., No. 61.

² *Supra*, p. 180.

³ " *Es ware uns nur von Wert, einigermassen daruber orientirt zu sein, wohin der Weg etwa fuhren soll.*"

⁴ *ibid.*, p. 88.

⁵ *D.D.*, i., No. 68, p. 96.

⁶ *Dringend geboten.*"

⁷ *Tagesbericht* of Berchtold, 20 July; *D.A.*, i., No. 35; Gooss, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-18,

idea that an AustroSerbian war could entitle Italy to compensation under the Triple Alliance.¹

If, however, Jagow had some conception of the complications likely to arise in Rome, this did not affect the general tendency of Berlin to press Vienna for action. Indeed, Berchtold found it advisable to supplement the explanations of the delay which he had given to Tschirschky, by a special message to the German Chancellor through Szögyény. To take energetic action in Belgrade at the very moment when Poincaré was the guest of the Tsar might, he argued, be interpreted in St. Petersburg "as a political affront," and so might throw Nicholas II into the arms of the extremists. It would therefore be wiser not to deliver the Note until Poincaré had left Russia, and this would involve another week's suspense. Szögyény at once notified this, and Jagow, while accepting the argument, expressed "quite extraordinary regret at this delay."» It is quite possible that in the first instance the desire not to affront Russia was one of Berchtold's real motives for delay; and it was certainly one which would sound well in Berlin. But it is abundantly clear that ere long his dominant motive was to eliminate all possibility of French action during the crisis, by presenting, at the very moment when the French President and Premier had started upon a sea voyage of several days, demands which Serbia must accept or reject before they could hope to reach Paris and establish full contact with the diplomatic world. Berchtold's whole game depended upon secrecy, and, unless his secret was prematurely betrayed, the longer he delayed the more completely was he likely to take Europe by surprise.

¹ Article VII. of Treaty of 1912; see *infra*, pp. 235, 239.

² Berchtold to Szögyény, 15 July; *D.A.*, i., No. 21.

³ Szögyény to Berchtold, 16 July; *D.A.*, i., No. 23.

THE JOINT COUNCIL OF 19 JULY: FINAL DECISIONS

On 19 July, as intimated, a further Joint Council of Ministers was held at Vienna,¹ and approved Berchtold's motion that the Note to Serbia should be delivered at 5 p.m. on 23 July, with a time-limit of forty-eight hours. Further delay was considered impossible, in view of Berlin's impatience and the growing suspicion of Rome. After a discussion of military measures, Tisza proposed that a resolution should be passed disclaiming all plans of conquest against Serbia, and pledging the Monarchy not to annex any territory save perhaps such frontier rectifications as strategy might enjoin. To this Berchtold raised objections, arguing that the Monarchy, though it should itself not annex Serbian territory in the event of victory, must aim at a drastic partition of Serbia between Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, and perhaps Roumania. Besides, the Balkan situation was quite uncertain. Albania could not be relied upon; even Bulgaria might again become Russophil; and so at the end of the war "it might no longer be possible not to annex anything." Tisza, however, adhered to his original view, justifying it first by Hungarian opposition to the annexation of more Slavs, and also by his belief that Russia would fight *à outrance* to prevent Serbia's destruction.

Stürgkh's suggestion that the case might be met by expelling the Karagjorgjevic dynasty and forcing Serbia into subordination to the Monarchy by a military convention does not appear to have won much support. It was finally resolved that on the outbreak of war, which all present seem this time to have taken for granted, Austria-Hungary should convey assurances to the Powers that she was not conducting a war of conquest, and did not intend to incorporate Serbia. "Naturally," this

¹ See Minutes in *D.A.*, i., No. 26.

resolution did not rule out " necessary strategic rectifications," or " Serbia's curtailment in favour of other States," or " temporary occupation of Serbian territory."¹ A somewhat doubtful light upon the sincerity of such assurances is thrown by one passage in the minutes, where Tisza emphasised the good effect which a renunciation of territorial claims would have upon European opinion, and where Berchtold replied that he "in any case had the intention of giving this declaration in Rome," though, of course, this conflicted absolutely with the reservations on which he had just been insisting.¹

¹ *ibid.*, pp. 66-7.

CHAPTER VIII

THE DUPING OF EUROPE

HITHERTO our documentary sources have revealed Berchtold as persistently bellicose and secretive, but in the concluding phase of the crisis the quality most in evidence is his perfidy. Next to his natural desire to secure Berlin's unreserved support, and following directly upon it, he appears to have spared no effort to lull Europe into a false sense of security. That this was done quite systematically is well shown by the following incident. Following upon the designs of the Council of 7 July, it was decided that the Minister of War and the Chief of General Staff should go on leave from Vienna on 11 July, and Berchtold himself confided to Tschirschky that this was done "deliberately in order to allay any anxiety."¹ In this he acted upon a memorandum of Baron Conrad, who urged the need for avoiding any premature alarm of their opponents, such as might give rise to precautionary measures.¹ Conrad himself has quite frankly published in his *Memoirs* an account of his interview with Berchtold as early as 8 July. It was then that the decision to go on leave was actually taken, and it appears that Berchtold had *already* fixed upon 22 July for the presentation of an "ultimatum" to Serbia — from which it may be inferred that he was already confident of converting or "rushing" Tisza. The consequences of an invasion of Serbia and a war with Russia were then discussed, and Berchtold's concluding words were:

¹ Tschirschky to Berlin, 10 July, *D.D.*, i., No. 29, p. 50; confirmed by Conrad himself in *Aus Meiner Dienstzeit*, iv., p. 61.

² *D.A.*, i., No. 14

³ Conrad, *op. cit.*, iv., p. 61-2.

" above all no measures which could betray us: nothing must be done which could attract attention."

The Ballplatz Press Bureau naturally took care to spread the news, and *The Times* correspondent, like many others, duly fell into the trap. On 15 July he announces¹ that not only Conrad and Krobatin but the two Ministers of National Defence also have gone on leave, and he definitely links up this fact with an improvement upon the Viennese Bourse. Meanwhile, on 16 July, Szögyény reports to Berchtold that the Italian Ambassador in Berlin had been showing signs of " extreme anxiety," but that he was reassured — in other words, misled — on learning that Krobatin and Conrad had left Vienna.'

It must be added that Berlin not merely regarded this manner of duping Europe as very " clever,"* but itself adopted similar methods. That invaluable witness, Herr von Schoen, the Bavarian Charge d'Affaires in Berlin, tells his own Government on 18 July that it was the intention of Berlin to cite the Emperor's absence in Norway and the leave of absence of Moltke and Falkenhayn¹ as proofs that " it was just as much surprised by Austria's action as the other Powers."¹

That Berlin connived in other ways also at Vienna's efforts to delude Europe is shown by an interesting press incident. On 19 July the Official *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* published an article which treated Austria-Hungary's demand for " clarification " (Tisza's phrase) as warranted in the opinion of Europe, and then went on as follows: " We associate ourselves with the hope expressed in more than one quarter that a serious crisis will be averted by the Serbian Government giving way in good time." In any case the interests of Europe as a whole " make it appear desirable and necessary that any discussion between Austria-Hungary and Serbia

¹ *The Times* of 16 July.

² Szögyény to Berchtold. *D.A.*, i., No. 23.

³ *D.D.*, iv., Anhang iv., No. 2, p. 126.

⁴ He might have added Tirpitz.

⁵ *ibid.*, p. 128; cf. also *supra*, pp. 179. 193 and *infra*, p. 238.

should remain localised." This article, which was of course much commented upon throughout the European press, exercised a depressing influence upon the Bourse of Berlin and led *The Times*¹ to print its first really alarmist headline. In point of fact, however, it had been intended by the Wilhelmstrasse as a sedative, as transpires from a telegram sent by Jagow to Tschirschky on the previous day.² In it he warns the Ambassador that an article is to appear on the 19th, "mild in tone out of *consideration for European diplomacy*," but that it is not to be regarded in Vienna as "drawing back" on the part of Germany. It is incidents such as these that make it impossible to deny that Berlin was throughout July the constant accomplice of Vienna.

These are, however, merely isolated facts which chance has left on record. Far more important and equally deliberate were the steps which Berchtold took at almost every European capital to delude those in authority and prevent any possibility of intervention in favour of peace. No survey of the Austro-Serbian dispute would be complete without a reference to these manoeuvres, and it will perhaps be more convenient to carry their story right on to the date of the actual rupture with Serbia before dealing with the Note itself and its reception by the Serbian Government. It is obvious that a detailed diplomatic analysis of the fatal "Twelve Days" would lead far beyond the purpose of the present volume, but if Serbia's position in the fatal quarrel that plunged half the world in war is to be correctly estimated, it is essential to marshal all those facts which reveal a definite design of action rather than a mere drifting towards disaster. There is doubtless much still hidden from us, perhaps much that will never become known, but what has already been revealed is amply sufficient for our purpose. Indeed, it may be asserted that never before has the searchlight

¹ 21 July, "An Ominous Scare."

² 18 July, *D.D., L.*, No. 70.

of history been able, so soon after the event, to penetrate the obscure corners of a great diplomatic tragedy.

BERCHTOLD AND ST. PETERSBURG

In St. Petersburg itself the murder had created a highly unwelcome situation; for not merely was Russian official opinion peculiarly sensitive to such incidents, so reminiscent of Russian internal conditions, but it was at once felt to provide Austria-Hungary with the very sort of pretext for aggression in the Balkans for which she had been seeking, and of which it had been Russia's constant aim to deprive her.

The first definite indication of the Russian attitude is the friendly warning given by the Foreign Minister, Mr. Sazonov, to the Austro-Hungarian Charge d'Affaires, Count Otto Czernin,¹ as early as 5 July. His reference to the constant Austrian press attacks upon Serbia and their irritating effect upon Russian opinion led Count Czernin to mention the possibility of his Government instituting a search for the criminals on Serbian soil. To this Sazonov rejoined, "No country has had to suffer more than Russia from crimes prepared on foreign territory. Have we ever claimed to employ in any country whatsoever the procedure with which your papers threaten Serbia? Do not embark on such a course."² This argument goes to the root of the whole matter and ought never to be lost sight of in any consideration of Russia's action during the crisis.

As time passed, and apart from blustering articles in the Austrian and Magyar press, no action of any kind was taken in Vienna, St. Petersburg grew calmer and reassured, and the chief centre of interest was the approaching visit of the French President. Sazonov himself took five days' leave on 14 July, and his two

¹ Not to be confused with his kinsman, Count Ottokár Czernin, then Minister in Bucarest, and afterwards Foreign Minister.

² Paléologue to Viviani, 6 July; *French Yellow Book*, No. 10.

chief subordinates, Neratov and Trubetskoj, were also out of town.

The Russian attitude was at this time made very clear to King Charles of Roumania, who repeated it to the German Charge d'Affaires in Bucarest.¹ The idea of war, Sazonov assured the King, was highly distasteful to Russia, since it would involve the risk of " far too many internal disturbances." On the other hand, Russia could not possibly remain inactive in the event of an Austro-Hungarian attack upon Serbia.¹

On 18 July the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Count Frederick Szápáry, had what appears to have been his first conversation with Sazonov on the subject of Austro-Serbian relations, as affected by the murder. On this occasion Sazonov expressed himself as " somewhat disquieted " by the latest news from Vienna, but was quite emphatic in his disbelief in Serbian official complicity. Szápáry took shelter behind his ignorance of the results of the Sarajevo enquiry, but stated that " Vienna was convinced that the Serbian Government would come to meet any possible demands on our part."²

To the German Ambassador Sazonov spoke much more frankly, criticising the official tolerance of anti-Serb excesses in Bosnia after the murder, denying the existence of any considerable " loyal population " in that province — " except at most a few Moslems and Catholics " — and insisting on the correct attitude of the Serbian Government.« Poutalès, in reporting this to Berlin, emphasises the intense hostility of the Minister towards Austria-Hungary and the increasing Russian contempt for that country. In a later conversation he could not resist charging Sazonov to his face with " irreconcilable blind hatred for Austria," to which the

¹ Prince Waldburg to Berlin, n July, *D.D.*, *L*, No. 41.

² The same attitude was ascribed to Sazonov by the Roumanian statesman, Mr. Take Jonsescu, in conversation with Prince Lichnowsky in London on 23 July, Lichnowsky to Berlin, 23 July; *D.D.*, *i.*, No. 129.

³ Szápáry to Berchtold, 18 July; *D.A.*, *i.*, No. 25, p. 61.

⁴ Poutalès to Bethmann Hollweg, 13 July, *D.D.*, *i.*, No. 53.

Minister rejoined, " Hate does not correspond with my character, and so I do not hate Austria, but I despise her."¹

When he next met Sazonov, a week later, the latter was already highly alarmed, as a result of reports from London, Paris and Rome, and if Pourtalès is to be believed, the conversation took a very animated turn, the Foreign Minister denouncing in particular the dangerous policy of Forgách and Tisza and the warlike aims of the Clerical group round the late Archduke, and again insisting upon " the entirely correct behaviour of the Belgrade Government."¹ He warned the Ambassador that " Austria-Hungary, if absolutely bent on disturbing the peace, must not forget that she would have to reckon with Europe," and that Russia would not tolerate a " humiliation " of Serbia, or indeed an ultimatum to her. This, and similar language employed towards the Italian Ambassador, Marquis Carlotti,³ was duly reported to Berlin, which was thus fully warned of the extreme danger of Russian intervention if Vienna could not be restrained. But of restraining influence there was less question than ever, and the running comments of William upon Szápáry's telegram⁴ show, on the contrary, real irritation at the possibility of restraint.⁵

On 20 July, Szápáry received the text of the Note to Serbia, and the covering Note for the Powers⁶ and the verbal comments with which he was to place it in Sazonov's hands on the morning of the 24th.⁷ With this secret explosive in his breast he attended President Poincaré's reception of the diplomatic corps on 21 July, and in reply to an enquiry regarding Austro-Serbian relations

¹ Pourtalès to Bethmann Hollweg, 25 July, *D.D.*, L, No. 204.

² *ibid.*, Pourtaks to Bethmann Hollweg, 21 July, *D.D.*, i., No. 120.

³ *ibid.*, p. 141.

⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 138-41.

⁵ e.g. on Sazonov's phrase, " there must in no case be any question of an ultimatum," William comments with obvious satisfaction, " is already there 1 " (*ist bereits da!*), *ibid.*, p. 141.

⁶ *D.A.*, i., No. 29.

⁷ *D.A.*, i., No. 30 (5).

had the effrontery to declare that Vienna " regarded the situation with calm, being convinced that Serbia would not reject what we should have to ask."¹

Poincaré's question as to the nature of these demands he evaded by the grossly dishonest statement that " the enquiry was still proceeding and he knew nothing as to its result." The President's arguments against holding official Serbia responsible for what had happened and his attempt to draw analogies from the murder of Carnot and similar events, Szápáry treats as " tactless " and " threatening in tone," strongly contrasting with Sazonov's " reserved and cautious attitude." Pourtalès also reports to Berlin¹ his colleague Szápáry's impression that " Poincaré is inciting here to a conflict with the Triple Alliance," but adds his own view that on the contrary the President's remarks were due to the prompting of Sazonov, who was engaged on a policy of bluff." Poincaré on his part was unfavourably impressed, and suspected that Szápáry had received orders to be silent, and that Austria-Hungary was preparing a *coup de théâtre*.*

The French guests left St. Petersburg on the night of the 23rd, before news of the delivery of the Note in Belgrade at six could reach St. Petersburg; and it was not till the next morning that Szápáry, according to instructions, communicated it to Sazonov. Austria-Hungary, the Ambassador assured him, " felt free from all feeling of disfavour (*Missgunst*) and ill-will towards Serbia," and indeed had, during the crisis of 1912, made it possible by a " genial and disinterested attitude " for Serbia to double her territory.⁴ Her sole object was to protect the Monarchy against " insurrectionary miasmas " from the neighbouring Kingdom and to check their tolerance by the Serbian Government.

¹ Szápáry to Berchtold, July 21, *D.A.*, i., No. 45.

² 23 July, *D.D.*, i., No. 134.

³ Paléologue, *La Russie des Tsars*, i., p. 10.

⁴ *D.A.*, i., No. 30 (5); Berchtold's instructions to Szápáry.

The Ballplatz had accumulated ample evidence to prove the connection between the murder and Belgrade, and to render further forbearance impossible, and it now relied on Russia's solidarity in action to repress regicide and anarchy.

Statements so conventional and so obviously at variance with the facts could hardly have produced a favourable effect at any time, but coming as they did only a few hours after the President's departure, they supplied additional evidence of Berchtold's duplicity, and above all, of his eagerness to handicap Russia by making effective consultation with her Western ally impossible.

If Sazonov had known what we know to-day — that so far from establishing Serbian complicity the Ballplatz had had in its possession since 13 July the admission of its own official investigator that that complicity was not merely hard to establish but definitely improbable — his indignation might have been even greater. A further proof of duplicity, also not yet in Sazonov's hands at the moment of this interview, is supplied by the "reassuring explanations" which the Ballplatz had given to the Russian Ambassador in Vienna on 21 July, with the result that he had thought it safe to take some days' leave of absence in the country.¹ As it was, Sazonov, as reported by Szápáry himself,² not unnaturally assumed from the first that Austria-Hungary desired war and was using the murder as a pretext. (" *Vous mettez le feu à l'Europe.*") Serbia could never accept such demands; for if, for example, Austro-Hungarian officials obtained the right of interference in Serbia itself, "you will then always be wanting to interfere, and what a life Europe will lead then!" To Szápáry's phrases about monarchical solidarity Sazonov replied with the abrupt phrase, "*L'idée monarchique na rien à faire avec cela.*" The

¹ *French Yellow Book*, No. i8 (Dumaine to Bienvenu-Martin, 22 July); No. 20 (Bienvenu-Martin quoting Dumaine). cf. Poincaré, *Origines*, p. 233.

² Szápáry to Berchtold, 24 July, *D.A.*, ii., Nos. 16, 17, 18.

diplomatic *dossier*, he added, had no real point after such an ultimatum: " *c'est que vous voulez la guerre, et vous avez brûlé vos ponts.*" Nor were matters improved when the Minister laid a large measure of the blame for this policy upon Forgách, and when the Ambassador countered by defending " the conciliatory rôle " played by that diplomatist as Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade! As Forgách's chief rôle in Belgrade had been to supervise the forgery of anti-Serb diplomatic documents in his own Legation,¹ this reference only served to irritate Sazonov still further, and though he retained a " relative calm," his general attitude was " thoroughly hostile " (*durchaus ablehnend und gegnerisch*). Following upon this conversation, Sazonov held a Cabinet Council of five hours, and then saw the German Ambassador. Their talk at first took a stormy course, but ended with a friendly appeal of Sazonov in favour of Russo-German co-operation for the maintenance of peace. His main argument was that the Austro-Serbian quarrel concerned not merely the two states but all Europe, all the more so since the present Note to Serbia took as its point of departure Serbia's own Note of April 1909, disclaiming all interest in Bosnia, and since this Note was produced under the auspices of all the Powers. Russia, he warned Pourtalès, would demand an " international enquiry " into the *dossier* supplied by Vienna. To this the German replied that Austria-Hungary would not accept interference in her quarrel with Serbia, and that Germany " could not accept any suggestion conflicting with her ally's dignity as a Great Power."² Sazonov insisted that Russia could not be indifferent to Austria-Hungary's intention of " swallowing Serbia," to which Pourtalès retorted that her intention was not this, " but to inflict a justly-merited punishment." Sazonov's appeal for peaceful co-operation was met by the assurance that Germany " had no wish to

¹ See *supra*, p. 33.

² Szâpâry to Berchtold, 24 July, *D.A.*, ii., No. 19.

unchain a war, but of course fully supports the interests of her ally."¹ It is of some importance to note that Pourtalès's own report to Berlin of this conversation confirms the accuracy of Szápáry's summary, but strangely omits all reference to Sazonov's conciliatory appeal!² These telegrams of Pourtalès and Szápáry to Berlin and Vienna respectively prove conclusively that the Central Powers had ample warning of Russia's attitude and deliberately disregarded the imminent danger of war which their policy involved.

Meanwhile, on the same day (24 July), Count Berchtold received the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Vienna, Prince Kudashev,³ and assured him of his special desire to inform Russia at as early a date as possible of the steps taken in Belgrade. The very fact that it was Kudashev, and not his chief, Mr. Shebeko, whom Berchtold received, was due to an added perfidy,, for the Ambassador had left for the country two days earlier, " in consequence of reassuring explanations " at the Ballplatz.⁴

Such an assurance as Berchtold's, given when one-third of the brief time-limit had already elapsed, must have sounded sufficiently thin to Kudashev himself, but its utter insincerity is still more obvious to us, who know from the Minutes of the Council of Ministers and the correspondence with Berlin that the main aim of Berchtold's tactics was, on the contrary, to conceal his action from St. Petersburg just as long as possible, and that the shortness of the time-limit was above all intended to paralyse Russian action in Belgrade.

¹ *ibid.*, p. 20.*

² Pourtalès to Bethmann Hollweg, 25 July, *D.D.*, i., No. 204, p. 210.

³ *Tagesbericht* of Berchtold, 24 July, *D.A.*, ii., No. 23.

⁴ *French Yellow Book*, No. 18. cf. Sir Maurice de Bunsen's despatch of 1 September, 1914 (*British Diplomatic Correspondence*, No. 161). "So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was preparing, that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence about 20 July." This may not be very creditable to Shebeko's foresight, but it supplements the evidence against any aggressive designs on the part of Russia. According to Tschirschky (23 July, to Berlin, *D.D.*, i., No. 131), Shebeko saw Berchtold before leaving, but Serbia was not mentioned.

Kudashev expressed anxiety at demands so drastic, and hinted that they seemed to him impossible of acceptance. His warning that Russia could not be indifferent to a "humiliation of Serbia" was met by Berchtold's assurance that "nothing lay farther from him than to humiliate Serbia," and that this was not in Austria-Hungary's interest. The peculiar perfidy of such a remark is best illustrated from the minutes of the Council of 7 July, at which Berchtold induced all his colleagues, save Tisza, to agree that success, "even if it should end with a striking humiliation of Serbia, would be worthless,"¹ in other words, that something even worse than "humiliation" was intended.» Equally false was his assurance that Austria-Hungary desired no territorial changes, in view of his insistence, at the Council of 19 July/ upon the need of partition and even the possibility of annexation!

Kudashev also expressed much alarm at the shortness of the time-limit, and on learning how Giesl had been instructed to proceed at Belgrade, he remarked, "*alors c'est la guerre.*"⁴ Next day, in the name of his Government, he wired to Berchtold,⁶ who had in the meantime left for Ischl, urging an extension of the time, and also pressed this view verbally upon the permanent secretary, Baron Macchio. The latter made it clear that such a

¹ See *supra*, p. 187. (*D.A.*, i., No. 8, pp. 35 and 38.)

² That Berchtold should have calmly placed this on record in his *Tagesbericht* — which is indeed our chief source for the incident — speaks volumes for his own mentality and that of the Ballplatz. It should be compared with another illuminating incident revealed in the Minutes of the Joint Council of 19 July (*D.A.*, i., No. 26, p. 66). Berchtold, it will be remembered, contested Tisza's proposal for an explicit pledge against all annexation of Serbian territory on the ground that the war might alter conditions so much that annexation might become inevitable. To this Tisza replied by reminding him that Russia would resist "*à outrance*" rather than tolerate Serbia's destruction, and that his proposed pledge was necessary "in order to improve "Austria-Hungary's "international situation." Berchtold hereupon declared that he had "in any case the intention of giving this declaration in Rome!" Surely perfidy cannot go much further than this.

³ See *supra*, p. 200. (*D.A.*, i., No. 26, pp. 65-6.)

⁴ All this Berchtold appears to have dictated in cold blood, for *he* is our authority. (*D.A.*, ii., No. 23, p. 24.)

⁵ *D.A.*, ii., No. 28.

proposal would not be acted upon, and added that the Note addressed to the Powers was not intended to lead to answers on their part, but was merely "an act of international courtesy."¹ Berchtold not only telegraphed special approval of this uncompromising attitude, but went still further in his reply to Kudashev, curtly reminding him that "even after the rupture of diplomatic relations" [which, then, Berchtold already took for granted], "Serbia could bring about a peaceful settlement by unreserved acceptance of our demands, but that in that case we should be compelled to demand from Serbia the reimbursement of all costs and losses due to our military measures."* What conclusion can reasonably be drawn from all this, save that Berchtold adhered to his old view that a peaceful settlement would be "highly unsympathetic,"⁴ nay more, that he added as an after-thought a yet more impossible demand, such as must greatly reduce the prospects of Russia influencing Belgrade in a peaceful sense?

While, however, refusing Sazonov's appeal for a delay, Berchtold on the same day sent instructions to his Ambassador in St. Petersburg⁴ which show that he was at least anxious to hold back Russia from action, though seeing but little chance of convincing Sazonov. Szápáry is to describe the Monarchy as "territorially saturated," and to lay stress on the *defensive* character of its action, its unexampled forbearance towards a small neighbour, its lack of all hostility to the Balkan Christians or to the Orthodox faith, and the essentially Conservative nature of Austro-Hungarian policy. The arguments adduced are conventional and unconvincing, save for the interesting suggestion that Turkey's expulsion from Europe had "removed all possibility of conflict" between Austria-Hungary and Russia. For his own information

¹ D.A., ii., No. 29. (Macchio to Berchtold).

²D.A., ii., No. 30.

³D.A., ii., No. 27.

⁴ *supra*, p. 191.

⁵ 25 July, D.A., ii., No. 42.

⁶ A phrase coined by Aehrenthal in 1908

Szápáry is informed that Russia must no longer be allowed to secure immunity for Serbia's policy of menace to the Monarchy. If indeed Russia intends to use the occasion " for the final reckoning with the Central Powers," then of course, Berchtold quite rightly remarks, all such instructions are superfluous. But it may be that she is embarrassed and " not so eager for attack or ready for war " as the jingo press would suggest or "as Poincaré and Izvolsky might perhaps wish."¹

In this phrase may probably be traced one of the chief factors which determined Berchtold's action and eventually plunged Europe into war. There can be very little doubt that Berchtold shared the view of William II » that Russia was as yet quite unprepared for war, and would therefore rest content with diplomatic protests and shrink from the final arbitrament of the sword. In short, he calculated upon a repetition of the crisis of 1909, when Berlin, standing " in shining armour " at the side of Vienna, forced St. Petersburg to renounce its backing of Belgrade. In this view Berchtold was confirmed by the highest military opinion of the Monarchy, Baron Conrad considering that Russia would not be ready for war on a grand scale until 1916, and that this interval afforded the last respite within which a forcible settlement of the Serbian question might be attempted.³

But quite apart from military reasons, the statesmen

¹ *ibid.*, p. 38.

² See *supra*, p. 175.

³ This view was constantly preached by Pourtalès (cf. p. 208). On 25 July Szögyény transmits to Vienna a summary of Pourtalès's interview with Sazonov (shown to him at the Wilhelmstrasse), and concludes from certain phrases used by Sazonov that " Russia will not for the present undertake any warlike measures " (*D.A.*, ii., No. 34). On 28 July Szögyény assured Goschen that " Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war " — " an opinion," adds Goschen, " shared by many people " in Berlin (*B.D.C.*, No. 71, Goschen to Grey). M. Paléologue (*La Russie des Tsars*, i., p. 33) records having informed Sazonov on 27 July that Pourtalès had expressed to the Ministers of Holland and Belgium his conviction that Russia would capitulate. Again the Bavarian Charge d'Affaires, Herr von Schoen, writing to Munich on 18 July, quotes Zimmermann as arguing that " Bluff is one of the favourite requisites of Russian policy," and that " Russia likes threatening with the sword, but at the decisive moment does not like drawing it for others." (*D.D.*, IV., Anhang iv., No. 2, p. 128.)

of Vienna and Berlin were further encouraged by the precarious internal conditions of Russia. The gigantic workmen's strikes organised in St. Petersburg and other cities at the time of the French visit were interpreted (and certainly not without foundation) as symptoms of revolution sufficiently grave to deter the Tsar and his advisers from all foreign adventures. The German Ambassador, in his reports to Berlin, lays great stress upon the coldness and indifference of the Russian public towards the representatives of their French ally.¹

It is scarcely open to doubt that Russian official circles viewed war with apprehension, though the view that it would serve as a diversion from internal troubles no doubt competed with the saner opinion that even if not unduly prolonged it would accentuate those troubles tenfold. But the decisive factor was that a knowledge of the abandonment of Serbia would not merely undermine Russian influence in the Balkans, but almost automatically force all the states of the Peninsula, including even Roumania and Turkey, into the orbit of the Central Powers and thus alter, very greatly to Russia's disadvantage, the whole distribution of forces in Eastern Europe. We are to-day justly suspicious of that conception of "prestige," which exercised so great a sway upon pre-war diplomacy, but this was clearly a case in which prestige was bound to play a vital part; and the greater the danger from revolutionary and subversive elements inside Russia, the more impossible was it for any Government to alienate those wide circles to which Panslav sentiment made a living and passionate appeal. Thus that dual motive which has underlain Russian policy in the Near East for two centuries past — on the one hand, dynastic and imperialistic ambition, seeking to increase its own prestige and power by redressing the handicap imposed upon Russia by geography, on the other hand the traditional ties of

¹e.g. Pourtalès to Bethmann Hollweg, 24 July. (*D.D.*, i., No. 203.)

race, religion and custom which so long prompted the Balkan Christians to regard Russia as an elder brother and liberator, and which were genuinely and keenly felt as an obligation of honour by the upper and middle classes of the old Russia — all this combined to force the Russian Government to risk everything for Serbia. The very fact that it had surrendered in 1909 to the menace of Berlin rendered a second surrender all the more impossible; and the tactless manner in which Russia's diplomatic defeat had been paraded before Europe by William II increased the anxiety of St. Petersburg lest the Central Powers might again publicly proclaim the powerlessness of Russia to save her friends. Even if the diplomatic evidence be laid entirely on one side, it is impossible for anyone who looks below the surface to deny that the elimination of Russian influence from the Near East was in fact the foremost aim of Berlin and Vienna, and that the murder of Sarajevo was being used as an effective instrument for that end. Just as the Serbian victories of 1912 had been countered by the creation of Albania, the defeat of Bulgaria by Germany's support for King Constantine and King Charles at the Treaty of Bucarest, the Russian *rapprochement* with Roumania by the establishment of Liman von Sanders at Constantinople, so now the apparent check at Sarajevo was seen to offer a new opening in the " grand game," and was to be met by a series of rapid counter-moves which would not merely isolate Serbia, but leave Russia without a single pawn. The two allies desired peace with Russia, but at the expense of a fresh surrender, which this time might have been final.

As we shall see, even after the diplomatic rupture a last desperate effort at conciliation was made by Sazonov which, with a little good will in Berlin and Vienna, would almost certainly have averted war. But the perfidious and secret attitude of Berchtold, the negative and impatient attitude of Berlin, persisted to the last, and

the action of the soldiers in St. Petersburg and Berlin — due in part to panic, in part to unscrupulous ambition — merely precipitated a disaster which the diplomatists had foreseen and deliberately risked.

It is quite evident from the above survey that a vital factor in the calculations of Germany¹ was the assumption that Russia was not ready, and would therefore make diplomatic protests, but would not go to war. This was the Emperor William's belief, and in it he was strengthened by secret military information, by the reports of Count Pourtalès, by what Bucarest reported of Sazonov's alarms, by the views expressed by Dumaine in Vienna, and — perhaps most decisive of all — by the outbreak of a strike movement of almost revolutionary dimensions, at the very moment of the French visit. Prince Henry of Prussia, who had come for a flying visit to England, had gone so far as to maintain that "if Russia moved," there would be an internal revolution and the dynasty would fall.' William, then, hoped to bully the Tsar and manœuvre his Government into the same kind of surrender as had terminated the Bosnian crisis of 1909, and argued that, if after all Russia should accept the challenge, the summer of 1914 was a better moment for the great struggle than some later date. In the words of Count Moltke, the German Chief of Staff, "every delay means a diminution of our chances."

Though it is notorious that the assumption of Russian unreadiness for war was a decisive factor at Berlin and Vienna, it is none the less very frequently argued that Russia was preparing for war upon the Central Powers and had actually fixed upon the summer of 1914 for the execution of her design. A few wild

¹ Not so much of Austria-Hungary, who deliberately took the risk of war from the outset.

² Sir Arthur Nicolson reports this to Sir Edward Grey on 26 July, by telegram and letter to Itchen Abbas.

³ Conrad, *Aus Meiner Dienstzeit*, iii., p. 670.

pamphleteers have even gone so far as to suggest official Russian complicity in the Archduke's murder — a charge altogether too frivolous to require refutation. The best proof that Russia had no intention of attacking Germany in 1914 is provided by what actually happened in the autumn of that year. For the plan of the Russian General Staff rested on the assumption that the whole Polish salient, including even Warsaw itself, was incapable of defence against the German offensive, and would have to be abandoned. It was only in response to the military dangers of the Western front that Russia made a superhuman effort in East Prussia which created a valuable diversion but ended in disaster to herself. Indeed, it was not till late in the autumn that the final decision to hold Warsaw was made, and the Siberian Corps was rushed into the city at the last moment and for the time being arrested the German advance. This illustrates how little the idea of an offensive figured in the Russian plans.

It should be unnecessary to add — what is common knowledge to every student of military history — that Russia's lack of strategic railways placed her at the greatest disadvantage against Germany, whose strategic system was almost as perfect on the East as on the West. The fact that Russia was trying to perfect her system — obviously with a view to war, like all military measures in all countries — was one of the very strongest reasons urged by German military circles for forcing an issue in 1914. That official Russia was torn between a war party with Panslav leanings and a Germanophil party which distrusted the democratic West, cannot be denied; but that the former pressed for war, in expectation of an early offensive and easy victory, is hardly credible. It would be more correct to say that when it saw that the statesmen could no longer control the political situation, it insisted upon forcing the pace by measures of military urgency. Some people may argue that these were

dictated by panic, but it would be fairer to speak of well-informed alarm at the immense superiority of the German military machine.

A systematic attempt has been made to throw upon Russia the chief blame for war by insisting upon the criminal deception played upon the Tsar by his Minister of War in ordering a general mobilisation against his orders. But the attentive reader will, I hope, ere this have reached a conclusion which seems to be inevitable — namely, that the real responsibility for war lies in the period *preceding* the ultimatum of 23 July, and that those Powers who till then deliberately worked to deceive Europe and render intervention impossible must bear the responsibility for what ensued. Recent publications¹ have tended to invalidate Suhomlinov's assertions and to exculpate Russia. But in any case, if we regard matters in their proper perspective, we must surely admit that by 31 July, when General Suhomlinov took the alleged action, the military groups were already forcing the politicians into the background in all the Continental capitals, and peace was at the mercy of any measure of panic or provocation. And this risk both Berlin and Vienna took with their eyes open.

What really made a rupture inevitable was the contention of the Central Powers that the fate of Serbia was no concern of Russia, and might be decided solely by Vienna. This was the real meaning of the word "localisation," and from the very first everyone knew that Russia never could or would accept a view which would have been equivalent to abdicating for ever her position in the Slavonic world. Here lies the kernel of the whole matter, and only the sophist or the pedant Will deny it.

¹ See especially General S. Dobrorolski, *Die Mobilmachung der russischen Armee*, 1922.

NOTE ON RUSSIA'S ALLEGED WAR DESIGNS

A few indications from private sources may be added here, to which an exaggerated value must not be assigned, but which may serve as straws showing the direction of the wind.

At least a year before the war Mr. Zvegintsev, then reporter in the Duma Committee on Imperial Defence, informed Sir Bernard Pares that as a result of the military reorganisation which was then being undertaken, the real danger for Russia would come in July and the following months of 1914, when the transition from old to new would be at its height. From this Zvegintsev drew the conclusion that if, as he believed, Germany intended to attack Russia, she was likely to select that moment.

The state of uncertainty in which Russia lived in the years preceding the war is illustrated by a statement made to Sir Bernard Pares in 1916 by General Alexeyev (then Chief of Staff and really Commander-in-Chief, in succession to the Grand Duke Nicholas), to the effect that from 1909 to 1914 he, as chief of staff in the Kiev military district, had had permanent orders to be ready for the repelling of invasion at any time at forty-eight hours' notice.

These two anecdotes show pretty clearly how unready Russia was for military aggression. Let me add three brief incidents on the political side.

In the spring of 1914 Dr. Scheiner, President of the Czech Sokol Organisation, paid a visit to Russia and saw Mr. Sazonov, who reproached him for the lack of interest in Russia displayed by the Czechs. They could not, he added, count upon Russia, for her army was not ready for a decisive war. In January 1914 Sazonov expressed himself in very much the same way to another important Czech, Dr. Kľofác, and insisted that the Great Powers did not want a war. (See President Masaryk's

Memoirs, *Die Weltrevolution*, p. 14.) Again, Mr. Pasic, on his return from St. Petersburg early in 1914, informed Mr. Mestrovic, the sculptor, that Russia was anxious to avoid any warlike complications and would not be ready for at least two or three years.

BERCHTOLD AND PARIS

Count Berchtold's attitude towards France was simplicity itself. Count Szécsen was privately informed by Count Forgách as early as 8 July, with regard to Austria-Hungary's intentions and solidarity,¹ and his function consisted in observing the strictest secrecy and lulling to sleep all anxiety on the part of the Quai d'Orsay or the Paris press.

President Poincaré, accompanied by the Premier, Mr. Viviani, and the Russian Ambassador in Paris, Mr. Izvolsky, left for St. Petersburg on 15 July and set out on their return voyage late at night on 23 July.¹ We have already seen that one of Berchtold's main objects was to prevent the Russian and French statesmen from realising the full gravity of the Balkan and European situation before they had parted company, and also to reduce to a minimum the danger of French intervention before the expiry of the ultimatum. For this purpose nothing could be more effective than the fact that during this brief period the President and his Prime Minister were on board a battleship in the Baltic, and hence fatally handicapped for delicate diplomatic negotiations.

On 20 July, Szécsen, like his colleagues in the five other principal capitals, received the Note to Serbia, the covering Note to the Powers, and instructions to deliver them at the Quai d'Orsay on the morning of the 24th. His verbal comments were to be confined to a

¹ Gooss, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

² It should be noted that the visit to Russia had been arranged as long ago as January 1914, and was to be followed by state visits to Stockholm, Christiania and Copenhagen. There was thus nothing even remotely provocative in it, as is sometimes suggested.

polite recognition of French efforts during recent crises " to bridge the difference between the two groups of Powers." Szécsen at once warned Berchtold that to select the very moment of Poincaré's departure from Russia for the delivery of the Note would be regarded in Paris as an attempt to take the French unawares (*Ueberrumpelung*),¹ and would probably have a " bad press. " The arguments provided by Berchtold' to meet such an attitude on the part of the French were, firstly, that the *demarche* in Belgrade had to be held up until the Sarajevo enquiry had been completed — an argument which he himself of course knew to be immaterial and insincere — and secondly, that it would have been " far less polite still to have disturbed the festivities in St. Petersburg by earlier action," while (and this was the real point, which could not be pressed in Paris) " it would not have suited Vienna at all " to act while the Tsar and his Ministers were exposed to the influence of the two " agitators," Poincaré and Izvolsky.

Meanwhile, M. Dumaine, the French Ambassador in Vienna, called on Berchtold and emphasised the dangers of a " racial war " between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, but blunted any possible effect of his remarks by expressing the belief that Russia " would not. intervene actively, but would far rather aim at localising the war." ³ This was at once reported by Tschirschky to Berlin.⁴

On the very eve of the ultimatum, Mr. Dumaine, acting on instructions, warned the Ballplatz of " the anxiety aroused in Europe," but was assured by Baron Macchio that " the tone of the Note and the demands which would be formulated in it allow us to count on a peaceful result,"⁴ since it contained nothing with which

¹ 22 July, *D.A.*, i., No. 51.

² Berchtold to Szécsen, 23 July, *O.A.*, i., No. 57.

³ *Tagesbericht* of Berchtold, 22 July, *D.A.*, i., No. 53.

³ 23 July, *D.D.*, i., No. 131.

⁴ *French Yellow Book*, No. 20 (23 July).

a self-respecting state need hesitate to comply.¹ Here again, then, we find the Ballplatz deliberately duping the representative of a Power whom he wished to place before an accomplished fact. Indeed, as Prince Kudashev points out in a subsequent despatch to Petrograd, Macchio's evasive answer — to the effect that action would probably be taken at Belgrade next day — was actually uttered at the very moment when Giesl was presenting the ultimatum! Dishonesty could hardly go further.²

When on 24 July Szécsen communicated the two Notes to the Quai d'Orsay, it was in the absence of all the principals, and the conversation was merely formal. On the same day, his German colleague, Baron Schoen, informed the French that Berlin regarded the controversy as one "to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia," and "urgently desired the localisation of the dispute, because every interference of another Power would, owing to the natural play of alliances, be followed by incalculable consequences."³ This thinly-veiled menace first revealed to the Quai d'Orsay the imminence of the danger to European peace.

So far, then, as France was concerned, Berchtold may be said to have been completely successful, and it was not until the President's hurried return on 29 July⁴ that Paris really began to make itself felt in the European crisis. The fact of M. Poincaré's elimination at the most critical period is conveniently slurred over by many

¹ These assurances were given in two long interviews between Dumaine and Macchio on 22 and 23 July (see de Bunsen's despatch of 1 September, *British Diplomatic Correspondence*, No. 161). At the second of these "he was not even informed" that the Note was at that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be published in Vienna on the following morning."

² Kudashev to Sazonov, 26 July (*How the War Began — Russian Foreign Office Diary*, p. 39).

³ Bienvenu Martin to Poincaré, 24 July, *French Yellow Book*, No. 28. Szécsen, wiring to Berchtold on the same day, (*D.A.*, ii., No. 10) quotes Schoen as also saying that if a third state should interfere, "Germany would be found loyally on the side" of Austria-Hungary. In the French document no such phrase occurs, but the implication is of course the same. See also Schoen to Berlin, 24 July, *D.D.*, i., No. 154.

⁴ He was not due back till the 31st, but in view of the alarming news, abandoned the Danish and Norwegian parts of his programme at the last moment.

of those who denounce him as one of the foremost war criminals.

BERCHTOLD AND LONDON

Towards London Berchtold showed the same attitude of resolute silence, and gave no indication whatever of his intentions, either to Sir Edward Grey through Count Mensdorff, or to Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador in Vienna. Indeed the latter complains, in his report of 5 July, that both he and his Russian colleague, Mr. Shebeko, " find a difficulty in extracting from Berchtold . . . anything like an explicit statement of his views on international affairs/"¹

The first inkling of trouble appears to have come to Sir Edward Grey in a conversation on 6 July with Prince Lichnowsky, who " knew for a fact," though he could give no details, " that the Austrians intended to do something and that it was not impossible that they would take military action against Serbia." * This, and perhaps other information of which we have no record, led him on 8 July to express to the French Ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, his " apprehension " at the possibility of an Austro-Hungarian *demarche*, and both agreed that France and Britain must unite in " encouraging patience in St. Petersburg."» He spoke in the same sense to the Russian Ambassador, Count Benckendorff, and made him promise to write to Sazonov.⁴ Next day a despatch of Bunsen reached him, quoting the outspoken remarks of Herr von Tschirschky, the German Ambassador in Vienna. Austro-Serbian relations, the latter argued, " must be bad, and nothing could mend them "; he had " tried in vain to convince Berlin of this fundamental truth."* Whether this influenced Sir Edward Grey or

¹ Bunsen to Grey, 5 July (received 9 July).

² Grey to Rumbold, 6 July.

³ Grey to Bertie, 8 July.

⁴ Grey to Buchanan, 8 July. ⁵ Bunsen to Grey, 5 July.

not, whether he was alarmed by Tschirschky's violent views or encouraged by the scepticism which they seemed to encounter at Berlin, he at any rate had a further conversation with Prince Lichnowsky on 9 July, in which he was frank and conciliatory to the verge of indiscretion. In it, referring to recent rumours of a Russo-British naval convention, he freely admitted that military and naval conversations had taken place with both France and Russia since 1906, but renewed the assurance that no secret agreement existed with either country. He followed this up by promising " to continue the same policy as I had pursued through the Balkan crisis, and do my utmost to prevent the outbreak of war between the Great Powers. The greater the risk of war the more closely would I adhere to that policy."¹ Language of this kind was as striking a proof of sincerity as could well be given, for on the one side it served as a warning that the Entente had a serious background such as Berlin could appreciate, while on the other it revealed the obvious desire of the British Foreign Secretary to avoid war at all costs. Indeed, it is simply incredible that he could have spoken thus on any other hypothesis. Following upon the two agreements with Germany on the Portuguese Colonies and the Bagdad Railway — by then ready for final signature — and upon the no less frank assurances given to Lichnowsky a few weeks earlier,² they ought to have completely reassured Berlin, if it, on its side, had been equally pacific.

Sir Maurice de Bunsen learnt nothing whatever of what took place at the eventful Council of Ministers of 7 July,³ and reports that even his Serbian colleague, Mr. J. M. Jovanovic, " has no reason to expect that any threatening communication will be addressed " to Serbia. On 16 July, however, he was able to report to London

¹ Grey to Rumbold, 9 July.

² Despatch of Grey to Goschen, 24 June, published in *Grey's Twenty-five Years*, Vol. 1., pp. 303-6.

³ Bunsen to Grey, 12 July.

the language used by Berchtold to a mutual friend on the previous day. This friend, whose name does not occur in the despatch, but who actually was Count Henry Lützow, former Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to the Quirinal, reported that the situation was "regarded in a serious light" at the Ballplatz, that "a kind of indictment" was "being prepared against the Serbian Government for alleged complicity in the conspiracy," and that "immediate unconditional compliance" would be demanded, "failing which, force will be used." Moreover, Germany was "said to be in complete agreement with this procedure." » We know now that Lützow's information was the result of Tisza's conversion to a policy of aggression on 14 July, thanks to Berlin's explicit pledge of support, and thus the Bunsen despatch is the first real clue to the Central Powers' intentions that became available in London during the war.« But it was not worded in such a way as to cause acute alarm at the moment, and it was only later that its full significance became apparent.

As late as 20 July, Sir Edward Grey, in conversation with Prince Lichnowsky, had no definite information regarding the Austro-Serbian dispute, but heard of the assurance given by Berchtold to the Duke of Avarna, denying the gravity of the situation and merely urging the need for clearing it up. Lichnowsky was convinced that "Austria was certainly going to take some step," and "regarded the situation as very uncomfortable."³ He agreed with Grey that the idea of any of the Great Powers "being dragged into a war by Serbia" was "detestable." « At the same time Grey took it for granted that Vienna "would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Serbia,

¹ Bunsen to Grey, 16 July.

² Though first referred to in print in Mr. Steed's *Through Thirty Years*, vol. i » p. 404 (1924), it was already known in 1914 to a limited number of people, including the present writer.

³ Grey to Rumbold, 20 July.

⁴ *British Diplomatic Correspondence*, No. 1.

founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial."

The first direct conversation on the subject of Serbia between Sir Edward Grey and Count Mensdorff took place on 23 July. The reasons for this were that the latter had every interest in avoiding a discussion which might have given some insight into his chief's plans, whereas the former had deliberately refrained from raising a question which he knew that Austria-Hungary regarded as the exclusive concern of Vienna and Belgrade — all the more so because he did not know what evidence Vienna possessed of Serbian complicity.¹

On 20 July Mensdorff received instructions² to communicate the two Notes on the morning of the 24th, adding verbal comments on the "converging tendencies" of British and Austro-Hungarian policy in the Near East, and a reminder of the British attitude towards the murder of 1903, which should make it easier for London to understand the public demand for "atonement" of this new outrage. While, however, Mensdorff pursued the passive rôle which these instructions involved, alarming rumours circulated in the London diplomatic corps, though the general public remained almost without a suspicion of the approaching storm. On 22 July, then, Grey asked Mensdorff to visit him on the following afternoon, and the Ambassador, realising that absolute secrecy would produce a disastrous effect, appealed, to Berchtold* for permission to announce the impending *démarche*. This authorisation he duly obtained/ but contented himself with summarising the contents of the Note to Serbia, instead of showing the full text. Grey at once fastened upon the time-limit, "which was in effect akin to an ultimatum/" and expressed his strong regret. It was then that he uttered his memorable

¹ Mensdorff himself, in his telegram of 23 July to Berchtold (*D.A.*, i., No. 59), deports Grey as speaking in this sense, and there is every reason for regarding as quite accurate.

² *D. A.*, No. (430).

³ *D.A.*, i., No. 54.

⁴ *D.A.*, i., No. 58.

warning as to " the awful consequences involved in the situation "; general war would, he feared, lead to " a complete collapse of European credit and industry, and quite irrespective of who were victors, many things might be completely swept away." ¹ To-day the Foreign Secretary's words have a strongly prophetic ring, for foremost among the many things which the great flood has since swept away are the Habsburg dynasty and state.

Mensdorff reported Grey to be " very anxious " as to the consequences of the *démarche*, and already in favour of " a direct exchange of ideas " between Vienna and St. Petersburg; he also held out the prospect of unfavourable criticism in London. Doubtless prompted by this warning, Berchtold sent his Ambassador two further telegrams of instruction. He was to emphasise Serbia's responsibility in not taking any spontaneous action towards punishing the criminals² and to explain the need for a short time-limit by Vienna's " long years of experience of Serbian dilatory tactics." Next day he told Mensdorff to assure Grey that the *démarche* was not a formal ultimatum, since it would only involve a rupture of diplomatic relations in the first instance, and not actual war. This was, to say the least, disingenuous, in view of Berchtold's real intentions and Berlin's insistence upon haste as essential to avert interference. In any case he promptly destroyed such effect as the argument was likely to have by adding that if it should come to war he would hold Serbia liable for Austria-Hungary's military outlay, since this would be the third mobilisation which she rendered necessary within six years.⁴

¹ *British Diplomatic Correspondence*, No. 3. The essential phrases are correctly quoted in Mensdorff's report to Berchtold. (*D. A.*, i., No. 59.)

² This point is dealt with on p. 134. Berchtold, however, presumably assumed Grey to be ignorant of the Serbian *démarche* in Berlin on 20 July, in this very sense. (See p. 135.)

³ 22 July, *Austro-Hungarian Rotbuch*, No. 9; *D.A.*, I., No. 61.

⁴ 24 July, *D.A.*, ii., No. 13.

Meanwhile Grey, forewarned by Bunsen " that a serious crisis may be at hand,"¹ had discussed with Mensdorff the actual text of the Note to Serbia, and gave classical expression to the general view in Western Europe, by remarking that he " had never before seen one state address to another independent state a document of so formidable a character."* The fifth demand, for instance, seemed to him as " equivalent to the end of Serbia's state independence."³ He expressed " great apprehension " as to the peace of Europe, and in conversation with Prince Lichnowksy, showed himself " very perplexed and uneasy."⁴ " Never before," he said, " had such a tone been employed towards an independent state," and he criticised the form of the Note even more than its contents, pointing out that the time-limit " made any action (*Einwirkung*) impossible."

To Lichnowsky Grey spoke even more frankly, declaring that a state which accepted such demands " would really cease to count as an independent state,"⁶ while an Austrian invasion of Serbia would mean imminent danger of an European War. He therefore put forward a double proposal — (1) a joint German-British request to Vienna for an extension of the time-limit, and (2)

¹ This fear Sir Maurice based on a conversation with Count Forgách. (Bunsen to Grey, 23 July.)

² Grey to de Bunsen, 24 July. *British Diplomatic Correspondence*, No. 5.

³ Mensdorff to Berchtold, 24 July (2.50 p.m.), *O.A.*, ii., No. 14. This telegram is the same as was published as No. 10 in the original *A.H. Red Book*. It is, however, of some importance to compare the two versions, as showing the extent to which the Ballplatz " doctored " its documents before publication. In its ungarbled form it not only confirms in every detail Sir Edward Grey's own version of what occurred (as given in the *British Diplomatic Correspondence*), but also shows him as from the first desperately anxious to preserve peace. But the *Austro-Hungarian Red Book* appeared at a time when Sir Edward was the chief diplomatic scapegoat selected for abuse by the German and Austrian Governments, and therefore facts which revealed him in his true light as would-be peacemaker had to be suppressed or distorted. Thus in this case both his reference to the " formidable character " of the Note and his concluding remarks regarding " what could still be attempted to meet the impending danger " were omitted.

⁴ Mensdorff to Berchtold, 24 July (8.48 p.m.), *O.A.*, ii., No. 15.

⁵ Lichnowsky to Berlin, 24 July, *D.D.*, i., No. 157. On this William II's marginal note is; " Much to be desired. *It is not a state in the European sense, but a band of robbers.*"

mediation *à quatre* between Vienna and St. Petersburg.¹ In further telegrams of the following day Lichnowsky reported the prevalent view in London that such a Note was "inconceivable" without "German encouragement," and for that very reason earnestly begged Berlin not to reject Grey's proposal for postponement.¹ Lichnowsky, in contrast to the heads of his own Foreign Office, understood the Southern Slav Question in its main bearings, and had not hesitated to warn them against Vienna's "adventurous" policy, as unlikely to lead "either to a radical solution of the question or to a destruction of the Panserb movement."⁴ But he failed to convince either Jagow or Zimmermann, although he warned them in ample time* that British opinion would be hostile to the coercion of Serbia. When the Note appeared, the latter assured Lichnowsky that Berlin had not seen it beforehand, but added: "Now, however, that Austria-Hungary, on her own initiative, has decided on sharp language, it is a matter of course that we cannot advise Vienna to yield. Austria-Hungary's prestige at home and abroad would be finally destroyed if she yielded."

The publication at a late period in the war of Prince Lichnowsky's famous Memorandum revealed him as one of the few Germans in authority who, recognising the awful dangers involved, directed his whole efforts towards a peaceful solution. His dispatches from London published since the war showed that he also formed a clear estimate of the issues involved between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, the secret aims and motives of Berchtold, and the probable reaction of British opinion to the general situation.

¹ Here William's comment is categorical; "I won't take any part (*Ich tue nicht mit*) unless Austria expressly asks me, which is not probable." *D.D.*, i., No. 157, p. 171.

² 25 July, *ibid.*, No. 163.

³ *ibid.*, No. 165.

⁴ 16 July, *ibid.*, No. 62. He had warned Grey as early as 6 July of the dangers of an Austro-Serb conflict (with a view to giving him time to act at St. Petersburg in a moderating sense.) ⁵ *ibid.*, No. 20.

⁶ 14 July, *ibid.*, No. 43.

⁷ 24 July, *ibid.*, No. 153.

Lichnowsky's attitude contrasts very markedly with that of the Austro-Hungarian Embassy in London, members of which, he reports to Berlin on 28 July, " have in their conversations with me and my staff never made the slightest attempt to conceal that Austria aims solely at the overthrow of Serbia and that the Note was intentionally framed so as to be unacceptable."¹ Next day we find the German Chancellor telling his Ambassador in Vienna that " in London, Count Mensdorff presents portions of Serbia to Bulgaria and Albania and runs counter to Vienna's solemn declarations at St. Petersburg."

Beyond this point it is unnecessary for us to pursue the course of events in London, which now became one of the central points in that vast diplomatic game commonly referred to as " The Twelve Days." Sir Edward Grey's gallant struggle for peace has been known in its main outline ever since his epoch-making publication of the *British Diplomatic Correspondence* in August 1914; and the German and Austrian documents issued since the war have only served to confirm their accuracy and utterly to dissipate the calumnies so long directed against him from Berlin.' It is my object to disentangle the specifically Austro-Serbian dispute from the far wider issues to which it gave rise; and as the rôle of Serbia, after her answer was delivered on 25 July, became very largely negative in the European crisis, it will suffice to restrict our enquiry to points in which she was directly concerned. This is all the more possible because the central thesis of these pages is that the peace of Europe had been deliberately and irremediably undermined by Austro-Hungarian and German action before 25 July, and therefore that during the period of twelve days upon

¹ *D.D.*, ii., No. 301. Lichnowsky to Berlin.

² i.e. against the territorial curtailment of Serbia, *D.D.*, ii., No. 361; Bethmann Hollweg to Tschirschky, 29 July.

³ It is, of course, but right to add that to-day no serious German historian adheres to the view of Grey generally accepted in 1915-16, just as on the Entente side the Crown Council of Potsdam has been abandoned as a myth.

which attention has hitherto mainly been concentrated, nothing short of a miracle, which did not occur, could have averted disaster.

BERCHTOLD AND ROME

Most remarkable of all, however, was Berchtold's treatment of his Italian ally. It will be remembered that as early as 6 July, at the interview of Count Szögyény with the German Chancellor, it was agreed that the wisest course would be not to inform either Italy or Roumania beforehand as to the action contemplated by Vienna.¹ To this line Berchtold consistently adhered; but he could not fail to realise the bad effect which his silence was likely to produce upon an already restive and highly sensitive ally, and already on 12 July we find him consulting his Ambassador to the Quirinal, Mr. de Mérey, as to whether it would be safe to inform the Marquis San Giuliano of the *démarche* on the previous day, or perhaps a few hours beforehand.² Mérey replied that San Giuliano must be given previous notice, if Berchtold did not wish him to feel " a very grave personal affront." ³ Berchtold then agreed that Rome should be informed of the *démarche* one day in advance, promising to notify Mérey later on as to the exact details.⁴

As time passed, it became increasingly apparent that Rome was scarcely less dangerous than St. Petersburg, as an obstacle to Berchtold's designs; and we see him torn in two between the fear lest Rome might again intervene in favour of peace with the same success as in August 1913, and that other fear — still more present to the German Government — lest failure to let Italy into the secret might be taken to absolve her from her obligations in case of war. His embarrassment was increased both by San Giuliano's sceptical attitude and

¹ *supra*, p. 176; also Gooss, *op. cit.*, p. 34, and *D.A.*, i., No. 7, p. 24.

² Gooss, *op. cit.*, p. 76; *O.A.*, i., No. 16.

³ 14 July, *D.A.*, i., No. 20.

⁴ 15 July, *D.A.*, i., No. 22.

by the consideration which Berlin from the first showed for the Italian point of view.

The German Ambassador in Rome, Baron Flotow, who was on friendly terms with the Foreign Secretary, as early as 16 July¹ describes San Giuliano as highly alarmed at what he could conjecture of Vienna's intentions, his pessimism being increased by the illness which was ere long to prove fatal.» He regarded strong action against Serbia as foredoomed to failure, and drawing a close analogy between the Serbian situation of to-day and that of Italy in the Risorgimento, ascribed, with considerable justice, Berchtold's ineffective Balkan policy to that typical " police " mentality which had brought disaster upon Austria in the 'fifties and 'sixties.³ Impressed by San Giuliano's language, Flotow addressed to Berlin the clear warning that compensation must be found for Italy, or she would attack Austria-Hungary in the back.¹

Even without these warnings Jagow had been led by his personal acquaintance with the Italian situation to anticipate Rome's hostility to any intervention of Vienna in the Balkans and even a claim for compensation. He therefore instructs Tschirschky on 15 July⁶ to raise the question with Berchtold, on the ground that Italy's attitude towards the conflict would have a decisive effect upon Russia and, of course, intimately concerned Germany in the event of a general war. For Tschirschky's own information, Jagow added his opinion that Valona being inadmissible, the Trentino must be regarded as " the sole adequate (*vollwertige*) compensation." It might be distasteful to the Emperor and to public opinion, but the real question was, " what value Italy's attitude has for Austrian policy." Three days later, Jagow returns to the charge, and begs Berchtold to consider whether, by allowing Italy to involve herself at Valona, he would

¹ Flotow to Berlin, *D.D.*, i., No. 73.

² Flotow to Berlin, *D.D.*, i., No. 75.

³ *ibid.*, No. 73.

⁴ 16 July, *ibid.*, No. 75.

⁵ *D.D.*, i., No. 46.

not be greatly easing the Serbian situation for himself. Vienna must be under no illusions; an attack on Serbia will not only be most unfavourably received in Italy, " but will in all probability meet with direct opposition."¹ The moral which Jagow then drew was that " a timely agreement between Vienna and Rome " was urgently needed.

But Berchtold was not to be moved by this sensible advice from Berlin. On 17 July, in conversation with Tschirschky's deputy, Prince Stolberg, he had expressed his intention of placing Italy before a *fait accompli*.^{*} In this he was doubtless confirmed by Mérey's warning that San Giuliano had probably got wind of Vienna's plans through an indiscretion of the German Ambassador, Baron Flotow »; nor, he significantly added, would it be the first time that such a thing had occurred. This warning Berchtold appears to have verified from other secret information; for on 20 July he is able to inform Mérey that San Giuliano had not merely learnt something from Flotow, but had pressed the Russian and Roumanian Governments to make " threatening representations " in Berlin and Vienna, with a view to preventing the latter's action.⁴ When, then, at their next conversation Tschirschky again brought up Jagow's and Flotow's alarm at the attitude of San Giuliano, Berchtold tried to reduce the Ambassador to silence by regretting the leakage and broadly hinting that he knew all about it, since it could not be in Vienna, where the Duke of Avarna was kept entirely in the dark.⁵ He then added that in view of Italy's evident desire to thwart his whole action, he could not begin any discussion with her, and would therefore only give San Giuliano a day's previous notice, which

¹ Jagow to Tschirschky, 18 July, *D.D.*, i., No. 68.

² Stolberg to Jagow, *D.D.*, i., No. 87.

³*D.A.*, i., No. 24.

⁴ Berchtold to Mérey, 20 July; *D.A.*, i., No. 33. Presumably the word " threatening " is Berchtold's version of what can scarcely have been stronger than " urgent " in San Giuliano's instructions to Carlotti and his colleague in Bucarest.

⁵ *Tagesbericht* of Berchtold, 20 July, *D.A.*, *L.* No. 35.

seemed to him " sufficient as an act of courtesy towards an unreliable ally."¹ He refused to be intimidated by the news from Rome, and flatly denied that Italy had any claim to compensation, in view of Austria-Hungary's decision against annexation. That he took such a line towards his friend Tschirschky, whom he must have known to be fully informed as to his own " reservations " and ulterior designs,² throws a curious light upon Berchtold's mental processes.

Meanwhile, to make it more difficult for Berlin to renew its pressure, Berchtold instructed Szögyény to inform Jagow that he objected at the present juncture to any discussion of the question of compensation with Rome.¹

Acting then in accordance with this *non possumus* attitude, he transmitted to Mérey on 20 July a full statement of Austro-Hungarian policy towards Italy,⁴ instructions for the Ambassador's forthcoming interview with San Giuliano/ and on the same day the Note to Serbia and the covering Note to the Powers, for communication on the morning of the 24th. Italy's claim to possible compensation rested on Article VII of the Triple Alliance, which aimed at " the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Balkans " (*dans les régions des Balkans*), and which debarred either Austria-Hungary or Italy from altering this " by temporary or permanent occupation," save " after a previous agreement between the two Powers . . . on the basis of mutual compensation." Berchtold now argued that the words " *dans les régions des Balkans* " only applied to *Turkish* territory, and not to that of the Balkan states, and that consequently this clause could not be invoked in respect of action directed against Serbia. Mérey was to take this line if the subject of compensation was raised by San Giuliano, but was to

¹ *ibid.*, p. 102.

³ Gooss, *op. cit.*, p. 121; *D.A.*, i., No. 32 (2).

⁴ *Rotbuch (Italian)*, No. 2; *D.A.*, i., No. 32 (x).

⁵ *Rotbuch (Italien)*, No. 1; *D.A.*, i., No. 34.

² see *supra*, pp. 187, 191, 201, 213.

⁶*O.A.*, i., No. 30 (a).

" avoid further discussion." In order to allay the Foreign Minister's alarm, he was to state that Vienna " had no thought of a campaign of conquest or an incorporation of Serbian territories," or again of seizing Lovcen, as rumoured in the *Temps*.¹ He was also to make the deliberately misleading statement that he had as yet " no precise information regarding the Sarajevo enquiry," but that though " serious language " would be necessary in Belgrade, yet Vienna regarded " a peaceful issue as thoroughly possible."

The interview duly took place on 21 July.» San Giuliano showed himself " much preoccupied," and insisted that the quarrel with Serbia could only be solved by " conciliation," not by " humiliation and force." While reaffirming his desire for "a strong Austria-Hungary ' ' (Mérey had reminded him of his assurances in this sense to Berchtold at their meeting at Abbázia in April 1914), he made it clear that any extension of territory by Austria-Hungary would be regarded as contrary to Italian interests. He would support any such demands upon Serbia as could be " legitimately " fulfilled, but could not go further without antagonising the whole of national and irredentist opinion in Italy. Mérey's own impression, as reported to Vienna, was that San Giuliano was full of " mental reserves," but as yet considered that war would be averted by the Powers bringing pressure to bear in Belgrade.

It is obvious that Mérey did not succeed in allaying San Giuliano's alarm, for next day, and again on 22 July, he told the German Ambassador that he regarded the situation as " extremely critical,"* announced his intention of discussing it with the Premier, Signor Salandra, and then suggested that the three of them should meet on the 24th for a kind of German-Italian " *Aussprache*."⁵

¹ *D.A.*, i., No. 42.

² *ibid.*, p. 100.

³ Mérey to Berchtold, 21 July, *O.A.*, i., No. 43.

⁴ Flotow to Berlin, 22 July, *D.D.*, i., No. 109.

⁵ Flotow to Berlin, 23 July, *D.D.*, i., No. 119.

Before this could take place, the relations of Vienna and Rome were still further complicated by Mérey's failure to give San Giuliano previous notice of the intended *demarche* in Belgrade. Whether the blame for this should be ascribed to contradictory instructions sent to him by Berchtold, or to a belief that in remaining inactive he was really interpreting Berchtold's inmost wishes, or again simply to his own ill-health and a misunderstanding as to the Foreign Minister's whereabouts on the critical day,¹ must remain a matter of conjecture. Certainly his German colleague in Rome seems to have been quite clear as to the cause, for he informs Berlin how much his own difficulties had been increased by Mérey's illness and the incompetence of his deputy,² and alludes to the "complete inefficiency (*gänzlich* *Versagen*) of the Austro-Hungarian Embassy, which for a fortnight past had been virtually without contact with San Giuliano and had done nothing whatever in the press."³

In any case the fact remains that Rome had its first intimation of Austria-Hungary's action against Serbia on the morning of 24 July, at least sixteen hours after the Note had been delivered in Belgrade, and that even then the Consulta only received a bare notification of the fact, and not the actual text of the Note, and this not from the Ambassador, who was in bed, but from his substitute Count Ambrózy.« In other words, Italy not merely received no previous intimation of action which was certain to affect her own treaty obligations and international security, but was actually left without information longer than any of the Powers belonging to either European grouping.

Under such circumstances it is not surprising that

¹ Mérey's instructions and behaviour are given in detail by Gooss, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-4, but these details simply tend to obscure the real cause.

² Flotow to Berlin, 24 July, *D.D.*, i., No. 156.

³ Flotow to Berlin, 25 July, *D.D.*, i., No. 167.

⁴ Flotow to Berlin, 24 July, *D.D.*, i., No. 136.

Flotow's conversation with Salandra and San Giuliano was somewhat "agitated" (*erregt*).¹ The two statesmen at once made it clear that Italy regarded action so " momentous " and " aggressive " as the Austro-Hungarian *demarche* without previous warning, as contrary to the spirit of the Triple Alliance, and could not therefore feel " engaged " for the future. San Giuliano in particular insisted that there could be no *casus fcederis* in a case of such obvious aggression, and raised the question of compensation. Flotow deduces from their attitude three main issues — fear of Italian public opinion, a sense of Italy's military weakness, and the desire to extract something for Italy out of the crisis — if possible the Trentino.* He adds his own view that " the sole possibility of keeping hold of Italy is a timely promise of compensation." »

A day later he supplied a further motive for San Giuliano's nervousness, namely, the fear lest Austria-Hungary's action might create a precedent for similar complaints against the Italian irredenta. He reports San Giuliano to be unconvinced regarding Vienna's disclaimers of annexation, and suggests that Rome would prefer to submit the delicate question of compensation to the mediation of Berlin, rather than treat direct with Vienna through two Ambassadors so unsuitable for the purpose as Mérey and Avarna.⁴ This suggestion Jagow dismissed as impossible.* But he had lost no time in trying to allay the bad effect of Berchtold's bungling in Rome, by assuring San Giuliano⁷ that Germany also was " not informed in detail about the Austrian Note, *and indeed did not want to be.*" This was hardly honest,

¹ *ibid.*, No. 156.

² Flotow to Bethmann Hollweg, 25 July, *D.D.*, i., No. 244.

³ *ibid.*, No. 168 (which is No. 156 transmitted more fully by Jagow to William II).

⁴ Flotow to Berlin, 26 July, *D.D.*, I., No. 211. As Sir Maurice de Bunsen points out (*British Diplomatic Correspondence*, No. 161), Avarna " was left completely in the dark " by Berchtold " during this critical time."

⁶ Jagow to Flotow, 26 July, *D.D.*, i., No. 239.

⁷ Jagow to Flotow, 24 July, *D.D.*, i., No. 145

considering that Berlin, though ignorant of the actual text of the Note to Serbia, had been repeatedly consulted by Vienna, had been kept posted by Tschirschky as to Berchtold's intentions, had received ample and detailed notice of the procedure to be adopted¹ and could at any moment have imposed upon Vienna a more moderate attitude.

Jagow was left in no doubt as to Italy's policy. Her Ambassador in Berlin announced on 24 July that she would adopt towards Austria-Hungary "as benevolent and friendly an attitude as possible," but must have a clear interpretation of Article VII of the Alliance, otherwise she must direct her aim towards preventing the Monarchy's territorial extension²; while in Vienna the Duke of Avarna notified to Berchtold that Italy reserved her right to compensation under Article VII. The German Government was thus in an unfortunate situation between its two allies, and while re-emphasising its support to Vienna and even urging greater speed as the best means of averting intervention/ informed Berchtold quite plainly that it associated itself with the Italian interpretation of Article VII and held compensation to Italy to be necessary, even in the event of a temporary occupation of Balkan territory. The General Staff reminded the politicians that Germany's whole military action would be endangered if Italy did not recognise the *casus fœderis*, and both the Chancellor' and the Emperor William himself« impressed upon Berchtold the vital

»See *supra*, pp. 191, 192, 194, 195, also 179; Tschirschky's despatches to Berlin, *D.D.*, I., Nos. 19, 29, 40, 49, 50, 65.

¹ Jagow to Tschirschky, 24 July, *D.D.*, i., No. 150.

² *Austro-Hungarian Rotbuch (Italien)*, No. 9.

³ Tschirschky to Berlin, 26 July, *D.D.*, i., No. 213; Szögyény to Berchtold, 25 July, *D.A.*, ii., No. 32; *Tagesbericht* of Berchtold, 26 July, *D.A.*, iL, No. 63.

⁴ Bethmann Hollweg to Tschirschky, 26 July, *D.D.*, i., No. 202: "Vienna must not evade this (understanding) by doubtful interpretations of the Treaty, but must take decisions in keeping with the gravity of the situation."

⁵ Jagow to Tschirschky (transmitting the Emperor's orders), 27 July, *D.D.*, i., No. 267.

importance of a speedy agreement between Vienna and Rome. Yet as late as 28 July Berchtold, in conversation with Avarna, was still insisting that the quarrel concerned no one save Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and though denying all idea of annexations, declined to give any binding declaration to this effect.¹ At last, however, on the same day he did instruct Mérey to inform San Giuliano that Austria-Hungary, while "not foreseeing or intending territorial acquisitions," would, if compelled to resort to them, be ready to discuss with Italy the question of compensation.* For the Ambassador's own guidance he added that he had only consented to "such concessions," because of the great issues involved, which demanded the closest co-operation between the three allies.

By this time, however, it was clear that Italy's active assistance was out of the question and that her neutrality was the very best that could be hoped for. Such was the result of Berchtold's secrecy and obstinacy.

Conrad, meanwhile, was quite clear as to the need for devising some kind of compensation for Italy; but it is typical of his reckless outlook that on 26 July he suggested in all seriousness to the German Ambassador that Italy might be allowed to seize Montenegro.³ In this connection it is not uninteresting to note that both Vesnic, the Serbian Minister in Paris, and his colleague, Tittoni, the Italian Ambassador, had expressed to the Quai d'Orsay their alarm lest Austria-Hungary might make a sudden attack on Mount Lovcen, in order to prevent Serbo-Montenegrin co-operation.⁴

The negotiations between Vienna and Rome may at

¹ Berchtold to Mérey and Szögyény, 28 July, *D.A.*, iL, No. 87.

² *ibid.*, p. 162; Gooss, *op. cit.*, p. 192. On 27 July, however, he had authorised Szápáry (*B.A.*, iL, No. 75) to inform Carlotti and Sazonov that Austria-Hungary, so long as war with Serbia was localised, did not intend to make any territorial conquests.

³ *D. D.*, iL, No. 326, Tschirschky to Jagow.

⁴ Bunsen to Grey, 21 July, reporting conversation with Dumaine.

first sight seem to lie outside the immediate scope of the present enquiry. But the reader will, it is hoped, admit that nothing illustrates more clearly Austria-Hungary's " will to war " and the crooked methods employed to attain that end, while all the evidence would seem to suggest that Berchtold was following a sure instinct in this policy of concealment, and that San Giuliano, if initiated in time, would have found some means of preventing the contemplated aggression.¹

BUCAREST

Special attention deserves to be paid to the attitude of Roumania during the weeks following the murder. As has already been shown,* both Vienna and Berlin had for some time been highly alarmed at the progressive alienation of Roumania from the Triple Alliance, and Count Czernin had reported from Bucarest the fears expressed by King Charles that in the event of war he could no longer be sure of carrying the country with him. Both the Ballplatz and the Wilhelmstrasse, however, were disposed to exaggerate the King's control of foreign policy, and the Emperor William in particular was confident that his intervention at Bucarest would restore the old harmony. Czernin challenged the accuracy of this view, and adhered to his opinion after the murder. Early in July he reported to Berchtold a conversation in which the King expressed " great pessimism " as to the future of Austria-Hungary, and had insisted upon the need for drawing a distinction between the assassins (*Mordbuben*) and official Serbia.³ To the German Chargé d'Affaires the King poured cold water on the

¹ It is worth adding that Tschirschky protested very strongly to Macchio, on 25 July, at the Ballplatz's failure to fulfil its promise to inform San Giuliano beforehand. (Tschirschky to Berlin, 25 July. *D.D.*, I., No. 187.) Macchio shoved the blame on to Mérey.

² *supra*, pp. 93~5.

³ Jagow to Waldburg (Chargé in Bucarest), 13 July, summarising Czernin's report, as read to him by Szögyény. *D.D.*, I., No. 39.

idea of drawing Bulgaria into the Triple Alliance under present circumstances. Bulgaria, he argued, could not be trusted, and if Russia got wind of the negotiations she would promptly make a revolution at Sofia, and the existing Government could easily be swept away. He himself was quite ready to meet the Emperor William's wishes by "drawing back from Serbia" and trying to restrain the anti-Austrian agitation in Roumania, but in that case Hungary must make things easier for her Roumanian subjects.¹ In a longer conversation with Prince Waldburg on 10 July, King Charles spoke still more frankly. He admitted that he had twice warned Czernin of his inability to fulfil his treaty obligations in the teeth of Roumanian public opinion. He recognised that William II "had always worked in Vienna for an understanding with Serbia." He threw doubts upon Russia's alleged design to reconstruct the Balkan league with a special point against Austria-Hungary. Above all, he re-emphasised "the hopelessness of an alliance with Bulgaria." The Ballplatz seemed to him to have "lost its head," and it would be well if Berlin could dispel the lack of confidence prevailing in Vienna. In this connection the King referred to "the political abilities" of Count Berchtold "in not exactly flattering terms."

By way of practical suggestion he held that Berlin should appeal to the Russian Government to discourage Austrophobe tendencies in Serbia, and he declared himself ready, if desired, to exercise similar pressure in Belgrade and to support any action in this sense in St. Petersburg, though he must not be revealed as the originator of the proposal. From Prince Waldburg's report it is evident that King Charles attached the very greatest importance to such steps, but Berlin does not seem to have followed the matter up.

These various communications made it clear to

¹ Waldburg to Berlin, 10 July, *D.D., i.*, No. 28.

Berchtold that Bucarest definitely favoured peace, and could not be utilised for his designs. This explains why, during the last week before the ultimatum and the eve of actual war, Roumania is allowed by Austria-Hungary to drop out of the picture, despite the very definite knowledge that she was willing to play a mediatory rôle and could have done so with perhaps greater effect than any other Power.

CHAPTER IX

THE ULTIMATUM TO SERBIA

It was necessary to describe in some detail the methods by which Berchtold secured immunity from intervention on the part of any of the Great Powers. The procedure adopted towards Belgrade need not detain us long.

The discussions at the Joint Council of 7 July make it quite clear that tactical rather than moral considerations were the determining factor at Vienna. To the majority present the murder provided an admirable excuse for an already contemplated attack upon Serbia; and, as the latter was not to be regarded as a civilised nation, any preliminary warning might be dispensed with. Even Tisza based his criticism of the proposed policy solely on tactical grounds, pointing out that in the Balkans it was always easy enough to manufacture a pretext, but that on the present occasion the ground was insufficiently prepared. It is especially noteworthy that Berchtold regarded the enquiry at Sarajevo as of secondary importance, and only ordered a high Ballplatz official, Herr von Wiesner, to be sent there, at the instance of Tisza, who favoured the preparation of a *dossier* as a means of impressing Europe.

We have already seen that Wiesner, so far from establishing the guilt of the Serbian Government, reached the opposite conclusion that that guilt was not merely incapable of proof, but extremely improbable.¹ His concrete proposals were therefore restricted to: (1) Measures to prevent the connivance of Serbian officials in smuggling persons and material across the frontier;

¹ See above, p. 117; *D.A.*, i., No. 17.

(2) Dismissal of the individuals actually responsible for letting through Princip and his friends; and (3) Criminal proceedings against Ciganovic and Tankosic, the two individuals who supplied them with weapons at Belgrade. None the less, the Ballplatz continued to hold up the thesis of official complicity, and instructed its representatives abroad to treat the Sarajevo enquiry as proving that the outrage is " the work of a widely ramified conspiracy whose threads reach over to the neighbouring kingdom."¹

The Note itself opens with a reference to the Note of 31 March, 1909, by which Serbia, at the instance of the Powers, assured Vienna that the annexation of Bosnia did not " affect her rights," and promised to change her policy towards Austria-Hungary and " henceforth live on neighbourly terms with the latter." These pledges, however, had not prevented the growth of " a subversive movement " in Serbia, aiming at the detachment of the Monarchy's southern territories; and the Serbian Government, so far from suppressing this, had " tolerated the criminal activity of various societies directed against the Monarchy, the unbridled language of the Press, the glorification of assassins, the share of officers and officials in subversive action, an unhealthy educational propaganda — in short, everything which could lead the Serbian population to hate and despise Austria-Hungary and its institutions. " It now resulted from the enquiry in Sarajevo and "the confessions of the murderers" that the crime had been " hatched in Belgrade," that the arms and explosives in their possession had been given them by Serbian officers and officials belonging to the Narodna Odbrana, and finally that the entrance of the criminals into Bosnia had been " organised and effected by the heads of the Serbian frontier service."

In order, then, to make such things impossible in the future, Austria-Hungary demanded that the Serbian

¹ Berchtold to nine Ministers. 23 July; *D.A., L*, No. 73.

Government should issue a formal condemnation of all this " criminal and terrorist propaganda," and a pledge for its energetic repression, and that this should appear, in the actual wording dictated from Vienna, both in the official journal at Belgrade, and in an " order of the day " specially addressed by King Peter to the Serbian army. In addition to this, the Serbian Government was to fulfil the following ten demands:

1. To suppress all publications inciting to hatred of Austria-Hungary and directed against her territorial integrity.

2. To dissolve forthwith the Narodna Odbrana, and " to confiscate all its means of propaganda "; to treat similarly all societies engaged in propaganda against Austria-Hungary, and to prevent their revival in some other form.

3. To eliminate from the Serbian educational system anything which might foment such propaganda.

4. To dismiss all officers or officials guilty of such propaganda, whose names might be subsequently communicated by Vienna.

5. To accept " the collaboration in Serbia " of Austro-Hungarian officials in suppressing " this subversive movement against the Monarchy's territorial integrity."

6. To open a judicial enquiry against those implicated in the murder, and to allow delegates of Austria-Hungary to take part in this.

7. To arrest without delay Major Tankosic and Milan Ciganovic, as implicated by the Sarajevo enquiry.

8. To put an effectual stop to Serbian frontier officials sharing in " the illicit traffic in arms and explosives," and to dismiss certain officials at Sabac and Loznica who had helped the murderers to cross over.

9. To give explanations regarding the " unjustifiable " language used by high Serbian officials after the murder.

10. To notify without delay to Vienna the execution of all the above measures.

Finally, a time-limit of only forty-eight hours was imposed for compliance. The whole form of the document was curt and severe in the extreme.

In a private letter of instructions,¹ Berchtold informed his Minister in Belgrade, Baron Giesl, that the Note contained the " minimum " necessary " to clear up our present quite untenable relation to Serbia." Under no circumstances, he added, could any extension of time be conceded, and there could be "no negotiations, only unconditional acceptance." Giesl was further ordered, in delivering the Note, to refuse all information as to Austria-Hungary's subsequent intentions, but to remind the Serbs that she had twice, in recent years, been driven by their action to costly military measures, and that if this happened again she would hold them liable for all the expenditure incurred. Failing acceptance within the time-limit, Giesl was to leave Belgrade instantly with his entire staff.«

On 21 July, Berchtold, having learnt in the interval that Basic had left Belgrade on an electioneering campaign, told Giesl to notify the Serbian Foreign Office that they might expect to receive " an important communication on the afternoon of the 23rd,"³ but, if even this should not bring Pasic back to Belgrade in time, the Minister was to hand it over " under all circumstances " to the Premier's substitute. Finally, as an after-thought, and in order to make assurance doubly sure, Berchtold intimated to Giesl that even the resignation of the Serbian Cabinet would not be accepted by Vienna as an excuse for delay.⁴

¹ 20 July; *D.A.*, i., No. 28.

³ 21 July; *D.A.*, i., No. 36.

² See further *D.A.*, ii., No. 1.

⁴ 23 July; *D.A.*, i., No. 63.

Giesl himself does not appear to have exercised much influence upon Berchtold's decisions; but that he was in entire agreement with them is shown by a long despatch which he sent to his chief on 21 July, and in which he laid it down as " a well-known axiom that Serbia's policy rests on the detachment of the Southern Slav provinces, and eventually on the destruction of the Monarchy as a Great Power, and knows this aim only." ¹ Austria-Hungary, he declares, is not merely hated but despised by the Serbs, their Press continually discusses its impending collapse, and the alarm with which they at first viewed the possible consequences of the murder has vanished day by day, until the danger of energetic action by Vienna is being dismissed as mere bluff. The conclusion which Giesl reaches is that " a war for the Monarchy's position as a Great Power, and even for its existence as such," is quite inevitable, and that punishment should be enforced regardless of consequences.

Before the time came for Giesl to act upon his instructions, a last opportunity of restraining Berchtold presented itself to the German Government. On 21 July the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin announced to Jagow his Government's desire for good relations with Austria-Hungary, and its readiness " to fulfil all Austria-Hungary's demands for a strict enquiry into the murder, in so far as they were compatible with the honour and sovereignty " of Serbia.¹ At the same time he begged Germany " to use her influence upon Vienna in a conciliatory sense." To this Jagow curtly replied that Serbia had in recent years been so lacking in correct and neighbourly behaviour that energetic language from Vienna was only to be expected. He then told Tschirschky to inform Berchtold of the Serbian *démarche* and this answer, and pointedly omitted all attempts at conciliation. Hence it is hardly too much to assume

¹ *D.A., i.*, No. 37.

² Jagow to Tschirschky, 20 July (*D.D., L.*, No. 91), and *Tagesbericht* of Berchtold *re* conversation with Tschirschky, 21 July (*D.A., i.*, No. 38).

that Jagow's rebuff to Serbia was a direct encouragement to Berchtold to persist in his design of presenting such demands as no Government *could* regard as compatible with its honour and sovereignty.

So far, indeed, from urging conciliation, Jagow next day specially warned Berchtold of a slight detail which, if overlooked, might render outside intervention possible. We have seen that the German Government did not see the text of the Note before its final adoption (after the event Jagow assured Rome that they had not *wished* to see it!), but that they were kept closely informed from Vienna as to each step of the proposed action.¹ They knew, then, that the Note was to be delivered in Belgrade between 4 and 5 p.m. on 23 July,¹ as being the earliest moment which would ensure its tenor not becoming known in St. Petersburg before Poincaré's departure.³ It now occurred to Jagow that if the Note was delivered before 5 o'clock it might just arrive in time for Poincaré, who was timed to leave at 11 p.m. (that is, 9.30 by Central European time). He therefore sent Vienna telegraphic warning of this danger/ and in due course received an answer conveying Berchtold's " warmest thanks " for the hint, and announcing that Giesl had been instructed to postpone the delivery of the Note till 6 o'clock.⁴ This detail deserves emphasis, as showing the minute attention devoted to the whole affair in Berlin. This results very clearly from the German Diplomatic Documents, which contain Jagow's special wire to the Ambassador in St. Petersburg asking the exact hour of Poincaré's departure, and his request to the Admiralty Staff to provide him with a time-table — days and hours — of the President's cruise." Thus Berlin's

¹ cf. pp. 191-2, 194-5, 238. » Berchtold to Giesl, 20 July; *D.A.*, i., No. 27.

² Stolberg to Bethmann Hollweg, 17 July; *D.D.*, i., No. 65.

³ Jagow to Tschirschky, 22 July; *D.D.*, i., No. 112. This was ordered by Berchtold in his wire to Giesl, 23 July; *D.A.*, i., No. 62.

⁴ Tschirschky to Berlin, 23 July; *D.D.*, i., No. 127.

⁵ See *D.D.*, i., Nos. 93» 96. and 108.

share in the plan for deluding and eliminating Poincaré at the height of the crisis is proved up to the hilt.

It is worth adding that, while Berchtold insisted upon referring to the Note as a "*démarche* with time-limit" (*eine befristete Demarche*), not only Giesl himself,¹ but the German Government from the first recognised its true character as "an ultimatum"² His contention that only action which led to immediate hostilities, and not merely to a diplomatic rupture, can be described as an ultimatum, may be dismissed as an obvious quibble. Indeed, an amusing light is thrown upon this point by one of William II's marginal notes. When the German Ambassador in Paris reported upon the French view that discussion might be allowed on minor points of the Note, his Imperial master commented as follows: "Ultimata are fulfilled or not, but there is no more discussion! Hence the name!"³

Punctually at the time appointed Giesl called at the Serbian Foreign Office. He was received, in Mr. Pasic's continued absence, by the Minister of Finance, Mr. Pacu, who, without reading the Note, expressed the fear that, in view of the elections and the absence of Ministers in their constituencies, it would be physically impossible to call a full Cabinet Meeting at such short notice. To this Giesl sarcastically rejoined that in so small a country as Serbia it would be easy enough to recall everyone very rapidly.

In these pages I have described in some detail the efforts of Berchtold to conceal his real intentions till the very last moment, and his success in deceiving almost every European capital. But nowhere was he more successful than at Belgrade, and, indeed, the way in which the Serbian Government was taken unawares by

¹ Gooss, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

² Moreover, Berchtold himself, in his conversation as early as 9 July, was comfortably discussing an "ultimatum," to be delivered on the 22nd. See Conrad, *op. cit.*, iv., p. 61.

³ *D.D.*, i., No. 154.

the ultimatum is one of the strangest incidents in the whole story. Mr. Pasic himself was more absorbed than anyone in the electoral struggle, but such thought as he could still spare for other matters was given, not to the Austrian danger, but to the problem of Serbo-Greek relations. On 19 July he had formally appointed Mr. Pacu as acting Premier *and Foreign Minister*, and left for Nis with Mr. Sajinovic, a high Foreign Office official, intending to proceed a few days later to Salonica and confer with Mr. Venizelos. When the ultimatum arrived, Pasic was in a remote corner of the former Sandjak of Novipazar, and, in order that the grave news from Belgrade should be conveyed to him, a mounted gendarme had to ride out from Mitrovica for twenty or thirty miles. Even then he failed to grasp the situation, and thought of continuing his journey to Salonica; it was only in response to urgent telephonic messages to Nis from Mr. Slavko Grujic, then permanent Secretary in the Foreign Office, that he at last allowed his carriage to be uncoupled from the Salonica train and sent back to Belgrade. It is difficult to acquit him and his colleagues of great remissness or lack of judgment, and it seems clear that the prompt adoption of a positive policy of investigation into the crime, and the offer of satisfaction to Vienna, would have completely dislocated Berchtold's secret plans, and rendered aggression on his part much more difficult. But this much may be said for Pasic and his colleagues — that this undoubted absorption and remissness goes a long way to invalidate the reckless charges of complicity sometimes levelled against them.

THE IMPRESSION IN EUROPE

The first stage of Berchtold's design had thus been successfully accomplished, and the Note had been safely delivered in Belgrade, without Europe having more than an inkling of what was impending. The second and

more difficult stage — that of convincing Europe that such action was reasonable and need not lead to foreign intervention — had now been reached.

On the morning of 24 July the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors in the capitals of the five Great Powers and in Constantinople, acting on Berchtold's instructions of four days earlier, presented copies of the Note to Serbia, and with it a covering Note to the Powers.¹ This latter, in the main, reiterates in other language the accusations of the Note itself, and draws a contrast between Serbia's criminal agitation on the one hand, and Austria-Hungary's longanimity, and especially her benevolent attitude towards Serbian expansion in 1912-13, on the other. By laying stress upon Serbia's breach of the pledge of 1909, as involving her "in conflict with the will of Europe," it seemed to be inviting some definite expression of approval, and this impression was increased by the concluding appeal for the sympathy "of all civilised nations," with Austria-Hungary's endeavour to prevent immunity for "regicide as a political weapon," and to eliminate Belgrade's continued menace to the peace of Europe. Berchtold had either not thought out the possible effects of such an appeal or had rashly assumed that the foulness of the crime of Sarajevo had permanently blunted Europe's critical sense. In any case, no sooner did any suggestion of modification reach him than he made it quite clear that the covering Note was not intended to elicit replies from the Powers, but merely as an act of international courtesy.» When, too, Sazonov skilfully treated the appeal to the Note of 1909 as a proof that the quarrel was a concern of all Europe, and entitled Europe to examine into the charges against Serbia, Berchtold insisted more rigidly than ever — and in this he had the

¹ *D.A.*, i., No. 29.

² This view was first expressed by Baron Macchio in his interview with Prince Kudashev (see above, p. 212); but it was promptly and emphatically endorsed by Berchtold himself (*D.A.*, ii., Nos. 29 and 30).

fullest possible backing from Germany — that the quarrel was the exclusive concern of Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

The general impression which the Note to Serbia produced in Europe may fairly be epitomised in the remark of Sir Edward Grey to Count Mensdorff that he " had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character." Not unnaturally, the very brief time-limit caused the most unfavourable comment of all, since it was so obviously intended to render impossible any kind of mediation from the outside. It seems probable that the curious mentality of the Ballplatz was swayed in this by historical analogies. Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, by his rigid attitude at Olmütz in 1850, had forced Prussia to capitulate within a space of two days, while the ultimatum which Austria presented to Sardinia in April 1859 contained a time-limit of only three days. And, to turn to a much more recent period, there is not much doubt that Italy's failure to give previous warning to Vienna of her impending Tripolitan War was considered a good reason for not informing Rome as to the Dual Monarchy's designs against Serbia.

Far more significant, however, than any comments of the foreign Press was the German Government's reception of the Note. Tschirschky had informed them at every stage of its main tenor, but, as the decisive day drew near, they not unnaturally became impatient, being torn between the desire to know its exact text and the desire to be able to assure Rome of their ignorance. Berchtold distinctly promised Tschirschky to show him the text before it was finally submitted to Francis Joseph,¹ but did not keep his word; and on 21 July he telegraphed from Ischl to Macchio, at the Ballplatz, informing him that the Note could not be given to Tschirschky till the next morning, " as there were

¹ *D.D.*, i., No. 50 — Tschirschky to Bethmann Hollweg (last sentence).

still some corrections to be made."¹ Macchio's colleague, Forgách, however, yielding to Tschirschky's insistence, presented him with a copy on that very day (21 July), with the result that it reached the Wilhelmstrasse on the 22nd more or less simultaneously from Tschirschky and from Szögyény. Jagow, according to his own account, when he received the Note, at once expressed the view that it was "sharp enough" (*reichlich scharf*), and "overshot the mark."¹ He also complained at its being submitted to him "at so late a stage as to prevent all possibility of expressing any opinion upon it" (*dazu Stellung zu nehmen*).^{*} According to another source,⁴ Jagow went much further, and told Szögyény that "the Note had the fault that it broke down all bridges," adding that "however sharp a Note might be, it must always leave an exit open, for the event of the other party being ready to give way." This is a valuable admission that the impression conveyed to Berlin, as to the rest of Europe, was a deliberate advancement of impossible demands.'

Jagow's chief, the German Chancellor, also expressed his regret at the Note's sharpness,« though in his Memoirs he has attempted to argue that Austria-Hungary, if she had used "velvet gloves," would only have aggravated the Panzerb danger, and that therefore sharp methods offered the best hope for a lasting peace.⁷

Very valuable evidence of the German attitude is provided by two despatches and a telegram sent by the British Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, Sir Horace Rumbold,

¹D.A., i., No. 46.

²Jagow, *Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieges*, p. no.

³ It is curious that he should have used this of all phrases; for William II and the Wilhelmstrasse had from the first made a special point of *refusing* all idea of "Stellungnehmen" towards Vienna's demands.

⁴ Wedel to Bussche, 5 September, 1917; *D.D.*, iv., Anhang ix., p. 172.

⁵ Jagow also confessed to Sir Horace Rumbold on 25 July that the Note "left much to be desired as a diplomatic document" (*British Diplomatic Correspondence*, No. 18). Tschirschky, on the other hand, told his colleague, Sir M. de Bunsen, that "he endorses every line of it." See telegram of Bunsen to Grey, despatched and received 30 July.

⁶ Bethmann Hollweg, *Betrachtungen sum Weltkriege*, i., p. 139.

⁷ *ibid.*, p. 140.

to Sir Edward Grey during this critical period, but not published in the original *British White Paper* of August 1914. Of these, the first in time,¹ describes a conversation between Rumbold and Jagow, who took his favourite line that the quarrel concerned no one save Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that this precluded Berlin from "making any remarks" to Vienna. Jagow "did not accuse the Serbian Government of direct complicity," but "considered that by doing nothing to check the unbridled utterances of a portion of the Serbian Press" they "were partly responsible for the creation of a situation which made that crime possible." He had told the Serbian representative "over and over again that it was very desirable that Serbia should put her relations with Austria-Hungary on a proper footing, and should take steps to control the Serbian Press," but received the answer that the Serbian Press was free, and that no Government could interfere with it. He gave it as his opinion that Austria-Hungary had shown "great forbearance," and left on Rumbold the definite impression that he "would approve prompt and vigorous action," and was "aware of the general character" of the impending *démarche*.

In a telegram of 24 July¹ Rumbold reports a conversation which the French Ambassador, M. Jules Cambon, had had that afternoon with Herr von Jagow. Cambon bluntly described as an untenable "fiction" the German theory that "the question at issue between Austria-Hungary and Serbia was an internal one, and could be localised." To this Jagow simply rejoined that "Serbia would doubtless give way." When asked by Cambon whether he seriously considered it possible for Serbia to accept certain of the demands, Jagow argued that it was "for the *Entente* to advise moderation at Belgrade." Cambon took advantage of this opening, and asked

¹ Rumbold to Grey, sent 22, received 27 July.

² Rumbold to Grey, sent and received 24 July.

whether Germany " would not also enjoin moderation on their ally." To this Jagow, " after some reflection, said ' that would depend on circumstances.¹ " He again denied previous knowledge of the Note, but admitted that it was too stiff. Cambon expressed to Rumbold the view that Austria-Hungary and Germany " are playing a dangerous game of bluff, and think that they can carry matters through with a high hand."

THE SERBIAN ANSWER

To the Serbian Government, absorbed in an acrimonious electoral campaign and deluded into a false sense of security by Vienna's long silence, the Austro-Hungarian Note came almost as a bolt from the blue, and caused corresponding consternation. It is true that prolonged Press polemics between Vienna, Budapest, and Belgrade had kept public opinion in an excited state, and, again, that the Government had received clear warning from its Minister in Vienna, Mr. Jovan M. Jovanovic, against optimistic views.¹ But, though he added that Austria was probably preparing for war with Serbia, regarded her as exhausted after the two Balkan Wars, and counted upon overcoming her resistance " before Europe could intervene," it does not appear that the Pasic Cabinet took any precautionary measures at this stage, or realised the full gravity of the situation. Perhaps the most striking proof of this attitude is the fact that it allowed the Serbian Commander-in-Chief, Voivode Putnik, to pursue his cure at an Austrian watering-place, with the result that the outbreak of war found him still upon enemy territory, and that only the special intervention of Francis Joseph made his return to Serbia possible.

After reading the Note, Mr. Pacu hurriedly summoned the Premier, Mr. Pasic, back to Belgrade, and during the next two days feverish discussions were held between

¹ 7 (20), July, *Serbian Blue Book*, No. 31.

the Cabinet and the Prince Regent. On 24 July Prince Alexander addressed to the Tsar a long appeal for help, reaffirming Serbia's readiness to open an enquiry into complicity in " the horrible crime " of Sarajevo, and to accept all such demands as " are compatible with the position of an independent State, *as well as* those to which your Majesty may advise us to agree," * but pointing out the impossibility of carrying out certain of the demands without new legislation, which was, of course, ruled out by the time-limit. Fearing an immediate attack from the Austro-Hungarian armies concentrating on the frontier, the Prince appealed to the Tsar's " noble Slav heart " for speedy Russian aid and renewed interest in Serbia's fate. Save for this telegram and the Tsar's answer three days later, * the messages exchanged between St. Petersburg and Belgrade have not been made public. There is a certain amount of indirect evidence to show that great pressure was brought to bear by the Russian upon the Serbian Government, to ensure a maximum of concessions to Austria-Hungary's demands. For instance, this impression, formed by Sir Edward Grey in conversation with the Serbian Minister in London, Mr. Boskovic, is transmitted with approval by the German Ambassador to Berlin.* But, in point of fact, the first telegram from St. Petersburg on the subject reached Belgrade a few hours after the departure of Giesl. It is true that it urged caution and concession, but it could have no influence upon the tenor of the Serbian Answer, which was the unaided work of the Belgrade Government.⁴ The anxiety with which they awaited an answer can

¹ *Russian Orange Book*, No. 6.

² *ibid*, No. 40.

³ 27 July; *D.D.*, i. No. 258. Here Serbia's *Nachgiebigkeit* is ascribed " solely to pressure from St. Petersburg."

⁴ This I learnt on first-hand authority at Belgrade itself. It appears, however, that Sazonov urged upon the Serbian Minister in St. Petersburg the need for going to the utmost limit of concession, and that on 24 July he wired to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Belgrade, that " it would perhaps be better, in the event of an invasion by Austria, for the Serbs to make no attempt whatever to offer resistance, but to retire, allow the enemy to occupy their territory without fighting, and appeal to the Powers " (see *How the War Began* — *Russian Foreign Office Diary*, p. 86). Thus once more Sazonov appears in a pacific light.

well be imagined. When it did at last arrive, Pasic crossed himself and exclaimed: " The Tsar is great and merciful! " He then embraced the Russian Chargé d'Affaires and " was overcome with emotion."¹

Certainly the answer presented by Serbia² is moderate and conciliatory in the face of grave provocation. It begins by expressing the desire to " remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair good neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary." After affirming Serbia's " pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis," and disclaiming responsibility for " manifestations of a private character," it expresses " pain and surprise " at the charges levelled against the Serbian Government, which had " expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and was ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of its attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to it."

It then announced its readiness " to hand over any Serbian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity proofs are forthcoming," and to publish the declaration demanded by the Austro-Hungarian Note, both in the *Official Gazette* and as an Army Order. Of the ten specific demands put forward, it accepted seven unreservedly,³ thereby undertaking to dissolve the Narodna Odbrana and similar societies (though taking care to point out that no proof of their guilt is supplied by the Note nor possessed by the Government), to suppress educational propaganda, to remove all officers or officials implicated, to arrest Tankosic and Ciganovic, to enforce frontier control, and to apologise for any offensive utterances brought home to Serbian officials.

On three of the ten demands Serbia made certain

¹ Strandman to Sazonov, 29 July; *Russian Orange Book*, No. 57.

² For full text see *British Diplomatic Correspondence*, No. 39.

³ Nos. 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

reserves, which it is impossible to describe as unreasonable. 1. It pointed out that the immediate suppression of a newspaper could not be effected without a violation of Article 22 of the existing Serbian Constitution, which guaranteed Press freedom in the most explicit manner. It undertook, however, to introduce into Parliament, as soon as it next met, legislation which would in future render Press attacks upon " the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary " a criminal offence, and to introduce " at the impending revision of the Constitution " a clause which would make confiscation possible in such cases. In treating this reply as inadequate, Austria-Hungary placed herself upon very weak ground, since she showed herself to be insisting upon something which no Serbian Government could fulfil without violating one of the most jealously guarded constitutional rights of Serbia.

2. To the demand that Austro-Hungarian officials should take part in the criminal investigation on Serbian soil Serbia only consented " in so far as such co-operation coincides with the principles of international law and criminal procedure, and also of good neighbourly relations." With a little goodwill on the part of Vienna this reservation need not have proved an obstacle to agreement; but it was bluntly dismissed by Berchtold on the inexplicable ground that the enquiry demanded had nothing to do either with international law or criminal procedure!¹

3. Only on one point did Serbia give a definite refusal. It pledged itself to open a judicial enquiry against persons implicated in the murder, but declined to allow Austro-Hungarian delegates any share in this — and this on the ground that it would be " a violation of the constitution and of the penal code"¹ This answer Vienna treated as a deliberate misunderstanding on the part of the Serbian Government, arguing that what was demanded was not a share in the " *enquête judiciaire*. "

¹ D.A., ii., No. 96, *Beilage*, p. 180-1.

itself, but only in the preliminary "*recherches*." Here again it is obvious that if Vienna, instead of merely treating it as a proof of bad faith, had pointed out this discrepancy, and insisted, however stiffly, upon its elucidation, a *modus vivendi* could have been reached.

In conclusion, however, Serbia was careful to guard itself against a possible charge of definite rejection, and therefore declared its readiness "to accept a pacific agreement" by referring points still at issue to the arbitration either of the Hague Tribunal or of those Powers whose mediation had induced Serbia to sign the Note of March 1909, now cited by Vienna as the point of departure for her present action. Serbia thus adroitly placed herself on very strong ground before Europe, and the strength of her position was increased by the fact that she had already twice offered to submit her dispute with Austria-Hungary to arbitration — first during the Bosnian crisis of 1908, and secondly at the Friedjung Trial in December 1909 — and that now for the third time she had been met with a categorical refusal from Vienna. The natural inference was that the Government of Belgrade was not afraid of the light of publicity being thrown upon its nationalistic activities, whereas the Ballplatz, with its record of forged documents and trumped-up treason charges, could not face an impartial tribunal.

Curiously enough, the Pasic Government made no attempt to exploit its own favourable tactical position, and Western Europe was virtually allowed to forget this triple offer of arbitration.

Meanwhile public opinion throughout Europe, even where most unfavourable to the Serbs, could not fail to be struck by the contrast between the extraordinary severity of the demands and the sweet reasonableness of the Serbian answer, and this contrast was only heightened by the violent commentary upon that answer,

which Vienna circulated to the Powers,¹ and still more by the abrupt action by which it rendered further discussion impossible.

Mr. Pasic had himself delivered the Serbian Answer to Baron Giesl at the Legation at a few minutes before six o'clock; yet, though the Legation is not less than a quarter of an hour distant from the station, the Minister and his staff were actually in the train on their way to the frontier by 6.30. Giesl can hardly have had the physical time to read through the Note, much less to digest it. It is true that he must have been aware that Serbia had at four o'clock issued orders for a general mobilisation, and he doubtless assumed that the answer could not therefore be a complete surrender. On the other hand, the attempt to represent this mobilisation as a bellicose act is disingenuous in the extreme. When it is remembered that the Serbian capital was then only separated by the river from the enemy's territory, and was already under the guns of a flotilla of monitors, it will be admitted that mobilisation and the withdrawal of court, government, gold reserve, and archives were the barest acts of precaution, and could not safely have been postponed more than an hour or two.

WILLIAM IPS COMMENTS

Most significant of all was the impression which it made upon the German Government itself. William II, who, ever since the crime, had expressed himself with regard to Serbia in the most violent and unrestrained terms, now wrote upon his copy of the Serbian Answer the following commentary: " A brilliant performance for a period of forty-eight hours; that is more than one could expect. A great moral success for Vienna, but *by it every reason for war is removed, and Giesl ought to have*

¹ D.A., ii., No. 96 (*Beilage*). Even Berchtold, in reporting to Francis Joseph, grudgingly admits that the Answer is "very skilfully composed" (D.A., ii., No. 78).

stayed quietly in Belgrade. After such a thing I should never have ordered mobilisation."¹ He then proceeded to write a full letter of instructions to the Chancellor, starting from " the conviction that on the whole the wishes of the Dual Monarchy had been met," and that " the few reservations . . . can in my opinion be cleared up by negotiation. But the capitulation has been proclaimed *urbi et orbi*, and puts an end to every reason for war." As, however, the Serbs " are Orientals, and hence lying, false, and masters in delay," and as " the Austrian army, which has been thrice mobilised to no purpose," needs some " external *satisfaction d'honneur*," it will be necessary, "in order that these fine promises may become truth and fact," to " exercise a *douce violence*," and to seize a solid pledge (*Faustpfand*) of fulfilment. He therefore suggests " the temporary occupation of part of Serbia, just as we kept troops in France in 1871 till the milliards were paid." " On this basis," he added, " I am ready to mediate peace with Austria."

That Bethmann Hollweg was in the first instance no less impressed than his master is shown by the confidential instructions which he sent to Tschirschky on 27 July, and in which he describes Germany's situation as " all the more difficult because *Serbia has gone very far*."*

But the Emperor's pacific mood did not last very long, while the chief aim of his advisers seems at this time to have been to precipitate matters. On 25 July Count Szögyény reports the Wilhelmstrasse as taking it for granted that Serbia's rejection of the Note would be followed by an immediate declaration of war by Austria-Hungary, " combined with warlike operations."⁴ " Berlin," he added, " sees in every delay in starting operations great danger of interference by other Powers," and " urgently warns us to act at once., and place the world before a *fait accompli*." This view Szögyény

¹ *D.D.*, i., No. 271, note, p. 264.

² Gooss, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-1, note.

³ *D.D.*, i., No. 277.

³ Szögyény to Berchtold, 25 July; *D.A.*, ii., No. 32.

himself fully endorsed, and in Vienna Tschirschky "warmly supported" it with Berchtold,¹ who brought Field-Marshal Conrad into the discussion. It then transpired that the Austro-Hungarian mobilisation could not be completed till 12 August, and that Berchtold was therefore regretfully "obliged to delay military operations yet awhile."²

"ULTIMATUM" AND "INVASION"

That the slow working of the military machine had been a constant source of anxiety to Berchtold is clearly shown by a conversation between him and Conrad in the autumn of 1913, when the possibility of mobilisation against Serbia was under discussion. "The dreadful thing," exclaimed Berchtold, "is those three weeks from the commencement of mobilisation to actual hostilities (*bis zum Losschlagen*). If only one could have it, 'ultimatum' and 'invasion'!"³

On the present occasion the same difficulty, of course, cropped up, and all that Berchtold could do to allay Szögyény's very evident dismay was to telegraph on 27 July⁴ that war will be declared "in the next few days," but that it is necessary to wait till concentration can be completed, so that the blow, when it comes, may be decisive. The disgust of Berlin at this delay is further commented upon by the Bavarian Minister, Count Lerchenfeld, in his report to Munich.⁵

From all this it will be seen that Berchtold was once more quite insincere when he assured Grey on 25 July that it was Austria-Hungary's intention to begin "military preparations, *not operations*."⁶

¹ *D.D.*, i., No. 213.

² *ibid.*, and also Szögyény to Berchtold, 27 July; *D.A.*, ii., No. 67.

³ Conrad, *Aus Meiner Dienstzeit*, iii., pp. 443-4.

⁵ *D.A.*, ii., No. 69.

⁴ 28 July; *D.D.*, iv., Anhang iv., No. 12.

⁷ Grey to Bertie and Buchanan, 25 July; *British Diplomatic Correspondence*, No. 14.

AN AUSTRIAN LEGAL OPINION

From the documents already quoted it is abundantly clear that Berchtold was resolved to make Serbia's surrender as difficult as possible, and desired a definite rupture. Indeed, up to the very last moment his chief anxiety is not lest war should result, but lest Serbia should, after all, swallow his impossible terms, or lest some other unforeseen incident should deprive him of all pretext for aggression. That this was his mood is shown by a hitherto unpublished document which has been recently placed at my disposal by a diplomatic friend.¹ On the very day on which the ultimatum was to expire, the Legal Adviser of the Ballplatz, Professor Hold, handed in a memorandum specially devoted to the consideration of possible loopholes in the Serbian answer. If, he advises, Serbia should qualify her acceptance by any kind of protest (*unter Formulirung irgend eines Protestes*), it should be rejected as inadequate (*nicht befriedigend*), and war should be declared. He adduces four reasons for such an attitude, the weightiest being that Serbia, by protesting, would *ipso facto* be abandoning the basis of the Note of March 1909, whose acceptance alone saved her from war with Austria-Hungary in that year, and on which her relations with Vienna had since rested.

If, however, Professor Hold continues, " Serbia announces her acceptance of our demands *en gros*, without any protest, we can still object that she did not within the prescribed time provide proofs that she carried out those provisions which had to be executed² at once ' or ' with all speed¹ and whose execution she had to notify to us ' without delay.² "' In a word, the Legal

¹ I am not at liberty to quote his name or the manner in which he obtained a copy of the original, but I can vouch absolutely for its authenticity.

² He is, of course, quoting from the Note of 23 July. His concluding paragraph deserves quotation in the original: " *Wenn Serbien unsere Forderungen ohne jeden Protest pauschaliter anzunehmen erklärt, können wir gleichwohl einwenden, dass es innerhalb der Frist sich nicht darüber ausgewiesen hat, dass es jene*

Adviser, at his chief's orders, is engaged upon a desperate search for even the tiniest peg or hook upon which to hang the final rejection of Serbian concessions. Nothing reveals more clearly the mentality of the Ballplatz on the eve of the "punitive expedition."

The evidence marshalled above shows clearly that after the rupture he was simply playing for time, and that his main object was to prevent intervention from any quarter, and to attack Serbia before Russia could move. General Auffenberg tells us in his Memoirs¹ that even at that time it struck him "as quite incomprehensible that anyone should doubt that it would come to universal war" when once the Serbian Answer had been rejected. But another prominent General, Count Uxküll, expressed to him in conversation the view that Russian intervention was out of the question, and might be dismissed as mere bluff. Berchtold doubtless alternated between these two opinions, but in any case he took the risk of the former.

GREY'S EFFORTS AT MEDIATION

That Berchtold persisted to the very end in devious and insincere methods is clearly shown by his attitude towards Sir Edward Grey's mediation, by his reception of Sazonov's pacific overtures, and by the misrepresentations through which he secured the Emperor's consent for war. Hence it is still necessary to deal briefly with these three points in so far as they bear directly upon Serbia's position.

1. Grey had already tried to secure an extension of the time-limit, and had proposed mediation between Austria-Hungary and Russia, but in both cases had met

Verfügungen durchgeführt hat, die es ' sofort ' oder ' mit aller Beschleunigung ' zu treffen hatte und von deren Durchführung es uns ' ohne Verzug ' zu verständigen hatte (Z. B. Auflösung der Narodna Odbrana) — siehe auch vorletzten Absatz unserer Note."

¹ *Aus Oestereichs Höhe und Niedergang, p. 262.*

with refusal. Nothing daunted, however, on 26 July¹ he put forward a formal proposal for a Conference *à quatre* in London (Germany, Italy, France, and Britain) " for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications."² We know now, though the fact was withheld at the time, that this proposal was the result of exceedingly anxious consultations between Sir Edward Grey and Sir Arthur Nicolson, and that the latter already regarded it as " the only hope of avoiding a general conflict " — " I admit, a very poor chance, but in any case we shall have done our utmost/³ Jagow objected that this " would practically amount to a court of arbitration,"⁴ but Grey at once explained that his intention was not " arbitration, but a private and informal discussion."⁵ Lichnowsky had just reported Grey as " annoyed," and as declaring that " if Austria-Hungary were not satisfied with this unheard-of humiliation of Serbia, that would prove it to be a mere pretext, aimed at the destruction both of Serbia and of Russian influence."

An Austro-Hungarian occupation of Belgrade, he said, would be a rash step, and would provoke a European conflagration. Lichnowsky, in repeating this to his colleague Mensdorff, expressed his own conviction that the invasion of Serbia would drive Britain into the opposite camp. Mensdorff himself had a similar conversation with Grey on the same day, in which the latter again described the Note to Serbia as " the greatest humiliation to which an independent State had ever been subjected,"⁷ and insisted that "if Austria is bent on war with Serbia under all circumstances, and assumes

¹ In D.D., ii., No. 304. The document as presented by Sir Edward Goschen bears the date 27 July, and appears to have only reached the Wilhelmstrasse on 28 July!

² *British Diplomatic Correspondence*, No. 36.

³ *Unprinted British Documents*, Nicolson to Grey, telegram and letter, 26 July.

⁴ *British Diplomatic Correspondence*, No. 43. Goschen to Grey, 27 July.

⁵ *ibid.*, No. 67; Grey to Goschen, 28 July.

⁶ Mensdorff to Berchtold, 27 July; *D.A.*, ii., No. 71.

⁷ Mensdorff to Berchtold, 27 July; *D.A.*, No. 72; cf. *supra*, pp. 227-31.

that Russia will remain passive, she takes upon herself a great risk."

Next day Grey again expressed great disappointment at Austria-Hungary's attitude to the Serbian Note, pled for the Conference, and deprecated any military action against Serbia in the meantime, to which Mensdorff could only answer that he feared that it was already too late.¹ And he was right, for before evening he was instructed by Berchtold to assure Grey that "Serbia's conciliatory attitude was only apparent, and intended to deceive Europe," that it offered "no kind of guarantee" for the future,² and that in any case hostilities could no longer be prevented, because the Serbs had already attacked the Monarchy.³ The peculiar perfidy of this last statement will become clear in a moment, when we consider how Berchtold won Francis Joseph for war.

Mensdorff's despatches make it quite clear that Berchtold, when he rejected Germany's appeal, was fully alive to the possible consequences, while from Lichnowsky we learn that Mensdorff and his whole staff freely admitted that Vienna's sole aim was "the subjection of Serbia."* The real reason of their intransigent mood was once again the attitude of Berlin. On 27 July Jagow conveyed to Berchtold⁵ the warning that during the next few days British proposals for mediation might be transmitted to him through Berlin, but that he might rest fully assured that Berlin, so far from identifying itself with them, was quite definitely opposed to their being considered, and merely handed them on, because a refusal would injure relations between Berlin and London. In other words, Berlin behind Grey's back was working to defeat his efforts at pacification, and encouraging its ally in its

¹ Berchtold to Szögyény, quoting Mensdorff, 28 July; *D.A.*, ii., No. 81.

² Berchtold to Mensdorff, 28 July; *D.A.*, ii., No. 89.

³ 28 July (really 1 a.m. 29 July), *O.A.*, No. 90 — to be contrasted with the form in which the same document appears in No. 41 of the Austro-Hungarian *Rotbuch* (1915). ⁴ See also Tschirschky to Berlin, 28 July, *D.D.*, ii., No. 313.

⁵ Lichnowsky to Berlin, 28 July; *D.D.*, ii., No. 301.

⁶ Szögyény to Berchtold, 27 July; *D.A.*, ii., No. 68.

warlike intentions. Next day the Chancellor himself prepared the German Federal Governments for the possibility of a European war by arguing that Austria-Hungary could not yield " unless she wants to abdicate finally as a Great Power," and warning them that if Russia should intervene Germany would throw her whole strength upon the side of her ally.¹

SAZONOV'S OVERTURES TO VIENNA

2. While Grey was struggling manfully, but in vain, on the one hand to hold back Vienna and on the other to win Berlin for joint mediation, Sazonov had recovered from the excitement into which Berchtold's bombshell had thrown him upon the morrow of Poincaré's departure, was making every effort to avert war, and in particular urged Belgrade to the utmost limit of concession.

On 26 July he saw the German Ambassador, who found him " far calmer and more conciliatory "; and he appealed "urgently" for Berlin's help in "building a bridge " which would satisfy Vienna's legitimate demands.¹ He emphasised his eagerness for peace, but also the impossibility of Russia allowing Austria-Hungary to reduce Serbia to the position of a " vassal state."

On the same day² Sazonov had a conversation with Szápáry which, according to the latter's report, must have been exceedingly cordial.* The Ambassador denied all idea of Austria-Hungary's aggressive designs in the Balkans, or of an Austro-German preventive war against Russia, represented Berchtold's action as one of " self-preservation " against hostile propaganda, and re-echoed the views expressed by Sir Edward Grey as to the terrible consequences of an European war. To this Sazonov

¹ *D.D.*, ii., No. 307.

² Pourtalès to Berlin, 26 July; *D.D.*, i., No. 217.

³ Or on 27 July. There is a discrepancy on this point, for Szápáry 's report of the conversation is dated as leaving St. Petersburg at 2.15 p.m. on 27 July (*D.A.*, ii., No. 73), whereas Pourtalès' summary of the same conversation is dated 10.10 p.m. on 26 July (*D.D.*, i., p. 233).

⁴ Szápáry to Berchtold (*D.A.*, ii., No. 73).

responded by the assurance that the Tsar and his whole Cabinet held similar views about Austria-Hungary, and that the " old *rancunes* " which existed in Russia against the Dual Monarchy were dying down. " As regards the Slavs," he added, "he no doubt ought not to say this to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, but he had no feelings whatever for the Balkan Slavs," who were " for Russia a heavy burden," to a degree that Vienna could hardly conceive!¹

He next criticised the Note as " not fortunate in form," and, while admitting seven out of the ten demands to be acceptable, took exception to points 4 and 5, arguing that " consular intervention " in the enquiries should be sufficient, and that to demand the wholesale dismissal of officers without proofs adduced was to expose King Peter to the danger of assassination. The Ambassador very neatly retorted that such an argument was the best justification of Vienna's attitude towards Serbia, but Sazonov simply insisted that the Karagjorgjevic were the last possible dynasty in Serbia, and that it was a general interest to avoid " anarchical convulsions " on the Hungarian frontier. He ended by arguing that the question of the Note could be settled by changes of wording, and suggested mediation by the King of Italy or by King George. Szápáry, in transmitting Sazonov's warm assurances, remarks that " Russian policy has moved a long way in two days " — first abrupt rejection, then sitting in judgment upon Vienna, then a plea for " Europeanisation " of the dispute, and at last recognition of the legitimate character of Vienna's claims and a search for mediators. It is clear that Szápáry was greatly impressed by Sazonov's attitude, though at the same time warning his chief of parallel activities in Russian military circles. His colleague Pourtalès was also impressed,

¹ On 28 July Prince Trubetskoy (soon afterwards appointed Russian Minister to Serbia) assured General Chelius, the German Military Attaché, " We don't at all love the Serbs." Chelius to Berlin, *D.D.*, ii., No. 337. William II's comment on this is " Regicides " (*Königs-und Fürstenmörder*).

but in his report to Berlin treated the conversation as a proof that Sazonov had " somewhat lost his nerve, and was looking for ways of escape,"^x perhaps as a result of news from Paris and London.

Here was the real opportunity for pacific effort, which, indeed, Sazonov on his part promptly followed up by instructing Shebeko to call upon Berchtold and suggest a continuance of this friendly discussion, either in Vienna or once more through Szápáry in St. Petersburg.² But Berchtold declined, on the double ground that public opinion in Hungary and in Austria* would not understand, and that Serbia had mobilised, and had even opened hostilities on the Hungarian frontier, " though Austria-Hungary had waited three days longer/ ' We have already seen that this delay was due solely to Conrad's desire to have the longest possible period for concentration, and that the politicians both in Vienna and Berlin regarded it with equal regret and embarrassment.

It is true that Berchtold had, late on 27 July, conveyed to Sazonov and to the Marquis Carlotti⁴ an assurance that, so long as war remained localised between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, the former " did not intend to make any territorial conquests."⁵ But, with this solitary exception, Berchtold showed no desire to conciliate Russia, and allowed very hopeful overtures to lapse. Direct contact between St. Petersburg and Vienna was not immediately lost, but it is clear from these documents, not accessible at the time, that both Berchtold and his Berlin advisers lacked the will to peace, and that only a miracle could now have averted the catastrophe. On the other hand, such eager and cordial overtures on Sazonov's part deserve special emphasis, as showing the Russian Government's genuine desire for peace at a moment when power had by no means passed into military hands.

¹ *D.D.*, i., No. 238.

² This we learn from Berchtold's own telegram of 28 July to Szápáry. *D.A.*, ii., No. 95.

³ He refers to the two in this significant order.

⁴ Italian Ambassador in St. Petersburg.

⁵ *O.A.*, ii., No. 75(i)

The real criticism to which Sazonov is open is not that he worked for war, but, on the contrary, that his keen anxiety to avoid war led him to make a whole series of suggestions or proposals which were not always clearly thought out, and which, following in rapid succession, misled both friend or foe as to his real intentions. On 24 July he wired to Strandtmann, the Russian Charge d'Affaires at Nis, that " it would perhaps be better " that in the event of an invasion by Austria the Serbs should offer no resistance whatever, " but should retire and issue an appeal to the Powers."¹ On the 25th he repeated this to Sir George Buchanan,² and suggested that Russia should stand aside and leave the question in the hands of Britain, France, Italy, and Germany. It was this which led Grey to propose the Conference *à quatre*. On the 26th he suggests British and Italian collaboration with Austria-Hungary in order to end the tension. On the 27th he is in favour of direct conversation with Vienna, but at the same time he transmits to Grey through Buchanan a somewhat incoherent scheme for close co-operation between the Ministers of the Powers in Belgrade. They are " to interchange all information which any one of them might receive with regard to any Serbian machinations or plots directed against Austria. In the event of such information reaching them, they should be empowered to exercise pressure on the Serbian Government with a view to preventing such plots maturing. While there should be no question of their being invested with the character of an international commission, the Ministers would be able, by co-operating together, to maintain close supervision over any anti-Austrian movements."³

¹ *How the War Began* (*Russian Foreign Official Diary*), p. 86.

² *British Diplomatic Correspondence*, No. 17, Buchanan to Grey.

³ *Unprinted British Documents*, Buchanan to Grey, telegram despatched 27, received 28 July (see portion omitted from version printed as No. 55 of *British Diplomatic Correspondence* in 1914).

All this, and, still more, his overtures to Berchtold, show Sazonov's goodwill, though they explain why Grey is "not quite clear as to what Sazonov proposes."¹ They are not the actions of a Minister working for war. But Sazonov was not a strong man, and by 28 July he seems to have given up hope, for on that day he assured Sir George Buchanan "that the only way to avert war was for His Majesty's Government to let it be clearly known that they would join France and Russia."

BERCHTOLD DECEIVES FRANCIS JOSEPH

3. There remained for Berchtold the crowning infamy of securing his sovereign's final consent to war under false pretences.

Already on 24 July Tisza urged strongly upon Berchtold the need for an immediate Austro-Hungarian mobilisation, if the Serbian Answer was not satisfactory,¹ and next day he pressed this view in greater detail upon Francis Joseph himself. "The slightest hesitation or irresolution," he argued, "would gravely compromise the Monarchy's reputation for energy and capacity for action . . . and would be attended by positively disastrous results."² In point of fact, eight Army Corps were mobilised that same evening. Conrad would have liked to postpone actual military operations till mobilisation was complete on 12 August, but Berchtold made it clear to him that the diplomatic situation would not allow this, and that a declaration of war was necessary in order to put a stop to "various influences" in favour of peace.»

The news of Serbia's rejection of the ultimatum and

¹ *Unprinted British Documents* Grey to Buchanan, 28 July.

² *ibid.*, Buchanan to Grey, 28 July.

³ *D.A.*, ii., No. 21.

⁴ "Vortrag" of 25 July. This document I owe to the kindness of a foreign diplomatic friend.

⁵ Conrad, *op. cit.*, iv., pp. 131-2.

Giesl's departure was brought to Francis Joseph at Ischl by one of his adjutants, Baron Margutti; and the latter has given a vivid and detailed account of the old man's emotion. " *Also doch!* " (" So it has come after all ") were his first words, showing that he had to the last hoped and believed that a rupture would be avoided. Then, after an interval, he added, half to himself, " Well, the rupture of diplomatic relations does not yet mean war."¹

On 27 July Berchtold visited Francis Joseph at Ischl, in order to win him finally for war upon Serbia. After admitting that the Serbian Answer was " very skilfully drafted," and, " though quite worthless in content, was conciliatory in form he added the significant warning that the Entente would probably " make another attempt to solve the conflict peacefully, unless a clear situation is created by the declaration of war."² As a conclusive argument for action, he informed the Emperor that there had already been an armed skirmish at Temeskubin, in which Serbian troops had been the aggressors, opening fire from Danube steamers; and this was also cited in the formal declaration addressed to Serbia, as affording additional provocation.³ This produced the desired effect. On the morning of 28 July Francis Joseph, who had long regarded war as the sole means of exit from an impossible situation³ but had none the less instinctively shrunk from the decision, gave his signature, and the declaration of war was at once transmitted to Serbia. But in reality the alleged skirmish at Temeskubin had not taken place, and the

¹ Margutti, *Vom Aem Kaiser*, p. 404.

² *D.A.*, ii., No. 78.

³ *ibid*, annexe to No. 78, p. 151.

⁴ Markgraf Pallavicini, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Constantinople, told Conrad that Francis Joseph had expressed himself in this sense during an audience in June 1914. See Conrad, *op. cit.*, iv., p. 107. Confirmation of this is to be found in *Secrets of the Bosphorus*, p. 56, by the American Ambassador, Mr. Morgenthau, who reports a conversation with his colleague Pallavicini on Francis Joseph's 84th birthday (18 August, 1914). Pallavicini told him that during an audience in May 1914 Francis Joseph " had said that a European war was unavoidable," since the Central Powers would not accept the Treaty of Bucarest as a settlement of the Balkan Question,

sentence referring to it was therefore erased from the document despatched to Kragujevac.¹ It was only on the 29th, when war was already an accomplished fact, that Berchtold calmly reported to his master that "the news had not been confirmed," and had therefore been omitted from the document.² Moreover, on his return from Ischl he repeated the same lie to de Bunsen as an additional reason why Grey's proposals for mediation could not be accepted.³ That he was this time consciously lying is shown by the fact that the declaration of war, in its curtailed form, had already been despatched to Serbia. He also used the incident in a telegram to St. Petersburg to justify his declaration of war.⁴ There is as yet no evidence to show whether the bogus incident of Temeskubin was manufactured at the Ministry of War, or whether the responsibility should fall upon the Ballplatz; but it is quite clear that the initiative for its invention must have come from some official quarter, and it is worthy of notice that Field-Marshal Conrad, in his extremely voluminous Memoirs, while quoting *verbatim* the document in its final form, passes over the incident in complete silence.⁵

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY DECLARES WAR

The declaration of war was received with immense enthusiasm both in Vienna and in Budapest, and despite the spectre of Russian intervention in the background, the phrase in commonest use was that of a "punitive expedition" against the savages of Serbia. Cheering

¹ Gooss, *op. cit.*, p. 219; Wendel, *Die Habsburger und die Südslawen*, p. 72.

² Gooss, *op. cit.*, p. 219. Berchtold adds that the only other incident known to have occurred was of too trifling a character to be cited as the basis of an important state document.

³ Berchtold to Mensdorff, 28 (despatched 29) July, *D.A.*, ii., No. 90. Curiously enough Sir Maurice de Bunsen's despatches contain no reference.

⁴ 28 July, *D.A.*, ii., No. 95.

⁵ Conrad, *op. cit.*, iv., pp. 141-3. Hermann Wendel (*op. cit.*, p. 73) has aptly compared the story with that of the French airmen over Nürnberg, used by Germany as an excuse for war, and afterwards admitted to have been false.

crowds on the streets sang the ballad of Prince Eugene, "*Der edle Ritter*," and his conquest of Belgrade two centuries earlier. In wide circles war was greeted as a positive "deliverance,"¹ and the Hungarian statesman, Count Apponyi, voiced the feelings of his people when the first news of war wrung from him the heartfelt exclamation, "At last!" He at least had the satisfaction of knowing that his own educational policy in Hungary had contributed as much as any other single factor to embroil the Dual Monarchy with both Jugoslavs and Roumanians.

Since the war, Hungarian controversialists have been active in disclaiming all responsibility for its outbreak, and seek to prove this by laying stress upon Tisza's cautious attitude during the first fortnight of July.» But this argument can only be upheld if Tisza's conversion, from 14 July onwards, into one of the staunchest advocates of drastic action, and the unreserved approval accorded to him by the Hungarian Parliament and public opinion, be passed over in discreet silence.» It is, moreover, essential to remember that while the Austrian Parliament could not be summoned during the war crisis because it rested on a pretty exact representation of the peoples of Austria and would almost certainly have revealed a majority hostile to war, the Hungarian Parliament, on the other hand, being the close preserve of the Magyar ruling class, and representing neither the working-classes nor the non-Magyar nationalities, presented a solid front in favour of the Chauvinistic policy which was now culminating in war and was destined to end in the downfall of the old Hungary.

¹ *Eine Erlösung*; cf. Auffenberg, *Aus Oesterreichs Höhe und Niedergang*, p. 260.

² See *supra*, pp. 165-9, 188-95.

³ Highly characteristic of these disingenuous tactics is an article in *Current History* for January 1925, entitled "Martyrdom of Count Stephan Tisza," by Ernest Ludwig, who was head of the Austro-Hungarian press propaganda in the United States during the period of American neutrality, and has now returned to America to conduct on behalf of the Hungarian Legitimists a campaign for the revision of the Peace Treaties.

The rupture of diplomatic relations and even the declaration of war did not destroy all hope of a peaceful solution. Berchtold had, it is true, rejected both Grey's and Sazonov's overtures, but there was still a possibility of direct discussions between Vienna and St. Petersburg, and this was favoured by all the Powers, including Germany.¹ But once actual hostilities commenced, it was generally realised that an entirely different situation would at once arise, and that at least partial mobilisation of Russia must automatically follow, * unless she was prepared to give Austria-Hungary a decisive start and virtually to abandon Serbia to her fate. Berchtold fully recognised this (incidentally he had been expressly warned of it by Grey), yet he deliberately permitted, if he did not directly instigate, a bombardment of Belgrade on 29 July. This was, of course, oil upon the flames, and forced the Russian Government to act, while rousing Russian public opinion. Yet Conrad treated Russia's preparation as sheer aggression, and now pressed the Ballplatz more urgently than ever to obtain the Emperor's sanction for a general mobilisation.

At the last moment Berchtold and Stürgkh appear to have had some misgivings as to the financial consequences for the Dual Monarchy, but Conrad was not slow to remind them that it was now far too late to raise that issue.

On the same day on which war was declared, Bethmann Hollweg advised Vienna to renew its assurances that it would under no circumstances annex Serbian territory,

¹ cf. Bethmann Hollweg to Pourtalès, 28 July, *D.D.*, ii., No. 315.

² Russia acted quite loyally in the whole matter. The Ambassador in Vienna, Shebeko, notified his colleague, Tschirschky, on 28 July, that the military districts of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan were being mobilised. Conrad, *op. cit.*, iv., p. 142. In St. Petersburg itself, on 29 July, Sazonov was quite frank to Pourtalès, explaining that as Vienna had mobilised eight corps, Russia was obliged to mobilise in the districts next to the Austrian frontier. See Pourtalès to Berlin, 29 July *D.D.*, ii., No. 343; Bethmann Hollweg to Tschirschky, 29 July, *ibid.*, No. 385. On the same day General Chelius is quite emphatic that Russia does not want war, but feels keenly the unjust treatment of Serbia (*ibid.*, No. 344).

and would only occupy it temporarily, pending satisfaction of its demands. But this advice, which of course involved a renewal of direct negotiations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, was given in so half-hearted a manner as to rob it of much of its effect.¹

The news of Austria-Hungary's declaration of war on Serbia rendered action on the part of Russia absolutely inevitable, and there can be little doubt that the bombardment of Belgrade, which soon followed, was deliberately intended in Vienna to diminish the chances of peace by rousing Russia still further. The effect was automatic. To Vienna's mobilisation of eight army corps on 24 July, St. Petersburg merely replied by certain preliminary measures of precaution, and though it was decided in "principle" to mobilise the four military districts nearest to Austria-Hungary, the actual order was not given. But when the news of war came, the army chiefs pressed the Tsar to order a general mobilisation. As the result of statements made by the then Minister of War, General Suhomlinov, on his disgrace and trial, it was for some time believed that the Tsar yielded to this pressure, but changed his mind the same day, and that his revocation of the original order was simply disregarded. But even Suhomlinov himself has now abandoned this version, of which there is no trace in his *Memoirs*, published in Germany in 1924,² and it now appears definitely established that on 29 July the Tsar upheld his opposition to a general mobilisation, but consented to a *partial* mobilisation.³ Though there is no written record of the motives underlying this decision, the only explanation that will fit all the facts is that it

¹ *D.D.*, ii., No. 323, Bethmann Hollweg to Tschirschky, 28 July. "In doing so you will carefully avoid creating the impression that we wish to hold back Austria." cf. Brandenburg, *op. cit.*, p. 423.

² *Erinnerungen*, pp. 353-71.

³ The earlier thesis may be found in Hoeniger, *Russlands Vorbereitung zum Weltkriege* (1919), but this is out of date since the publication of General Dobro-rolski's *Die Mobilmachung der russischen Armee* (1922). Much the best summary of the evidence on this whole question is that contained in chapters viii. and x. of Renouvin's *Les Causes Immédiates de la Guerre* (1925).

was prompted by Austria-Hungary's declaration of war upon Serbia. This is shown very clearly by the despatch of the German Military Attaché, General Chelius, to his Government in Berlin.¹

A LAST ATTEMPT IN ROME

One final effort was made by Sir Edward Grey to avert the catastrophe. News had reached London that Mr. Mihajlovic, the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires in Rome, had informed San Giuliano² that Serbia might still be prepared to accept even Articles 5 and 6 of the Austrian Note if only some definition could be reached as to the share of Austro-Hungarian agents in the investigations on Serbian soil, and that he had gone on to suggest the negotiation of this point through the Great Powers, so as to save the necessity for direct Austro-Serbian discussions.

San Giuliano was naturally encouraged by this proposal, but his hopes were speedily dashed when he talked with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador next day. For Mérey, discussing the possibility of a pledge by Austria-Hungary not to acquire territory at Serbia's expense, made it quite clear that no such undertaking could be given, "since Austria-Hungary could not foresee whether during the war she might not be forced, against her will, to retain Serbian territories."³

Meanwhile the news of Mihajlovic's step in Rome, when transmitted to London, encouraged Grey to urge once more upon Lichnowsky on the morning of the 29th the need for some moderating influence in Vienna, since he saw clearly that "unless Austria-Hungary were ready

¹ *D.D.*, ii., No. 344 (29 July).

² Who specially asked Sir R. Rodd to transmit to London. See *B.D.C.*, No. 64.

³ This conversation was revealed by Signor Salandra in a speech made on the Capitol on 2 June, 1915. He was answering the assertion publicly made by Count Tisza that such a pledge had been given. It is only fair to add that this represented Tisza's wishes (as revealed at the Joint Council of 19 July^{supra}, p. 200), but *not* those of his colleagues. See Bertrand, *L'Autriche a voulu la Grande Guerre*, p. 66.

to discuss the Serbian Question, the world-war would be inevitable."¹ In the afternoon he had a further conversation with Lichnowsky, in which, in his anxiety for a compromise, he abandoned his previous opposition to the occupation of Belgrade, and suggested this as a kind of hostage which Austria might hold in her hands pending a diplomatic settlement of her quarrel with Serbia.²

For the first time a pacific proposal carries real weight in Berlin, and Bethmann Hollweg that same evening³ wires to Tschirschky the Mihajlović proposal and Lichnowsky's and Grey's comments on it, and bids him tell Berchtold that „ we regard such a surrender of Serbia as a suitable basis for negotiations, subject to the occupation of Serbian territory as pledge (*Faustpfand*).“ Even the German military chiefs blew cold, for Captain Fleischmann, Conrad's Intelligence Officer in Berlin, wired to his chief that Moltke did not regard, the Russian ispatched n as a reason for Austria-Hungary following suit, and begged him not to declare war on Russia but to await her attack.« To this Conrad wired back, „ We shall not declare war on the Russians, and shall not begin war.”

It was at this moment that the Tsar ispatched his telegram to William II urging that the Austro-Serbian problem should be referred to the Hague Tribunal/ and William, despite frivolous comments upon it,« did actually telegraph to Francis Joseph in a moderating sense.⁷

¹ Lichnowsky to Berlin, 29 July (2.8 p.m.), *D.D.*, ii., No. 357.

² *ibid.*, 29 July, (6.39 p.m.), *D.D.*, ii., No. 368. This is the document in which Grey's honest plan for Anglo-German co-operation is unfolded, and on which William II's most famous *marginalia* are to be found, where for instance he calls Grey " the common swindler " and " common cur " (*gemeiner Hundsfott*) and comments " ultra-mean and Mephistophelian, but thoroughly English," or again, " With such rascals (*Haliunkén*) I'll never make a naval agreement."

³ The telegram was ispatched from Berlin half an hour after midnight (i.e. 12.30 a.m. on 30 July), *D.D.*, ii., No. 384.

⁴ Conrad, *op. cit.*, iv., p. 152.

⁵ *D.D.*, ii., No. 366, 29 July.

⁶ *Nanu I* " (which can only be translated by " What-hoi I don't think ") and a series of notes of exclamation.

⁷ *D.D.*, ii., No. 437, 30 July.

It seems probable that the Mihajlovic project and the Tsar's appeal, combined with the strong protests of Italy against Vienna's action, the certainty that Italy would both remain neutral and demand compensation, and the dislocating effect of all this upon the plans of the German General Staff, produced in the Emperor William a passing pacific mood, and this was the impression left upon Berchtold in Vienna. This impression was doubtless increased by the very outspoken message delivered to him by Tschirschky in Bethmann Hollweg's name on 30 July. The Chancellor had waited two whole days at a time of supreme crisis, without any response from Vienna to his appeal for direct Austro-Russian negotiations. He was now at last roused sufficiently to describe this as "a grave mistake," which "positively is provoking warlike action on the part of Russia." "We are ready," he added, "to fulfil our duty as an ally, but must decline to allow ourselves to be drawn by Vienna into a world war frivolously and without regard for our advice. In the Italian question also, Vienna seems to disdain our advice." All this Berchtold was to be told "at once with all emphasis and very seriously."¹

Berchtold could not resist language of this kind, and so gave instructions to Count Szápáry "to begin conversations with Sazonov."² But the conditions to which he still obstinately adhered — that Austro-Hungarian military operations against Serbia must be allowed to proceed unchecked, while Russia on the other hand must arrest her mobilisation — completely deprived it of any value, and indeed it is difficult to believe that it was ever meant seriously by Vienna. On the morning of 31 July, Berchtold was clearly in a state of desperation, but determined to force matters to an issue, for he invited

¹ *D.D.*, ii. No. 396. Bethmann Hollweg to Tschirschky, 30 July.

² *D.D.*, No. 433, Tschirschky to Berlin, 30 July. Professor Erich Brandenburg's narrative (*op. cit.*, p. 424) — otherwise so fair and accurate, though not always complete — does not seem at this point to conform with the printed documents.

Conrad and Krobatin to his office at the Ballplatz, where they found Tisza, Stürgkh and Burián waiting. He then assured them that his object in summoning them was to announce his belief that " Germany was drawing back."¹

But something had happened in the interval which finally put all doubts at rest and brought the crisis rapidly to a head. At 7.45 on the morning of the 31st Conrad had received a brief wire from Moltke, telling Austria-Hungary to " mobilise at once against Russia," and stating quite explicitly that Germany was about to mobilise.³ At the same time the Austro-Hungarian Military Attache in Berlin telegraphed Moltke's view that the situation would be critical unless Austria-Hungary at once mobilised, that this would involve the *casus foederis* for Germany, and that the new British peace proposals must be rejected. " For Austria-Hungary's preservation," he added, "to go through with European war is the last chance (*das letzte Mittel*). Germany goes with her unreservedly." When Conrad read out these messages, Berchtold exclaimed, " First rate! (*das ist gelungen!*) Who rules — Moltke or Bethmann? " That indeed was the whole issue. Berchtold in his turn read out a telegram of William II to Francis Joseph, intimating that he had not felt it possible to reject the personal appeal of the Tsar, and therefore transmitted it to Vienna. It was that Austria-Hungary should occupy " Belgrade or other towns " and then " notify her terms." But it is clear that even so far-reaching a concession as this scarcely interested the little group of men in Berchtold's room, with whom the fate of Europe now rested. Moltke's pledge was all that mattered, for it could be used to force the hands of everyone else. " I called you here," said Berchtold, "because I had the impression that Germany was yielding

¹ Conrad, *op. cit.*, iv., p. 153.

² *ibid.*, p. 152.

But now I have the most reassuring statement from the decisive military quarter."¹ All idea of mediation was simply swept aside, and it was at once decided to request Francis Joseph's signature for an order of general mobilisation. Not a moment was wasted, for by half-past twelve that same afternoon the order reached the Ministry of War.¹

Francis Joseph then replied to William, notifying the step which he had taken and adding the uncompromising phrase: "The action in which my army is at this moment involved against Serbia cannot be interrupted by the threatening and insolent attitude of Russia."» In this telegram the Grey proposals for mediation are carefully evaded.

It is important to add that this decision was in no way based upon the Russian order for a general mobilisation, which had been given about 4 p.m. on the previous day,⁴ and became public in St. Petersburg on the morning of the 31st, but which was not known to the authorities in Vienna until after they had ordered general mobilisation in their own country. Nor does the Russian decision appear to have been known to Moltke when he sent his message to Conrad, though the news reached Berlin sooner than any other capital. Indeed, Bethmann's brief effort at a compromise had already failed, and the "civilian Chancellor" had already ceased to control the situation in Berlin, before the military asserted their control in St. Petersburg also.

The essential facts are that Moltke's advice was given to Conrad before Berlin knew of the Russian order of mobilisation (for it reached *Vienna* at 7.45 a.m. on 31 July,⁵ whereas the news only reached *Berlin* at 11.40 a.m. on the same day⁶), and that Austria-Hungary ordered its general mobilisation before it knew of Russia's

¹ *ibid.*, p. 153.

² *ibid.*, p. 155.

³ 31 July, *D.A.*, iii, No. 49 (B).

⁴ For a critical analysis of the dispute as to the exact date, see Renouvin, *Les Causes Immédiates de la Guerre*, pp. 143-55.

⁵ Conrad, *op. cit.*, iv., p. 152.

⁶ *D.D.*, ii., No. 473.

decision. In view of this, the discussion as to the exact hour when the Tsar gave his consent¹ becomes almost as unimportant as the bogus story of a German mobilisation published by the *Lokalanzeiger*.² Much capital was made out of the latter by Entente war propaganda, and is still made of the former by German post-war propaganda, but both may be dismissed as red herrings. In a word, both Berlin and Vienna acted on their own initiative in mobilising. It is not true that their hands were forced by Russia, but far rather that they were forestalling Russia.

At 4.45 p.m. on 31 July the German Military Attaché informed Conrad that Germany had ordered "imminent state of war" against Russia. At 7.15 p.m. Conrad received a wire from Moltke, based on a misunderstanding, limited to the abrupt phrase, "Does Austria want to leave Germany in the lurch?" ("Will *Österreich Deutschland im Stiche lassen?*") Conrad instantly replied that "Austria-Hungary has demonstrated her will to war by general mobilisation and by ordering troops to be massed in Galicia." This final incident sets a fitting crown upon the whole narrative.

When once the military chiefs had taken the bit between their teeth in the three Imperial capitals, it is very difficult to see what could have averted a catastrophe. Various desperate expedients were still put forward by this or that statesman, but in his heart everyone of them knew that by this time it was too late to arrest the machinery set in motion. Hence, while a minute and detailed examination of the earlier diplomatic negotiations was an essential part of my task, it may, I think, be logically maintained that to submit to the same detailed analysis the diplomatic documents of the last five or six days before the war became general, would

¹ Some say 1 p.m., some say 4 p.m. on 30 July. See Renouvin, *op. cit.*, pp. 144-6.

² Count Montgelas (*op. cit.*, pp. 178-80) has shown clearly (1) That the story was untrue; and (2) That it reached St. Petersburg some hours after mobilisation was ordered there, and therefore had no influence upon the decision.

³ Conrad, *op. cit.*, iv., p. 155.

only serve to obscure the grim realities of the situation. From 29 July onwards (if not before) every General Staff is playing for time against its rivals, and the actual hours of mobilisation become an entirely subordinate issue. Those who treat the final act of mobilisation, whether by Russia or by any other Power, as a decisive factor in the apportionment of war guilt, show a lack of perspective and judgment that is pedantic in the highest degree.

The die was cast, and Berchtold, having by the action just described made a peaceful solution impossible, found it convenient for tactical reasons to continue conversations with the Russian Ambassador. Indeed, on 1 August the curious anomaly had arisen that Russia was at war with Germany, but not with Austria-Hungary. Berchtold assured Shebeko — as we know, very disingenuously — that Austria-Hungary did not want any territory from Serbia and did not wish to humiliate her. But when the Ambassador reminded him that Russia was still ready to revoke her military preparations if Austria-Hungary would only withdraw such demands as infringed Serbia's sovereignty, Berchtold simply replied that this was impossible after the declaration of war. Shebeko was left with the impression that Berchtold would still agree, if only he could extricate himself from the situation without loss of prestige.¹ But no further conversation took place, and on 3 August Shebeko wired to St. Petersburg the obvious explanation of Vienna's delay in declaring war — namely, that it wished to gain time for completing its military preparations.²

One last detail deserves to be mentioned. On 31 July the Serbian Minister in Paris, Mr. Vesnic, informed his Government at Nis that his Austro-Hungarian colleague,

¹ Stieve, *Iswolski im Weltkriege*, No. 12; Shebeko to Sazonov, 1 August: cf. Berchtold's report of 1 August, in *D.A.*, iii., No. 99.

² Stieve, *op. cit.*, No. 20.

Count Szécsen, had told him that " Serbia, if she would invite the mediation of one of the Powers friendly to her, might still prevent a further development of the conflict." It may well be that Count Szécsen, in the electric atmosphere of Paris on the last day of July, was personally anxious and conciliatory, but he was of course ignorant of the fatal decisions which were then being taken in Vienna by the civil and military authorities. It is hardly surprising that the Quai d'Orsay, when Vésnie reported this overture to them, dismissed it as altogether outstripped by events,¹ for France was herself " in hourly expectation of an ultimatum "

With the declaration of war on 28 July, Austro-Serbian relations entered upon an entirely new and decisive phase. The Southern Slav Question had become one of the prime causes of the greatest conflagration in history, and the manner of its solution was now dependent upon still greater European and world issues. It was already obvious that if the Central Powers should emerge victorious, the two Serb Kingdoms would sink from independence to vassalage, whereas in the opposite event Serbia might easily achieve a position analogous to Piedmont and unite the whole Jugoslav race under her banner.

¹ Stieve, *op. cit.*, No. 15. Strandtmann (Russian Chargé in Nis) to Izvolsky (Russian Ambassador in Paris), 1 August.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

THE foregoing narrative is an attempt to analyse, with due attention to detail, all relevant evidence relating to the crime of Sarajevo and the diplomatic dispute which followed from it. It is for the reader to judge whether the facts have been fairly selected, and how far they support the deductions drawn from them. It may, however, facilitate the reader's verdict in one sense or another if the concluding pages are devoted to a brief summary of the main conclusions which the author claims to have reached. This method should make it easier to distinguish the wood from the trees — in other words, should throw into stronger relief either the strength or the weakness of my arguments, and so bring us nearer to the truth of the matter.

My conclusions, then, fall under the following heads:

1. The occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878 created a permanent conflict of interests between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, which remained latent under the incompetent but Austrophil Obrenovic¹ dynasty, but flared up after the national revival which followed King Peter's accession in 1903 and the simultaneous change of *regime* in Croatia and Bosnia. This conflict was rendered still more acute by the annexation of Bosnia in 1908, by the misgovernment of Croatia by Hungary, and above all by Serbia's double victory in the Balkan Wars and the ferment thus produced throughout the Yugoslav provinces.

2. Austria-Hungary in 1908 planned a war of aggression

upon Serbia, which was only averted by Russia submitting to an ultimatum from Berlin and by the Entente advising submission. Again in 1912 and 1913 Austria-Hungary planned attacks upon Serbia, which were only frustrated by the disapproval of her German and Italian allies. In the winter of 1913 she again tried to pick a quarrel with Serbia over the Albanian question, which was averted by complete Serbian submission. She had already resumed her plans of aggression against Serbia before the murder took place and was trying (as Berchtold's memorandum of June 1914 shows) to win over Germany to a revision of Balkan policy such as involved the isolation and overthrow of Serbia.

3. The murder of the Archduke was only the culminating incident in a series of terrorist acts perpetrated against prominent representatives of the Austro-Hungarian *régime* in Croatia and Bosnia by Jugoslavs who were natives of the Habsburg Monarchy and acted on their own initiative. The nationalistic movement had in the seven years previous to the war gained firm hold upon the whole rising generation of Jugoslavs and assumed an increasingly revolutionary tinge.

4. The theory of Austro-Hungarian official complicity in the crime of Sarajevo must be rejected as fantastic. The facts upon which such a theory was based are fully explained by the acute conflict between the civil and military authority in Bosnia itself and in the ministries at Vienna, though both military and police must also stand convicted of criminal negligence.

5. The theory of Serbian official complicity in the crime is equally untenable. Such help as came to the assassins from Serbia was the work of three individual terrorists, members of a secret society called the Black Hand, which was at the time in the acutest possible conflict with the Government of Belgrade and on which that Government some years later took a terrible revenge.

The only point still left in doubt is whether the Serbian

Government through its agents obtained some knowledge of the plot and failed to give due warning to Vienna. This, if finally proved, would obviously reflect grave discredit upon Mr. Pasic, Mr. Ljuba Jovanovic and their colleagues of that time, but could not in any way alter the verdict as to initiative and direct responsibility for the crime.

6. An important contrast deserves to be drawn between the attitude of Serbia, who thrice (March and December 1909, and July 1914) offered to refer the whole dispute to international arbitration at the Hague, and that of Austria-Hungary, who each time rejected any such idea.

7. Count Berchtold from the first treated the murder as a pretext for war, admirably calculated to win public opinion to his side. His original design was a surprise attack upon Serbia, without previous declaration of war, and in this he had the support of all his colleagues, political and military, with the signal exception of Count Tisza.

8. Only Tisza and Francis Joseph himself showed sanity and foresight, but their hesitation was, above all, due to uncertainty as to German support. When once this support was unreservedly guaranteed, their scruples against war vanished.

9. The enquiry at Sarajevo was an after-thought, designed to impress Europe, and when Wiesner entirely failed to prove the official thesis the results were suppressed but the thesis none the less upheld as a basis for war.

10. Berchtold did all in his power to conceal his intentions from Europe, to lull friend and foe into a false security, to confront them with accomplished facts and to make intervention impossible and war with Serbia inevitable. He did this of course with the desire for "localising" the conflict, but in full consciousness of the risk of European complications.

11. Berlin, so far from restraining, encouraged Vienna step by step, repeatedly urged the need for precipitating

hostilities, blocked the way for intervention until peace hung by a thread, approved Vienna's refusal of arbitration at the Hague, and all this once more with a clear consciousness of the appalling risks.

12. In a word, it is not too much to assert that by deliberate action, often thought out to the smallest details, Vienna and Berlin had by 23 July created a diplomatic situation from which nothing short of a miracle could have saved Europe, and that the main responsibility for the outbreak of war must therefore rest upon their shoulders.

It would not, however, be just to conclude upon this note. The question of responsibility falls into two portions, and even though these are far too closely interwoven to be disentangled altogether from each other, yet it is essential that we should distinguish between the two sets of threads which make up the pattern. The first problem is to decide which Governments and individuals frustrated the efforts made for peace during July 1914, and thereby precipitated the Great War, and what were the motives which prompted them. But behind this there is the much bigger problem, how Europe was steered, or allowed to drift, into a situation of such extraordinary danger as that of 1914; and how far that situation was the result of conscious effort and design on the part of Governments, of public opinion, of individual statesmen, diplomatists, and writers. While an examination of the immediate causes will almost inevitably lead to a condemnation of the Central Powers as the aggressors, even the most cursory survey of the broader issue will make it clear that the ultimate causes are infinitely complex; that every nation must bear some share of the blame for what occurred, that it is extremely difficult to arrive at an exact apportionment of blame, and that even where guilt seems obvious, it may sometimes be possible to plead extenuating circumstances.

There are some people who, having reached this standpoint, have drawn from it the hasty conclusion that all were more or less to blame, that there is very little to choose between them, that in any case it cannot be estimated exactly, and that therefore the whole question had better be dismissed as equally insoluble and unprofitable. From this view I dissent most strongly. In effect, it amounts to an assertion of the double claim, that historical truth is unattainable, and that since peoples never learn from history, each generation must repeat the old blunders of its predecessors and so learn from bitter experience. Accept the first, and we must reject *a limine* all historical investigation as worthless. Accept the second, and we soon find ourselves committed to the pagan view that human nature is irremediable.

In point of fact, if ever it was worth trying to elucidate the causes of any historical event, surely it is so in the case of the Great War, which has affected the fortunes of Europe and the world no less profoundly than even the Reformation or the French Revolution. And at the same time there never was any upheaval since the world began, concerning which so much first-hand material of the very first importance has become generally available at so early a date, and of which we therefore have so reasonable a prospect of forming a just estimate.

Finally, quite apart from all abstract questions of historical truth, there is a highly practical reason why the closest possible attention should be paid to the problem of responsibility. In Germany — side by side with the many serious scholars who regard a full exposure of the truth as essential to the political convalescence of their country — powerful propagandist agencies have been created for the express purpose of demonstrating the preponderating guilt of the Allies, and thereby rehabilitating the old dynastic and militarist *regime* in Germany. Thus all who have at heart the extension of the League

principles of international co-operation and consolidation are directly and vitally interested in a full, speedy, and unsparing investigation of the causes of the war. Such an enquiry is equally desirable on the moral and on the political side.

The present volume, though in the main restricted to the field of *immediate* responsibility, will also, it may be hoped, throw new light upon an important aspect of the wider problem, which has hitherto not received sufficient attention in the West.

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CHAPTERS I AND II

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which, despite their virulence and patent exaggeration, were widely-accepted as reliable, notably by German official circles (as may be seen from the memoirs of Bethmann Hollweg and Jagow and their statements before the Reichstag Committee of Enquiry).

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A special place must be reserved for Field-Marshal Conrad von Hötzen-dorf's memoirs, *Aus meiner Dienstzeit*. These four ponderous volumes, which only reach to the autumn of 1914, are a veritable gold-mine for the historian, who must, however, follow the same tiresome process as the gold-digger, who has to throw away masses of dross before he can reach a nugget. The book is utterly undigested and out of proportion, and there is much that could have been omitted without any loss to the reader. But it will always remain a monument of Austrian pre-war mentality and of the danger from soldiers who meddle in politics.

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CHAPTER III

In the nature of things there could be no pre-war literature relating to the Yugoslav revolutionary movement. Of post-war publications much the most important are Borivoje Jevtic, *Sarajevski Atentat* (1924), which may be taken as interpreting the youth of Bosnia in those days, and *Spomenica Vlad. Gacinovica* (1921) — a collection of the scanty writings of one of the arch-conspirators and of essays to his memory. Volumes xi. and xii. of the Zagreb tri-monthly review, *Nova Europa* (1925), contain a series of valuable articles and documents relating to the plot and its origins. Distinctly useful, though written to prove a more than doubtful thesis, is the pamphlet of Niko Bartulović, *Od Revolucionarne Omladine do Orjune* (Split, 1925).

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CHAPTER IV

The conventional facts regarding the Archduke's career may be found in a special biographical pamphlet entitled *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand*, issued by the *Oesterreichische Rundschau* in 1910. (See also my article on him in the *Contemporary Review* for August 1914.) But the material from which a serious estimate of his character and aims may be gathered has for the most part not yet been published, and it is necessary to glean fragments from many different quarters, written and oral. Of special interest are the essay on the Archduke in the memorial volume entitled *Heinrich Lammasch* (1920) and Count Czernin's secret memoranda on his audiences with the Archduke, published in the first number of *Nase Revoluce* (an important Czech quarterly review). The memoirs of Field-Marshal Conrad, General Auffenberg, and Baron Szilassy, Mr. Steed's *Through Thirty Years*, and Baron Margutti's illuminating study of Francis Joseph [*Vom Alten Kaiser*], contain much valuable information scattered through them.

CHAPTER V

The account of the murder given in the text is based upon contemporary official and newspaper reports, checked by information obtained orally in Sarajevo and elsewhere. The memoirs of Conrad and Bilinski contain some valuable details not to be found elsewhere — notably as to the quarrel between Bilinski and Potiorek.

The best clue to the motives of the assassins is provided by the reports of their trial in October 1914; but these are only available in two very incomplete and unreliable versions published by the Austro-Hungarian Government during the war — one at Berlin in 1917, *Der Prozess gegen die Attentäter von Sarajevo*, by Professor "Pharos," and one in Switzerland during the same year. The full report is now being prepared for publication at Sarajevo.

Interesting side-lights are also to be obtained from a strange book entitled *Tajna Prevratna Organizacija* (*A Secret Pre-war Organisation*), Salonica, 1918 (638 pp.), which contains the reports of the notorious Salonica Trial. This was published officially, and widely distributed by the Serbian Government in 1918, but afterwards was withdrawn from publication and is now difficult to obtain. It must be used with great caution, as there is good ground for believing that essential parts of the evidence have been withheld; but it is a first-hand document of the first importance, especially as regards the alleged connection between the Sarajevo murder and the bogus Salonica conspiracy.

CHAPTER VI

The most important account of the preparations for the crime is to be found in a pamphlet written by one of the few survivors from the inner ring of conspirators, Borivoje Jevtic — *Sarajevski Atentat* (1923). This should be compared with the statements put forward in the Austro-Hungarian *dosner*, as published in the first *Red Book* (1915).

Professor S. Stanojevic's pamphlet, *Die Ermordung des Erzherzogs* (1923), contains valuable information as to the "Black Hand" and the Belgrade end of the plot; but, having been written for a political purpose, it passes over many essential facts in complete silence and must be used with caution.

An excellent brief summary of the question of responsibility is to be found in *Die Habsburger und die Südslawenfrage*, by Hermann Wendel. Herr von Wegerer's long article in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage* for June 1925 is entirely uncritical, and contains many utterly exploded theories.

Mr. Ljuba Jovanovic's article in *Krv Slovenstva* (1924), which must be regarded as highly compromising to himself and to Mr. Paáió until some answer is forthcoming, may be read in English in the *National Review* for April 1925 or in the *Journal* of the British Institute of International Affairs for March 1925.

CHAPTERS VII, VIII, AND IX

Till after the war we depended for documentary evidence upon the official publications of the various belligerent Governments, which, with the signal exception of the *White Paper* issued by Sir Edward Grey in August 1914, are extremely inadequate. All these publications (the British, French, Russian, Belgian, Serbian, German, and Austro-Hungarian) may be most conveniently consulted in the English edition published in 1915 under the title *Collected Diplomatic Documents relating to the Outbreak of the European War*.

For our present purpose the following documents are essential:

1. *First Austro-Hungarian Red Book* (1915).
2. *Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*, 1914, 3 vols. (1919), published by the new Austrian Republic (English translation published by Allen & Unwin, 1920).
3. Roderich Gooss, *Das Wiener Kabinett und die Entstehung des Weltkrieges*, an official Austrian narrative based upon the documents, and in the main superseded by the publication of the preceding volumes, but containing a few references omitted from them (which serves to show that, thorough-going though the Republican Government was, it did suppress some documents of importance).
4. *Die Deutschen Dokumente*, 4 vols., published by the German Government in 1920, and extending from June to August 1914.
5. *Deutschland Schuldig?* (Berlin, 1919), published by the German Government early in 1919 in view of the Peace Conference, and containing in the Appendices various Russian and Serbian documents for the period 1908-14, procured from the Bolshevik Government.

6. *Serbian Blue Book* (1915)

7. British, Russian, and French documents] see above.

8. B. Siebert, *Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Entente-politik der Vorkriegsjahre* (1921); a collection of Russian secret documents which appear to have been copied by Siebert, an official of the London Embassy, and supplied to the Germans — whether at the time, or only after the war, is not quite clear. They are badly arranged, but are admitted to be genuine by representatives of the Tsarist *regime* (English translation in America).

9. *Diplomatische Schriftwechsel Istvolksis*, 4 vols., edited by F. Stieve, and published by the German Government in 1924. They reveal Izvolksy as a dangerous intriguer, and are being exploited in some quarters as a proof that the Entente was the aggressor in the world war.

10. M. Bogicevic, *Kriegsursachen* (1919). The text, written by a former Serbian Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, who quarrelled with his own Government, is to be used with caution. But the Appendices contain important documents illustrating Serbian policy from 1908 to 1914, and appear to be authentic.

11. Montgelas, *Leitfaden zur Kriegsschuldfrage* (1923).

The two standard books in English on the immediate origins of the war — *The History of Twelve Days*, by J. W. Headlam (1915), and *The Outbreak of the War*, by Sir Charles Oman (1918) — are now out of date, owing to the post-war publication of documents; for, though their main arguments have been greatly strengthened by subsequent revelations, their perspective requires complete readjustment. For the present the only two serious attempts in *English* to collate the new material are Dr. G. P. Gooch's *History of Modern Europe*, which is necessarily all too brief in this connection, and the articles of Professor Sidney B. Fay in the *American Historical Review* for July and October 1920, January 1921, and January 1924.

Critical estimates are, however, to be found in Karl Kautsky, *Wie der Weltkrieg entstand* (1919), and in Dr. Heinrich Kanner's *Kaiserliche Katastrophenpolitik* (1922). But the former concentrated too much upon a personal attack on William II (the significance of whose marginal notes he was the first to stress), while the latter is too much absorbed by an attempt to demonstrate the accuracy with which he and his colleagues of *Die Zeit* criticised the policy of the Ballplatz and foretold the impending disaster. It is but fair to add that he is overwhelmingly successful in proving his prophetic gift. The same writer published in 1920 a small pamphlet entitled *Die neuesten Geschichtslügen*, which summarises briefly but effectively the main revelations of the German and Austrian post-war publications.

Special reference must also be made to two French studies of war origins, written in an impartial and moderate tone and based mainly on the diplomatic correspondence — *La Victoire*, by Alfred Fabre-Luce (1924), and *Les Origines Immédiates de la Guerre*, by Pierre Renouvin (1925). Neither book, however, in my opinion, presents the Austro-Serbian aspect of the case in its true perspective.

The *case* against Serbia in its extremist form may be found in the

ferocious pamphlets of Leopold Mandl (see notes on chapter i.), and in the articles of Miss Edith Durham (see especially the London *Foreign Affairs*, 1924-5, *cursum*, and *Contemporary Review* for January 1925). It is to be remembered that for the last sixteen years or more Mandl has been consistently used by the Ballplatz as the organiser of a campaign of Press defamation against Serbia and the Yugoslav movement in general. Latterly he has taken to writing (both under the name of " Nenadovic " and under his own signature) in *La Federation Balcanique*, a propagandist monthly published by the Bolshevik Government in Vienna, but is still allowed to write for the *Reichspost*, the official organ of the Austrian Christian Socialist party, to whom anything Bolshevik might be supposed to be anathema, but which still regards any stick as good enough to beat Serbia.

As this book goes to press, Herr Hermann Wendel, already known by a whole series of studies on Yugoslav questions, has published a large volume entitled *Der Kampf der Südslawen um Freiheit und Einheit* (Frankfurt, 1925), which is a real mine of historical information. It has been aptly and gracefully described as one of the most genuine acts of reparation on the German side. It is the work of one intimately acquainted with every phase of Yugoslav life and history, and can be recommended with the utmost confidence.

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